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Planet Utopia
The key figure of the capitalist utopia is the individual who is ultimately free. 
The capitalist’s ideal society is designed to protect this freedom. However, 
within Planet Utopia: Utopia, Dystopia, Globalisation, Featherstone argues that 
capitalist utopian vision, which is most clearly expressed in theories of global 
finance, is no longer sustainable today.
This book concerns the status of utopian thinking in contemporary global 
society and the possibility of imagining alternative ways of living outside of 
capitalism. Using a range of sociological and philosophical theories to write 
the first intellectual history of the capitalist utopia in English, Featherstone 
provokes the reader into thinking about ways of moving beyond this model 
of organising social life through sociological modes of thought. Indeed, this 
enlightening volume seeks to show how utopian thinking about the way 
people should live has been progressively captured by capitalism with the result 
that it is difficult to imagine alternatives to capitalist society today.
Presenting sociology and sociological thinking as a utopian alternative to 
the capitalist utopia, Planet Utopia will appeal to postgraduate and postdoctoral 
students interested in subjects including Sociology, Social Theory, Cultural 
Studies, Cultural Theory and Continental Philosophy.
Mark Featherstone is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University, UK.
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I  On the Seashore
On the seashore of endless worlds, children meet.
Tempest roams in the pathless sky,
Ships are wrecked in the trackless water,
Death is abroad, children play
(Tagore in Kuhn, 2013: Front Matter)
In his essay ‘The Location of Cultural Experience’, the psychoanalyst D. W. 
Winnicott (2005) quotes the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore in order to 
frame his discussion of the emergence of culture in play and playfulness. In 
his work on children, Winnicott was never interested in notions of utopia or 
dystopia, but rather the ways in which kids play, imagine, and create in secure 
spaces defined by their parents. In his view this experience, the experience of 
creativity, which we first encounter in the potential space set out by Mom, is 
a model for later cultural development. In other words, we learn to create 
through childhood play, which opens onto the infinite expanse of the human 
imagination and allows us to imagine entirely new worlds, and then take this 
forward into our adult life, where we continue to play, imagine, and create in 
secure spaces where we feel able to think new thoughts without penalty or 
punishment. Reading Winnicott’s (2005) work, and thinking through his use 
of Tagore, we might suggest that the seashore represents the liminal space of 
imagination and creativity, the borderland between feelings of security and 
containment where we know what is what and everything remains the same, 
and the experience of insecurity and otherness where we encounter anxiety, 
but also possibility, newness, and the future.
While the sandy beach represents the safety of land, the sea is the infinite space 
of possibility, mystery, and monstrosity. We know we can live on land. We can 
breathe. The sea, on the other hand, is the space of the shipwreck, disaster, and 
drowning. It represents endless expanse, the infinite that threatens to envelope 
us and dissolve our fragile sense of self in its vast, dark, waters (Hamilton, 2013). 
Despite— or perhaps more precisely because of— this risk, we know that without 
the sea and the possibility of exploration, we would miss and never encounter the 
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2 Introduction
hope of the new and the future. As we gaze out from the land over the vast 
expanse of water towards the horizon, what we see is possibility, potential, and 
utopia. In order to understand Winnicott’s reference to Tagore, then, we might 
consult Gaston Bachelard’s (1994) book on water, and particularly his idea of the 
Charon complex. Here, water, and the endless ocean, is simultaneously a repre-
sentation of death but also hope, the future, and the possibility of peace. Recalling 
Freud (2003), who talks about the oceanic experience in his Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Bachelard links the idea of the ocean to the bind between the endless 
peace of death and the infinite promise of the future. By positioning his children 
on the seashore, Winnicott (2005) avoids the worst excesses of the Freudian ocean, 
where men drown and are consumed by monsters emerging from the abyss, and 
instead allows his kids to look out over the vast expanse of water with their feet 
planted firmly on dry land. Thus, the seashore is Winnicott’s safe place which 
allows creativity and imagination to happen. The seashore is Winnicott’s spatial 
metaphor for imagination played out under conditions of psychological security. 
But why introduce this work with reference to Winnicott’s paper and particularly 
his use of Tagore’s seashore? What does any of this have to do with notions of 
utopia and dystopia?
I begin with reference to Winnicott’s (2005) work, and his reference to 
Tagore, because I want to argue that we have lost touch with the experience 
of the seashore in contemporary social and cultural life, especially under con-
ditions of neoliberal capitalism where everything is defined by its cost or 
quantifiable benefit, and that this has impacted upon our possibility to imagine 
other worlds which might improve or enrich our own. In this way my view 
is that we have lost our sense of the value of imagination, creativity, wonder, 
and the kind of naivety that is inseparable from the experience of childhood, 
simply because kids are not entirely integrated into the world. Before they 
are fully socialised into the world, kids retain the ability to look upon life 
through strange eyes and see things otherwise, on the basis of how they might 
look in some other imaginary universe. This is a situation, and an experience, 
which I think we need to rediscover in order to reopen the horizon of the 
future, a future that is beyond the narrow confines of neoliberal capitalism, 
where obsession with economy makes everything seem absolutely predictable. 
Moreover, I would risk the claim that this is more than an issue for individu-
als, who have simply become hyper- rational economic actors, and is in fact a 
matter of cultural politics, which decide how we behave in the world defined 
by cultural norms and values. This is the case because, as Winnicott (2005) 
shows, imagination, creativity, and the invention of the new are absolutely 
reliant on psychological security defined and provided by others and com-
munity. In this respect, culture, imagination, creativity, and thoughts of the 
new are not simply the property of the individual genius, but rather experi-
ences that are enabled by groups that create secure spaces to allow them to 
happen. However, I would argue that this is not the concept of security which 
has come to dominate the contemporary social and political experience in 
the West, especially since 9/11, because what the current mania for security 
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requires is absolute lockdown and limitation of creativity and imagination 
(Hamilton, 2013). In other words, contemporary concepts of security and 
safety restrict creativity, imagination, and cultural expression and limit the 
experience of the new to parameters set out by the neoliberal capitalist ortho-
doxy on the basis that what this orthodoxy is organised to compensate for is 
the stormy ocean of capitalism, which throws people back and forth and offers 
them little in the way of psychological peace and stability.
In this way we might argue that the reason for the situation where we 
become obsessed with a particular form of security is that we have lost sight 
of the liminal space Winnicott (2005) talks about through reference to Tagore’s 
idea of the seashore. As opposed to this experience of liminality, the globalisa-
tion of neoliberal capitalism has plunged the majority of the world’s population 
into a situation of social and economic insecurity, which compares to the 
terrifying experience of being cast adrift on the stormy ocean, and has sought 
to compensate for the consequences of this position through political measures 
designed to ensure security through the limitation of the sociological, political, 
and cultural imagination. Although a population living in precariousness, tossed 
about on the ocean of capitalism, is more likely to accept security measures— 
which insist upon a particular concept of normality, limit their ability to think 
otherwise, and contribute even further to the destruction of imagination 
wrought by the domination of economic logic— it is also true that people 
deprived off the human ability to think of their future will eventually react. 
Taking this into account, I think that we can identify a potentially utopian 
moment, the moment when the lack of possibility for cultural expression able 
to challenge the capitalist orthodoxy tips over into blind rage and the acting 
out of frustrations concerned with the fear and uncertainty of living in a 
global risk society which seems devoid of a human future. The question of 
this work is, therefore, concerned with social and cultural politics and the 
need to address what we might creatively and imaginatively consider a global 
dystopia, where people are reduced to the status of objects defined by economic 
value and there is no imagination beyond the imagination required to increase 
profit margins, and the search for a way back to the seashore, which will 
enable us to think about the new from the safety of a place without precari-
ousness, anxiety, fear, and death. Against the dire utopia- cum- dystopia of late, 
neoliberal, global capitalism, then, the objective of this work involves the 
attempt to reignite the utopian imagination, which involves thinking of dys-
topia as a worst- case scenario that requires radical change, and to open the 
present up to the kind of childhood naivety and critical distance required to 
think about the future. The ultimate aim of this attempt to think the con-
temporary global situation otherwise is to create a space for the new, for hope, 
and for the future, or, in other words, the kind of other worlds which children 
endlessly create through their play. However, before I move on and explain 
the structure of the book, I would like to take stock and explore how global 
capitalism produced our current impasse, which we might suggest is defined 
by a dystopic world without a future.
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II  The Global Capitalist Dystopia
In 2008, in the teeth of the American- led war on terror, the British political 
philosopher John Gray (2007) wrote about the end of utopia. For Gray, his-
tory had proven that utopia is a dangerous concept. Indeed, in his view 
processes of globalisation had resulted in the emergence of new faith- based 
forms of utopian violence structured around the historicist vision of some 
historical grand plan leading from the past through the present to the future. 
Against this idea Gray argued that the eschatological view that war, destruc-
tion, violence, and ultimately apocalypse would lead to the new and produce 
utopia were simply fantastical and based in irrational theological thought. In 
this respect my reading of Gray’s book, Black Mass (2007), is that it updates 
Karl Popper’s (2002a, b) classic critique of Stalinism, rooted in his attempt to 
destroy the philosophy of Plato, Hegel, and Marx. Following Popper’s books 
The Poverty of Historicism (2002c) and The Open Society and Its Enemies (2002a, b), 
Gray takes the view that the problem with utopian thought is that it is based 
in metaphysics, which projects an interpretation of the present into the distant 
past and far- off future in order to construct a law- based vision of history. In 
locating the origins of utopian thought in Zarathustra and ancient religious 
conceptions of the opposition between good and evil, Gray argues that the 
utopians’ mistake is to believe it is possible to separate the entirely good from 
the absolutely bad and discover some kind of good place devoid of evil. In 
religious thought, this good place is other- worldly and only becomes accessible 
post- mortem, whereas in modern utopian thought, the good place is some-
where else, located on the other side of the ocean, which we can reach through 
exploration and discovery.
If the classic ancient utopia is Plato’s Republic (1991), where the perfect 
world is an imagined city based in an appreciation of metaphysical form, the 
most famous modern utopia is Thomas More’s work of 1516 which gave the 
concept its name. Utopia, the good place, which is also a no place, is ironic 
in a way which Gray’s utopians are not. While More’s utopia essentially 
destroyed itself by erasing every statement of the good with a statement of 
impossibility (the good place is a no place and so on), which we may read as 
an early version of the critical technique Adorno (1981) would later call 
negative dialectics, Gray wants to argue that the majority of utopians actually 
believe in their schemes and want to see them realised. What this means is 
that while More was keen to critique the early modern enclosures, which 
placed common land in private hands, through reference to an imagined land 
where wealth was held in common, he never believed this was really possible. 
Thus, the good place is a no place, an impossibility. By contrast, Gray (2007) 
suggests that history’s major utopian political figures, from the Jacobins through 
Mao, Pol Pot, and Baader- Meinhof to contemporary radical Islamists, have 
been seduced by ideas of egalitarian justice and sought to impose their plans 
upon the world through the violent destruction of the other who is seen to 
stand in the way of its realisation. However, it is not only leftists whom Gray 
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targets in his discussion. He is also critical of contemporary neoliberal capital-
ists and politicians for their utopian vision of a frictionless global economy 
without borders or boundaries. Again, he points out that the realisation of 
this utopian fantasy relies on the violent destruction of alternative models of 
living and that this essentially contradicts the ethical core of utopia itself— the 
freedom of individuals to realise themselves through interactions with others. 
In his critique of a mode of thought that promises violence, destruction, hor-
ror, and ultimately totalitarian domination, Gray responds with a Popperian 
philosophy of reason, rationality, and critique which he considers more mea-
sured, open to debate, and essentially negotiation.
However, what Gray (2007) fails to recognise is the way in which contem-
porary capitalism, and the capitalist utopia of completely smooth regulation- free 
exchange, has produced a dire form of utopia, or perhaps we should say dystopia, 
devoid of belief and a human future. Thus the problem of Gray’s critique of 
utopia and the politics of belief is that the precise problem of contemporary 
global, neoliberal capitalism is that it has produced a social and economic form 
based in exchange, cost, benefit, and value, that is devoid of belief or any sense 
of wider significance. Utopia and some kind of belief are therefore exactly what 
is required today to save people from a void of disbelief and nihilism. It is 
surprising that Gray fails to recognise this problem, since I think that his book 
False Dawn (1998) remains the best account of the fantastical nature of the 
global capitalist utopia, which crashed in the same year that his work on the 
poverty of utopia was published. In this book, and against what we later find 
in Black Mass (2007), Gray effectively explains the collapse of the capitalist utopia 
and describes the opening of a new space of utopian potential, possibility, and 
futurity. Where we might say that Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and 
the Last Man (1992) tells the story of the American utopia realised, Gray’s False 
Dawn (1998) explains the discontents and coming collapse of this model of 
social, economic, and cultural laissez- faire. In other words, it offers a theory of 
the end of the end of history, which Gray then closes down in his Black Mass 
(2007) by explaining the inherent violence of the historical, or more precisely 
historicist, worldview that takes an analysis of the present and then extends this 
into a philosophy of past, future, and every moment in between.
In terms of detail, Gray’s thesis in False Dawn (1998) is that the original 
capitalist laissez- faire utopia of Adam Smith came to an end in the fires of 
World War I, simply because of the destruction wrought across Europe. Fol-
lowing the chaos of the interwar years, which saw the rise of fascism, Nazism, 
and communism, and the subsequent horrors of World War II, which effectively 
destroyed normal society for the major protagonists, Gray explains that the 
victorious democratic powers realised the necessity of tempering the violence 
of capitalism and regulating the market, in order to prevent a political swing 
to the extremes of left or right. Against the violence and unfreedom that 
resulted from economic turbulence, he shows how the Western powers turned 
towards welfare, managed capitalism, and a belief in a social, rather than indi-
vidual, good. Although this vision of social consensus politics remained in 
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place until the late 1970s, the capitalist utopia made a comeback when a 
combination of rising costs and union power began to eat into the production 
of surplus value and it became clear that the economic and political elites 
would need to free the market and stimulate competition in order to increase 
productivity and surplus creation. This is exactly what Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan achieved in Britain and America through the creation of a 
new highly moralised anarcho- capitalism defined by ideas of individual free-
dom, free market economy, and minimal government. In many respects the 
period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s represented the gestation of the 
new utopia characterised by class struggle that concluded in the collapse of 
Eastern European and Soviet communism and the subsequent rise of gangster 
capitalism. Looking further afield we might also look to the Chinese turn to 
a hybrid form of authoritarian free market economy, which began with Deng’s 
creation of the special economic zone and ended with the crackdown on the 
new left that followed ‘Tank Man’ and the events of Tiananmen Square, for 
evidence of the rise of the new global utopia- cum- dystopia.
Following these events, which saw the rapid collapse of the socialist alterna-
tive around the world, Fukuyama (1992) was able to declare the end of history, 
and neoliberal capitalism appeared to emerge triumphant, a potentially glo-
balised system, a kinetic utopia of perpetual motion, defined by individual 
freedom, competition, and the endless creation of surplus value. This new 
model of society was utopian in the way in which it took its lead from eco-
nomics and then proceeded to define every aspect of life through reference 
to economic logic. As such, politics became about economic management, 
while the sphere of culture was defined by the saleability of ideas and cultural 
objects. This social form, where significance reduces to calculations around 
more or less, is the realisation of the neoliberal idea, where economy and 
economic freedom are everything, and any attempt to disturb or manage this 
freedom is viewed with suspicion and regarded as a first step towards Soviet 
totalitarianism. Indeed, it is possible to argue that this fear of backsliding 
towards totalitarianism is the definitive idea of the neoliberal model, which 
not only justifies its commitment to economic freedom on the basis that 
freedom must be superior to management, but also organises its restrictive 
concept of culture, where there is no alternative to the current orthodoxy 
simply because the other form of social organisation is inherently bad.
What we find here, then, is a shift in the idea of the good, and a reorgan-
isation of the concept of utopia itself, from an idealisation of a static system 
to come, characterised by a vision of a perfectly egalitarian self- identical society 
without conflict, to a new ideal, and a new utopia of restricted or deferred 
conflict. This new utopia is premised on Hobbes’ (2008) political physics, 
where social struggle stands in for the natural survival of the fittest, Smith’s 
(1982) notion of the invisible hand, where the system is good in itself and 
should not be tampered with, and Hayek’s (2006) valorisation of freedom and 
an avant- garde society organised around movement for movement’s sake. In 
my previous work (Featherstone, 2010) I explained this shift in terms of a 
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concept of kinetic utopia, or utopia of movement, and explained the negative 
impacts of this model, which are still largely ignored today, insofar as there is 
little sense that they comprise inevitable systemic effects. But what are these effects, 
or what Ulrich Beck (1992) might call bads? What are the negative by- products 
of the new capitalist kinetic utopia? The central problem of this utopia results, 
in my view, from a new social form defined by the goods of competition and 
individualism, which result in a dystopic world of winners and losers, where 
violence and inequality are morally justifiable. While this may seem unprob-
lematic from the American point of view, where there is a historical com-
mitment to the rugged individual, the frontier, and the Wild West, the society 
of anxiety, fear, anomie, and disorientation this has produced is not productive or 
conducive to peaceful social relations, if this is understood to have any kind 
of importance in itself or for the individual. Of course, in the American- led 
neoliberal world defined by savage competition and the principle of winner 
takes all, there are better ways to manage inequality than the defence of the 
principle of egalitarianism. Thus what we have seen since the emergence of 
the new kinetic utopia is the creation of an asocial form where the fear of 
the other is sublimated into an obsession with security and defence.
However, there is more to this situation than the immediate rational deci-
sion to security and defence, because what this withdrawal from the social 
world achieves is a refusal of the other and an acceptance that life with them 
is impossible. In the words of Zygmunt Bauman (1995), the contemporary 
world of insecurity and security is a world of fragments, a world without a 
coherent social order, a world of social disorder, a world where anomie is 
paradoxically normal. The effects of this situation on the individual are pro-
found because, of course, this is not simply a social and political condition, 
but rather one which drills down into the lived experiences of every person 
subjected to the rule of the new utopia. As Lacan (1993) shows in his work 
on the psychoses, without a master signifier to tell individuals how to organise 
their world, they fall into madness, psychosis, and defensive psychological 
formations such as paranoia, which reconstruct a worldview on the basis of 
a deeply negative view of others who are objectified, dehumanised, and turned 
into monsters. In this way the dystopic condition of the kinetic utopia more 
closely resembles Bret Easton Ellis’ dystopian American Psycho (1991), where 
Bateman fantasises about butchering innocent people whom he transforms 
into objective projections of his feelings of frustration towards his meaningless 
world of things, than classic dystopias concerned with presenting the dark side 
of authoritarian or totalitarian domination, such as Kafka’s The Castle (2000), 
where the source of power remains hidden, incomprehensible, and inscrutable. 
Of course, we might say that Kafka’s vision of power imagines what would 
later come to pass in Easton Ellis’ dystopia. In Kafka’s nightmare, power is 
hidden. In American Psycho (1991) it vanishes altogether, and the fantasy of 
power’s existence in some kind of unified form is revealed in Bateman’s attempt 
to save himself through sadistic violence. Where we once believed that power’s 
lack of visibility was a sign of its concealment, Bateman’s psychotic fantasy 
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world is evidence that in the postmodern world, power in its modern, authori-
tarian form has disappeared to be replaced by a strange form of diffuse or 
micro power, what Foucault (2004) calls biopower.
The most recent iteration of this new turn was, of course, outlined by 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their Empire (2000). In Empire Hardt 
and Negri show that the contemporary global system is centreless and lacks 
a core. In their account the traditional centre of global power, America, which 
had dominated since World War II and the rise of the consumer society, has 
lost its grip. Instead, empire has become a transnational corporate utopia held 
together by a global market, what Baudrillard (2005) calls a system of objects. 
Although the basic idea of this utopia is frictionless exchange, and the regula-
tion of space is perceived in terms of an anachronism which will slow transfers 
of capital and the generation of surplus value, the reality of the global neoliberal 
capitalist system is that the border has become a site of enormous anxiety, 
fear, defence, and security. The reason for this borderline situation is that the 
frictionless kinetic utopia is always a fantasy which must accommodate the 
reality of the nation- state that must in turn struggle to maintain some kind 
of social and political order and temper the turbulence of the transnational 
economic system. Thus Foucault (2008) explains two variants of the neoliberal 
state committed to the economic organisation of life: the American anarcho- 
capitalist model, defined by an idea of individual freedom in the market, and 
the German ordoliberalist approach, where state regulation plays a much bigger 
part in the creation of the space of economy. In his view the American 
approach positions government in negative terms, so that there is a commit-
ment to minimal intervention in the lives of its citizens, whereas the German 
model requires positive government action in order to create a space of eco-
nomic freedom.
Although we can still find evidence of these two models in the practice of 
capitalism today, I would suggest that what we have seen happen since the 
1970s is a shift in the anarcho- capitalist model towards larger government, 
and centrally a greater sense of the need to intervene in the life of the social 
body. This idea is, of course, in Foucault’s work, and we find it explored most 
clearly in his seminar of politics, war, and social defence, published under the 
title Society Must Be Defended (2004). In this book Foucault explains that the 
role of government in the neoliberal society is to create a space for economy 
and limit its own influence. In this respect government becomes about admin-
istration and police power outside of the economic sphere which represents 
a kind of civilised battlefield. Since economy can never really contain the 
enmity unleashed in the name of competition, Foucault’s point is that the 
social world itself becomes a war zone that government must seek to control 
without any sense of bias beyond the moral ideal that order must be upheld. 
The only moral principle here is the principle of utility— what works for the 
economy. This setup is, of course, bad enough, because Foucault paints a 
picture of the capitalist utopia transformed into an inhuman dystopia, a machine 
set on the creation of value for no reason beyond the creation of value itself. 
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However, what we witnessed in the wake of the 2008 global crash in terms 
of bank bailouts, austerity programmes, and so on may lead us to move beyond 
Foucault’s view and conclude that matters are even worse, and that the global 
economic system works on the basis of class interests, which are barely hidden 
behind a utopian or dystopian vision of the neutrality of the machine that 
has no human interest.
In Foucault’s (2004, 2008) view, the main problem of the neoliberal system 
is always social defence and the management of danger which emerges from 
the borders of the machine. In his account this opposition to the other defines 
the racism of the capitalist system. Surveying the history of the kinetic utopia, 
we might argue that Foucault’s thesis is clearly supported by the events of 9/11 
and beyond in the apparently endless war on terror. In the first instance, what 
Al Qaeda, bin Laden, and Atta attacked was the symbol of American economic 
power, which led to the savage defence of this system in wars on the Afghan 
Taliban and later Saddam’s Iraq. For writers such as Derek Gregory (2004), this 
defence of ‘civilization’ represented a new form of colonialism, and it would be 
a mistake to fail to recognise the ethnic dimensions of the American- led war 
on terror. However, what is less apparent, but perhaps equally remarkable, is the 
ways in which this form of colonial power reversed and began to take effect in 
the Western powers themselves in the wake of the economic crash through the 
creation of a new politics of class demonisation and hate. The scene was already 
set for this politics of race hate by the Islamophobia which has taken hold across 
America and Western Europe since 2001, but I would suggest that it was only 
fully realised in the political discourse which evolved around austerity across 
Western Europe in the period following 2008. Here, the centrality of homo 
economicus, the neoliberal man who produces and consumes and nothing else, 
was aggressively defended against the apparently lazy, feckless, wasteful other 
who is regarded as genetically deviant and biologically unable to function within 
the coordinates of the system. Thus the undisciplined youth, the lazy unemployed 
person, the immoral single mother, and the devious immigrant have been 
demonised, condemned, and abused across Europe in a move which confirmed 
Foucault’s (2004) thesis that the essence of liberal and neoliberal freedom resides 
in ferocity and the slavery of the other.
Here, we encounter the class or what Foucault (2004) calls race- based politics 
of the new kinetic utopia- cum- dystopia, which shows that its view of the value 
of economic struggle is not devoid of interest, but rather structured by ideological 
bias and a motivated vision of insiders and outsiders. Centrally, however, Foucault 
also shows how all of this violence and social warfare is hidden beneath a discourse 
of totality, cohesion through struggle, and utopian freedom, which means that 
despite the violence of everyday life which everybody sees, there is no sense in 
either elites or the masses that this violence is somehow aberrant, inhuman, or 
representative of a condition civilised people might want to leave behind. This 
transformation of perspective, where what might first appear dystopic becomes 
utopic from a certain point of view which accepts the essential nature of violence, 
is one aspect of what Arthur Kroker (2007) calls quantum culture that 
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predominates in the contemporary neoliberal landscape. Beyond this ideological 
reversal, what we also find in neoliberal culture is a strange fusion of hyperbole, 
which defines the utopian belief that capitalism and the economic vision of reality 
is the truth of the world, and black cynicism, comparable to the Hobbesian view 
of the wickedness of man and the irreducibility of violence and warfare. Kroker 
explains this fusion of opposites in his Born Again Ideology (2007) through a dis-
cussion of the contemporary capitalist commitment to the utopian transformation 
of man and world through techno- science and its view of the essential, natural 
character of struggle where change seems impossible. Where one position is 
absolutely orientated towards the future and the possibility of change, the other 
is conditioned by an essentialist vision of humanity that remains impervious to 
transformation or improvement. In seeking to capture this ideological phenomenon, 
where oppositional positions fuse in a new form which resists the Western ten-
dency to recognise contradiction or produce synthetic solutions, Kroker turns to 
quantum physics and Niels Bohr, who discovered the essential contradictory nature 
of the universe where a particle can be in two places at once, to suggest a new 
model of thinking through political and social reality.
Although Kroker (2007) never extends his thesis to consider political econ-
omy, we might apply his concept to the changing nature of class structure in 
the developed world to show how the phenomenon of embourgeoisement, 
which led many in the 1960s to imagine a bright new future of affluence, 
fuses with the old concept of the proletariat, which post- industrial utopians 
believed had been consigned to the past by computer technology. Here, we 
may refer to the new class Guy Standing (2011) calls the precariat, defined 
by freedom from social structure and immersion in the capitalist game, but 
also by chronic insecurity in terms of knowing where their next meal is 
coming from. While Standing wants to suggest that the precariat is in many 
respects new, the product of neoliberal ideology around individualism and 
changes to capitalist attitudes to labour contracts and so on, another way to 
look at the emergence of the precariat is to refer back to Marx and Engels’ 
concept of the lumpenproletariat (Featherstone, 2013) and say that new pre-
carious class is really little more than a postmodern version of the old class 
that is not a class. Again, Kroker’s point holds even if Standing’s class is really 
the lumpenproletariat in new rags. The old comes back in the form of the 
new. The class which is not a class survives in the new quantum culture where 
opposites are happy bedfellows. Beyond the quantum nature of Standing’s new 
class, we should also note that perhaps the key characteristic of the old 
lumpenproletariat was its insecure position outside of normal class structures 
and the violence which followed from this essential precariousness. Although 
Marx never made much of the idea of the scum of the class system in his 
major works, in many ways these people were the dystopic future of his vision 
of capitalism which has finally arrived in our world in the form of the neo-
liberal precariat (Featherstone, 2013).
Evidence of the predominance of this class is everywhere today, from the 
floating population which continues to drive Chinese capitalism to chronic 
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labour insecurity across Europe and America. Similarly, it is not hard to find 
evidence of the dystopic effects of this globalised condition of insecurity in the 
phenomenon of infanticide and particularly the school shootings and school 
murders which have affected societies from China through Japan to America 
and reflect a thanatological tendency on the part of those excluded from the 
kinetic utopia to try to destroy the future (Stiegler, 2012). If Ellis’ American 
Psycho (1991) reflects the violent, psychotic, fantasy world of the consumer who 
wants to find some meaning in the world through destruction, we might consult 
Lionel Shriver’s We Need to Talk about Kevin (2003) to think through the psy-
chopathology of the youth who confronts a world devoid of real care or atten-
tion and responds with cold, nihilistic rage. Since Kevin’s war on the world is 
the result of the negative perception he forms in his early months that his parents 
never really cared about him and basically wanted rid of him, it is unlikely that 
the contemporary neoliberal turn to security will resolve the problem of nihil-
ism, primarily because this strategy is premised on a view of the natural wick-
edness of man and the need to manage the dangerous effects resulting from the 
normal struggle, conflict, and competition within global capitalist society. In 
other words, Kevin’s negative response to lack of care will never really be solved 
by the turn to a Benthamite or Foucauldian prison society where weapons are 
either outlawed or made more accessible in the name of defence, because neither 
of these moves will solve the basic problem of the lack of care in social relations 
engendered by the neoliberal generalisation of violence and violent competition 
as an essential economic good. Instead, the turn to security exacerbates the 
problem of the kinetic utopia- cum- dystopia by transforming Gray’s (1998) 
Hobbesian world into a new penal form, what Foucault (2004) calls the gulag 
archipelago of capitalism.
As we have already noted, 9/11 intensified this situation by emphasising the 
contrast between absolute economic freedom, which as Hobbes (2008) knew 
always folds back into complete unfreedom, and social and political authoritari-
anism under conditions of security. However, John Hamilton (2013) notes that 
the origins of the notion of security lay elsewhere in Cicero’s concept of securitas, 
which finds its etymological roots in the prefix se, meaning ‘away from’, the 
root word cura, or ‘care’, and the suffix tas for ‘state of being’. For Hamilton, 
the Latin origins of the English word ‘security’ should thus lead to the conclu-
sion that being secure refers to a state of lacking care or carelessness where we 
have no sense of otherness, danger, possibility, or the future. The irony of the 
contemporary obsession with security is, therefore, that its pursuit of a utopia 
of safety without danger folds into a careless totalitarianism that mummifies in 
the full psychoanalytic meaning of this term where mummy takes over and 
offers safe passage back to the womb where we can live life like corpses, stillborn 
in a world without otherness. Understanding the global kinetic utopia of total 
economic freedom and social and political mummification in terms of the 
emergence of post- mortem capitalism is instructive because it enables a new 
perspective on the endless war on terror, which becomes about the destruction 
of the other in the name of a totally secure life lived under the sign of death. 
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According to Foucault’s (2004) work, and especially his seminar on social defence, 
we find the most developed modern version of this commitment to security in 
Nazi society, where social war and the quest for biopolitical defence became 
absolute goods, taking the form of a suicidal death drive towards the ultimate 
form of purity, the death of the species itself.
What Hamilton (2013) effectively finds in the contemporary neoliberal 
drive towards a utopia of security is, therefore, social war resolved in an asocial 
form defined by mummification and post- mortem safety. However, it would 
be a mistake to imagine that there is no escape from this state of zombifica-
tion, and that we are condemned to the utopian- dystopian womb of security 
forever more in the way that Fukuyama (1992) imagined, because the eco-
nomic crash revealed the truth of what Paul Virilio (2012) calls the insecurity 
of history. Virilio explores this condition in his book The Great Accelerator 
(2012) through a comparison of the fate of the global economy and Large 
Hadron Collider. Here, he contrasts the terminal velocity of capitalism with 
the light speeds of the CERN machine and opposes the real crash of finance 
capital to the fantastical creation of a black hole capable of swallowing 
humanity in a story of techno- scientific utopianism gone bad in the emer-
gence of an abyssal dark dystopia without end. In the case of global finance 
capitalism, the utopia of complete freedom meshed with absolute unfreedom 
took the form of speculation on the basis of riskless risk, where enormous 
financial risk was offset by derivatives and other financial instruments designed 
to insure against losses on the free market. Of course, what took place in 
2007 through 2008 was the collapse of the fantasy of riskless risk in the near 
bankruptcy of the underwriters (insurance companies such as AIG) of the 
total risk of the system. What the crash revealed, then, about the kinetic 
utopia of absolutely smooth capitalism was its failure to recognise the irre-
ducible nature of risk and the limitations of the principle of exploitation. In 
this way the crash revealed the fantastical nature of the kinetic utopia, which 
was essentially based in first, a failure to understand that risk must always be 
underwritten by some insurer or other who possesses the resources to back 
the system itself (the state), and second, a refusal to recognise the limits of the 
cynical exploitation of the precariat based in their liminal position on the 
edge of the capitalist system.
In the first instance, the problem of the private insurers was that they were 
unable to underwrite the costs of the complex instruments designed to insure 
lenders against losses on the market because they were absolutely certain that 
the system itself was complete. In other words, they bought into the idea of 
the end of history and suffered from the complacent belief that those on the 
cutting edge of the kinetic utopia would remain good for their debt even 
though the flexibility of the capitalist economy itself meant that, however 
willing the precarious class may have been to repay its debts, there were limits 
to the exploitative credit and bad loans they could stand. Thus the fatal mistake of 
the financial elites was rooted in their belief in perhaps the core principle 
of the capitalist utopia— the unlimited nature of exploitation. In truth, 
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exploitation is limited. The contemporary situation is evidence of this fact. 
Basically, there is only so much exploitation the precarious class can take and 
remain within the system. Cast out of the system by redundancy and their 
inability to keep up with exorbitant debt repayments, the American precariat 
compromised the concept of riskless risk and transformed the kinetic utopia 
from a system premised on a fantasy of total security to a shambles defined 
by endless insecurity, panic, and anxiety about the future. The result of this 
apocalyptic shift, which saw security tip over into insecurity, has been the end 
of the kinetic utopia, or least the revelation of what Bourdieu (1998) calls the 
neoliberal dystopia of unlimited exploitation.
Although the capitalist elite has sought to extend the life of its violent 
utopia through austerity and the creation of more precariousness, it may be 
the case that the neoliberal system has nowhere else to go, simply because the 
majority are now largely excluded from the goods it has to offer and can no 
longer believe in its fantastical utopian story. As Bernard Stiegler (2012) explains 
in the second volume of his Disbelief and Discredit, the contemporary capitalist 
system represents dystopia realised. There is no belief in this social, political, 
economic, and cultural form, and the law of the capitalist superego which 
previously bound the majority to the system no longer holds. In this state, 
defined by the death of the Weberian spirit of capitalism, we are cast into the 
abyss of nihilism and significance disappears. The American dream is over and 
total objectivity takes over. Now there is nothing beyond crude materialism 
which reveals the excremental nature of the worker and the commodity that 
previously animated the system through the former’s spirited pursuit of the 
latter as a quasi- theological good full of value. In the wake of the collapse of 
this kinetic utopia, where the good was always simply one more purchase 
away, we find ourselves back on the seashore. Caught in the gravitational field 
of the black hole late capitalist dystopia, we can either collapse into cynicism 
and wallow in the meaninglessness of a permanent present without change 
or refuse this bleak situation, reconstruct the world, and recreate the future.
III  Post- Catastrophic Utopianism
Spirit is a bone.
(Hegel, 1976: 208)
It may be possible to employ the logic of Hegel’s enigmatic comment on the 
pseudo- science of phrenology to the study of the contemporary global dystopia 
in order to understand how the destruction of the spirit of capitalism in the 
rise of a new crude materialism without human future might produce frag-
ments of utopian hope. In much the same way that Hegel observed the 
reduction of spirit to bone in the new science of phrenology, what we have 
witnessed in recent years is the collapse of the capitalist belief system, which 
previously convinced with regard to its ideological principle of openness and 
centrally its defence of the principle of individual self- realisation. In the wake 
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of the global crash and subsequent great recession, which when it ends will 
have produced a slimmed- down, leaner, meaner version of capitalism more 
like Adam Smith’s (1982) version of laissez- faire capitalism than anything we 
have seen in the 20th century, what we find is capitalism stripped of its pre-
tension to inclusion and reduced to bare materialism, namely the reduction 
of the worker, labour power, to the status of a functional object in the name of 
the production of surplus value. The new capitalism is, thus, capitalism without 
hope, capitalism with a future. However, Marx and Engels (2004) understood 
in the 19th century that capitalism in its pure form— capitalism without 
concession, capitalism without pretence— cannot survive for very long, because 
of the resistance it necessarily produces. In this respect, in much the same way 
that Hegel identified the dialectical shift involved in the reduction of spirit 
to bone, Marx and Engels saw that the reduction of capitalism to pure mecha-
nism produces hope in the form of those who plan alternative futures. In the 
19th century this resistance took the form of the workers’ movement, socialism, 
communism, and utopian socialism. In the 21st century, these expressions of 
resistance have been extended by new media technology, which has enabled 
groups such as Anonymous to form around the idea of a global multitude of 
the exploited, and the very processes of global capitalism themselves, which 
have created a planetary class divide, where it becomes possible for writers 
such as David Graeber (2013) to talk about the 99 percent, the exploited mass 
of the world’s population.
I would argue that we find the origins of the notion of the 99 percent, 
which continues to inspire the anti- capitalist movement today, in Antonio 
Negri’s (2013) use of Spinoza’s concept of the multitude. The idea of the 
multitude, which Negri outlines in his book The Savage Anomaly (1999) and 
then employs in his works with Michael Hardt, namely Empire (2000), Multitude 
(2004), and Commonwealth (2009), develops out a radical vision of the liberal 
tradition that opposes the Hobbesian and Lockean theory of liberalism and 
restricted freedom. In Negri’s (1999) Spinozan concept of the multitude, what 
liberalism captures is the endless possibility of humanity, which always exceeds 
every structure organised to contain and define its orientation towards the 
future. Against this irreducible openness to the future, what Negri calls potentia, 
power seeks to organise, contain, and define possibility in the name of structure, 
control, and the maintenance of the status quo. Negri talks about this counter- 
tendency to potential in terms of potestas and argues that politics resides in 
the struggle between these two tendencies— the tendency, on the one hand, 
towards revolutionary change, the new, and the future, and on the other hand, 
towards conservatism, orthodoxy, and the maintenance of the status quo. In 
searching for a new politics of freedom in the contemporary globalised world, 
Negri (1999) suggests that we must enable the expression of potential through 
a new form, which he calls disutopia, where the creative and imaginative power 
of the utopian form is separated from its totalitarian potential in power. 
Essentially, I think that it is this disutopian impulse that animated recent resis-
tance movements, such as Occupy, which sought to oppose the neoliberal 
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orthodoxy but avoid the authoritarianism of the Leninist party model in the 
name of endless creativity, imagination, and freedom. There is, of course, little 
point in opposing the neoliberal capitalist machine through a new authori-
tarianism which destroys the human potential for creation, because the essential 
problem with the current orthodoxy is that it closes down the space of 
imagination which enables human life to flourish in order to exploit human 
labour power to the point where the reproduction of life starts to become 
unsustainable. In order to solve the problem of super- exploitation, which 
deprives many of the basic resources necessary to survive, the first objective 
must, therefore, be to free the human potential for creativity from the capitalist 
imperative that links culture to economic value and regards any other cultural 
production as worthless.
This is, of course, the point made by those who struggled against capitalism 
in the late 1960s. While Deleuze and Guattari (1983) fought the Oedipal 
structures of the patriarchal system, Marcuse (1987) argued against the per-
formance principle which reduces every aspect of human life to economic 
value. Although capitalism shifted to a new form in the wake of 1968, becom-
ing high- tech creative capitalism in order to absorb the imaginative potential 
of its opposition, it appears that this recent Californian transformation has 
now run its course. The terminal nature of the system, what we might call 
its lateness, was already evident before 2001 with the rise of the new anti- 
capitalist left in 1999, which expressed significant discontent with the capitalist 
idea of the good. However, even today, the problem of attachment remains a 
significant one. Although the capitalist machine may seem devoid of meaning 
and spirit, the dual technologies of bio- and psycho- power mean that the 
neoliberal subject, homo economicus, remains the hegemonic psychological type, 
even though this way of being currently resembles a zombie mode of sub-
jectivity without life, meaning, or significance. How, then, is it possible to 
fight this state of being that is already dead? Perhaps the only way to resist 
this type, which seems to live on after its own death, is to create the condi-
tions for the kind of dialectical reversal from base materialism to a new kind 
of imaginative idealism by insisting upon the dystopian state of the contem-
porary world system. In order to provide an example of what this dystopia 
of method might look like, consider Walter Benjamin’s (2009) work on Ger-
man tragedy, and imagine that the contemporary global system resembles a 
kind of baroque catastrophe.
In Benjamin’s (2009) work on the trauerspiel, early modern German tragedy 
captures the image of tyranny in a state of collapse. The tyrant seeks to exert 
control, but continually fails, because fate dictates that his efforts to shore up 
his empire must always miss their mark. Realising his terminal situation, the 
tyrant falls into an abyss of melancholia, characterised by a sense of paralysis 
and a perception of the end: the end of his reign, the end of his meaning, the 
end of his- tory. Surveying his world, the sovereign sees nothing but failure, 
ruination, and decay everywhere. It is in this dystopian vision of collapse that 
Benjamin finds utopian possibility and the space of the new. In a world devoid 
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of meaning and significance, he explains that the exposed thing, or what he 
calls the creaturely, offers hope for the future, because it affords the opportunity 
to begin again. As Susan Buck- Morss (1991) shows, Benjamin saw the same 
situation played out in the Paris arcades of the late 19th century, where the 
ruined objects of early consumer capitalism shone with utopian possibility. 
Perhaps this perspective is still appropriate, or even more appropriate, for the 
contemporary world, where consumer capitalism has become a global form, 
what Benjamin might call a global ur- landscape, a kind of natural background 
or fate which seems absolutely inescapable. Frozen in this natural system, there 
is nowhere to go, and we collapse into repetition, compulsion, and routine in 
order to dull the pain caused by our lack of future. However, descent into 
the dark underworld of the contemporary addictogenic society offers no real 
escape, because immersion in the compulsion to repeat simply emphasises our 
profane objectivity— unless, of course, it produces reflexive recognition and 
the determination to engineer change.
There is, therefore, value in ruins. There is ruin value in the debased worker 
who is simply a meaningless cog in a machine, ruin value in the prostitute who 
is little more than a piece of meat bought and sold like any other commodity, 
ruin value in the addict who is a slave to junk, ruin value in the slum dweller 
who must struggle to survive on a daily basis. In these ruined bodies living 
in dystopia we confront Benjamin’s (2009) creaturely life, the blank people 
Catherine Malabou (2012) calls the new wounded, the waste products of late 
capitalism who open up the possibility of the kind of catastrophic and post- 
catastrophic subjectivity Wilfred Bion explored through his work. For Bion 
(1993) these subjects come face to face with bare life, or the thing in itself 
he captured through his use of the symbol O, and must find some way forward 
into the future. In other words, O represents the lived experience of dystopia, 
a world catastrophe for a destroyed subject which is also a blank canvas, an 
island of hope that points towards an infinite number of possible futures. 
Although Bion was centrally concerned with catastrophic subjectivity, Benja-
min’s (1999) utopians were not only destroyed subjects- cum- objects— the 
prostitutes, the beggars, and scum of the capitalist system— but also children, 
who always exist on the edge of the world, because they are in the process of 
being socialised into normal ways of living. Benjamin (2006) found utopian 
hope in kids, whose naïve questions— Where did I come from? What is this, 
that, and the other? Why is the world the way it is? and so on— suggest 
distance from orthodoxy and the accepted order of things, because their way 
of being suggests a model of imaginative, ludic thought and practice which 
might enable everybody else to escape the closure of modern, capitalist society. 
Against the hard pragmatism of the capitalist, who is only interested in costs 
and benefits, Benjamin wanted to wake the capitalist subject up to the dream-
world of the child who invents the future through everyday play. For Benjamin, 
the human future is hidden within these small utopias (Stewart, 2010).
Even in the contemporary situation, where the child has become a key 
source of value production for capitalists, Benjamin would resist despair on 
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the basis that children will always find the new in their play with even the 
most profane objects. In his work, capitalism evolves through different con-
ceptions of value, where use value becomes exchange value becomes symbolic 
value becomes ruin value becomes utopian value, which results in the transition 
of the object from a useful object to a commodity to be bought and sold to 
a symbol to be exchanged and finally a ruined piece of waste that signals the 
closure of one way of thinking and the possibility of some other path into 
the future (Featherstone, 2005). This is how Benjamin finds utopia in dystopia, 
infinity in the finite and the profane, and suggests we might escape the nihil-
ism of the always the same of capitalism. Ž ižek (2008, 2010) makes a similar 
point in his recent works on catastrophe and utopia. In his In Defence of Lost 
Causes (2008), he argues that we must exploit the current global situation in 
the name of the lost cause of the eternal idea. However, whereas Ž ižek’s eternal 
idea reflects a Platonic notion of justice, I would argue that this concept has 
little value today, simply because of its inherent authoritarianism, and must 
instead be taken to represent a kind of empty signifier, which we need to fill 
out through creative practice. Thus, my view is that what the pursuit of the 
eternal idea of justice calls for is less some transcendental imperative around 
division of resources imposed from above and more the creation of a space 
of immanence to enable experimentation about what it is people value in life. 
Although this call may appear to be based in utopian idealism, I would argue 
that such activity is absolutely practical and rooted in the immanent idealism 
of the child at play. Absorbed in play, this utopian child exemplifies the idea 
of fixation, which reflects deep immersion in the objective world, where 
profane things become magical signs of the future to come.
Utopian play is purposeful, and characterised by practice organised around 
an imagined goal, but centrally a goal which is open to adaptation on the 
basis of creative interaction with changing circumstance. Thus it becomes 
clear why culture is so important politically— culture is the space of interac-
tion between the subject and the objective world, where the subject simulta-
neously makes meaning in the world and in doing so creates his own identity. 
In my view, this is what utopian practice means today, and how we can develop 
a mode of concrete utopianism to oppose the global capitalist system that 
seems devoid of spirit, significance, and human meaning. As Ž ižek points out 
in his apocalyptic Living in the End Times (2010), the generalised crisis of late 
capitalism, which takes in looming ecological catastrophe and intractable social 
division, means that we must find a way to move beyond the neoliberal utopia- 
cum- dystopia in the creation of a human world. In my view, culture must 
play a central role in this task, because culture is communication, and the basis 
upon which humans form worlds. Culture is also the medium of human 
imagination, creativity, and fantasy, what Winnicott called our little madnesses 
(Kuhn, 2013). I would argue that we need more little madnesses in the con-
temporary world, simply because neoliberal capitalism has created a worldless 
world where meaning is reduced to economic equations around value. There 
is no humanity in this mode of thinking.
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Thus, my objective in this book is to consider the concepts of dystopia and 
utopia from the vantage point of the seashore where children play and imagine 
possible worlds very different from our own. Following this introductory 
chapter, where I have sought to read global politics through the lens of the 
psychoanalysis of D. W. Winnicott, in the next chapter I move on to focus 
on the situation of contemporary Greece. Wrecked by EU austerity measures 
caused by fantastical attempts to build a new neoliberal utopia on the back 
of unsustainable debt and credit, I compare and contrast the Greece of the 
early 21st century with the Greece of the original utopians, the ancient Greek 
philosophers Plato (1991) and Socrates, in order to try to articulate a vision 
of a more socially just, economically sustainable society. In Chapters 2, 3, and 
4 of the book, which comprise the centre of the first part of the work, I move 
on from this exploration of Greece, which re- reads Plato’s Republic (1991) 
through the lens of Alain Badiou’s philosophy, in order to try to understand 
how the contemporary global capitalist model emerged and whether it is 
possible to read this history through concepts of utopia and dystopia. On the 
basis that there is no sustained study of the utopian vision of capitalism, which 
is supposed to be the realist mode of social and economic organisation par 
excellence, in these three chapters I track the evolution of capitalism and 
capitalist thought back through the work of Adam Smith (1982, 1999), John 
Locke (1988), and Thomas Hobbes (2008) before leaping forward into the 
works of Milton Friedman (2002) and finally the key theories of contemporary 
financialisation. In order to kick- start this history, I begin with a discussion 
of the difference between the capitalist vision of economy and the archaic, 
primitive view of economy found in Plato (1991), but also anthropologists 
such as Marshall Sahlins (1974) and Marcel Mauss (2000). Where the latter 
primitivists regard economy in terms of the need to sustain life, the capitalists, 
perhaps starting with Bernard Mandeville (1989) and John Locke, take economy 
as a means of ever- increasing productivity and profitability. Tracing the devel-
opment of this history, in Chapter 3 of the book I explore the development 
of capitalism in America, and particularly across the post- World War II period 
when Milton Friedman (2002) and the neoliberal thinkers read economics 
through the cold war cybernetic theory of early computational thinkers such 
as Norbert Wiener and John Von Neumann, who, with John Nash, was 
instrumental in the development of game theory (Mirowski, 2002).
In order to extend this work, which shows how economy evolved from a 
system for the distribution of scarce goods necessary to sustain life to a techno- 
scientific cybernetic model concerned with the production of profit removed 
from any concern with human or environmental sustainability, I move on to 
look at the ultimate form of capitalist, economic abstraction, financialisation, 
where money makes money without the need for human production. Against 
this theory of the non- or post- human dimensions of contemporary economy, 
where human and world are subordinate to the needs of the financial system 
that abolishes the future in the name of debt repayment, in Chapter 5 of the 
book I take up an alternative vision of economy, organised around the 
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irreducible sociality of people and the necessary relationship between human 
and world explored in the philosophy of Merleau- Ponty (1969) and Deleuze 
and Guattari (1994). The aim of this chapter, then, is to suggest a leftist, red- 
green model of what I call the minor utopia, where work and productivity 
are understood in terms of natural productivity and the satisfaction of need, 
rather than abstract profit making that harms humanity both in itself and 
through the destruction of its biospheric life support system. In this chapter 
I connect Merleau- Ponty (1969) to Marx (1988), and recall my earlier refer-
ence to Winnicott (2005) on infant creativity, in order to argue that humans 
are infinitely creative and imaginative and defined by the need to express 
themselves and that the capitalist model of economy has progressively subju-
gated this potential and reduced humans to profit- making machines. Inspired 
by Marcuse’s (1987) work, I suggest that under this utilitarian model there is 
no room for life or human imagination that transgresses the current order of 
things, which is by definition beyond utility.
In Chapter 6, I return to the issue of the utopian potential through an explo-
ration of the dystopian dimensions of the ur- space of sociality, the city, in cinema 
of the Danish director Nicolas Winding Refn, and particularly the ways in 
which he situates his characters within an autistic space where social relations 
never hold and continually break apart. The space of the city is, of course, key 
here because the history of the ideas of utopia, dystopia, identity, society, economy, 
politics, and culture can be traced back to the invention of the urban form that 
creates a space for the articulation of everything human. Akin to a variety of 
contemporary utopias, which envision the city in terms of dystopian collapse, 
Winding Refn’s films, but particularly his most recent works Drive (2011) and 
Only God Forgives (2013), imagine the globalised city (his cities span the globe, 
from LA in the West to Bangkok in the East, to create a nightmarish vision of 
the global city) saturated with asociality, suspicion, mistrust, and ultra- violence. 
At the heart of both films I consider, the main character is explained in terms 
of destroyed masculinity rooted in lost childhood and the kind of abandonment 
one might imagine Winnicott’s children suffer in the mechanised world where 
alienated work in the name of profitability is more important than human 
development. It is on the basis of this work on cultural expressions of global 
dystopia linked to ideas of the collapse of social and particularly familial relations 
that I turn, in Chapter 7, to a consideration of the situation of youth in con-
temporary Britain. In this chapter, entitled Dis- United Kingdom, I move back 
into straight sociological critique and take up a discussion of the riots of 2011. 
Building upon the recent work of Bernard Stiegler (2012), who writes of 
uncontrollable societies and destroyed subjectivity, I seek to understand the riots 
in terms of the explosive frustrations of a blank generation, or what we might 
call a de- generation, whose future, and thus utopian hope, has been taken away 
by the condition of intergenerational abandonment that is implicit in neoliberal 
economics, politics, and society.
In this dystopia, which I explore through the idea of hoodie horror, the real 
horror is not the horror of violent youth (a kind of feral, criminal underclass), 
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but the horror of youth abandoned by a mechanised economic system that puts 
profit before intergenerational debt, social responsibility, and a sustainable, liveable 
human future. Finally, and in order to conclude the book, I think about possible 
responses to this hopeless, dystopian situation and seek to argue for the critical 
value of what I call the spectre of sociology. Here, in the concluding chapter, I 
seek to articulate a new ethico- political role for sociology that transcends a 
concern with the production of ‘useful facts’ and revolves around the need to 
oppose the violence of neoliberal capitalism in the name of a liveable future. 
Since neoliberalism must ignore an ethical sociology, which consequently becomes 
a spectral way of thinking concerned with invisible social relations and aban-
doned responsibilities, and instead seeks to transform the discipline of Marx, 
Durkheim, and Weber into an instrumental servant of the state that produces 
fact and never asks questions, I close the book by suggesting that sociology, 
sociological thought, and the sociological imagination are ghosts, ghouls, and 
spectral manifestations of the future that haunt the neoliberal utopia/dystopia 
of the present. In the contemporary critical period, where there appear to be 
no alternatives but also no way to carry on with the current order of things, 
the future is literally unimaginable. Any imagined future is ridiculous, science 
fiction, and thus utopian in the worst sense of the word, simply because instru-
mental rationality cannot imagine change outside of its fixed vision of the world. 
This is a truly dystopian state of affairs that demands utopian thinking. In this 
respect I argue for a utopian, spectral form of sociology— a ghostly, value- based 
way of thinking from the past that we must paradoxically keep alive in the 
name of future possibility to come. In this respect I seek to imagine a new 
version of sociology, a utopian sociology able to imagine the unimaginable, a 
critical sci- fi sociology on the seashore.
Filmography
Drive, 2011, Nicolas Winding Refn, Icon.
Only God Forgives, 2013, Nicolas Winding Refn, Icon.
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I Hyper- Plato and Contemporary Utopia
In this chapter I propose to situate the first, classic, utopian imaginary, Plato’s 
(1991) Republic, in the context of the contemporary global crisis or, to use the 
Greek term which possesses a slightly different meaning that I will explore 
below, krisis. In order to read the Republic (1991) in this way, I will take Alain 
Badiou’s (2012) recent hyper- translation of Plato’s text and explore its relation-
ship to the global crisis. My thesis here will be that Badiou’s hyper- translation 
reflects the ways in which the crisis has thrown utopian politics back to the 
future. In other words, I want to suggest that the crisis has thrown the utopian 
politics of the past, which many have suggested were dead and buried by the 
excesses of the 20th century and centrally the horror shows of Hitler, Stalin, 
and Mao, back centre stage, where they come to represent future possibility. 
Moreover, I suggest that these politics represent a kind of sci- fi politics, a utopia 
to come, because they return in the context of a static, stagnant scene organised 
around a kind of zombified version of Fukuyama’s (1992) end of history 
paradigm. In this respect, the purpose of my chapter is to read Badiou’s (2012) 
Plato, a sci- fi Plato for the 21st century who we might call Hyper- Plato, in 
the bright light of the contemporary global scene ruled by the zombie politics 
of 1989, the year when the Berlin Wall came down and Fukuyama’s fantasy 
of global America came to pass. In order to set this reading up, I follow my 
exploration of Hyper- Plato with a discussion of collapse of the global economic 
system. Here, I rely on Yanis Varoufakis’ (2011) theory of the Global Minotaur 
because it captures the idea of the post- war utopian global order constructed 
by American policy makers. The idea of system- building is important here 
because I want to emphasise that in much the same way that Daedalus, the 
original architect of the Cretan labyrinth, designed the home of the monstrous 
Minotaur, the contemporary global system was the product of a plan to ensure 
the future of an American- led form of globalisation.
It is on the basis of this plan, which was executed over the course of the 
second half of the 20th century, that I suggest the global system might be 
understood in terms of a utopian strategy to create a world in America’s 
image. In tracking the collapse of this real fantasy, in the third, and final, 
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section of the chapter, I seek to locate the collapse of the global utopia of the 
monstrous Minotaur in the original space of Plato’s Republic (1991), Greece. 
Here, I show how the crisis— or krisis to use the Greek term which refers to 
a moment of decision and thus emphasises the relationship between the eco-
nomic collapse and the necessity of a leap to a new state or condition— found 
form in what we might call, following work in Radical Philosophy (2013), the 
Greek symptom. This means that the collapse of the global utopia of the 
Minotaur found symptomatic expression in the dystopian conditions of con-
temporary Greece, the ancient home of utopian thought. Thus, in order to 
conclude the chapter, I explore the ways in which the heirs of Hyper- Plato, 
those who recognise the utopian impulse in Plato that exceeds the authoritar-
ian monster that inspired Robespierre, Lenin, and Stalin, have sought to oppose 
the global dystopia which has landed in Greece in the early 21st century.
In his contemporary reconstruction of the Republic, Badiou (2012) creates 
a new utopian figure adequate to the political situation of the 21st century— 
Plato who is more than Plato, Hyper- Plato. Emerging from the cave of the 
distant past into the banal wreckage of the present, Hyper- Plato looks towards 
the future. Against the deeply depressive atmosphere of the contemporary 
moment, where we realise there is no alternative but know that change is 
absolutely necessary, Hyper- Plato confronts his reader with a discussion of 
fundamentals. Akin to his ancient brother, his theory is modelled on an appre-
ciation of Spartan order and organisation. Regarding the Spartan origins of 
Hyper- Plato, we might consider Plutarch’s (2008) portrait of perhaps the very 
first utopian statesman, Lycurgus, and note his key reforms— the redistribution 
of land and recourses, equality, and rule by elders. I think that we find this 
basic appreciation of the importance of the communal in Badiou’s (2012) 
Hyper- Plato. Similarly, he supports the Spartan approach to socialisation, though 
he may not extend his theory of child rearing to the lengths found in the 
ancients. However, he recognises the value of the Spartan view that kids are 
part of the city, rather than the property of their parents, and that they should 
be educated in the name of discipline and obedience to community. Centrally, 
Hyper- Plato supports the Spartan opposition to elaborate ways of saying very 
little— the Spartan utopia was, of course, entirely opposed to the use of non-
sense in language, because this obscures discussion of fundamentals, and what 
we find in Hyper- Plato is a concern for fundamentals that is strangely anti-
thetical to contemporary political debate, which simply confirms that there is 
no other way but what we have today.
What matters in Sparta is always community, and the Spartan group and 
Spartan city would be a kind of hive. In this sense the Spartan is an insect- 
man who lives, works, and dies for the good of the group. As Elizabeth Rawson 
(1991) points out in her study of Sparta in history, the Spartan focus on col-
lectivity was, in the ancient context, a novelty because traditional Greek hero-
ism, based in Homer, had always insisted upon individual glory. Although he 
is keen to reject the image of the insectoid, because of the insect- man’s 
appearance in Kafka (2007), Burroughs (2010), and others, and wants to 
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support ideas of individual realisation, Badiou’s (2012) Hyper- Plato opposes 
the search for fame and glory for its own sake. He associates this excessive 
desire for recognition and the need for adventure with contemporary celebrity 
and suggests that these are the psychological traits that we find along the road 
to the emergence of tyrannical, fascist man. One need not be Freud or a 
psychoanalyst to understand that the root cause of the need for fame and 
glory is weakness and a diminished sense of self, and Hyper- Plato supports 
this view in his psychosocial theory of the political self. While he does not 
explicitly support the Spartan commitment to war as a way of life, what he 
finds in the warrior’s orientation to life is a vision of truth beyond the con-
temporary bondage to economy that ties people to a miserable materialism 
defined by meaningless metabolism. Indeed, I think that we can find the 
Spartan hatred of money in Hyper- Plato’s account of his utopia, simply because 
of the ways in which money breaks ranks and creates inequality, envy, and 
jealousy. For Badiou’s (2012) Hyper- Plato, true social life is impossible without 
equality because inequality produces hatred between self and others. In the 
Spartan case this is why the famous battle of Thermopylae is so important 
and remains such a vital myth in Western culture, because what the symbol 
of the three hundred reflects is the spirit of communal transcendence in the 
face of the immense gravity of material forces of opposition.
Although Badiou’s (2012) Hyper- Plato is no warmonger, he links the idea 
of order and control to justice. Where he departs from the Spartan fantasy of 
his ancient brother is in his attempt to save some sense of Athens, and its 
principles of openness and newness, from the sheer functionalism of the hive 
model of communism, which ironically re- emerges in the late capitalist utopia. 
Hyper- Plato’s city is not simply a camp, where the soldier is ideal and func-
tion is all that matters, because he understands the need of people to realise 
their potential outside of their allotted place in the social order. Place of birth 
cannot be everything, and Badiou’s (2012) Hyper- Plato disagrees with his 
ancient ancestor on this issue. Where Plato advances the need to tell lies, and 
achieve order through the myth of metals, Hyper- Plato does not seek to link 
his utopia to some natural system. However, it would be a mistake to say that 
Hyper- Plato has no sense of order, because I think that he remains indebted 
to Platonic cosmology, and the notion of quasi- divine symmetry which we 
find in Timaeus and Critias (2008), on the grounds that cosmological order 
supports his idea of justice. The challenge of Hyper- Plato is to escape the 
history of the unfolding of this idea of orderly, functional justice and beauty. 
This idea has, of course, played out across modern history, and the history of 
the idea of utopia named by Thomas More (2008). Beyond the French Revo-
lution and the Nazi utopia, the idea of a cosmic utopia of perfect order and 
symmetry found its global form in the American- led empire which appeared 
on the scene in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this respect, 
I think that Hyper- Plato’s unlikely interlocutor is Francis Fukuyama (1992), 
because Badiou has brought Plato back to intervene in the decadent dying 
days of this global utopia- cum- dystopia. In throwing Plato into the present, 
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Badiou transforms him into Hyper- Plato, the philosopher of the future shorn 
of the authoritarianism Karl Popper (2002) found so disagreeable. Hyper- Plato 
is thus Plato more than Plato. He is the idea of Plato, who Plato would have 
been if he had not been a Greek aristo, committed to the defence of class 
power and so on.
However, it would be a mistake to say that Badiou (2012) simply wants to 
preserve the idea of Plato, the utopian thinker who imagined a new society, 
because he is also keen to insist on the need for Hyper- Plato to overcome 
the classical dualism of his ancestor— the absolute separation of the forms and 
sensible world. Centrally, Hyper- Plato is never simply about the assertion of 
the utopia idea, because Badiou wants to show how the idea can participate in 
the sensible, in the real world, through a process of subjectivisation. In this 
way Hyper- Plato’s objective is to reach a view of the utopian truth and uni-
versalise this vision through a process of subjectivisation which takes in Plato’s 
original psychology of the five types of political man. Thus Hyper- Plato is 
no longer simply a philosopher, but also a psychoanalyst, who understands 
that we can find the truth of a social system in the psychology of its people. 
We can see this thesis in operation from the very start of Hyper- Plato’s Republic 
(2012), where his Socrates debates the meaning of justice with Thrasymachus. 
While Thrasymachus takes the view that might is right and that justice serves 
the interests of the powerful, Socrates insists that inequality can only produce 
discord and hatred and that any idea of justice that advances these conditions 
is not worthy of the name. While inequality produces hatred between people, 
and thus destroys the social system, Hyper- Plato’s Socrates also notes that this 
condition tears the self apart and creates a state of schizophrenia, because the 
reason of unjust man is no longer in charge of its own house but has instead 
become subordinate to other psychological forces emerging from the libido.
But is this idea, where the self is controlled and disciplined, really a recipe 
for freedom? Glaucon’s response to Socrates suggests that freedom resides in 
behaviour driven by the appetites. True individuals, capitalist individuals, do 
what they want. They may pretend to be good in order to gain favour from 
others who respect their higher values, but this is little more than a cynical 
nod to social necessity, and the truth of their behaviour is driven by the 
principle of desire and the desire for advantage over others. According to this 
miserable vision of social life, Glaucon notes that injustice is the complaint of 
the weak who never get what they want out of life. It turns out that this is 
a key debate in Hyper- Plato’s work, because it opens out into his Socratic 
discussion of the idea of justice which structures the new Republic’s theory 
of utopia. In this account Socrates’ first question is to ask his interlocutors 
about the identity of society. What is society? His response is that society is 
essentially a division of labour where individuals specialise in the performance 
of particular tasks. Of course, the problem with this theory of the division of 
labour, which Durkheim (1984) would revisit in the modern period of history, 
is that eventually the division of tasks becomes so complex that the social 
system starts to collapse under its own weight. The relationships between 
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individuals break because they have little in common. They fall into a state 
of anomie where they have no sense of their part of the collective. Against 
this problem of specialisation, Socrates suggests that it is better for people to 
remain closer to nature and live more basic lives because this enables them to 
remain part of a common social system based in their common being on the 
earth. Although Glaucon baulks, and proposes that what Socrates suggests is 
a primitive city of pigs, Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) Spartan utopia of a 
division of labour organised around basic needs is attractive because it frees 
his citizens to think about fundamentals rather than navel- gaze and vanish 
into solipsistic obscurity.
Beyond this advantage, the appeal of Socrates’ city of pigs is, of course, always 
supported by its difference from the catastrophic dystopia of Atlantis, which 
casts a dark shadow over Hyper- Plato’s Republic. Here, we should recall that 
Atlantis was Plato’s original dystopia from Timaeus and Critias (2008) which 
reflected the likely injustice, inequality, and disaster that would result from urban 
hubris, excess, and expansion. Against the uncontrollable desire, and eventual 
hate, which came to characterise Atlantis, Hyper- Plato’s Socrates suggests that 
his ideal city would teach kids to be good citizens who would display active 
thought. He tells us that they would investigate, create, and make decisions not 
because they thought they could gain personal advantage but because they want 
to discover the truth, which refers to ideality, symmetry, or beauty of phenomena. 
In order to achieve this, the kids would need to learn courage, self- restraint, 
concentration, and disinterestedness. In short, Hyper- Plato’s Socratic educational 
philosophy becomes about moving beyond self- interestedness towards a univer-
salistic attitude to the discovery of truth and meaning able to inform social 
policy on the ground. However, there is no more basic social policy than this 
educational policy designed to produce citizens who are balanced, moderate, 
stable, and self- disciplined, because these people would grow into those who 
would design the ideal city in their own image. In Hyper- Plato’s view, these 
universal citizens would be capable of producing a universal city— a city without 
borders, a city without otherness— and ensuring that the beauty of their creation 
would not slide back towards division and fragmentation. But unlike his ancient 
ancestor, whose city was famously immobile and timeless because he sought to 
cut it off both temporally and spatially, Hyper- Plato seeks to evade limitation. 
This evasion of limitation, or allowance for change and development, is most 
clearly reflected in the way he cuts into the original text’s vision of the alloca-
tion of essential tasks.
Where Plato (1991) allocates roles on the basis of birth and the myth of 
metals, Hyper- Plato’s universal man is Marx’s (1988) polymorphous worker, who 
can work everywhere but also has special talents which the city should look to 
foster. In this respect Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) utopian city would be uni-
versalistic in its openness and provision of opportunity to workers, who would 
be able to realise their particular talents across a range of fields. Centrally Hyper- 
Plato is concerned to maintain this dialectical complex, where the division of 
labour remains open enough to foster individual talents, across the key functions 
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of society— production, defence, and government. This democratic openness is 
essential to the goodness of his utopian city because it means that the distribu-
tion of roles will never become caught in a rigid class stratification system based 
upon inheritance and a tradition of normalised inequality. In seeking to avoid 
the corruption of roles, Hyper- Plato insists that his people should be self- 
disciplined, courageous, wise, and essentially live selflessly for their community. 
It is here that education becomes central to the postmodern Greek’s theory, 
because it is education that ensures the production of proper psychological 
development and organisation. While the original Plato (1991) called the three 
parts of the self: reason, spirit, and passion, Hyper- Plato translates these terms 
into thought, affect, and desire in order to better situate his vision of the ideal 
person within a post- Freudian universe. However, in much the same way that 
his ancient brother insisted upon the importance of reason in the governance 
of the self, Hyper- Plato explains that his ideal self would be organised around 
thought, which would ensure his participation in the universal idea. On the 
basis of this participation in the idea, his person could then relate to others in 
a fair and equal manner and thus create a just society based upon unity and 
collective psychology, rather than discord and selfish individualism.
For Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012), this is what justice means— symmetry, 
balance, and unity— and injustice resides in the collapse of this beautiful 
form. Thus injustice refers to excess, inequality, fragmentation, and the dark 
confusion these conditions produce in both social relations and individual 
psychology. This distinction between the just and the unjust is key to under-
standing Badiou’s (2012) futuristic version of the first utopia. For example, 
in order to ensure justice and equality in what he calls his fifth form of 
government, or communism, Hyper- Plato also insists upon the classical 
Spartan principle of gender equality because talents and abilities are always 
distributed evenly across genders. Although his society is no patriarchy in 
this respect, Hyper- Plato is keen to escape from the totalitarianism of his 
ancestor, who abolished the family and passed kids over to professional child 
carers, by explaining that private life and family is necessary to provide 
shelter from public life and the space of the state. In this respect, he seeks 
to balance the principle of universalism, where equality reigns, with a rec-
ognition of the need to allow particularity and private life choices room to 
breathe. Of course, the balance between these states is not easy to find, which 
is why Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) emphasises the importance of thought 
and the need for philosophy to inform politics in the creation of a dialectic 
of theory and practice. Everything starts with thought, and the ideational 
sense of beauty and totality, because it is only this that can resist the perver-
sion of endless opinion, babble, and confusion Hyper- Plato links to contem-
porary democracy which has no sense of direction. Against this tyranny of 
opinion, where everything tilts towards the needs of the rich and famous, 
Badiou’s (2012) postmodern Greek waits on the appearance of some Event- 
God that would shake this nonsensical system to its core and open up a 
space for the rediscovery of the beauty of truth.
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It is in this context that Badiou’s (2012) Hyper- Plato returns to his ances-
tor’s famous cave myth, which becomes a movie theatre in the contemporary 
postmodern global society. In this new scene the ancient prisoners of the cave 
who sat transfixed before the flickering images on the cave wall become slack- 
jawed kids caught in the warm glow of the screen that captures their attention 
in the name of orientation towards the consumer lifestyle. The purpose of 
the Event- God is thus to break the spell of the screen and recapture the atten-
tion of kids who need to turn back towards the beauty of the idea. If he can 
encourage the kids to forgo the spectacle of the screen, Hyper- Plato imagines 
that he can switch them onto philosophy and centrally numbers, which he 
thinks are essential for participation in the beauty of the abstract idea. Of 
course, these are not the numbers of the Wall Street banker or contemporary 
global capitalism, that screen out the reality of the greedy, desiring self and 
provide a sheen of objectivity and fairness for a form of accumulation which 
is essentially pathological and corrupted. Instead, Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) 
numbers perform an important function— they serve to lift individuals out of 
their self and enable their participation in abstraction, equality, and justice. 
Indeed, in seeking to translate this concern for numerical abstraction, sym-
metry, and reason back into the language of the material sphere, Hyper- Plato 
strikes against the contemporary masters of numbers by explaining his utopian 
proposal to limit wages and accumulation. There will be no monstrous bank-
ers’ bonuses in Hyper- Plato’s utopia because people will possess no more than 
they need to live a sustainable life on earth. In this way, he opposes the con-
temporary consumer society of desires and wants in the name of a city limited 
by human need and moderation.
But if this is Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) ideal society, how are we to under-
stand the process which led the early humans from their primitive state, when 
need was what mattered, to their current exorbitant situation, which brought 
the Greek back to the future in the first place? The answer is Hyper- Plato’s 
discussion of his ancestor’s typology of bad societies, which shows how, when 
people had what they needed, the original city of pigs became corrupted and 
collapsed in various more or less dystopian forms. Given that Hyper- Plato sug-
gests that we need to find our way back to truth and justice today, the suggestion 
of the new Republic is that the contemporary, postmodern, global capitalist 
society represents a version of one or more of these dystopian forms in need 
of reform by philosophical critique. First, he tells his interlocutors about timarchy, 
which is a militaristic society where honour and status is what matters. Timarchy 
emerges when the original communistic society becomes complacent and people 
are overtaken by a desire for power and domination. This occurs because the 
original utopian commitment to the truth contains the potential for its own 
demise in its fundamentalist devotion to a cause which easily slips into a self- 
righteous search for power and a myopic rejection of others who become 
dangerous enemies. Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) explains that once this occurs, 
timarchy becomes a spectacular society where people are obsessed with struggle 
and essentially their status relative to all others. The result of this situation is 
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the emergence of a society of inequality, hatred, and permanent low- intensity 
warfare. Under these conditions the objective of government becomes about 
the management of violence and policing conflict and social war. However, the 
real problem with the timocratic society is that it also contains the seeds of its 
own destruction in the Machiavellian lack of transcendental purpose. In other 
words, the problem of timarchy resides in the complacency of the combatants 
and their tendency towards base materialism.
Over a more or less extended period of time, people in the timocratic 
society lose their sense of higher morality and forget exactly why they are 
concerned with achieving status and power. While the original moral timocrat 
wanted power in order to evidence his own adherence to a transcendental 
principle of excellence, the complacent fall from this position occurs when 
the descendent of the warrior wants status for its material benefits. Here, the 
timocrat becomes the oligarch who obsesses over money and accumulation 
and is defined by material desires. While this condition is the preserve of 
elites, and excludes the masses, Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) explains that we 
live in oligarchy. However, this state of affairs cannot last because the inequality 
inherent in this kind of society generates resentment, rebellion, and eventually 
the overthrow of the elites by the middle class, who want their own piece of 
the pie. Unfortunately, however, the oligarchic masses lack the moral compass 
to pull back from excess and, instead of seeking to return to a basic society 
of needs, they set out to generalise the elites’ obsessive, acquisitive way of life 
across the entire society. Here, Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) explains that oli-
garchy becomes democracy where economy, money, and accumulation is 
everything to everybody and there is no wider or deeper meaning to life. 
Given this lack of transcendental significance, goodness, or truth, government 
in democracy is absolutely concerned with popularity. The leader in demo-
cratic society has two interrelated objectives— to remain popular and give the 
people what they want, which is access to riches. As it turns out, this is a 
fatal strategy simply because the leader can never give the people what they 
want. This is the case because desire has no end. As the post- Freudian or 
Lacan analyst understands, once desire is unleashed it expands endlessly and 
eventually consumes the entire society in a blaze of irreconcilable conflicting 
urges. Herein we enter the deadly society of drive.
Finally, Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) explores the true dystopian society, 
tyranny or fascism. This occurs when appetite becomes everything and desire 
short- circuits to create a society of drive where people can no longer wait to 
consume. On the basis of this psychopathology, where I must have everything 
now, democracy is fundamentally unstable and further revolution becomes 
inevitable. Hyper- Plato notes that it does not take long before the impoverished 
masses take the law into their own hands and kick out the elites who were 
unable to satisfy their impossible desires. Enter the tyrant or fascist leader who 
seizes power on the basis that he will subdue the elites and give the people 
what they want. Centrally, the fascist leader also possesses an idea, but this is 
not Hyper- Plato’s beautiful idea but rather a perverted, corrupted idea based 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   30 10-12-2016   8:17:26 PM
Back to the Future 31
on division, hatred, and a thirst for annihilation. Driven by his philosophy of 
hate, the fascist is absolutely unable to tolerate difference, and tortures and 
murders anybody who threatens opposition. However, despite his commitment 
to murder, the fascist never really has any authority, because his position is 
based on corruption, violence, and others who are similarly determined by 
hatred and will kill him if the opportunity presents itself. Under conditions 
of fascist state terror, there is no self- control and no self- discipline, but only 
violence and fear. At this point, Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) explains, the 
endless desire for money is replaced by endless hate and the death drive, where 
the fascist personality seeks to merge with eternity through the destruction 
of himself and everybody else. Long live death! In practical terms, the fascist 
personality manifests its commitment to death in drive- based addictogenic 
behaviours— the fascist self is hyper- sexual, hyper- violent, but also hyper- moral, 
where the excessive aspect of these behaviours confirms their interrelation, 
interdependence, and fatal circularity.
Although Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) scheme suggests no way back from 
tyranny or fascism, I would suggest that a cunning dialectical reversal is implicit 
in this form of anti- government. The fascist self is driven by sadistic bloodlust 
and the search for pleasure, but there is no real release for anxiety and terror 
here, only fear of the other who is similarly lycanthropic. It is in this way 
that I think Hyper- Plato’s fascism presupposes a space of utopian possibility. 
As Walter Benjamin (2009) explained in his work on German tragedy, ruins 
and absolute misery create spaces of hopeless hope and ideality. According to 
Hyper- Plato, humans need this ideational substance in order to survive. They 
cannot live in materiality alone, because they are more than animals who 
simply live, feed, breed, and die in the world. However, he is also clear— 
humans must choose their own idea. It cannot be imposed upon them from 
above. This is the additional problem of tyrannical government. The precise 
reason tyranny lacks a beautiful idea is because its idea is essentially particular, 
organised around the desires of one person, who is, by virtue of his belief in 
his own individual righteousness, deeply perverse. Who, then, should choose 
the idea? Who is qualified to choose the beautiful idea? Again, Hyper- Plato 
is very clear. The people who will be in a position to choose the beautiful 
idea will be those who have been reduced to nothingness, because it is only 
in their base materiality, their misery, and their animality that people will be 
able to understand what is at stake in social life and organise the social world 
in the interests of everybody. In this respect Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) 
Republic is deeply dialectical but also revolutionary in ways that his ancient 
brother’s work was not, simply because he pins his hopes for the future on 
the wretched of the earth, and those who have been destroyed by a form of 
society devoid of beauty, justice, and ideality. While Plato’s (1991) saviour class, 
the philosopher kings, was elite, Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) people of the 
future are those who are lost in today’s world. They are miserable, nowhere, 
non- people, but in this way contain the potential for goodness. They are the 
utopian people— the non- people who are also the good people.
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This is how Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) reads the contemporary world 
situation. He is never explicit about this, but Badiou’s decision to reimagine 
Plato for the 21st century suggests that we are currently balanced on the edge 
of a major dialectical shift, where the misery of capitalist materialism has the 
potential to open out onto a new ethics based in ideality. Centrally, then, I 
think that we must understand Hyper- Plato’s discussion in the context of 
Fukuyama’s (1992) end of history period, which has been transformed from 
a triumphalist story about the final victory of the Anglo- American model of 
capitalism to a horror show concerned with zombie ideas about globalisation 
and the spread of democracy, simply because he poses his fundamental ques-
tions about the nature of society, politics, economics, and culture for a fatal 
society where it seems that nothing will ever change, but that everything must 
be rethought and rebuilt from the ground up. Here, I think we approach 
Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) contemporary utopianism, which implies both 
a dark dystopian vision of the present and an almost fatalistic sense of utopian 
possibility to come. In the next section of this chapter, I propose to explore 
the origins and collapse of Hyper- Plato’s global utopia- cum- dystopia of Ameri-
can economic power before leaping back to Greece to seek out utopian pos-
sibility in the wreckage of the home of the original utopians.
II  The Coming of the Event- God in the Global Capitalist 
Utopia- cum- Dystopia
How should we understand the coming of Hyper- Plato’s Event- God, the critical 
moment which will shift global society from a dystopian present which seems 
endless towards a future full of possibility and hope, and locate this situation in 
contemporary history? For the economist Yanis Varoufakis (2011), the contem-
porary collapse of the global financial system represents this critical moment, 
which Hyper- Plato would understand in terms of the emergence of the Event- 
God and the possibility of a new idea about how we might organise social, 
political, economic, and cultural life. Although we might connect his account 
to Hyper- Plato’s myth of cinema and suggest that what the global financial 
crisis represented was the collapse of the utopian capitalist fantasy of endless 
economic growth, Varoufakis (2011) opts for a different metaphor, the Global 
Minotaur. Here, the global financial system, organised around the endless cir-
culation of money beyond any real relationship to material things, is less a movie 
theatre or a screen for the capture of our attention and more a labyrinth, a 
postmodern version of Daedalus’ mythological maze designed to house the 
Cretan monster, the Minotaur. In Varoufakis’ (2011) account, the problem with 
the contemporary global labyrinth is that its homeowner is wounded and unable 
to defend his own house. The result of this is that the people who had previ-
ously lived in fear of the beast no longer need to fear him. Akin to Hyper- Plato’s 
(Badiou, 2012) cinephiles, who will one day learn the difference between film 
and reality, the people caught in Varoufakis’ maze can start to think for them-
selves and no longer have to live in the labyrinth, because the Minotaur no 
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longer threatens to consume them. In other words, they are free to step outside 
of the maze and create the world on their own terms.
In Varoufakis’ (2011) story the Global Minotaur is America and the labyrinth 
is the American- led global economic system that has developed since the end 
of World War II. He explains how since the 1960s American policy has 
entailed the consumption of the surpluses of the rest of the world. While this 
was enabled by the rise of the consumer society and the individual’s thirst for 
luxury and excess, Varoufakis points out that America became a deficit society. 
In other words, America began to live in debt. It became a bloated, luxurious, 
excessive nation built upon consumption far beyond its means. However, he 
points out that this was enabled by creditor nations, who sent the profits made 
from American consumers back to the land of the free in order to buy world 
money from Wall Street. The next move was for the bankers to use this new 
money to finance American capitalism and American consumers in order to 
consume and complete the labyrinthine system. Everything would continue 
to work, so long as the global system could continue to feed the beast. Accord-
ing to Varoufakis (2011), this idea of economy based in the recycling of 
surpluses was largely unshakeable from the 1960s onwards, and formed the 
basis of global economic structures until the global crash of 2008 destroyed 
it under the weight of unmanageable debt. The problem here was that America 
could no longer consume the rest of the world’s surpluses, because of its own 
indebtedness causing a crisis of finance and liquidity, to keep capitalism on 
the rails. However, Varoufakis’ (2011) story starts much earlier than the 1960s 
and the emergence of the neoliberal period dominated by finance, credit, and 
indebtedness. Indeed, he tracks the development of this system back to the 
end of World War II and America’s emergence as a global creditor. At this 
point America’s problem was that it lacked a method to recycle its own sur-
pluses, but it saw that political control could be bought in Germany and Japan 
in order create a global Pax Americana— an American utopia based in a shared 
consensus around the goodness of capitalism.
At this point, the Americanised global system was designed in the name of 
cold war politics. Support for West German and Japanese capitalism was part 
of the Truman doctrine, strategy of containment, and opposition to Soviet 
communism. While America financed the West German economic miracle, 
German corporations sold to Europe, which became its principal export market. 
In the case of Japan, Maoist China meant large parts of Asia were inaccessible, 
so early post- World War II Japanese capitalism supported the American war 
effort in Korea. Back home in America, in the 1960s Kennedy and Johnson 
sought to create a more equal society in order to guarantee social cohesion 
and maximise the population available to consume. At this point the essential 
building blocks of America’s utopian global plan were in place. For Varoufakis 
(2011), this plan unravelled under pressure of the cost of the Vietnam War, 
and America became a debtor nation. The effect of this deficit was to place 
enormous pressure on the relationship between the value of the dollar and 
the price of gold, with the result that Nixon brought an end to the gold 
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standard and gold convertability in order to avoid cutting spending. On 
15 May 1971 the dollar became free- floating global currency, the currency 
necessary to purchase oil, and the second stage of the global economic plan 
began to take shape in the form of an empire of debt and surplus recycling. 
Supported by low interest rates, the Global Minotaur came to life. At this 
point America began to attract the surpluses of other nations in order to 
finance American consumption, stimulate productivity around the world, attract 
further surpluses, and so on ad nauseam. Under this system it became impos-
sible for Americans to consume enough, with the result that greed became a 
kind of global civic virtue— after all, Americans were now consuming in order 
that the rest of the world could continue to produce and so on into a future 
of endless excess. Finally, and off the back of this consumption, Wall Street 
became big business, simply because there is profit in finance in the form of 
interest. Heading into the 1980s neoliberal financial culture began to take off.
In the words of Costas Lapavitsas (2013), Wall Street culture is premised on 
a model of profit without production. In his view the massive expansion of finance 
under conditions of neoliberal capitalism was the result of a dangerous lack of 
productivity in Western capitalism from the 1960s onwards. Centrally, this 
remains the case today and is likely to define a future organised around austerity, 
automation, and redundancy. However, before he reaches this point Lapavitsas 
explains the perversity of what we might paradoxically call financial production. 
In the first place his account of global finance follows Aristotle’s (2009) view 
of the monstrosity of finance— profit from finance is monstrous because there 
is no new value when money begets money begets money and so on. In his 
view this form of capitalist incest can only lead to disaster in the form of a 
monstrous society— an overblown, excessive society committed to greed or what 
the Greeks called pleonexia, because it has no sense of work or the real produc-
tion of value, which requires immersion and engagement in the world. The late 
capitalist society of Gordon Gekko, Michael Douglas’ infamous character from 
Oliver Stone’s Wall Street (1987) who proclaims that greed is good, could be 
considered ironic in this respect. Its emergence was premised on the labyrinthine 
design of America’s post- World War II planners, who sought to create a stable 
system which would globalise capitalism and prevent the catastrophic recurrence 
of events such as the stock market crash of 1929. However, they made the 
mistake of founding their moderate, stable system upon the normal excesses of 
monstrous accumulation and consumption and failed to imagine what would 
happen when this monstrosity could no longer be contained. Like Daedalus, 
the master engineer and builder, they built their machine to house monstrosity, 
but unfortunately in their case, the monster eventually grew too big for its 
prison. In the end the system was destroyed by the excesses of accumulation, 
consumption, and what Lapavitsas (2013) calls profit without production.
In seeking to theorise the idea of the global financial system, Lapavitsas imag-
ines a shift from the sphere of production towards the sphere of circulation. At 
this point capitalism has entered a new stage and become what Felix Guattari 
(Genosko, 2012) writes about in terms of semio- capitalism, where the symbolic 
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nature of money is revealed in an economy of free- floating value— value which 
is no longer based in productive engagement with the materiality of the world. 
Under these conditions America became a kind of fantasy space, which Jean 
Baudrillard (1988) writes about in terms of hyper- reality, because anything was, 
and necessarily had to be, possible. Excess was no longer a privilege or even a 
choice— instead, it became a kind of Kantian imperative, essential to ensure the 
functionality of the global system. Thus America became hyper- real, more than 
real, a fantastical utopia, off the back of the fundamental geopolitical importance 
of consumption. In terms of domestic policy, the tax cut becomes a key symbol 
of the maintenance of the hyper- real nation because the tax cut means that the 
American consumer can buy what the new capitalist worker in the sweatshop 
of productivity, China, makes. In return the Chinese corporation, which makes 
cheaply in order to sell dearly, reinvests its surpluses in Wall Street, which in 
turn finances American business and the American consumer. In this way, 
consumption and the hyper- real life survive despite a productive sphere organised 
around low wages, driven down to ensure competition with the Chinese worker. 
This was increasingly the setup in the final days of the Global Minotaur— Chinese 
capitalism produces through low- cost labour in order to generate surpluses to 
sacrifice to the American Minotaur which then buys Chinese goods and so on 
into the future. On the American side, Wal- Mart becomes a utopian space of 
cheapness where the destroyed American worker can continue to consume. Of 
course, in terms of the sphere of production, and the world of work, Wal- Mart 
drives the American worker into the ground in the name of competitiveness. 
Thus the utopia of cheapness and value for money is a necessary antidote for 
the miserable conditions of militarised labour which is the other side of the 
dialectic of global capitalism organised around a dystopic race to the bottom.
However, this neoliberal utopia, or what Mike Davis and Daniel Bertrand 
Monk (2008) call an evil paradise, collapsed under the weight of its own 
hyper- reality. In other words, it became a victim of its own success. Given 
the misery of the worker who is part of the inhuman ideology of cheapness, 
the hyper- real utopia of America organised around consumption and buying 
a good life screened out every other reality including balanced budgets. On 
the basis that Wall Street was not only willing to support this hyper- real fantasy 
world, but also actively sought to profit from it through both high interest 
repayments and a percentage of defaults, it is not surprising that the American 
consumer bought into the dialectic of global capitalism. At the top of the 
food chain, of course, the American political elite itself was committed to 
maintaining the consumer fantasy in order to maintain productivity abroad 
and financialisation at home. Thus the labyrinthine global system collapsed 
somewhere deep inside the monster itself, which was completely sold on the 
goodness and transcendental beauty of the financial system. But everything 
went wrong when American consumers, impoverished but jacked up on debt, 
determined to own a piece of the pie, their own home, could no longer fund 
their hyper- real life. Unfortunately, large numbers of these poor Americans 
could not afford their repayments and began to default to such an extent that 
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the banks burdened with toxic assets lost liquidity and could no longer afford 
to finance American consumption.
The American response to this situation was, of course, bank bailouts and 
quantitative easing designed to restore liquidity to the markets. However, the 
damage was already done, and the American labour market was in no position 
to continue to support the exorbitant consumption which had driven the 
global system since the 1970s. Across the Atlantic, the collapse of the Minotaur 
impacted upon both productivity and consumption and drove the Eurozone 
economy into crisis, which the German leaders of the EU sought to resolve 
through austerity. Here, the ideology of ordoliberalism or ordungspolitik sug-
gested that the crisis was the result of a lack of economic balance in the 
southern nations, which had consumed too much from a weak productive 
base. From the German point of view, these nations needed to cut their spend-
ing and increase productivity in order to balance their books and compete on 
a global level. According to Lapavitsas (2013), the pervasive nature of this 
view, which ignored the wider geopolitical and ideological roots of the crisis, 
led to the rise of a new brand of economic racism across Europe. Understood 
through the ordoliberal lens, the lazy European periphery, the Greeks, Spanish, 
Italians, Portuguese, and Irish, were to blame for the Eurozone situation and 
needed to change their own economic behaviour. Thus the peripheral states, 
which had been driven into debt by their own elites’ adoption of neoliberal 
policy, became debtor nations and began to impose austerity measures upon 
their own people in order to continue to finance the frozen markets. In this 
context austerity came to mean a squeeze on wages, which were already low 
by comparison to their northern neighbours; public sector cuts, in order to 
reduce government spending; and tax increases, largely targeted at middle- and 
low- income groups. The real purpose of this squeeze on public finance was, 
of course, to service national debt and ultimately fund the bank bailouts made 
necessary by the crisis in liquidity which had impacted globally. However, as 
economist Mark Blyth (2013) notes, austerity never really works to address 
recession because it fails to solve the issue of a lack of productivity, which 
requires investment.
In the case of the Eurozone crisis, austerity cannot address the crisis in the 
peripheral nations because it does not respond to issues of job creation, but 
only deepens the problem by causing even more unemployment and redun-
dancy. Given this lack of attention to concerns around productivity, the only 
way in which austerity addresses competitiveness is by further driving down 
wages in a situation where there is mass unemployment and workers simply 
have no choice but to take what is on the table. Thus, it is possible to see 
how the collapse of the Global Minotaur eventually became an opportunity 
in the Eurozone to drive down wages and retrofit the workforce for global 
competition where the Chinese worker is the ideal type. Here, we see the 
emergence of what Slavoj Ž ižek (2015) calls capitalism with Asian character-
istics, and a dark, dystopian version of Hyper- Plato’s city of pigs. Here, workers 
live to satisfy their needs and nothing more, but the problem is that even this 
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is no longer really possible in a society organised around a competitive race 
to the bottom. Under these conditions the worker is caught in a fatal bind. 
Debt is necessary to support life— health care, education, periods of unemploy-
ment, and so on— but also moralised as essentially evil. In the capitalist world, 
the worker is not part of some Spartan utopia, where the collective lives and 
dies together, but rather totally individualised, self- reliant, and self- responsible. 
Thus their needs cannot be socialised, but must be met on an individual basis. 
For this reason, debt is essential and must be repaid and escaped in order to 
restore moral goodness, simply because the creditor cannot be expected 
to pick up the bill. Akin to the debtor nations, which must remain bound 
to their debts despite the human costs to their populations, indebted workers 
are by definition morally suspect and must find some way to repay their debts. 
As a result they are tied to work and a future of low- wage labour in order 
to continue to service their debt, which they may very well never escape. For 
David Graeber (2011) and Maurizio Lazzarato (2012), this is the contemporary 
condition of debt and the morally depraved indebted man that we must escape 
if we are to ever live in a more humane society. In their view the current 
indebted society is a dystopia which stretches out in time, colonising our 
future with endless repayments, and a utopian solution to this problem would 
either entail the cancellation of debt, or its humanisation, where we recognise 
that indebtedness is part of our humanity, universality, and participation in 
Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) social truth. In many respects these two possi-
bilities amount to the same solution— communism.
For both Graeber (2011) and Lazzarato (2012), the problem of debt resides 
in the transformation of obligation into a financial problem, because this codes 
the relationship between individuals in cold, hard, objective terms. What is a 
human relation effectively becomes a commodity transaction which must be 
quantified and eventually resolved through repayment. Following repayment, 
the relationship between individuals is effectively cancelled, and the normal 
business of the self- enclosed capitalist worker/consumer resumes. At this point 
the necessary hell of obligation, debt, dissolves. According to Lazzarato (2012) 
this is effectively how Nietzsche (2003) came to understand debt in the second 
essay of his The Genealogy of Morals, although he had little sense of the need 
to exchange the morally hazardous idea of debt for the communistic notion 
of obligation. In this essay Nietzsche explains the horror of endless debt that 
destroys man’s humanity and transforms him into a calculator who endlessly 
weighs his own and everybody else’s debt. Under these conditions nobody is 
free because debt is everywhere. As Lazzarato (2012) notes, the German word 
for debt, schulden, recalls the word for guilt, schuld, in support of his idea that 
the rise of calculative debt creates a new subject, the morally indebted man 
who lives under the gaze of the great calculator, financial capitalism, which 
employs debt power to debase debtors every day. Under the gaze of debt 
power, I am always guilty because I am always in debt, but I can be either 
good or bad for my debts, depending on whether there is a view that I will 
be able to pay in the future. Thus whether I am considered solvent or insolvent 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   37 10-12-2016   8:17:27 PM
38 Back to the Future
dictates my future— I either have a future in debt where I can obtain further 
finance or my future is cancelled and my life is limited to basic repayments. 
In this situation, my objective must always be to remain solvent and able to 
make enough money to service my debts, which effectively transforms me 
into my own capitalist object, a surplus- making machine, an entrepreneurial 
self committed to enterprise and future surpluses.
Beyond the paradox that a future organised around necessary debt is no 
future at all, the problem of the rise of the entrepreneurial self is that all social 
relations become defined by objective, calculative, instrumental reason. Although 
the German social theorists Ferdinand Tonnies (2010) and Georg Simmel 
(1997) both identified this effect of capitalism and the rise of the money 
society in the late 19th to early 20th century, what is new about the contem-
porary indebted person is the way in which his entire life is infected with 
economic logic, simply because neoliberal ideology leaves no aspect of life or 
society untouched by cost/benefit analyses. In this respect the problem of the 
Nietzschean (2003) approach to the resolution of debt that Lazzarato (2012) 
adopts, which is the desire to escape from the debt relation in its entirety, is 
that it fails to recognise the essential and irreducible nature of social relations. 
As Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) shows through his re- presentation of his ancient 
ancestor’s original discussion of the division of labour, social interdependence 
is not a choice but a fact, and the failure to recognise this is the hubris of 
those who believe themselves somehow more than human— superhuman. 
Centrally, it is this conceit which inadvertently confirms what eventually 
becomes the neoliberal condition of indebtedness, since the endless desire to 
escape from the evil of social interdependence continually resolves in the 
demonization of social obligation in the idea of debt, where reliance on others 
is quantified with a view to repayment and cancellation in the name of the 
fantasy of absolute self- reliance. This is precisely what David Graeber (2011) 
recognises and continually affirms in his history of the idea and practice of 
debt— debt is everywhere in the form of the obligations which emerge from 
essential sociability and only becomes itself in the form of what we might 
call debt- in- itself as a kind of symptom of the desire to escape from sociability 
and its related obligations. This desire to escape is, of course, the utopian 
fantasy of the person who believes he is somehow above the social, where the 
classic case is the Nietzschean superman or American cowboy.
For Graeber (2011) primordial debt, which is the debt we owe to the world 
and everybody else in society, is inescapable because we cannot live without 
either our biological or sociological life support systems. Following Plato’s (1991) 
original story of the Republic, this thesis was most famously formulated under 
conditions of modernity by Thomas Hobbes (2008), who saw that people could 
not survive in a state of nature. On the basis of this view, Hobbes suggested a 
contract where people pay for social security with individual freedom. This is 
not, however, a one- off payment, and we must continually recognise our debt 
to society and others by setting aside our own interests in the name of the good 
of society. Although Hobbes never went so far as to suggest that people would 
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make this bargain out of anything but self- interest, which is where the problem 
of the liberal and what would become neoliberal fantasy of the self- reliant self 
comes from, Graeber (2011) finds in this basic contact between self and society 
the roots of the communistic idea that I would trace back to Plato and Badiou 
projects forwards into Hyper- Plato. However, where Plato, and by definition 
Hyper- Plato, see beauty in this social relation which creates universality, Hobbes 
and the original liberals saw necessity and self- preservation and were thus con-
stantly tempted to imagine potential escape. This is evidenced, of course, by the 
very idea of the contract, which suggests a legal bond, where no natural relation 
of trust exists— it is also clear how this contractual relation finds form in mon-
etary exchanges that similarly enable relations between strangers who have no 
desire to become brothers. At this point Graeber (2011) recalls both Marx (1988) 
and later Simmel (1997) when he notes that the problem with this monetary 
form of sociality is that it alienates humanity in quantity and transforms people 
into things. Under these conditions life becomes about calculation— how much 
am I/you worth?— and humanity is nowhere.
The irony of this situation, where humanity is transformed into an abstract 
quantity, is that it resolves into a miserable materialism, which is devoid of any 
kind of significance beyond more or fewer calculations. Against this brutal 
materialism, ironically devoid of the very ideality that both Plato (1991) and 
Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) suggest are essential to human life, Graeber (2011) 
notes that religion comes back to offer some transcendental significance. In the 
world of Hyper- Plato, we have seen that this is the case in the form of Islamic 
radicals concerned with opposing the reduction of life to timeless calculations, 
but it is also true that the extent to which religion opposes the liberal and more 
recently neoliberal capitalism of social relations is limited, per Nietzsche’s (2003) 
insight, by the endless need of the religious man to weigh his sins. Along the 
same lines we also know that Max Weber’s (2010) Calvinists, who founded 
American capitalism, sought to demonstrate their salvation through capitalist 
success. In the hyper- rational salvation economy that resulted from this psycho-
logical complex, God eventually left the scene, leaving behind a nihilistic machine 
that worked for its own sake but was somehow haunted by the original spirit 
of capitalism which says that escape from misery, debt, and sin is ultimately 
possible through monetary accumulation and consumption. This is essentially 
the capitalist utopia of Adam Smith (1982, 1999), where debt and the spectre 
of the defaulter who cannot escape his indebtedness are resolveable conditions— 
pathological states that we must tolerate, but not normalise, in order to save the 
ideal of the selfish individual who is ultimately self- contained, self- reliant, and 
also the key element of the good society.
This is essentially why the indebted man becomes such a moral problem 
in the contemporary global system— debt is essential to live and, under the 
psychological complex of capitalism, consume in order to live a good life, but 
it is also a moral evil that limits individualism, the core principle of the good, 
capitalist society. However, this becomes especially problematic under condi-
tions of financialised capitalism, where debt is a universal phenomenon, and 
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everybody’s future is a repayment plan that stretches out across an endless 
present. As Graeber (2011) notes, when this starts to happen there is no sense 
that there is an outside to debt, no sense of a capitalist utopia where I have 
no debt, and the very idea of debt as a social obligation which could be 
cancelled through final repayment starts to collapse back to the original uni-
versal communistic idea where I am obliged to everybody else who sustains 
my existence. In this sense Graeber (2011) shows how the dystopia of the 
post- Minotaur world, which was ultimately organised around the capitalist 
fantasy of an escape from indebtedness through excessive consumption, need 
not be simply about slump, insecurity, and precariousness. Although these 
conditions are the initial manifestations of the collapse of the Global Minotaur 
and the late capitalist utopian system that was home to the beast, we should 
not bemoan the critical stage of a machine organised around the idea that 
those who make it can buy their way out of social relations, somehow living 
outside of society like the monstrous offspring of Nietzsche’s superman and 
the Wolf of Wall Street, Jordan Belfort (2013). Beyond the initial crisis where 
debt becomes unmanageable and austerity transforms society into an inhuman 
dystopia, an unliveable wilderness, we may find the hopeless hope of Hyper- 
Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) universal, communist idea, where the moral evil of debt 
transforms itself into the transcendental principle of obligation and duty to 
others. What is more is that this is precisely what it is possible to see in 
austerity Europe today— a super- state caught between a dystopia totally insen-
sitive to human needs and a utopian adventure that recalls the origins of the 
European idea in the home of the original utopians, the ancient Greeks. For 
Zygmunt Bauman (2004), this is the choice that Europeans face. They must 
choose between the ordoliberal fortress state that wants to punish its own 
people and lock out anybody living beyond its borders or reject these paranoid 
politics in favour of a more human, socialistic state based upon the idea of 
universalism. In the recent work of the late German sociologist Ulrich Beck 
(2014), this decision comes down to a choice between Germany, and Merki-
avelli’s vision for a 19th- century future of Victorian capitalism, or Greece, and 
the original idea of Europe, which is simultaneously Spartan and universalistic 
and Athenian, and open to a future beyond the weight of debt to the great 
God of the bottom line. In the final section of this chapter, I return to Greece, 
home of the European idea and utopian thought and contemporary laboratory 
for the creation of capitalism with Asian characteristics outside of Asia itself.
III  Contemporary Greece and the Hopeless Hope of the 
Universal Idea
Perhaps the key difference between Plato (1991) and Badiou’s (2012) postmodern 
Hyper- Plato is that whereas the former wrote about his utopia from a position 
of assumed power and authority, his contemporary brother realises he is in the 
position of the revolutionary and must found his idealistic city on the grounds 
of the contemporary post- historical hegemon of Fukuyama (1992) and the 
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neoliberals. This is why the idea of the Event- God is so important to Hyper- 
Plato’s discussion, because it represents the critical point when the old system 
breaks down and is replaced by the beautiful idea of the future. However, this 
is ironically where Hyper- Plato’s analysis lacks— perhaps because of his ancient 
brother’s work, and his position of assumed power, Hyper- Plato has little sense 
of a revolutionary politics or how to oppose a state which is organised around 
holding onto power, even though it is itself dead on its feet, a kind of stagger-
ing, shambling zombie devoid of thought. In this respect, I think that it is pos-
sible to say that what we need to take from Hyper- Plato is a vision of the new, 
and the necessity of the communist idea, but that we should turn to others for 
a politics of resistance and rebellion. In the current context, and especially in 
the home of utopia, Greece, where the krisis of the neoliberal system is perhaps 
most keenly felt, Hyper- Plato provides the idea of communist, but not a revo-
lutionary politics of opposition. In search of this politics of resistance we might 
turn, for example, to Jacques Ranciere’s (2010) theory of dissensus to oppose 
the contemporary consensus of the undead. In Ranciere’s classic exploration of 
the notion of dissensus, he explains that the real politics must oppose pure politics 
because these are based upon a distinction between the rulers and the ruled 
where the rulers make decisions and tell the ruled what to do. Akin to Hyper- 
Plato (Badiou, 2012), who insists upon universality and the polymorphic nature 
of the citizen, Ranciere says that real politics occur when those who are absolutely 
outside of the circle of pure politics make their voices heard. Again following 
Badiou’s Hyper- Plato, who finds the idea of the future in the wretched of the 
earth who have been transformed into animals by a city which has no place 
for them, Ranciere’s politics come from the part of society that has no part or 
place in society.
But while utopian politics emerge in the socially excluded, the shit of society, 
in both Ranciere (2010) and Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012), Ranciere is quick 
to say that those who manage pure politics, those in power who call the shots, 
will never simply roll over and allow a new society based in the idea to take 
shape. In thesis 7 of his ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, he introduces his concept of 
the police which ensures the ‘distribution of the sensible’ and excludes others 
who have no place in the hegemonic vision of society. Thus the police ensure 
that the hegemon remains in place by preventing the emergence of legitimate 
opposition and telling those who may be sympathetic to other views to move 
on and simply accept the status quo in the name of security and stability. 
According to Ranciere’s (2010) Althusserian concept of police, there is nothing 
to see in the crisis— in fact, there is no crisis— and what people need to do 
is simply readjust to the new hegemonic vision of normality. Against this 
vision of consensus, which Ranciere associates with contemporary post- 
democracy, post- politics, and authoritarian capitalism, he explains that what is 
required is a new vision of politics which embraces the principle of dissent 
or what he calls dissensus. Indeed, from Ranciere’s point of view everything 
went awry when Plato (1991) sought to produce a perfectly ordered city with 
no space for opposition or debate. In his view, the problem with the Platonic 
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model is that it relies on the idea of political philosophy, where the order of 
the city is an object of truth rather than debate, because what this excludes 
is the possibility of the inclusion of the part that has no part— in other words, 
those who dissent. Thus Ranciere’s (2010) Plato is a police philosopher— a 
philosopher of order and security— and what he seeks to introduce is a phi-
losophy of resistance and opposition.
In terms of the contemporary global situation explored above, I think this 
theory of resistance is vital, because this is exactly what we cannot take from 
Hyper- Plato. Against his ancient brother, who was a philosopher of authori-
tarian order, Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) drops the idea of an urban utopia 
organised around the myth of metals and instead opts for a social system based 
on a far more flexible conception of universality. Centrally, my interpretation 
of Badiou’s (2012) Hyper- Plato is that he absolutely accepts the value of dis-
sensus, debate, and disagreement, and that this is written into the very form 
of his work on the ideal city. Although he seeks to contain this within the 
bounds of his idea, there is no sense in which this is based upon the exclusion 
of a part that has no part. Indeed, the only exclusion that we find in Hyper- 
Plato’s city is the exclusion of the exclusive desire for division which, for 
example, relies on the tyrannical rulership of the poor. This is, of course, 
precisely the exclusion of pure state- based politics which Ranciere effects in 
his defence of the need for the real politics of dissent. However, what we 
cannot find in Hyper- Plato— and this is why I think Ranciere’s thesis is 
important for my discussion— is a theory of resistance to police power, beyond 
the idea that we must escape the command of habit that becomes the habit 
of command in Ranciere’s theory of real politics. While resistance is implicit 
in Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012), whose very reappearance on the contemporary 
scene is symbolic of the attempt to question the undead norms of the neo-
liberal, end of history paradigm that we follow out of habit, what Ranciere 
(2010) provides is an explicit theory of resistance and the need to oppose the 
state’s vision of the new normality of what Yannis Stavrakakis (2013) calls the 
debt society. My view of Hyper- Plato’s work is that he performs this resistance 
through the way he seeks to derealise or derange the contemporary political 
scene through his discussion of the basic fundamentals of the good society. I 
think Badiou’s (2012) Hyper- Plato resists through the way he throws the 
ancient past into the undead present in the name of the rebirth of the new— 
the precise effect of this procedure is to effect the disruption of police order 
which Ranciere calls for in his political theory and open a space for dissensus 
and the participation of the part that has no part in normal state politics.
However, Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) also leads the reader back to Greece, 
the home of the original utopians, frontierland of the contemporary global 
krisis, most advanced space of social dystopia under conditions of austerity 
and, as a consequence, the most likely space for the re- emergence of the 
beautiful utopian idea into the undead world of post- politics. Writing about 
the ways in which the ancient past haunts the Greek present in his book on 
Athens, Jacques Derrida (2010) explains that we owe ourselves to the other 
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side and the idea of the great universal which inspired Socrates, the first phi-
losopher who ultimately gave himself to death, the universal, and the idea in 
399 BC. According to Vangelis Calotychos (2003), this sense of indebtedness 
to the ancient past is a particularly Greek phenomenon, which finds form in 
what he calls Greek ‘ab- sense’, a sense of otherness or separation, which is also 
a sense of lack, loss, or Freudian melancholia. Perhaps it is this melancholic 
sense of indebtedness to the idea, or what we might call, following Derrida 
(1994), the spectres of Plato, which brought the student of Socrates back from 
the dead in Badiou’s (2012) spooky Hyper- Plato. Following Derrida’s (1994) 
theory of spooks and Ranciere’s (2010) work on politics, I think that it is 
possible to see how Hyper- Plato haunts the contemporary scene— the funereal 
logic of the Greeks means that it is here, in the space of the philosophers, that 
the pigs, those who suffer, those who know what is at stake, those who have 
no part, will continue to come back and haunt police power. Despite their 
misery, these are the people of the other utopia which contrasts so starkly 
with the fantasy of neoliberal Greece that began to emerge in the early 21st 
century, and especially around the spectacle of the 2004 Olympics.
For the political theorist Paschalis Kitromilides (2013), this tension between 
freedom and conservatism has always been present in modern Greek culture 
and remains live in contemporary postmodern Greece. While the ghosts of 
Socrates and Plato haunted Greek modernity and Enlightenment politics from 
the 18th century onwards, there was always a particularist, nationalistic, intol-
erant strain in Greek culture, concerned to create a new Greece on the basis 
of opposition to the Ottoman invaders from the east. Although there is a 
principle of freedom at work in the resistance to invasion, and Ranciere (2010) 
would approve of the dissent of the ruled in the face of the ruler, the problem 
with this expression of Greek political freedom is that it resolved into a form 
of chauvinism and fascism which reflects Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) expla-
nation of the way in which democracy and rebellion slide into tyranny when 
they lose their relationship to a universalistic idea of truthfulness. I think that 
we can find these two tendencies present within contemporary Greek politics— on 
the one hand, those haunted by the spirit of Socrates, the anarchists, want to 
reform the city outside of the post- political system of the elites, and on the 
other hand, the elites who have become the modern, and today postmodern, 
tyrants who rely on police power and fascist extremists in order to defend 
their interests that are absolutely lined up with those of the neoliberal utopians 
are out to protect the undead system defined by injustice, inequality, division, 
and confusion.
In his work on the contemporary Greek political situation, Costas Douzinas 
(2013) outlines this struggle between the people, who are outside of state politics 
and centrally have no democratic control over the dictates of the infamous troika 
of the European Union, European Central Bank, and International Monetary 
Fund which has sought to pull the strings of government from a distance, and 
the elites, who are committed to the maintenance of the zombie neoliberal 
system that continues to destroy Greek society. Early in his book Douzinas notes 
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that he first became involved in the Greek crisis when he was made aware 
of the situation of the three hundred Hepatia immigrants on hunger strike over 
the state’s refusal of their basic human rights to recognition. Recalling the famous 
three hundred Spartans who similarly stood up to the immense material force 
in the name of principle, Douzinas (2013) explains that the Hepatia immigrants 
symbolise the wider struggle of the Greek people with the state that reduces 
them to the status of inhumans, or homo sacer, the Roman figure who may be 
killed with impunity because he stands outside of the law. Against the inhuman-
ity of the figure Giorgio Agamben (1998) explores in his book of the same 
name, Douzinas argues that the Greek people have little choice but to fight for 
freedom and democracy. Since the state has defined normal politics in terms of 
agreement with neoliberalism and austerity, they have no choice but to take up 
real politics, Ranciere’s (2010) politics of dissent, on the street and in the square, 
the ancient agora, which was, ironically, the foundation space of both the market 
and debate and discussion in the ancient city. In reclaiming the square for politics, 
Douzinas (2013) regards those who occupied Syntagma Square in Athens in the 
summer of 2011 as the last free men in Greece— the followers of Hyper- Plato 
and the beautiful idea of communism. While the neoliberal police want to 
transform man into homo economicus, the contemporary indebted man who must 
become an entrepreneurial machine in order to keep his head above water, 
Douzinas defends the protestors because they keep alive the democratic tradition 
of zoon politikon, the human as political animal.
In Douzinas’ (2013) account of the Greek situation, this democratic struggle 
is absolutely necessary because the neoliberal demand to repay debt has created 
a humanitarian crisis across the country. Of course, in the hands of the Greek 
elites this demand has led to a repeat of the global response, where socialism 
comes in to save the rich, while the people are thrown to the lions of the 
market. For Douzinas, this has become the new reality principle of Greece 
and the rest of Europe which the neoliberal elites have sought to normalise to 
the exclusion of opposition and resistance. This is the case even in the face 
of the extremity of the situation, where austerity is not simply an economic 
policy, but a biopolitical form of life, which threatens the means of existence 
of large sections of the population. In line with Michel Foucault’s (2004) 
theory of biopower developed in his lecture course, Society Must Be Defended, 
where the biopolitical shift represents a move away from taking life towards 
letting die, what I think we can see in the politics of austerity is a strategy 
of abandonment, where the state looks after the neoliberal elites and simply 
lets the people live or die. The politics of this strategy have, of course, been 
governed by an idea of abdication of responsibility— ‘in the face of the global 
crash there is little that governments can do, but seek to tighten their belts’— 
which excuses malign neglect and any need to intervene in the situation of 
what Stuckler and Basu (2013) call the body economic. If the body politic is 
caught between a normal politics of neoliberal austerity, where the rich receive 
welfare and the poor are thrown to the lions, and the politics of resistance, 
where the poor assert their right to live a decent life and the rich respond 
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with brutal police power, Stuckler and Basu explain that the austerity body 
economic is in crisis, split between those living on the edge of survival, where 
poverty, unemployment, depression, intoxication, and suicide have become the 
norm, and those who continue to profit, even in the face of such catastrophe. 
According to the vision of Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012), there could not be a 
less beautiful, more grotesque society than this— a society defined by misery, 
division, and hate.
This is, of course, a far cry from the utopian fantasy of the new Greece, which 
emerged in shadow of the Global Minotaur. In the early years of the new 
century, Greece grew on the basis of the same financial bubble that sustained 
the American fantasy of endless consumption, and even built its own hyper- real 
utopia of a global Greece. Before Badiou (2012) brought Plato back for the 
political crisis of the 21st century, the Greek neoliberals had already sought to 
bring ancient history to the postmodern present in the form of the Olympics, 
which involved the transformation of Athens into a spectacular global city. In 
this new self- confident capitalist Greece, the Anglo- American obsession with 
property ownership and property prices began to take hold, and upmarket areas 
of Athens such as Kolonaki became playgrounds of the elites who had money 
to burn. However, in the much the same way that the neoliberalisation of urban 
space across the world has always been absolutely exclusive, the development of 
Athens never really took account of people or Greek society itself, which had 
never been organised around the kind of industrial capitalism of its northern 
European neighbours, such as Britain and Germany. What this means is that 
the neoliberal fantasy world was bought and built on the back of state indebt-
edness, rather than a strong productive base, and when the Global Minotaur 
could no longer hold the global system together, the fantasy was exposed to the 
cold light of day. At this point the people were held to account for the neoliberal 
excesses of the rich by the transnational elites who never had any intention of 
accepting the costs of the overblown financial system. Under conditions of 
austerity, what Ross Domoney (2014) calls the authoritarian- financial complex 
took over from normal political process and Greece entered a phase of military 
neoliberalism defined by the absolute opposition between the elites, the fascist 
Golden Dawn party, and the anarchists and leftists, who would come to identity 
with the radical left party, Syriza.
While the fascists have sought to transform the crisis into a problem of the 
other, the foreigner, and the immigrant, the elites, backed by the transnational 
neoliberals, have followed the logic of disaster capitalism Naomi Klein (2008) 
explains in her work, The Shock Doctrine. In the face of social, economic, and 
political crisis, the neoliberal elites have begun to dismantle the public sector 
and privatise its functions. Wages have been driven down in the name of the 
transformation of Greece into a neoliberal paradise, and the country has effec-
tively been downsized. For Panayota Gounari (2014), this radical transformation 
of the body economic has led to catastrophic effects, which she explains in 
terms of social necrophilia. Here, she makes use of Erich Fromm’s (1992) psy-
choanalysis of necrophilia from his work on human destructiveness to try to 
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understand a form of economic behaviour which punishes, attacks, and essentially 
destroys the social in the name of calculation. In tracing the thanatological 
dimensions of austerity, Gounari says that death is everywhere in Athens— 
children suffer from malnutrition, young people face lives organised around 
redundancy, and the poor must struggle to make ends meet on the streets. Thus 
Athens becomes a thanatopolis, a city where people struggle to survive, and 
there is no future because basic survival is everything. Following the same train 
of thought, where culture starts to collapse back to nature under pressure of 
economic violence, Laurie Penny (2012) notes that Athens is a city in the process 
of disintegration. In order to capture this state of urban anomie she calls her 
short book Discordia and explains that in the divided city there is no sense of 
the future. In this respect, Athens becomes a strange, timeless zone— a horrible 
inversion of utopia, a true dystopia, where the Lacanian symbolic order which 
organises the way people situate themselves in time and space collapses into a 
psychotic version of Fukuyama’s (1992) society at the end of history. In response 
to this social psychosis where life seems entirely meaningless, those trapped at 
the very bottom of Greek society have turned to narcotics and in particular to 
shisha, or the cocaine of the poor, which addicts report ‘makes you want to 
kill’. Is this not, then, the perfect narcotic for a thanatological society destroyed 
by austerity and in the grip of a kind of civil war between the neoliberal elites, 
the fascist champions of the death drive who have absolutely embraced the state 
of social war, and the leftists who remain committed to Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 
2012) universal idea of communal justice and equality?
Under these conditions contemporary Greece recalls Weimar Germany in 
the 1920s. In much the same way that Weimar Germany was wrecked by 
crisis and suspended between the communist and fascist solutions to the ruins 
of capitalism, Greece is a nation set to pause— the way forward is 19th- century 
capitalism, the radical left, or the extreme right. Caught in this moment of 
interval, Christos Filippidis (2011) explains that the city no longer fulfils its 
civic function. Where the original city, the polis, was designed to organise 
people in order to enable them to live better, more secure, human lives, Filip-
pidis explains that contemporary Athens has become an urban jungle of 
violence and conflict. In the face of the collapse of capitalist society, Filippidis 
explains that the abstract space of the city, which is set up to manage the 
population, no longer holds. In other words, the order of the Greek city has 
broken down before the anger, resentment, and violence released by the eco-
nomic crisis. Although these emotions are considered largely pathological in 
neoliberal society, where instrumental rationality, calculation, and objective 
measures of cost versus benefit take precedence, Peter Sloterdijk (2010) explains 
that anger is in the very origins of Europe. Long before Socrates and Plato 
made the idea central to European thought, Homer’s heroes inhabited what 
Sloterdijk calls a utopia of motivation— a universe where everything comes 
back to drive and the struggle to escape the gravity of nature. According to 
Sloterdijk, this motivation is absolutely necessary to human life. It is what 
separates humans from animals and complete immersion in the world. In the 
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Greek case, we might say that this motivation, anger, and indignation is all 
that is keeping the people alive and preventing them sliding into complete 
submission. In this respect, Ranciere’s (2010) idea of dissensus is less about 
politics and more about metabolism or basic survival in the face of a vision 
of consensus which is committed to nihilism and destruction.
The problem in Greece is, of course, that this necessary anger has taken 
two forms. While the left has sought to argue for the beautiful idea, social 
unity, and equality, the extreme right has employed a psycho- politics of sadism 
in order to mobilise the poor against others. In this situation, the fascist party, 
Golden Dawn, trades on the idea that the way out of the crisis is to brutalise 
people worse off than yourself in a kind of brutal social war where the only 
law is survival of the fittest. Against Hyper- Plato’s communist idea, then, the 
philosophical guide of Golden Dawn would be Thrasymachus, who took the 
view that power is everything and might is right. There is no society here, 
but instead a strange antisocial density of people characterised by revulsion of 
proximity. Sloterdijk (2010) captures the idea of this antisocial society, where 
people are revolted by the others they have to live with, through the concept 
of Sartrean hell which we find in his play No Exit (1989)— ‘Hell is other 
people.’ In this state, living through anger and hate, the fascist cannot stand 
other people who become monstrous. As Klaus Theweleit (1987, 1989) explains 
in his study of Nazi psychology in Weimar Germany, fascists seek to over-
compensate for their own destroyed self through the destruction of the other. 
In this respect they transform themselves into hyper- masculine, armoured, 
militarised machines, and then dehumanise the other, who becomes a kind of 
abomination, in order to wipe out the very possibility of a social relation— it 
is, of course, impossible to insist upon a social relation when neither member 
of the potential relationship is human or capable of relationality. In the Greek 
case, the fascist body becomes a throwback to the ideal classical body, the 
Discobolus (Discus Thrower) of Myron, whom the Nazi sculptor Arno Breker 
idealised in works such as his 1935 Prometheus, while the body of the other 
is transformed into Dionysus, a monster beyond reason and centrally the 
characteristics of beauty, symmetry, and order that both Plato (1991) and 
Hyper- Plato (Badiou, 2012) link to goodness and truthfulness.
The truth of the matter is, ironically, that it is the fascist body, and the 
fascist self, which is ugly, distorted, and divided against itself, in the sense that 
the fascist is conscious of his own weakness but chooses to refuse this in a 
spectacular display of power, a fantasy of strength which masks his own impo-
tence and absolutely relies on the construction of the monstrous other who 
simply needs to be destroyed. In other words, the fascist hates himself, but 
projects this onto the other, who becomes a screen for his own monstrosity. 
Quite apart from the struggle with the neoliberal elites, who are also set on 
the preservation of inequality and injustice, the leftist resistance must also 
oppose this fascist violence, which is in truth simply a symptom of the prin-
ciple of radical division inherent in neoliberal politics. The result of this ideo-
logical connection between neoliberal politics and the rise of fascism, which 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   47 10-12-2016   8:17:28 PM
48 Back to the Future
is clearly articulated in Hyper- Plato’s (Badiou, 2012) account of the slide 
towards dystopia, is that the Greek police clearly identify with and support 
Golden Dawn. Under these conditions, the problem of the left is not only 
that its politics is abjected, othered, and ruled out of bounds by the police 
concerned with defending the neoliberal centre, but that the police are also 
supportive of the extreme right, whose reaction to the presence of otherness 
is violent attack. In the Greek case, this is not a new situation. As Neni 
Panourgia (2009) explains in her work on the Greek left, Dangerous Citizens, 
leftists have historically been abjected by the state and forced to fight a kind 
of endless social war in order to survive. In this respect, Greek politics has a 
history of resistance to consensus, especially in the form of anarchism which 
steps out of state politics, because national unity has often been by dictatorship, 
and the result of state terror and the suppression of opposition.
Ranciere’s (2010) politics of resistance and dissent is, therefore, not new 
in the Greek context— in this case it is not a novelty based upon the end 
of history and the rise of post- political consensus, but rather a tradition 
grounded in opposition to state power where consensus is often founded 
upon the exercise of violence. Along these lines, Douzinas (2013) argues 
that the force of the multitude has utopian potential to change the situation 
in Greece. He understands their protest in terms of Ranciere’s idea of true 
politics beyond the state and links them back to the ancient tradition of 
direct democracy where government was not simply by representation. 
Beyond representative politics, the occupation of Syntagma of 2011 was thus 
about the exercise of counter- power. When the multitude says that they 
have had enough of those in power, they are no longer simply a crowd, but 
rather united, transformed into what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
(2000) call the multitude, by their common opposition. This is an important 
step for Douzinas, and Badiou agrees with him in his work on the rebirth 
of history from its long sleep under the influence of Fukuyama’s (1992) 
theory, because he thinks that anger, rage, and indignation create a proto- 
unity, a ‘we’, far beyond the immediate space of the square. Although Syn-
tagma was, in his view, the immediate point of resistance, the space where 
the people rejected power and challenged the common- sense consensus of 
neoliberalism, this moment of dissent connected with other spaces of rebel-
lion across time and space to form a history of opposition and a narrative 
of indignation that captured the spirit of the times and further unsettled the 
already shaken hegemon. In this way Douzinas (2013) connects Syntagma 
to riots in the Paris suburbs in 2005 and London in 2011 and numerous 
other cases of rebellion through the idea of angry counter- power and sug-
gests that we can link these rioters together to form a network of resistance— a 
negative proto- communist unity. The concept of negativity is central here, 
however, because there is little sense of an idea in these outbursts of violence— 
there is no positive sense of where these protests would lead or how they 
would replace power.
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However, what these moments can be seen to reflect is the emergence of 
Hyper- Plato’s Event- God, which smashes through the consensus and opens the 
space for some new social, political, economic, and cultural paradigm. In rec-
ognition of the need to take advantage of this critical moment, Douzinas (2013) 
suggests that the next step for the Greek resistance is to capture the state through 
the support of Syriza— the postmodern communist opposition— and from there 
to find ways to challenge the destruction of society through austerity. In other 
words, anger, indignation, and refusal are not enough on their own. In order to 
effectively oppose the transformation of the Greek into bare life in the service 
of the German economic machine, Douzinas clearly supports Badiou’s Hyper- 
Platonic solution— political organisation centred on the defence of an idea of 
justice, equality, and communism. Following the anarchists, who shout, ‘We are 
an image of the future,’ Douzinas (2013) hangs the future of Europe on the 
politics of contemporary Greece and the hope that the leftists might be able to 
somehow save society from the neoliberal necrophilic economic good. Akin to 
Badiou (2012), who brings Plato back to the present in the name of the future 
in the form of Hyper- Plato, Douzinas looks to the past, and the ur- space of 
utopia, for his sense of universal truth. Against the brutal materialism of neo-
liberal capitalism, which has no sense of humanity or value beyond economic 
calculation, he explains that the other— where this can mean other people, other 
ideas, and other values— has always been central to Greek thought. Indeed, in 
many respects the experience of thinking itself is always the thought of the 
other, the thought of the unthought, because it cannot be anything else. In 
Douzinas’ (2013) view, then, our task should be to think— we must think, and 
think otherwise, through the lens of the foreigner, who is always strange— because 
it is only when we think through strangeness that we can think outside of 
police power which orders our lives, cancels our thought in automatic response, 
and normalises the inhumanity of the capitalist system. Where Badiou (2012) 
reinvents Plato in the form of Hyper- Plato, who is always more than his ancestor, 
Douzinas thus makes Greece speak to a wider situation. We might, therefore, 
say that his Greece is a kind of Hyper- Greece— a symptom or navel which we 
can trace outwards, towards a global or universal problem, and a global or uni-
versal idea. Despite this universality, however, there is no sense in which Douzinas’ 
(2013) Greece is somehow a philosophical abstraction. On the contrary, his 
dystopia is now— it is live and urgently demands the utopian response, the 
beautiful idea of communism, which the party, Syriza, has thus far found impos-
sible to deliver, but which remains on the other side of the borderline of the 
neoliberal nightmare.
Filmography
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I  The Theology of Unbelief
The central question of contemporary capitalism revolves around its impossible 
durability. How has this socio- economic system, which celebrates the extreme 
wealth of a small minority at the price of the impoverishment of so many, 
survived the recent financial crash that revealed its undemocratic core? The 
answer to this question may reside in the utopian form of late capitalism, which 
also signifies its dystopic democratic deficit. Of course, this is not to suggest 
that there is anything particularly unusual about undemocratic government or 
in fact assert that democracy is necessarily the best form of government. Indeed, 
we might conclude that Pericles’ model of government is inherently pathological, 
best suited to the kind of critical opposition we find in Socrates, and note Plato’s 
(1991) opposition to the rule of the stupid masses that put his teacher to death. 
Moreover, the reader would not be surprised by the claim that what the con-
temporary Anglo- American champions of freedom idealise in their populist 
rhetoric is in practice nothing like the political form the Greeks spoke about 
in terms of democracy, but that they were never particularly keen on in any 
case. The Greek, and most famously Platonic, problem of democracy was that 
it put too much power in the hands of the masses, who simply cannot be trusted 
because of their tendency to elect crowd- pleasers and tyrants who are only too 
happy to tell them what they want to hear. However, the problem with con-
temporary capitalism in its neoliberal form is that it even fails on this cynical 
measure of democratic government, primarily because it can no longer pretend 
to be able to offer the people what they want in exchange for their subservi-
ence. That is to say that even if one rejects the notion of the ideal electorate 
able to vote for the common good rather than their own interests, the problem 
with democratic government under conditions of neoliberalism, and what the 
financial crash and most especially the response to the crash reveals, is that it is 
no longer possible to say that it is in any real way connected to political democ-
racy in even the cynical sense, where the people vote for the leaders who are 
likely to give them what they want, because it is constrained by an ideological 
form that is inherently utopian and ideologically undemocratic. What the 
response to the crash revealed is that beyond the utopia of democratic 
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participation, where people vote for the best polis, and further out than the 
cynical city, where people vote for the leader who will serve their own ends, 
we encounter the tyrannical asociety, where even the cynical vision of democracy 
collapses and the idea of a free vote is a sham designed to preserve the fantasy 
that the people are in power, while the tyrannical leaders pull the strings. This 
was, of course, Plato’s (1991) fear about democracy— he thought that it contained 
the tendency to collapse into tyranny. It may be that this ancient horror story 
has been realised today in the emergence of the neoliberal capitalist utopia, 
where democracy is little more than a screen to hide the truth of a new form 
of economic totalitarianism.
Centrally the key ideologues of late capitalism, including Friedrich Hayek 
(2001) and Milton Friedman (2002), who I propose to explore in this chapter, 
made the connection between capitalism and freedom on the basis that gov-
ernment should work for the economy, in order to ensure fair competition 
and maintain economic order, but absolutely not become embroiled in dictating 
ends to people who are more than capable of making their own decisions. In 
this respect, the early neoliberals wanted to move away from laissez- faire, 
because the classic political economists, such as Smith (1982, 1999), put too 
much emphasis on the ability of the market to regulate itself, but were also 
concerned to avoid any kind of interference in the market itself. Instead, they 
wanted to set the rules, regulations, and laws of economy in order to make 
sure capitalism works. Although there can be little doubt that they believed, 
and perhaps some even continue to believe, in freedom inside the market, it 
is more difficult to make the claim that they had or have the same faith in 
proper political freedom, which we might define in terms of the freedom to 
make decisions about the organisation of the market, simply because the latter 
would tend to threaten the technocratic belief that what matters in govern-
ment is not some idealistic concern with debates about fundamental goods, 
but rather governance, to use a Foucauldian term which has entered the lexicon 
of capitalist institutions shorn of all its critical significance, and the organisa-
tion of rules to ensure economic efficiency. In this respect, there is nothing 
democratic about neoliberal capitalism, unless we think in economic terms 
about the objective nature of competitive struggle, which this form suggests 
should be organised in order to reward merit where this refers to ability, hard 
work, creativity, and sensitivity to market needs.
Thus contemporary neoliberal capitalism is never really democratic in politi-
cal terms, because its ideological form demands that political leaders abandon 
their concern with ends in favour of working on means which ensure that 
economy becomes a space of freedom. What this means is that even when 
an electorate votes for this, that, or the other leader on the basis of their media 
performance, their ability to charm the people or ‘look the part’, the political 
freedoms neoliberal politicians offer are illusory because they are in truth 
technocrats already bound by a utopian vision that the best kind of society 
is one characterised by a capitalist economics and driven forward by competi-
tive struggle which stimulates innovation, development, and modernity. The 
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reason this vision is truly utopian is because it suspends the space of political 
debate, which no longer matters because the decision has been made by his-
tory. As Margaret Thatcher announced in the early 1980s when she said that 
‘there is no alternative’, and Francis Fukuyama (1992) proclaimed a decade 
later when the wall came down, history is over because capitalism is the only 
game in town. In my view this is why neoliberal capitalism first realised in 
the Conservative and Republican governments of the late 1970s and early 
1980s signifies the emergence of the capitalist utopia which has been rolled 
out over the last three decades and become a kind of global common sense 
that owes its durability to the absence of alternatives which it has itself abol-
ished through the foreclosure of democratic space.
This is precisely what Wendy Brown (2015) explains in her book on the 
neoliberal destruction of the utopia of democracy, possibility, and imagination. 
What she shows is that neoliberalism represents the humiliation of politics by 
economics and the transformation of the former into the administrator of the 
master field of the latter. But it is not only politics that is humiliated by 
economics in this neoliberal utopia, because law loses its fundamental concern 
with justice and starts to become about the creation of regulation best placed 
to ensure efficiency and competition. Similarly, sociology becomes a form of 
statistical knowledge production organised to enable the new capitalist state 
to sharpen its social policy to ensure economy functions more effectively. 
Given this utopian machine, where electorates vote for political leaders who 
humiliate politics in the administration of economy, law in the creation of 
regulation for competition, and sociology in knowledge production concerned 
with the creation, maintenance, and defence of competitive society fraught 
with alienation, anomie, and potential collapse, what people vote for is less 
ideals and more technocratic competence that they simply cannot assess for 
lack of expertise and knowledge. Moreover, even if we assume this expertise 
and knowledge, and take the view that the late capitalist voter is a competitive 
individual who makes decisions on the basis of what is good for him rather 
than good for society as a whole, the contemporary neoliberal order would 
be left with a democratic deficit simply because what the response to the 
economic crash has revealed is that the kind of utopia the neoliberals have in 
mind is less one that champions free competition in order to ensure maximum 
efficiency in distribution of goods, and more one concerned with the defence 
of class power and construction of a social, political, economic, and cultural 
system defined by the mass acceptance of extreme levels of inequality. But 
why is this the revelation of the crash and subsequent neoliberal responses?
The democratic deficit is the truth of the financial crash because the history 
of the period post 2008 has seen governments step in to defend the financial 
system and act as ‘lender of last resort’, but then look to pass this debt down 
to the masses in the form of austerity in such a way that reveals the class bias 
of the political elites, who are undoubtedly over- identified with the economic 
system they support through regulation and policy. In this way the neoliberal 
utopia has been revealed to be less about the objective defence of economic 
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freedom against the state concerned with unfairly redistributing in the name 
of social justice and more about a class war that no longer speaks its name, 
primitive accumulation, precariatisation of the middle classes and proletariat— 
who can no longer assume their place in the socio- economic system and base 
critique on this position— and the progressive immiseration of the world’s 
poor, who become a vast reserve pool of labour. This is the utopia of neo-
liberal capitalism for the super- rich revealed by the crash that ended the 
Anglo- American fantasy of universal embourgeoisement, development, and 
modernisation and is in truth a far more pervasive dystopia of inequality, 
desperation, and hopelessness about the lack of alternatives caused by the 
capture of politics by economy. It is in respect of the collapse of the neoliberal 
fantasy of endless growth, what the American champions of the managed free 
market called the great moderation, that the economist John Quiggin (2012) 
writes of zombie economics in order to explain the view that even though 
it is clear that neoliberal ideas no longer work in the real world, the neoliberal 
elites continue to push these notions post- mortem, because they have no other 
way of thinking. However, it is also quite possible that the contemporary 
neoliberals realise that their ideas are bankrupt insofar as they could ever deliver 
better lives, development, modernity, and hope for the majority, but that they 
are content to continue to operate on the basis of neoliberal principles simply 
because they serve their utopian purpose— the creation of a global system of 
super- exploitation able to extract profit from workers too poor to resist and 
interest from debtors who must borrow money in order to survive.
This is the capitalist utopia par excellence simply because it contains no 
resistance in the form of an ideology of socialist reason able to separate itself 
from the history of totalitarianism and provide the masses with an alternative 
way of thinking to frame their complaints about the everyday misery of living 
in the neoliberal utopia. Since there is no sense of socialist reason, where 
politics comes back to humiliate economics in order to open a space for the 
true democratic discussion of fundamental goods beyond economic rules, 
regulations, and restrictions, the masses easily buy into the neoliberal dream-
worlds that circulate through the channels of what Adorno and Horkheimer 
(1997) spoke about in terms of the culture industry, even though they cynically 
know that the fantasy will always remain beyond their reach. In this respect 
the high- end neoliberal utopia, which revolves around the fantastical creation 
of a city of absolute carnal indulgence, is always beyond the reach of the vast 
majority, even though they hold onto it for the lack of any other viable belief 
system. Outside of the rich middle classes and desperate proles, who desire 
neoliberalism’s fantasy spaces in order to fend off the dark night of precarity 
that haunts them every day, the world’s poor labour under the illusion that 
the capitalist meritocracy may deliver them a better life, where they can eat, 
drink clean water, and access health care and education. It is only the absolute 
minority, David Graeber’s (2013) 1 percent, who live in the neoliberal utopia, 
where carnal pleasure is everything and the life of the mind is meaningless. 
This is why the capitalist utopia is no utopia worthy of the name.
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Although we may speak of the neoliberal form through the idea of utopia, 
because it entails the totalisation or globalisation of a particular vision of the 
world, it would be a mistake to imagine that there is any wider philosophical 
sense in which this form of capitalism could deliver a utopian world. The idea 
that capitalism, never mind neoliberal capitalism, could produce a better world 
for the masses represents the central fantastical idea of free market thought from 
Mandeville (1989) through Smith (1982) to Mises (2007). But even more, the 
economic humiliation of the political, and as a consequence philosophical, means 
that the outside edge of the capitalist utopia, the moment when needs are met 
and degenerate into wants, and then beyond modest wants the most perverse 
desires humans can imagine in order to give themselves something, however 
meaningless, to believe in, is a truly stupid, perverse utopia. This is the contem-
porary neoliberal utopia, which pretends to operate on the basis of absolute 
efficiency, but reveals its perversity through its fundamental defence of economic 
reason. This perversity emerges from the fundamental economism of neoliberal 
thought that cancels politics and philosophy and transforms society and culture 
into spaces of idiocy and madness that masquerade as places organised around 
the democratic freedom to choose. This is, however, a truly psychotic vision of 
freedom and choice, which will never be able to organise a life, or the life of 
a society, because politics and philosophy remain the arts of debate, decision, 
and the good. Economics cannot replace politics and philosophy, and the result 
of its arrogant attempt to do so is the emergence of the perverse utopia, con-
temporary neoliberalism.
What is more is that this critique of economy is clearly known in Western 
thought. Consider Aristotle’s (2009) Politics, where he warns about the perversity 
of money, which can become an end in itself; Weber’s (1992) Economy and 
Society, where instrumental reason threatens to transform society into a rational 
nightmare, an iron cage; or Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1997) horror of the 
dialectic of the Enlightenment, where freedom collapses into unfreedom and 
slavery. Of the course, the problem with the neoliberal present is that despite 
our knowledge of these critiques, we fail to take them seriously because we 
believe in the madness of late capitalist reason, the neoliberal utopia. If this 
is the case, our next question should be: What is it about the neoliberal utopia 
that leads people to believe but simultaneously stubbornly refuse to recognise 
the utopian madness of this form of reason? In order to answer this question 
we must look back to the history of Western thought, Platonism, and the con-
nection made between Plato’s ideal city and totalitarianism by Karl Popper 
(2002a) in his work on the open society. In this work Popper firmly identifies 
Plato, utopianism, and the horrors of totalitarianism, and at the same time 
advances the cause of liberalism, which refuses the fantasy of historicism where 
the future resides in the present which resides in the past, and perhaps most 
importantly the theory of methodological individualism. While the critique of 
historicism insists upon the idea of the open society, which is characterised by 
the openness of its conception of the future, methodological individualism ensures 
that this openness functions in microscopic terms. Here, liberal individuals 
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maintain an essential critical distance from others who may influence their 
opinion. As a result they are able to think for themselves. The other side of 
this independence, however, entails the individuals’ essential limitation. Since 
they remain apart from others, and as a result outside of any prevailing world-
view, their view of the world is also partial, limited, and incapable of a holistic 
vision of the social, political, economic, or cultural situation.
The value of this view for Popper (2002a), and the other members of the 
Austrian school such as Hayek (2001) and Mises (2007), is that it ensures, first, 
liberal independence, since no one individual can claim the role of universal 
planner, and second, the primacy of the intelligence of the collective that knows 
more than any singular individual. In Popper’s work it is this methodological 
individualism that ensures that the liberal society is an open society. For Mises 
and Hayek, it is this figure, the figure of the individual, who ensures the supremacy 
of the market society, since the mechanism that pools the intelligence of indi-
viduals to create collective intelligence is the market. Where the utopian planner, 
the totalitarian ruler, Hitler or Stalin, forms the collective, the people, on the 
basis of his own view, and as a result violates the perspectives of every other 
individual who must bow before his superior vision of the world, the ethical 
superiority of Popper’s Austrian liberal society resides in the way in which the 
collective worldview emerges from individual interactions without the apparent 
suppression of any particular viewpoint. While Popper (2002c) found the 
mechanism for arbitration between views in empirical science, where utopian 
theory finds falsification in evidence, the market theorists Hayek (2001) and 
Mises (2007) saw the economy as a decision maker. Here, exchange produces 
information and the price mechanism creates a form of collective intelligence 
which is total, but not totalitarian. Given that this system entails liberal freedom 
and places the individual at the heart of society, but at the same time produces 
a kind of spectral collective intelligence that comes from nobody in particular, 
it is not hard to see how the neoliberal utopia emerged from the horrors of 
the Austrian critique of totalitarianism (Popper, 2002a, b).
The effect of this theoretical model, which I would suggest laid the founda-
tions for the emergence of the neoliberal utopia we live inside today, was to 
simultaneously prohibit philosophy and political theory concerned with the 
good— since there can be no overall vision of the good in a world where the 
collective is a spectre— and rationalise the madness of the neoliberal model, 
simply because the Austrian individual is assumed to be a rational free thinker, 
capable of making his own decisions. Against the totalitarian monster, it is 
easy to see how the Austrian individual took on this rational appearance. 
While the insane utopianism of Hitler and Stalin was clear to people of the 
mid- 20th century, the Austrian individual was always a methodological abstrac-
tion, designed to represent rationality, and most importantly limitation. Whereas 
the utopian sees everything, knows everything, and occupies the position of 
a god, the liberal individual is rational, reasonable, partial, and respects this 
situation. However, the problem with this vision, which we see clearly in the 
contemporary neoliberal utopia in power, is that the abstract construction of 
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the Austrians refuses to accept this limitation. Although— and most importantly 
because— he is bereft of the opportunity to imagine the whole and think 
about the cosmos through philosophy and politics, he works his human desire 
for transcendence out through the economy. Caught under the spell of indi-
vidualism, which ensures that he cannot effectively transcend himself in others 
in the creation of a truly thoughtful society, the neoliberal individual seeks to 
become through things, which are more real than the others he finds around 
him, who have been transformed into abstractions. Of course, they may suffer 
and call out for his help, but he has no responsibility to them beyond the 
emergence of the collective intelligence of the market where he meets them 
on equal terms.
It is, of course, not normal to associate capitalism with utopia or utopianism, 
since the horror story of the history of utopia from Plato onwards concerns 
the nightmarish results of the attempt to create the perfect world (Popper, 
2002a, b). By contrast the liberal, and later neoliberal, corrective to this vision 
focuses on the individual, and the way in which individuals may prevent each 
other’s worst excesses, cancelling these in a collective that takes off the sharp 
edges of their most extreme views, and is in this respect simultaneously imma-
nent and transcendent. However, the madness of this vision, which projects 
the human desire to transcendence through the economy in such a way that 
legitimates extreme work and exorbitant levels of consumption, has become 
clear in the contemporary totalisation or globalisation of the neoliberal model 
that is ironically aneconomic regarding wider theological, philosophical, or 
political significance. In other words, there is no wider significance in the dark 
utopia of neoliberal capitalism that projects everything into work, consump-
tion, the abstract individual, and market intelligence, and finds no fault with 
massive levels of inequality, misery, and despair. But this is, of course, not 
where the utopian vision of political economy starts out. Although Popper 
(2002a) accuses Plato of political hubris in the design of his ideal city, it is 
possible to argue that Plato’s initial objective was the organisation of a social 
economy subordinate to philosophical and political principles. Plato’s (1991) 
division of labour, and economic model, was defined by the principle of beauty, 
where beauty was equal to the ideal of justice rather than the ideal of the 
free market. While the free market entails the separation of price from value, 
since there can no absolute relation between the two because price fluctuates 
on the basis of the supply of and demand for valuable objects, Plato’s objective 
was to collapse price into value in order to assign objects a place in his ideal 
city where everything finds its correct position. Against the modernity of the 
free market, where the relation between price and value shifts endlessly because 
of the fluctuations of the market, the objective of Plato’s (1991) ancient model 
was stability and the management of change.
Popper’s (2002a) critique of Plato in this respect concerns the latter’s suppres-
sion of political dissent in the name of the vision of the philosopher kings who 
are able to decipher the significance of the forms in order to translate these 
theological symbols into worldly order. But where this critique of Plato centres 
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around an excess of vision or transcendent symbolism, the problem of Popper’s 
open society, which has clearly come to the fore in contemporary neoliberal 
society, resides in its absolute lack of vision and its psychotic overcompensation 
for the total absence of a transcendent frame that could offer existential or even 
everyday significance. In Plato’s (1991) vision, economy was never meant to 
carry this burden. What mattered to him was the Socratic pursuit of knowledge. 
Economy was simply a reflection of the cosmos. In this way we might find a 
reflection of Plato’s ancient utopia in Marshall Sahlins’ (1974) idea of Stone Age 
economics, where the motor of modern dynamism, lack, is taken away by the 
reduction of desire in traditional society organised around limited objectives. 
For Sahlins the primitive economy is domestic, based upon what he calls an 
obstinate, communistic way of living, and there is no relationship between 
exchange and profit. This is partly because Sahlins’ primitive nomad cannot 
own very much and does not work the land, which he moves through rather 
than occupies for any length of time, but also because he has little sense of the 
value of things in themselves. Akin to Platonic (1991) man, who sees the pro-
fanity of things by comparison to the divine forms, Sahlins’ primitive man is 
no fetishist and has no interest in making a killing. Indeed, Sahlins (1974) 
compares his Stone Age economist to Hobbesian man, who is always looking 
to gain the upper hand in his relations with other men, when he contrasts 
Hobbes’ (2008) asocial warre of all against all with the primitive worldview 
organised around the principle of exchange of all with all.
Of course, we might imagine that Sahlins (1974) wants to project capitalism 
back onto his primitive economy, and suggest that the Stone Age economist 
was some kind of ultra- capitalist, but this is not the case because the exchange 
he refers to is exchange without profit. On the contrary, where the capitalist, 
particularly as defined by Marx (1990), is always on the look out to make a 
profit, and must somehow give the other back less than he deserves, Sahlins’ 
(1974) economy is characterised by the primitive practice of gift exchange, 
where men must always look to give back more than they receive in an eco-
nomic form that is less about profitability and more about excess and expen-
diture. In this economic form that places friendship and generosity over war 
and competition, Sahlins explains that the gift must always be repaid in a more 
excessive present in the practice of what he calls generalised reciprocity. This 
contrasts with the capitalist mode of exchange, or negative reciprocity, where 
the objective is the miserly necessity to profit and the attempt to obtain 
something for nothing. In order to show how primitive, Stone Age economics 
differs from its modern counterpart, Sahlins (1974) evokes Marcel Mauss’ 
(2000) work on the gift, and particularly potlatch, to show how the obligation 
to reciprocate in the institutionalisation of generosity creates a durable and 
robust social form. Where capitalism is characterised by alienation, anomie, 
disenchantment, and social relations that only really endure because of legalisa-
tion, Sahlins shows how primitive economy functions on the basis of spirit of 
necessary interdependence. In other words, there is a sense in his case studies, 
including Malinowski’s (2014) work on the Trobriand Islanders, that primitive 
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man understands his phenomenological being in the world in a way that 
modern capitalist man has completely forgotten.
II  Generosity, Indebtedness, and the Fear of Totalitarian 
Economics
Where the modern, and certainly postmodern, neoliberal capitalist man is first 
and foremost an individual who meets others in a spectral space of collective 
intelligence, the market, that requires nothing of him but more individualism, 
primitive man must continue to give in order to be part of the universal, the 
cosmos. This is the significance in Sahlins (1974), but also in Mauss (2000), 
of the Trobriand Islanders’ concept of the Kula, or circle, which is perhaps 
the best symbol of the utopian form in anthropological literature. While 
modern economy maintains its dynamic form through profitability, which 
entails the receipt of something for nothing and the reinvestment of this 
surplus in order to generate modernisation and further gains, the primitive, 
Stone Age economic form is similarly dynamic, but in this case dynamism 
emerges from excess, expenditure, and sacrifice. This is, of course, how Georges 
Bataille (1991) conceptualises the sacrificial general economy which starts with 
the sun, which radiates energy and warmth, and leads him to conclude that 
existence itself is a form of excess. In other words, while the capitalist is 
miserly, and bases productivity in frugality, austerity, and punishment, Bataille’s 
primitive general economist revels in luxurious expenditure. Now, this is not 
to say that Bataille’s consumer accumulates fine things, because he is no capi-
talist who attaches worth to possession. Instead Bataille’s man glorifies expen-
diture, consumption, and the process of passing away that gives birth to the 
new, which passes in turn, and so on until there is no more and existence 
itself will flatline. Although this existential flatline is inevitable, and Bataille is 
close to the Buddhist vision of existential suffering, he remains fascinated by 
the moments of incandescence that consumption creates. For example, in the 
first volume of his The Accursed Share (1991), he recalls Blake’s (1970) ‘Tyger 
Tyger, burning bright, in the forests of the night’ and compares the tragic 
majesty of this beast to the sexual act and the little death that takes the lovers 
one step closer to their own end.
The comparison and contrasts between Plato’s (1991) original utopian city, 
where stability is everything, and Bataille’s (1991) notion of excessive economy 
is striking. Where Plato sought to arrest change in a Spartan utopia of order 
and organisation, and becomes the target of Popper’s (2002a) critique because 
of his conservatism, Bataille focuses on the primitive practice of gifting and 
sacrifice which was well known to the Greeks, and particularly Sparta, where 
no man was worth more than the city, in order to generate a theory of cos-
mological order from an exploration of excess and expenditure. In other words, 
Bataille (1991) seems to reach the point of utopian stability sought by Plato 
through extremity that collapses what the French thinker calls restricted 
economy into a natural, cosmological whole. But even though is it possible 
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to understand Plato’s (1991) ideal city through the fearful symmetry of Bataille’s 
(1991) lover, Mauss’ (2000) giver, and Sahlins’ (1974) nomad, who produce 
their own kind of natural continuous being, I would suggest that this explora-
tion of what we might call primitive dynamic equilibrium, where stability 
emerges from excess, creates the possibility of the modern, and later postmodern, 
capitalist utopia, which exchanges the excess and expenditure of primitive 
economics for the scarcity and lack of the modern economic form where 
there is never enough. While there is a clear symbolic comparison between 
the primitive attempt to connect economy to cosmological perfection and the 
Austrian vision of the market that represents a kind of collective intelligence 
above and beyond any single individual, the contrasts between these two 
philosophical imaginaries are also profound.
Although Hayek (2012) uses the concept of kosmos to explain the spontaneous 
order of the market, which simply emerges from the behaviour of free, inde-
pendent individuals, the difference between the modern capitalist vision of the 
universal economy and the primitive philosophy of the economic universe resides 
in the capitalist’s translation of the primitive’s generosity and understanding that 
men should give more than they receive into a theory of profitability where 
wealth creation comes from the exploitation of others who the capitalist pays 
less than they produce and then pockets the rest in the name of a surplus ready 
for reinvestment. In a sense Popper (2002a) recognises the weakness in Plato’s 
primitive utopia form, which allows the capitalist translation, when he notes 
that the enemy of the closed society is nature and the problem of decay. Although 
he uses the word ‘decay’ in order to present the ideal city in a state of permanent 
decomposition and construct Plato as a kind of ancient mortician desperately 
trying to keep the long since dead corpse looking presentable, one could easily 
replace the term decay with the idea of expenditure in order to found the 
stability of the utopian city in the economics of giving and dynamic equilibrium. 
Following Bataille’s (1991) train of thought, this makes sense since the city, 
civilisation, and communal life are a reflection of the human that is in itself a 
representation of the excessive quality of nature. However, regardless of the way 
in which Popper (2002a) reads the utopian nature of Plato’s city in terms of 
decay, decomposition, and decrepitude, he clearly spots the weakness in the 
primitive economic form and sets about what he calls the closed society from 
the point of view of his own utopia, the open society, where the individual can 
think for himself, and most importantly now stands apart from the whole, which 
in Hayek (2001, 2012) and Mises (2007) he only returns to in the form of the 
market. But of course, there is no friendship in the market, since this is a condi-
tion of individualism— I must insist on my independence and protect this from 
others who want to infringe upon my personal space— and the result is the 
decline of ancient reciprocity into a modern dynamic suspicion where the state 
must step in to mediate between people in the form of money and other con-
tracts (Hobbes, 2008).
This is, of course, the dystopian story told by Ferdinand Tonnies (2010) in 
his Community and Association and Georg Simmel (1997) in his work on the 
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modern city, where objectivity trumps emotional bonds of friendship every 
time, and the individual is left in a state of desperate lack. Given this history 
which we must live every day, it is surprising that Popper’s (2002a, b) theory 
of the escape from the totalitarian closure of the utopian circle remains hege-
monic in contemporary culture many years after it was possible to pretend 
that liberal democracy and capitalism were some kind of utopian alternative 
of freedom to the horror show of Stalinism that never had much in common 
with the primitive economy of communistic generosity and was perhaps more 
similar to the kind of state- led bureaucratic capitalism we occupy today. Even 
though it is hard to believe in the Austrian fantasy of the free individual in 
contemporary society, simply because it is clear to more or less everybody 
bar the super- rich that the monstrous global market dictates to people, and 
that they do not have very much influence in economic processes that impact 
their lives, it is shocking that the phobic opposition to the totalitarianism of 
reciprocity and generosity remains live. We find this fear of the circle of 
obligatory generosity in Derrida’s (1994) Given Time, where the late master 
thinker of deconstruction appears to suffer from geometric claustrophobia, 
and seeks to break out of the cycle of gifting by pointing out that Mauss’ 
(2000) primitive society made unreasonable demands on men by insisting that 
they give generously. For Derrida the obligatory gift is a contradiction in 
terms, an impossibility, and Mauss looks to obscure the hidden charges of 
reciprocity implicit in his present by calling it a gift.
Against this sleight of hand, which Derrida (1994) suggests imposes a hid-
den tax upon the receiver who must repay his debt whether he likes it or 
not, he wants to fracture the social circle of friends with an aneconomic, 
undecidable gesture. Thus, he returns Mauss’ (2000) obligatory gift, and what 
he considers the unreasonable hidden charge, with Baudelaire’s (2009) false or 
counterfeit coin, which may or may not be real money. While Derrida’s point 
is that the counterfeit coin is an undecidable gift, which may or may not be 
real and therefore imposes no kind of obligation on the beggar who receives 
the coin, what he fails to see is that the effect of his response to Mauss’ ethic 
of giving and reciprocity, the counterfeit coin, is to replace the primitive 
economy of excessive returns with a new asocial form based in formalisation, 
abstraction, and universal suspicion where trust is in short supply. In contrast 
to Mauss’ (2000) economic form, which formed a topos, or utopos, a good 
place that is also a no place, Derrida’s attempt to break out of the totalitarian 
circle of the hidden charge casts everybody into Baudelaire’s city of evil, 
undecideability, and unhomeliness, the atopos, the place that is also nowhere 
by virtue of the fact it is no longer marked out by the human quality of trust 
in the future. In this respect Derrida’s (1994) gesture— he palms Mauss off 
with Baudelaire’s counterfeit coin— introduces instability into the primitive 
economy, fractures the utopian circle, and opens out onto a space where the 
other is untrustworthy and it makes sense for everybody to look for competi-
tive advantage. This is the space of modern capitalism, the space of alienation, 
anomie, and disenchantment, where we should look to profit from every 
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exchange by giving the other less than we receive. The problem of Derrida’s 
reading of Mauss is, therefore, that because he starts off by taking the gift for 
a confidence trick designed to impose a hidden charge upon the recipient, he 
is able to cynically respond with Baudelaire’s counterfeit coin, in such a way 
that confirms that he took the problem of economy from the view of suspi-
cion, cynicism, and what we might call criminal reason, where we look to 
scam the other in the first place.
Where Mauss (2000) follows the primitive, and wants to give more in order 
to receive more and generate social bonds, Derrida (1994) finds the hidden 
charge, and wants to respond with his own confidence trick and give less, give 
nothing, because he approaches the problem from the modern point of view 
where the ideas of reciprocity, generosity, and common being are tainted by the 
history of totalitarianism. However, where bad money may have been reflective 
of the confidence trick of really existing communism in the 1950s, when Stalin 
led to the emergence of the view that Marx was himself a totalitarian, I would 
suggest that there is very little that is rebellious or radical about the confidence 
trick in neoliberal capitalism. In the contemporary moment on the other side 
of the cold war and the end of history, to meet the kind of generosity that 
demands a generous response with a counterfeit coin is perfectly normal, rational 
even, from the point of view of the criminal reason of game theory where the 
objective is to outplay the opponent and come out of every exchange with a 
profit in hand. Even better if one can, in the words of Erving Goffman (1952), 
cool off the marks so that they are happy to lose out on the deal because they 
are completely unaware of the sleight of hand that has taken place. Is this not 
precisely what Popper (2002a) achieves when he attacks Plato’s (1991) utopian 
city on the basis of its decrepitude that could equally be understood in terms 
of its propensity to excess and generosity and what Derrida (1994) enacts when 
he introduces asymmetry, uncertainty, and mistrust into Mauss’ (2000) primitive 
economy in the name of individual freedom?
The truth is that this individual freedom, and mistrust of others who need 
our attention, is perfectly normal under conditions of neoliberal capitalism 
that regards collective and communal institutions, including state and economy, 
in terms of cybernetic structures best placed to support a kind of autistic 
individualism unable to understand others. In the face of this situation, a far 
more radical gesture would look to recuperate Mauss’ (2000) economy of 
excess and take steps to save the spirit of Plato’s (1991) utopian city— which 
was that the individual is made in his relation to others whom he cannot 
escape— from the oblivion of the neoliberal revolution that seems caught under 
the spell of the Stalinist monster that it grows more like every day. While 
Stalinism sought to destroy the individual through totalitarian bureaucracy 
and the reach of the state that was in no way reflective of Marx’s (1988) 
original vision of primitive communism, neoliberal capitalism buries individuals 
in indebtedness that means that the freedom they possess is only ever the 
freedom to work, make money, and repay debts that lock them into neoliberal 
subjectivity long into the future. In this respect it may be possible to read 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   63 10-12-2016   8:17:29 PM
64 The Origins of the Capitalist Utopia
Derrida’s (1994) attempt to fracture primitive economy in a way that is critical 
of the obligations debt imposes upon the future, and recognise his relationship 
to Nietzsche’s (2003) critique of theological debt in his On the Genealogy of 
Morals, but even here I would suggest that it is important to be able to critique 
financial debts that destroy futures in the creation of restricted horizons 
organised around endless work and debt repayment and at the same time save 
the broader concept of debt that enables an understanding of humans’ com-
mon participation in being. This form of debt, which we should understand 
ontologically, represents what Merleau- Ponty (1969) calls the flesh in his later 
works in order to explain the relationship between self, other, and world, and 
is very different to financial debt, which we should think about in ontic terms, 
that effectively individualises people and confirms that they are on their own.
While individuals own their ontic financial debt in such a way that defines 
their horizon and limits their future, the ontological conception of debt that 
we can derive from phenomenology explains how what we might call indi-
viduals participate in a form of being that is continuous, boundless, and is 
never the property of anybody or anything. Indeed, this form of debt that 
flows through people, confirms their identity, interdependence, and immersion 
in the world, only ever appears in the form of debt from the perspective of 
individuals who have come to believe that they are somehow outside of rela-
tionality and dependence on others and the world. Akin to Mauss’ (2000) 
ethic of generosity, which appears to be about unfair hidden charges from the 
point of view of a modern schooled in the political philosophy of suspicion, 
the infinite debt that we owe to being is no kind of debt from the perspective 
of the person who recognises his inescapable immersion in the world that 
gave birth to him, conditions his present, and enables his future. Where this 
vision of debt, which David Graeber (2011) understands in terms of the very 
basis of social life, differs from the financial conception of the debt relation 
that we find in the work of Maurizio Lazzarato (2012) and others is that 
ontological debt is universal, infinite, and inescapable, and as a consequence a 
condition of existence itself. By contrast, the ontic version of debt, which 
emerged with the money economy and has taken on new, democratic form 
in neoliberal society, is never universal, even though it seems to suture every-
body into the late capitalist economy, because this world is made up of two 
classes, creditors and debtors. In much the same way that this new debt rela-
tion is particular, it is also finite in the sense that there is a view that eventually 
every debt must be repaid in full and debtors will escape their bonds, even if 
the state of indebtedness seems to stretch far off into the future.
In this respect the ontic condition of indebtedness is never final, which may 
appear to offer a utopian horizon of hope but in fact only confirms the misery 
of subordination to the debt that remains in place and leads the figure Lazzarato 
(2012) calls the indebted man to view social relations in terms of a hierarchy 
of morally sanctified punishment and abuse. In other words, it is the very pos-
sibility of freedom, which seems ontologically viable in the distant future, that 
confirms the indebted man’s misery in his present state of indebtedness that 
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never ends. By contrast the ontological conception of debt we can take from 
Merleau- Ponty (1969) frees the subject precisely because debt vanishes into its 
very universality, infinity, and necessity. Where the modern caught in ontic debt 
looks towards the utopia of the individual who is free from the restriction of 
others for some sense of hope, the man who recognises his ontological indebt-
edness finds his freedom in his relationships with others and the world, which 
is precisely what Mauss (2000) explains in his work on reciprocal generosity 
and Derrida (1994) and Popper (2002a) fail to recognise because of their cold 
war, anti- communist worldview and opposition to collective forms of humanity. 
The central political effect of Austrian theory, which we can trace further back 
to Smith (1982) and perhaps before Smith to the original contract theorists 
Locke (1988) and Hobbes (2008), is therefore to normalise the decision to take 
the ontic level of financial debt, where the individual believes it is possible to 
escape the condition of indebtedness, over the ontological truth of existential 
debt, where there is no escape because debt is a necessary condition of existence, 
and maintain the utopian belief that the latter state is simply a condition of the 
former position of an individual caught in the red.
The alternative to this utopia, the capitalist, financial fantasy of irresponsible 
debt- free living, is truly radical. What would happen if we were to truly 
assume the ontological nature of indebtedness? The answer is that the ontic 
level of debt, where we assume payment in full is possible, would become 
impossible, and every loan would essentially become a primitive gift paid in 
response to the essential indebtedness to others and world. Under these condi-
tions the Austrian utopia of the free individual who only ever meets the other 
in the abstract space of market exchange would collapse, and it would be 
impossible to sustain the belief in the possibility of living in the black. From 
the point of view of this new perspective, which is in itself primitive, ontic 
debt cancellation would occur by virtue of the emergence of the assumption 
of ontological indebtedness that is in reality little more than a recognition of 
limitation in others and world. It is truly ironic that Derrida (1994), the master 
of deconstruction, who spent a career looking to undermine self- identical 
fantasies, failed to recognise that Mauss’ (2000) gift economy, which he takes 
for a utopia of self- enclosure, is in fact based in a recognition of indebtedness 
of self to other and the world that sustains life and that this is in itself a com-
mentary on the tragic limitation of humanity. However, this position is only 
problematic when we start from the position of the individual who wants to 
escape closure— which is precisely what Derrida looks to achieve since he 
finds hidden charges everywhere— and we transform indebtedness into a 
financial evil that we must tolerate but eventually escape for a utopian space 
of free individualism. Where excess in the first, primitive system resides in 
the other, who constitutes the self through their primal interaction, and the 
world, which enables both self and other to exist, in the second, modern 
system, the self looking to escape, the self- identical individual who wants to 
be on his own, seeks to quantify indebtedness in order to emphasis his separa-
tion from others and world.
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Under these conditions the self is a creditor, the other is a debtor, and the 
distance between the two economic actors is founded in the contingent nature of 
their relation that will not last forever. Where the social relation based in the 
obligation to generosity is essentially horizontal and recognises interdependence, 
the contract organised around debt repayment is hierarchal, punitive, abusive, 
and rooted in the desperate desire of creditors to assert their individualism and 
independence relative to the other, who is considered morally defective by virtue 
of his indebtedness. In Freudian terms, the other needs to move through the 
Oedipal phase and stand on his own two feet, but when he is not able to do 
this the creditor piles on the pain in the form of interest upon the debt he 
owes. The purpose of interest is, of course, to mark the contingent nature of 
the loan and signify that there is nothing necessary about the debt relation. 
Interest signals to the debtor that he needs to repay the creditor’s loan and then 
some because his need to rely on the other is wholly unnatural. On the credi-
tor’s side interest emphasises independence, because it not only signifies the 
temporary nature of the relation to the debtor, but also strengthens the creditor’s 
claim to individuality through the sadistic attack on the other, who must pay 
even more than he took in credit in the first place. The creditor thus imposes 
shame upon the debtor, who feels the immorality of indebtedness, and we enter 
Nietzsche’s (2003) vision of the horror of the debt relation from On the Geneal-
ogy of Morals. However, what we can see is that long before this moral system 
emerges, which takes debt to be a kind of contingent state that we must feel 
shame about, a more basic, natural, ontological vision of indebtedness needed 
to be screened from view in the ideological shift that took place in translation 
from ancient or primitive socio- economy to modern political philosophy which 
based economy upon the free interactions of individuals.
If we consider Aristotle’s (2009) Politics, and particularly Chapters 8 and 9 of 
Book I, what we find is a vision of the problem of the transition from socio- 
economy, where money is concerned with equal exchange, to a new kind of 
individualised system, which assumes that social relations are contingent, and 
that money can create more money in the form of interest. In other words, 
indebtedness becomes about profitability. Writing from the perspective of the 
primitive economy, Aristotle condemns the perversity of the economy that makes 
money from money, because this practice has no foundation in the real world. 
However, this dynamic system where money performs the essential function of 
making social relations possible and drives productivity would become the core 
belief of the capitalist utopia of individuals who meet in the modern utopian 
space par excellence, the spontaneous order of the free market. If we say that 
Plato’s (1991) ideal city represents the first truly worked- out ancient utopia, then 
we might claim that Thomas More’s (2008) Utopia represents the last moment 
of the primitive socio- economy. Where the real threat to Plato’s city was the 
kind of individualism characteristic of Atlantis, where people had no sense of 
their necessary relation and indebtedness to others, More’s problem was the 
realisation of this individualism in the form of early capitalism and particularly 
the enclosure movement that meant that the very ground of universal 
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indebtedness, the commons, was in the process of privatisation. Although Marx 
(1990) would call this process of the seizure of common land primitive accu-
mulation and paint a picture of the destruction of necessary relations between 
self, other, and the world in the form of social land, the first truly modern 
philosophers of the capitalist utopia understood the privatisation of land and 
the emergence of the new economy in a very different way.
In Thomas Hobbes’ (2008) Leviathan, perhaps the key work of the figure 
Leo Strauss (1996) understands as one of the first modern philosophers, there 
is no assumption about primitive economy and necessary exchange. Instead, 
the first men inhabit a state of nature and must fight to survive. It is only 
when they realise the futility of this condition of what we might call natural 
hyper- individualism, or a form of individualism that cancels itself upon the 
collapse of freedom into the unfreedom of universal fear of others, that they 
decide to contract in order to generate sovereign authority, the living God, 
the Leviathan. Under these new conditions, which Hobbes associates with the 
emergence of political society proper, men trade some of their freedom for 
security and obey the rules of the sovereign. However, absolute control is 
impossible, since men remain wicked creatures by nature, and the living God 
creates a space of safe competition, the economy, which absorbs violence and 
ensures that society endures. Here, individualism is prior to relationality which 
must be created in order to manage the natural violence of men who would 
otherwise murder each other in the name of their own survival. While there 
appears to be very little one could call utopian about Hobbes’ vision, especially 
if we compare his anthropological fantasy of the state of nature to ancient 
conceptions of the good society, I would suggest that his image of what we 
might call the ‘good enough society’ forms the basis of the history of liberal 
and contract- based utopias which culminate in the contemporary neoliberal 
imagery of a kind of cybernetic globalisation where humans and machines 
work together in the production of endless surplus value.
From Hobbes (2008), through Locke (1988) and Mandeville (1989), to 
Smith (1982) and into the 20th century with the Austrian and Chicago School 
thinkers, I would argue that it is possible to trace the evolution of a capitalist 
utopia that ironically starts from a position characterised by deep pessimism 
about the wickedness of humanity and ends in the construction of a quasi- 
theological machine that promises to deliver the good life on a global scale. 
The striking irony of this construction, revolving around the resolution of 
deep pessimism and avowed pragmatism in a more or less theological vision 
of spontaneous order, is in a sense what ensures the great durability of this 
utopian model, because this remains a utopian fantasy, perhaps the only truly 
global utopian fantasy, that cannot speak its name. The reason for this failure 
is founded in the history of this utopian form, which starts with the modern 
critique of ancient idealism. As Strauss (1996) notes in his work on Hobbes, 
modern philosophy starts with the critique of the ancient attempt to build 
cities on the basis of how men should behave, and the resolution that what 
needs to be done is the construction of a political philosophy grounded in a 
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historical understanding of how men actually behave and what they are really 
like in practice. The value of this shift, which we find in Hobbes’ assumption 
about human wickedness, is that philosophers will be able to give up trying 
to build impossible cities, which only ever result in horrendous violence, and 
concentrate on the dirty business of creating the best possible society instead. 
This is, in a sense, the position of the contemporary liberal philosopher John 
Gray, who writes about the horror of the history of utopian experimentation 
across a number of books including Black Mass (2007), with the important 
qualification that he recognises that liberal democratic capitalism has itself 
become a utopian nightmare in the late 20th and early 21st century.
Essentially, this is what separates Gray (2007) from Popper (2002a) and the 
Austrians who thought that the free individual and the emergent spontaneous 
order could evade the worst excess of totalitarianism. Although his story takes 
in Plato, Hegel, Marx, and what he considers the fantasy of the perfect society, 
he explains that the nightmare of utopia was not consumed in the ovens of 
Auschwitz, but rather re- emerged in the liberal and neoliberal capitalist form 
that Fukuyama and the post- cold war Anglo- American political elites found at 
the end of history. In Black Mass (2007) Gray calls utopia an apocalyptic religion 
and suggests that the global war on terror may be the final moment in the long 
history of the quest for perfection, simply because there is nowhere else to look 
for the ideal once we proclaim the end of the end of history in the deserts of 
the Middle East. According to this view, the failure of the American neoliberal 
vision under Bush and Rumsfeld is significant because what this signifies is the 
recognition of the impossibility of the perfect circle of utopia on a global scale. 
Here, the round world, the ultimate island, lost in the infinite blackness of space, 
is the final utopian place, and when this fails there is nowhere else to project 
our human vision of perfection but off world in the shape of extraterrestrial, 
sci- fi fantasies, including Martian colonies. In this respect Gray (2007) imagines 
that the war on terror represents the end of terrestrial utopia because of its 
global scale, but it remains debatable whether the sci- fi utopia would fare better, 
because it also suffers from what he thinks is the principle problem of utopia— 
that is its obsession with the enemy that needs to be eradicated in order to 
enable the realisation of the new world. This was, of course, a condition of the 
creation of America and remains the American problem today. Gray explains 
that we find the same problem of enmity in the French Revolution, Bolshevism, 
and other revolutionary movements including the Khmer Rouge, Baader Meinhof, 
up to contemporary radical Islam and the Islamic State. There is no doubt that 
the same problem haunts sci- fi, where the alien is normally a monster that wants 
to destroy humanity and corrupt our world.
III  Lockean Money and the Violence of Spontaneous 
Order
Gray’s (2007) story moves from a discussion of apocalyptic religion through 
the modern utopias of Stalin and Hitler to the postmodern version of America 
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where individualism and market forces take precedence over every other rela-
tion. However, his recognition that the rage of the post- colonial revolutionaries, 
from Fanon (2001) through to the Islamic State, have their own utopian visions 
means that the drive to perfection has no future. But it is this terminal condi-
tion, which finds representation in the contemporary obsession with dystopia 
and the apocalypse that imagines the strike- through future for a world which 
no longer believes in anything but endings, that Gray (2000) thinks will open 
a space for a new form of liberalism, what he calls natural liberalism in his 
book on the two forms of liberal thought. Against the Enlightenment model 
of liberal thinking, which he thinks ends up in contemporary America and 
the attempt to totalise its own social, political, economic, and cultural structures, 
he turns to a natural form of liberalism that foregrounds pluralism and under-
stands that there can be no ultimate truth. Of course, the problem with this 
position is that it never escapes the logic of totalisation. This is the case because 
Gray’s view that we must construct a society of tolerance assumes that what 
is intolerable is intolerance, with the result that his perfectly open, plural vision 
of society closes towards a utopia of liberal tolerance or we might say a utopia 
of capital which is entirely indifferent to difference, simply because difference 
is everywhere, and hangs together on the basis of the reduction of quality to 
base quantity that enables commensuration and exchange. Finally, Gray’s (2000) 
vision, which collapses towards Simmel’s (1997) cold world of objectivity and 
indifference, is problematic because its commitment to individualism reproduces 
the problem of contemporary neoliberalism concerned with its phobia of ends 
and the assertion of values which is contained in the utopian ideal that the 
only legitimate value is the tolerance of a plurality of values.
The reason Gray’s (2000) prohibition of ends is fatal to his project is because 
it is precisely the ban on the creation of values, utopian imaginaries, and sci- fi 
futures that generates the desperate need for these new worlds which often 
takes the form of extreme consumerism, what we might call the privatisation 
of utopia, in a universe where the social is a phobic object with totalitarian 
associations. We can, therefore, see that the liberal utopia has a kind of ideo-
logical gravity that Gray cannot escape, and that it is this situation on the very 
edge of the utopian form that means that capitalism, and particularly its hard 
neoliberal form, is a strange paradoxical kind of pragmatic utopia that imagines 
its own cynical realism in such a way that its transcendental, idealistic assump-
tions fade from view. In light of this recognition, it may be appropriate to 
think about contemporary neoliberal capitalism less in terms of a kind of hard 
pragmatism, which has no ideological faith, and more through the lens of 
Elizabeth Hansot’s (1975) theory of perfection and progress, where she sets 
out two forms of utopia. Beyond the ancient classical utopian form of Plato 
(1991) that we can trace through to More (2008), Hansot outlines the existence 
of a parallel modern dynamic version of utopianism that dispenses with the 
idea of some kind of final telos and instead founds the idea of perfection in 
progress or dynamism. While Hansot explores this modern utopian form 
through reference to H. G. Wells’ (2005) A Modern Utopia, I would suggest it 
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is possible to project the same kinetic model through to an exploration of 
Bolshevism, Nazism, and further late capitalism. While Bolshevism and Nazism 
took the basic Platonic principle of the beautiful, just, ordered society, which 
they read in terms of class and racial purity, they also subjected the primitive 
idea of stability to modern, technological reality in order to develop an idea 
of dynamic equilibrium, where order was possible through ceaseless movement 
and development into the future.
In Bolshevism this concern with technological emergence grew out Marx’s 
Prometheanism and a recognition that development was necessary to move 
the Soviet Union from a largely agrarian to industrial society. By contrast, the 
Nazis sought to chase down the primal fantasy of the volk through techno-
logical mastery in the ideological form Jeffrey Herf (2008) calls reactionary 
modernism. In both cases American capitalism, and in particularly Fordism, 
became a model of how perfect order could emerge from dynamism in order 
to produce a kind of processual utopia. As such, it may be the case that the 
meaning of the modern, kinetic utopia resides in the way in which the ancient, 
Platonic view of the perfect city, which fed through into theological thought 
in Augustine and Aquinas in their works on the heavenly city of God, found 
new form in the emergence of capitalism. While More’s (2008) work may be 
understood in terms of the final moment of the old vision of stable perfection, 
and Hobbes (2008) began to generate the new kinetic model where conflict 
could be overcome and sublimated in the dynamism of economic competition, 
I would suggest that it is also important to understand the role of the work 
of John Locke (1988) in the emergence of the capitalist utopian form. In 
Locke’s work, and particularly the Two Treatises of Government (1988), the key 
issue of More’s utopia, land, becomes the wellspring of the new kinetic model. 
Where More champions the principle of the commons and ends up trans-
forming his ideal city into a kind of totalitarian nightmare in order to defend 
the principle of the public, Locke starts out by reading the commons in terms 
of waste land. In other words, where More finds ideal space, Locke sees noth-
ing, waste, and most importantly an affront to God.
When More’s (2008) explorers find utopia off the coast of America, what they 
stumble upon is new common land free from the enclosures of early modern 
capitalism, but when Locke (1988) looks to America what he sees is the origin 
of the world and empty space that must be worked in the name of God. In 
Locke’s work God means man to survive and live off the land. In order to achieve 
this end, God’s plan is that man should subdue and discipline what is useless and 
unproductive in the name of development and the avoidance of waste which is 
wholly immoral. In this way, Locke (1988) shifts the ancient idea of justice, which 
was mainly concerned with distribution, towards a new conceptualisation of the 
just concerned with utility and productivity. In this view justice is about making 
the best use of resources, and the labour that makes this possible is a wholly 
moral act. Indeed, the idea of labour is essential in Locke’s (1988) work, and he 
originates his labour theory of value from the vision that moral men should mix 
work with land in order to create private property. Again, this theory represents 
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a sea change from the ancient view of distributive justice, where enclosure becomes 
about excess, gluttony, and tyranny, because in Locke’s view private property and 
the private possession of land is not simply legitimate but actively moral and the 
realisation of God’s will. The critique of this view, which we can find in Domenico 
Losurdo’s (2011) work on the other side of liberalism, is that the creation of the 
concept of the waste land ended up justifying colonialism, primitive accumula-
tion, and genocide. Despite this, however, Mark Neocleous (2014) explains that 
Locke’s utopian vision of the civilisation of land in a kind of moral frontierism 
continues to animate Anglo- American thought in its endless war on primitive 
communism, which means economic forms that fail the test of the free market, 
the desert, which refers to spaces where waste is everywhere and growth is 
nowhere, and nomads, or those who refuse to base their existence in the accu-
mulation of private property.
But Locke’s (1988) contribution to the emergence of the capitalist utopia 
involves more than a moralism of productive land, because he also develops a 
theory of money, which in a sense connects substantive labour in the world 
or on the land that then becomes human, civilised, and worldly, with the 
purely abstract form of money that ends up floating off on its own in the 
late 20th century that saw Nixon’s suspension of the convertibility of money 
into gold, until it comes to form a postmodern virtual utopia, perhaps the 
utopian form par excellence, in the shape of global finance that is simultane-
ously everywhere and nowhere. For Locke the essential problem of productive 
land, and the limits of this model, resides in the issue of over- production. 
What happens when men who work the land produce too much, more than 
they need, and the goods they produce end up waste? The problem of spoil-
age is, therefore, representative of the limit of Locke’s (1988) theory of land 
and labour, and it is only through the mechanism of money that he escapes 
this bind. In Locke’s view the value of money resides in its ability to convert 
goods that may be subject to the problem of spoilage into a commodity that 
can be exchanged for every other good and most importantly never spoils. 
Under conditions of the money economy, the man who works the land and 
produces too much can spread the fruits of his labour out into society through 
the mechanism of money in order to contribute to the common wealth. 
Money means that he no longer needs to worry about surpluses and spoilage 
because he can sell what he produces but does not need in exchange for 
currency that means that he can buy other goods. By contrast, others benefit 
from money because they can purchase the goods made by their fellow men 
and sell the surpluses they themselves produce.
In this way money, which is itself extracted from the earth in the shape of 
the gold that confers value upon the abstract idea of currency, ends up becom-
ing the mechanism that allows Locke’s (1988) virtuous utopia of labour to 
become a truly capitalist system based in over- production and the management 
of surpluses. When people sell their surpluses, what they obtain from others in 
the form of money becomes capital that they can spend or reinvest in the name 
of further growth. Thus money solves the problem of spoilage and opens up a 
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space for endless productivity. In Locke’s view this is what God requires of men 
and in this respect money becomes a kind of divine symbol. As Phillip Good-
child (2002) notes, money becomes godly in capitalism and structures a new 
kind of piety. In this way, to say that we believe in money, or to assert in the 
words of Michael Douglas’ Gordon Gekko that ‘greed is good’ (Stone, 1987), is 
not simply to make a glib statement about the way modern capitalists idolise 
accumulation, but rather to signal the trace that exists between theology, labour 
theory, and the importance of money in making sure it is possible to carry out 
God’s divine plan for men. Whether this has been forgotten or not today, and 
whether or not we can understand the relationship between money and God’s 
work, it is clear that money retains a kind of theological unconscious that we 
might date back to Locke and that structures out belief in value of currency 
today. Against the biblical view that the love of money is the root of all evil, 
Locke’s (1988) God is a good capitalist who understands that money and the 
circulation of money is the engine of growth and the key to the development 
of the waste land he gave to men to make their own. As such, money also 
becomes a mechanism for individual development.
In their infancy men have nothing and rely on God for survival. In other 
words, they rely on the vicissitudes of the environment, other men, and animals 
that also have to struggle to survive. At this point men exist in nature, which 
is no kind of world in the phenomenological sense of a human space. But 
labour enables men to make the earth into a world, become human, and stand 
on their own two feet. Money enables them to continue to grow, develop the 
world, and themselves. Thus we encounter the utopia of capitalism, the capitalist, 
and the self- made man that starts with Locke and endures in contemporary 
postmodern society in the form of the entrepreneurial individual. Of course, 
the difference between the 17th century and the contemporary period is vast, 
and there is no doubt that Locke’s work must be understood in the context of 
early modernity when capitalism was in its infancy. As Goodchild (2002) points 
out, ecological finitude represents the limit of the Lockean model. However, the 
other side of this critique is that Locke’s (1988) vision of the civilisation of 
waste and his related theory of money enables a recognition of the reasons why 
capitalism is unlikely to respect the outer limits of the planet’s potential for 
development and modernisation. On the one hand, waste is an entirely subjec-
tive category, and colonists have never been too keen to weigh the relative merits 
of different visions of civilisation, which means that endless development and 
redevelopment of existing lands is morally unproblematic from the capitalist 
perspective. On the other hand, money represents, especially in its contemporary 
virtual form shorn of its reliance on precious metals and even material cash, a 
kind of infinite horizon that transforms the tendency towards growth into a 
theoretical, if not practical, absolute. When we read these two approaches to 
overcoming natural finitude together, what we start to see is the emergence of 
the late capitalist machine set up for the extraction of value from the world, 
men, and animals that respects no limits because the monetary form has been 
transformed into a kind of theological symbol.
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In the 17th century this emergent cybernetic system, which unites men 
and their environment in a machine for the production and exchange of 
goods, made use of money to manage the problem of over- production in 
economic exchange, while in late capitalism, pure or virtual money, which no 
longer has any anchor in what Lacan (2007) calls the real, becomes the driver 
of the productive process in the form of financialisation and investment 
designed to stimulate and impose the demand to produce. In the first instance 
the prime mover of productivity was God, who wanted men to produce in 
order to make the world and become independent, and money represents the 
solution to the natural limits of productivity, but in the second case, money 
stands in for God, and the circulation of money in the shape of finance enables 
investment and the need to produce and over- produce in the name of the 
extraction of further surplus value. For Locke (1988) human labour eventually 
ends in the production of money through the creation of material surpluses, 
but in contemporary capitalism virtual money feeds productive systems that 
look to extract ever more value from natural resources in the form of human, 
animal, and what we might call bio- capital, where even the very cells of 
organisms become potentially valuable. However, there was, of course, media-
tion between Locke’s 17th- century model of capitalism based in labour theory 
and contemporary financial capitalism that entailed the development of the 
cybernetic model of capitalism that was eventually expressed in Mises (2007) 
and Hayek (2012) and completely realised in the global financial system.
But long before the realisation of the financial utopia, which eventually 
collapsed in the emergence of the abyss between virtual money and the pro-
ductive economy that was considered largely irrelevant but that ultimately 
conditioned and supported the hubris of the financial system, the original 
theorists of what we might call cybernetic capitalism, which entails the more 
or less mysterious coordination of men in a kind of economic machine, were 
Adam Smith (1982) and Bernard Mandeville (1989). In Mandeville’s famous 
work, The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits (1989), the cyber-
netic metaphor emerges from the way insects represent the organisation of 
men in the early capitalist economic machine. Later in the eighteenth century, 
Adam Smith (1982) translated Mandeville’s organic, insectoid metaphor into 
a theological story in order to complete the cybernetic construction of eco-
nomic coordination that now stretched from the insect world through men 
towards God and His divine kingdom. In both Mandeville and Smith, the 
story of economic organisation entails the pursuit of self- interest that coordi-
nates in spontaneous order. While Mandeville’s bees find their place in the 
hive, Smith explains that individual economic activity leads to social coordina-
tion through the machinations of an invisible hand. However, the difference 
between the two positions resides in the role of government, which Mandeville 
(1989) considered necessary to the coordination of the wickedness of men, 
and Smith (1982) thought was unnecessary to the emergence of spontaneous 
order. Indeed, for Smith, government intervention in market forces was ill 
advised and the state should allow economic processes to play out under the 
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guidance of the invisible hand, which was representative of providence, or 
God’s will in the world. But what is strange about Smith’s (1982) utopia, 
which translates the cybernetic economic system into a theological machine 
of cosmological span, is the way in which it develops on the basis of the kind 
of post- humanism that it is possible to identify in contemporary neoliberal 
economics.
We can see Smith’s (1982) post- humanism very clearly when we consider 
his concept of sympathy and think about how this contrasts with Spinoza’s 
(1996) understanding of the same idea, and the way in which his vision of 
individualism feeds into what Mike Hill and Warren Montag (2015) call 
laissez- faire necro- economics, which is utopian only insofar as it commits the 
totalitarian crime of the subordination of human life to the demands of some 
supra- individual abstraction, in this instance the market. According to Hill 
and Montag’s interpretation of Smith’s idea of sympathy from The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (2010), there is no trans- individual basis to his understanding 
of market society, because his theory of the sympathetic interaction of people 
is founded in intra- individual processes which mean that there is always an 
abyss between people. In other words, Smith’s capitalist individual does not 
connect to the other directly, but is instead a kind of Kantian individual who 
experiences the other in his own terms. In this respect the other in Smith’s 
concept of sympathy is never the other in itself, but rather the other subjec-
tively experienced in the imagination of the individual who can never really 
know the other or understand the other’s plight. Given the essential gap 
between self and other, which can only be bridged through the sympathetic 
imagination where the self tries to put itself in the shoes of the other, Smith 
turns to Stoicism in order to suggest that the other should maintain a state 
of reserve and calm in the face of the turbulence of life, because complaint 
causes revulsion and strains the bonds of civilisation. The reason reserve and 
calm are important to Smith is because these forms of behaviour represent 
what they came to symbolise for the famous Roman Stoic Seneca (2010, 2014), 
self- mastery in the face of the stresses and strains of life. For Seneca these 
stresses were irrelevant in the cosmological scheme of things, and what we 
find in Smith is a modern, capitalist update of this thesis concerned with 
command of the self. In Smith the Stoic philosopher who transforms himself 
into an empire becomes the capitalist individual who remains calm in the face 
of the turbulence of the market, which becomes the cosmos which is indif-
ferent to pain, suffering, and misery.
It is for this reason, explain Hill and Montag (2015), that Smith was suspi-
cious of the conception of sympathy found in Spinoza’s (1996) work, because 
this led to the emergence of the multitude, or mob, which could take on a 
mind of its own and threaten cosmological or, in his view, market forces. In 
light of this, Smith insists on the sanctity of laws of private property and 
maintains that these must hold in the face of claims based in trans- individual 
connectivity. As long as the trans- individual claim that justice relates to the 
necessary interconnection of people is kept off the table by laws around 
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individual private property, Smith saw that the capitalist cosmos could continue 
to operate. It is, however, no wonder Smith recognised the threat of multitude, 
since his faith in the capitalist cosmos led by the invisible hand resulted in 
the horror of what Hill and Montag call necro- economics, where the poor 
and destitute should be left to die in order to allow market forces to balance 
resource, price, and population. Developing the idea of necro- economics, Hill 
and Montag (2015) read Smith’s faith in the market through Foucault’s (2004, 
2008) theory of biopower, where the state no longer puts criminals and out-
siders to death but rather abandons those who are pathological to the state of 
nature in order to develop a bio- economic cybernetic theory of the market. 
According to this view, market forces must be allowed to dictate to price of 
food. Those who cannot pay this price, the waste of humanity, will die of 
starvation and in this way balance the market. In this respect death is a utili-
tarian principle in the necro- economic system, where machines, men, and 
nature are integrated into a cybernetic, cosmological unity that works. It is in 
order to secure this system that Smith insists that the state must ensure that 
the farmer has immunity from the trans- individual claims of the masses and 
defend the market from calls for a right to existence.
For Smith the effect of government intervention into the mysterious pro-
cesses of the market would be catastrophic, because this would distort prices 
and effectively mean that useless masses would eventually drive the productive 
farmer out of business, leading to a situation where starvation would become 
a widespread problem. Hill and Montag (2015) note that Smith found support 
for this view in a theory of the relationship between Chinese despotism and 
famine culture. Reading Jean- Baptiste Du Halde’s (2009) The General History 
of China, Smith sought to defend the state of the poor in capitalism through 
comparison to the nightmare of China, where famine was rife and periodi-
cally threatened the entire population, rather than the unproductive poor who 
made little economic sense. In order to understand the violence of Smith’s 
necro- economics, Hill and Montag (2015) look to rethink Giorgio Agamben’s 
(1998) figure of homo sacer, or the criminal who could be killed with impunity 
because he was outside of the law, in terms of Abbe Roubaud’s les malheureux, 
or the unfortunate victims of the benign neglect made necessary by the defence 
of objective processes that secure utopian balance in the overall economic 
scheme of things. It is precisely this vision of objective justice, which looks 
to the defence of the beauty of the whole and neglects the concerns of the 
individual who is understood in terms of personal freedom, that we find in 
the early neoliberalism of the Austrians. As Hill and Montag (2015) point 
out, Mises thought that there could be no right to subsistence, or idea of 
social justice geared towards equality, because this would infringe the principle 
of freedom embedded in markets and disrupt the mechanics of spontaneous 
order that Hayek (2012) found in capitalism.
It is this concern with the invisible hand of spontaneous order that I believe 
defines the modern utopia, where freedom, innovation, development, modernity, 
and the drive towards the new result in the emergence of a novel dynamic 
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form of organisation. Although Mises (2007) and Hayek (2012) explain the 
formation of this unity in terms of the price mechanism, what we find in 
Smith’s (1982, 1999) work is the fundamental importance of what we might 
call a theological unconscious that finds expression in the notion of providence. 
Unlike the classical utopias of Plato (1991) and More (2008), there is no telos 
in the kinetic utopia of Smith (1982), Locke (1988), Mises (2007), and Hayek 
(2012), but the good is present, and beauty is in evidence, and this is manifest 
in the mystery of the market that works. Thus we can see that the morality 
of this new utopia is utilitarian, post- human, harks back to the Stoicism of 
Seneca (2014) who saw that the cosmos is indifferent to the suffering of men, 
and in this respect deeply theological because it imagines that objective order 
is in the universe. This is precisely Agamben’s (2011) point in his history of 
economic reason. He starts off by reading economy back into the Greek idea 
of oikonomia, which refers to household administration, before showing how 
this reflected back onto the Aristotelian view of nature. He notes that even 
though this is God’s order, God is the prime mover who is not inside his own 
machine. Nature and the economy are, therefore, never really disenchanted, 
because God still reigns when he does not govern. This is why the symbol 
of the economy is the empty throne, the invisible hand, or spontaneous order, 
because what these images represent is the God who is simultaneously every-
where and nowhere. In this respect Agamben disagrees with Weber (1992, 
2010), who understands modernity in terms of progressive disenchantment, 
because what the progressive retreat of God from view really means for 
Agamben is that He is now everywhere and only becomes invisible by virtue 
of His absolute presence and visibility in the orderliness of economic life.
This is an important point that must not be overlooked, because it essentially 
determines whether capitalism, and especially contemporary neoliberal capital-
ism, is a utopian economic system, which means a system organised around 
fundamental assumptions about the good that can be subject to critical inter-
rogation, or whether it represents the end of utopian thought, and the end of 
human imagination about the good, and simply represents a degeneration 
towards a kind of obsession with administrative, instrumental reason. The 
problem with the latter view, which I do not believe the exploration of the 
history of the emergence of capitalism in thought can sustain, is that it becomes 
impossible to find space for critical engagement with economy because it is 
post- political and simply reflects the working out of administrative problems. 
This is essentially the problem with Jamie Peck’s (2013) recent account of 
neoliberalism, which explains that there is no real neoliberal ideology, but 
instead a much more mobile neoliberal reason or stratagem that responds to 
problems on the ground without recourse to some transcendental ideal. The 
reason I find this position problematic is that what the idea of a neoliberal 
strategy really describes is a model of ideology realised or completed that is 
only nihilistic and post- political by virtue of the fact that it is has either 
forgotten its own deep theological history or repressed this towards what Samo 
Tomsic (2015) calls ‘the capitalist unconscious’. It is the dirty secret or repressed 
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history of this capitalist unconscious that critical thinkers should look to 
unearth, because it is only by revealing the utopian assumptions of the con-
temporary neoliberal system that it will become possible to question theological 
notions such as the spontaneous order which first emerged in Aristotle’s (2009) 
philosophy of household management.
When we say that neoliberal capitalism is a kind of pragmatism, and that 
the attempt to label this new form of economic reason is problematic because 
it has no ideological unity, I think we betray the history of thought, and fail 
to see that these ideas come out of a long philosophical, historical process and 
that they will be superseded in turn, once critical thinkers escape from the 
sticky, smoky atmosphere left behind by Fukuyama’s (1992) triumphalist dec-
laration of the end of history. Given this claim, and the clear utopianism of 
the Bush/Blair period, it is shocking that there are those who imagine that 
neoliberal capitalism is no more than a post- ideological stratagem and cannot 
see that the contemporary global economic system represents the totalisation 
of Smith’s (1982, 1999) fantasy of the invisible hand and Hayek’s (2012) neo-
liberal corrective where the role of the state is to ensure that competition 
remains possible and the God/less machine survives. It is precisely the God/
less nature of this system that Will Davies (2014) misses in his truly dystopic 
vision of neoliberal capitalism which he seeks to capture in the idea that the 
neoliberal is the destruction of politics by economics. Although this may 
appear to be the case, and there is no doubt that contemporary neoliberal 
management screens out political alternatives, this is because economic reason 
is a kind political theology that is no longer up for debate. While Davies 
suggests that the crash and subsequent government bank bailouts show that 
neoliberalism is now a purely authoritarian system organised around Schmit-
tian (2007) decisionism, and that this means that contemporary capitalism 
lacks legitimacy, one could also argue that what the decisive action of the 
Schmittian sovereign really points to is that cast- iron belief in a system has 
enormous affective power, regardless of its pragmatic utility.
Of course, the other side of this fundamental belief in manufactured spon-
taneous order, a notion that in itself reveals the pure irrationality of the neo-
liberal advance on laissez- faire, is a failure of the critical imagination to think 
otherwise that one often finds in utopian- cum- dystopian visions. In neoliberal 
capitalism the individual is essentially a competitor who thinks through the 
lens of a kind of economic physics able to rationalise a state of pure war 
restrained by legal regulation. In a world where the key thinkers are Norbert 
Wiener (2013), originator of cybernetic theory, and John Von Neumann (Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007), who wrote the book on game theory, 
there is little room for thought that steps outside of calculative reason. Accord-
ing to Goodchild (2002), the calculative space- time of late capitalism screens 
out the possibility of the transcendence of thought. Under these conditions 
the original thinking behind the superiority of the market and the belief in 
the transcendental power of spontaneous order have become immanent, because 
of what we might call their globalitarian diffusion, to the extent that they 
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now reflect the strange geometry of a kind of flat abyss or abyssal surface. 
That is to say that there is nothing more than neoliberal capitalism, but that 
this ‘nothing more’ that is neoliberal capitalism is somehow more than nothing, 
which is precisely what enables this system to retain its effective power. It is 
precisely because of this minimal difference inside neoliberal nihilism, which 
separates its God/less reason from itself in order to reveal its deeply theological 
utopian roots, that it is possible to hollow out a space of critical freedom and 
political possibility in a cybernetic machine that seems otherwise closed to every 
possible alternative on the basis that they fail to make sense within its paradig-
matic boundaries. It is precisely this sense of closure, and strange con/fusion of 
belief and unbelief in fundamental economic reason, that means that we should 
talk about the really existing neoliberal capitalist utopia and lead critical thinkers 
to recognise that this God/less machine must be engaged on a number of levels, 
including the historical, philosophical, and theological, in the name of the 
unfortunates who are the collateral damage of this system and should form the 
basis of an alternative utopia organised around a theory of distributive justice 
and trans- individual, phenomenological interconnectivity.
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I  What Is the Meaning of Money?
In the last chapter I explored the origins of the contemporary capitalist utopia 
through an exploration of the notion of spontaneous order that emerges in 
liberal thought and eventually leads to Smith’s (1982) vision of the invisible 
hand. In the conclusion of this exploration I suggested that the normalisation 
and diffusion of the idea of spontaneous order may have resulted in the cre-
ation of a theology of unbelief, where belief seems to collapse towards a state 
of nihilistic disenchantment precisely because it is already everywhere and 
nowhere. The result of the emergence of this (un)belief is that the capitalist 
utopia exhibits a level of durability which is hard to understand in light of 
market turbulence that seems to indicate that spontaneous order is at best a 
post- human form which would then, presumably, have limited value for 
humans. The reason for this durability is, from the point of the view of the 
theory of theological unbelief, the result of a belief that cannot speak its name, 
denies its own existence, masquerades as reason, and is, as a consequence, more 
or less immune to reasonable critique. In this chapter, I propose to move my 
exploration of capitalist utopianism forward to take in the rise of neoliberalism 
and the development of the theory of cosmological spontaneous order across 
the 20th century. Although I offer a discussion of the Austrians, and in par-
ticular their adaptation of Weber’s (2013) theory of methodological individual-
ism, in my exploration of the origins of the capitalist utopia in this chapter 
I examine these writers in context and look at the paradoxical idea that 
grounds neoliberalism, the state- managed free market, in terms of its historical 
situation both pre- and post- World War II and finally in relation to cold war 
political culture. Specifically, I propose to follow Daniel Stedman Jones’ (2012) 
suggestion, and separate neoliberal history into three stages marked by the 
Austrians, and specifically Hayek, Mises, and Popper, the Americans, and par-
ticularly Friedman, and finally the expression of these ideas in global politics 
to the contemporary end of history period, or what we might now call the 
end of the end of history in the wake of the global economic crash. Regard-
ing the shift from Smith’s (1982) vision of spontaneous order to the utopian 
image found in Friedman (2002), Hayek (2012), through to advocates of global 
The Late Capitalist Utopia in 
Power
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finance, I follow Phil Mirowski’s (2002) thesis that it is possible to understand 
the development of late capitalism through its embrace of techno- science and 
specifically cybernetic theory over the course of the 20th century. While 
spontaneous order was a theological metaphor in Smith (1999), my suggestion 
is that in the 20th century, this vision was filtered through techno- science, 
with the result that the neoliberal conception of the economy starts to rep-
resent a man- machine assemblage. In Mirowski’s (2002) work on the utopian 
con/fusion of cybernetics and economy in the 20th century, key figures include 
Norbert Wiener (2013), who first proposed the idea of cybernetics, which 
refers to the interaction of man and machine in a system organised around 
principles of command, control, communication, and computation, and John 
Von Neumann (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007), whose work on game 
theory transformed Smith’s rational individual into a kind of mathematician 
able to weigh risks and probability in order to gain competitive advantage.
In seeking to think through the implications of this shift, I explore the ways 
in which neoliberal thought conceives of economy, and by extension society, 
politics, and culture, in terms of techno- scientific machines completing with 
cybernetic minds and bodies that respond to stimulus in more or less rational 
ways. Here, I suggest that the shift from the Austrians to the Americans rep-
resents an important moment, because where Popper (2002a, b), Mises (2007), 
Menger (2009), and Hayek (2012) imagined a rational economy, society, and 
political system through the image of spontaneous order, it was the Americans, 
and specifically the Friedman- era Chicago School, that transformed economics, 
economy, and as consequence society into mathematics and mathematical 
objects. Under these conditions the role of politics becomes about technical 
management of the cybernetic system, with the result that democratic par-
ticipation in consideration of decisions around fundamental goods starts to 
take a back seat and freedom moves towards the space of the private sphere 
of individuals who express their self through their consumption choices and 
the development of a kind of doomed market subjectivity. The reason this 
new market subjectivity becomes an ethical problem, perhaps the ethical prob-
lem of the 21st century, is because the mode of individualism, which is never 
complete but always desperately in search of completion through the symbolic 
systems of the market, is fated to a life of endless work, terminal consumerism, 
and eventual burnout and exhaustion. This form of subjectivity, which Dardot 
and Laval (2014) call ultra- subjectivity, is therefore always late, in the sense 
that it is doomed before it has even begun, and represents the dystopic coun-
terpoint to the neoliberal capitalist utopia that relies on ultra- subjectivity to 
maintain its hyped- up form of dynamic equilibrium. The real affront of the 
neoliberal utopia is, therefore, that it lives off the imposition of a dystopic 
form of subjectivity defined by the progressive destruction of mind and body 
and hides this behind its techno- scientific computational aesthetic that suggests 
objectivity, neutrality, and the impossibility of alternatives.
What is more is that the prospects of salvation are not good for the ultra- 
subject because what characterises neoliberal capitalism as late capitalism is the 
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problem of growth, vitality, and dynamism, which was sustained by world war 
and recovery from world war across most of the 20th century, but today is 
exhausted by ecological finitude and technological limitation. Under these condi-
tions, growth and the maintenance of the dynamism of the neoliberal utopia will 
only come from the modernisation of the south, which produces new limits in 
the form of ecological destruction, the progressive mechanisation of the worker 
in the cybernetic economy where every aspect of life becomes a site of possible 
value, and the increasing virtualisation of the economy that further condemns 
human subjectivity to marginality, meaninglessness, and transformation into waste. 
Following the elaboration of this thesis through reference to Dardot and Laval’s 
(2014) work, I turn to the issue of the progressive objectification of value and 
the virtualisation of capitalism in the form of the stock market, which is the 
topic of Chapter 4. Here, I consider the translation of economy from a sphere 
of thought through the philosophical image of the invisible hand in the laissez- 
faire, liberal, political economics from the 18th century to the early 20th century 
to the mathematical, computational conception of a cybernetic networked order 
in the neoliberalism of Friedman (2002) and the Chicago School from the 1950s 
onwards, in order to advance a theory of the capitalist utopia realised in a kind 
of techno- scientific sublime. In other words, the invisible hand, or spontaneous 
order, is no longer simply a metaphor, but rather a computational matrix realised 
across the global network in the neoliberalism of Friedman and the Chicago 
School that captured the world powers and major global institutions and subse-
quently transformed the sphere of international relations into a space of economic 
contestation and competition.
In order to try to capture this vision of the globalisation of the really exist-
ing neoliberal late capitalist utopia, I conclude the chapter with an exploration 
of the ways in which utopian order and dystopian disorder play out in con-
ceptualisations of stock market trading, which shifts from a space of American 
frontierism, speculation, and high risk in the 19th century to a supposed closed 
universe of riskless risk in the late 20th century and early 21st century when 
the practice of securitisation led to the ultimate capitalist utopian vision— the 
economic, mathematical absolute where it is possible to hedge against the 
inevitable fluctuations in price and as a result escape the vicissitudes of time 
and the future itself. While this vision of the cancelled or what I want to call 
the strike- through future (future)— because this kind of utopianism paradoxi-
cally recalls the sci- fi fantasy of a high- tech world far off in the future— 
represents the utopian idea par excellence, since it is spatially contained by 
virtue of its global reach and temporally limited through techniques that make 
it possible to hedge against the radical uncertainty of the future, it is also 
reflective of a dystopian nightmare because the kind of dynamic equilibrium 
it suggests represents the opposite of what Bataille (1991) and Mauss (2000) 
wrote about in their theories of the cosmological primitive economy. Where 
they made generosity, the limited needs of humanity, and, in Mauss at least, 
redistribution the condition of an economy of excess, the late capitalist, neo-
liberal utopia disappears or vanishes humanity and the human body beneath 
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a cybernetic dystopia, which is comparable to the kind of totalitarianism found 
under Stalin and Mao, with the only difference being that the Soviet and 
Chinese communists destroyed humanity through politics, while the neoliberal 
utopians suggest that the market decides, and imagine that this somehow makes 
the destruction of body and mind by the objective violence of the techno- 
scientific economy more bearable.
Of course from the point of view of the starved body and ruined mind, it 
makes no real difference, and offers no real compensation or comfort, to say 
that its executioner is sat behind a console in a London investment bank. This 
is no better, or somehow more defensible, than to look for the architect of 
monstrous violence behind a desk in CCP headquarters in Beijing. This dif-
ference makes no difference, which is precisely why the Chinese communists 
have found the transformation from communism to capitalism so very easy 
to make. Although this thesis suggests a hopeless, post- political future, where 
late capitalist utopianism transcends divisions between left and right, and even 
unites American Friedmanites and Chinese post- Maoist marketeers, it is the 
very completion and realisation of this cybernetic utopian machine that opens 
up a space to consider its potential dialectical negativity. This was revealed in 
2008, when it became clear that the overconfidence, and utopian hubris, 
of the market fundamentalists who imagined the condition of riskless risk was 
their greatest enemy. At the same time that this hubris threatens to undermine 
the late capitalist utopia in power, and has today led to discussion of zombie 
politics and zombie economics, resistance to the neoliberal utopians who 
remain in love with their system post- mortem will require the imagination 
of a new utopia, or fundamental good, which should emerge from the very 
human condition neoliberalism ignores. The human body that suffers may 
very well become the new utopian figure of the 21st century which will 
enable the construction of a new ethics to oppose the post- human, cybernetic, 
utopia of capitalism. Finally, and in order to think through the possibility of 
the emergence of the critical space necessary to articulate this vision, in the 
conclusion of the chapter I set up a consideration of theories of market tur-
bulence, including Benoit Mandelbrot’s (2004) theory of the inherent wildness 
of markets, in order to, first, comment on the crash of 2008, and second, show 
how the impossible durability of the capitalist utopia may well be threatened 
by its neoliberal, ultra- rational formulation. Here, I open a space to consider 
Quentin Meillassoux’s (2009, 2015) work on the limitations of the idea of 
finitude in order to show how the inherent hyper- chaos of markets opens a 
space for potential utopian change which is necessary because of the ways in 
which the hyper- rationality of the late capitalist mathematical utopia violates 
and humiliates the human body in pursuit of value. In this respect, I move 
into the discussion of financialisation, the stock market, and the potential col-
lapse of the mathematical sublime in Chapter 4.
Beyond the Hobbesian (2008) state of nature, where savage violence is the 
normal state of affairs and men must fight to survive, perhaps late capitalism’s 
most durable origin story is that of Carl Menger (2009), who writes about 
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the function of money in the evolution of society in his essay On the Origins 
of Money. Without money, Menger explains, men would have been unable to 
exchange goods effectively, since barter requires direct exchange, and they 
would have struggled to locate, first, producers making exactly what they 
needed, and second, producers making exactly what they needed who wanted 
what they had to offer. Under these conditions one can imagine that economic 
exchange in the state of nature would have been sporadic, uncoordinated, and 
highly unlikely to solve the Lockean (1988) problem of spoilage through 
circulation. Following Locke’s turn to money to solve the problem of over- 
production, Menger (2009) suggests that without money that economy and 
society would have struggled to emerge, because money solves the problem 
of the uncoordination of wants through the provision of a universal means 
of exchange able to mediate between every other good. Thus money solves 
the problem of the double coincidence of wants and allows economy and 
society to take off because men can now trade freely. Moreover, money also 
solves the problem of incommensurability, or the incomparability of diverse 
goods, because it allows immeasurable quality to be measured through a uni-
versal mediator that translates singular qualities into comparable quantities 
according to a purely neutral, objective measure, market value, that never passes 
judgement on quality itself. In other words, the measure of the value of a 
particular good is found in its price, which reflects its value relative to every 
other good available on the market. What dictates the translation of value to 
price is never related to some sovereign decision about inherent quality, but 
rather market demand for particular goods and the ways in which this demand 
is either sated or thwarted by relative supply. In this way it is clear how 
Menger’s (2009) Austrian origin story plugs into Smith’s (1982, 1999) invisible 
hand, which describes how self- interested individuals find social coordination 
through the price mechanism, and connects to Hayek’s (2012) theory of cos-
mological spontaneous order that formed the bedrock of early neoliberal 
thought. What Menger’s vision of a primitive barter society, which makes the 
leap to money in order to enable the coordination of diverse wants, shows is 
that early market thinkers, including Mandeville (1989) and Smith (2010), had 
no need for the passions or a concept of trans- individual sympathy, because 
self- interested reason was enough to produce effective social interaction on its 
own. What we find here, therefore, in one of the key texts of early neoliberal 
thought is the move that, first, sets up the evolutionary origins of the market 
in the need of men to trade in order to sustain their existence, and second, 
rationalises this procedure in such a way that it is possible to see how the 
human would later disappear in the late 20th- century and early 21st- century 
model of Friedman and the Chicago Friedmanites.
While it is possible to identify the roots of the neoliberal utopian form in 
Menger’s (2009) short paper, consideration of the work of one of his con-
temporaries, Georg Simmel (2011), enables one to start to critique this model 
of social organisation that takes off from the abstraction of humans in the 
universal, empty mediator— money. In Simmel’s classic work, The Philosophy 
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of Money (2011), which he presented in sketch form to an audience of Austrian 
economists that included Menger in 1896, he shows how the money economy 
represents the modern form of society in that individuals interact, find their 
identity, and create society through economic relations. However, following 
Marx (1988), who explored the way modern capitalism proletarianises the 
worker, Simmel explains that the market is a reified, total system, what he calls 
an ‘autonomous cosmos’, that violates the inner life of the individual who 
suffers under conditions of objective culture, where abstraction, hyper- rational 
exchange, and high- speed circulation rule. Where Menger and the Austrians 
have no problem with the subsumption of the individual in the thing called 
the market, because they imagine that the individual remains free throughout 
the procedure of exchange, Simmel’s (2011) objective was to look beneath the 
surface of the modern economy in order to consider its impact upon the mental 
life of the individual. In his classic paper on the psychology of the modern 
urbanite, who he thinks is uniquely exposed to a modern economy that finds 
its home in the city, Simmel (1997) finds man transformed into a rational 
thing, an object, that regards others with blasé indifference and, under condi-
tions of extreme proximity, revulsion and horror. Akin to Rodin’s sculpture, 
which Simmel thought captured the dynamic quality of modernity, modern 
economic man is simultaneously in a state of constant motion and, precisely 
because of this mobility, hardened, and paradoxically strangely immobile (Frisby 
in Simmel, 2011).
In much the same way that Freud imagined the new split subject, where 
the ego forms a kind of exoskeleton or body armour to cover the id, uncon-
scious, or libidinal self, Simmel (2011) argues that modernity has left the 
subjective self, or the inner self, behind. While Freud turned to psychoanalysis 
to excavate the inner life of the subject he thought was necessarily repressed 
by Oedipus, Simmel found the processes of alienation in modernity and looked 
for traces of the inner life of the individual in every detail which, in his view, 
could reveal the truth of the whole and the totality of meaning in a world 
that seemed progressively meaningless. Herein resides Simmel’s opposition to 
the Austrians and, I would argue, his sociological utopianism that may be seen 
to connect him to his student, Ernst Bloch (1995). Following Nietzsche (1993), 
who bemoaned the oppression of Dionysus under the rationalism of modernity, 
Simmel’s (2011) project concerned the excavation of the utopian unconscious 
hidden beneath the progressive abstraction of the money economy. Although 
money is the social relation under conditions of modernity, Simmel suggests 
that the tragedy of culture, or the translation of quality into quantity and 
subjective perception into objective fact, hides a deeper level of existential 
interconnectedness that structures the identity of self and other and makes the 
individual continuous with the social. In this respect the problem with money 
resides in the way it translates this social being into the kind of objective 
economic form Mises (2007), Menger (2009), and Hayek (2012) wanted to 
defend in the name of the individual, whom they wanted to insulate from 
others through abstraction. Of course, what they could not see, and would 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   86 10-12-2016   8:17:31 PM
The Late Capitalist Utopia in Power 87
never see, is that it is precisely this abstract form, which Max Weber (1992) 
wrote about in terms of the world historical process of rationalisation, that 
ends up undermining the independence of individuals by transforming them 
into a part of a post- human cybernetic machine, the modern and later post-
modern economy.
The difference between Menger (2009) and Simmel (2011) over modern 
economy essentially revolves around their disciplinary difference. Where 
Menger saw money, economy, and the price mechanism as ends in themselves, 
Simmel wanted to look beneath the abstraction of the economy in order to 
understand the fate of subjectivity, precisely because his philosophy told him 
that humans are more than economic actors. This extra- economic dimension 
was of less interest to Menger, who took the individual for granted and never 
questioned its transformation into a commodity in a wider system. This 
oversight is striking because we can only assume that the reason he imagines 
the outer edge of the money economy, where people must struggle to barter 
and have no real means of exchange, is because he wants to assert the primacy 
of the individual who is originally outside the system of exchange that emerges 
in history. By contrast, Simmel (1910) starts from the opposite position when 
he questions the very possibility of society only to arrive at the conclusion 
that self and other are inseparable in an originary universal that it less cyber-
netic and more organic in form. The irony of this position, however, is that 
it is precisely this organic social form that Simmel thinks enables the existence 
of the individual who can never be completely subsumed into the social whole. 
What concerns him about modern economy, and by extension the system of 
spontaneous order we find in the Austrians, is that this insight vanishes into 
an undialectical apprehension of the absolute divisibility of the individual on 
the one hand and the abstract socio- economic form on the other hand. The 
true horror of this position, which separates individual from social in the form 
of objective self and money economy, is that both disappear in a mutilated, 
alienated individual that no longer recognises itself and a reified economic 
form that is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere.
Since Simmel passed in 1918 and Menger died in 1921, they ushered in 
the interwar period which would supposedly consign laissez- faire to the past 
and leave Menger’s followers, Mises and Hayek, out in the cold. Although 
Menger’s essay, published more than a century after Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations, would eventually found what would later become the neoliberal utopia 
in power, by the early 21st century the classic laissez- faire model of capitalism 
had been abandoned in the name of state regulation of markets. From the 
point of view of Simmel’s (2011) theory of money and markets, the problem 
with the economy, which became very clear in the early 20th century, is that 
it had floated off and become a kind of autonomous cosmos, beyond the reach 
of individuals, but, perhaps more importantly, political leaders, who realised 
that the 19th- century liberal view of the invisible hand was no longer fit for 
purpose in the 20th century. According to Rosa Luxemburg (2003), who 
published The Accumulation of Capital in 1913, and Lenin (2010), who published 
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his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1917, the problem with 
laissez- faire capitalism was that it was driven by the kind of relentless need to 
accumulate capital that Marx (1990) and Simmel (2011) identified in their 
works. In both Marx and Simmel, modern economy is a pitiless machine that 
transforms everything it meets into objective quantity, capital, or waste product 
on pain of its own death. For Luxemburg and Lenin it was precisely this need 
to move or die trying that had led to the emergence of the expansionary or 
imperial capitalist state organised around the need to seek out colonies in 
order to secure access to raw materials and open up new trade routes. The 
rest is history— the history of the form of capitalism Deleuze and Guattari 
(1983) write about in terms of a war machine that consumes bodies and land 
in the name of the creation of surplus value.
The result of the emergence of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) new industrial 
capitalist state war machine in the mid- 19th century was that the major pow-
ers of the period, Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and America, began to 
come into conflict over their imperial concerns in the virgin lands of Africa 
and Asia. While this in itself could have been resolved through the proper 
separation of economy and state in the creation of a truly global market, this 
was not in place in the 19th century, when capitalist accumulation was reliant 
on naked state power, and would have to wait until the invention of soft 
power and cultural imperialism in the 20th century. At this point capital could 
flow more freely because of the emergence of high- tech forms of communi-
cation, but before the emergence of postmodern capitalism, and a more or 
less networked form of globalisation, the result of state- backed processes of 
primitive accumulation was that skirmishes between the great powers in colo-
nial space were inevitable and war was always likely. While Germany had 
designs on becoming an imperial power to rival Britain, and had achieved 
this to some extent in the early 20th century, its great ally, the Austro- Hungarian 
Empire, was in the process of collapse under the weight of ethno- nationalism 
stoked by the Slavs’ big brother to the east, Russia. Under these conditions 
the problem for the new industrial powerhouse, Germany, was that its expan-
sionary potential was limited by the French to the west and the Russians to 
the east. In many respects the situation in Austria- Hungary, and the flashpoint 
produced by the Serb nationalists’ murder of Franz Ferdinand, provided the 
Germans with the opportunity to try to escape their situation in central Europe 
through war on France, Russia, and by extension the British, who were locked 
into the decision to fight the Germans by a series of interlocking treaties with 
the French and Russians.
Thus, the development and expansion of European capitalism, especially in 
the case of Germany, which became the new European superpower in the 
wake of unification in 1871, eventually led to World War I and the first 
moment in the story of the collapse of the laissez- faire model in the fires of 
1914–1918. In the wake of the war, the Americans led the attempt to create 
an interstate system to prevent further global conflict, the League of Nations, 
and also sought to prop up Germany, which had been squeezed by French 
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reparations imposed at Versailles in 1919, in order to create a barrier to Soviet 
expansion. Regardless of the pragmatic politics of American loans in this 
period, it is possible to think about the transfer of surplus capital to Germany 
in terms of what Bataille (1991) would later call a profitless operation or 
sacrifice in the name of the salvation of Germany. However, the problem of 
American generosity, the Dawes Plan and later Young Plan, which were designed 
to address the problem of hyper- inflation, was that Weimar became over- reliant 
on American money under conditions where the American economy was 
itself on the edge of a crash brought about by excessive consumption and the 
kind of expenditure that brought the German loans about in the first place. 
The catastrophic potential of this situation was realised in 1929 when German 
over- dependence on American money was exposed by the Wall Street crash, 
which, in the view of Galbraith (2009), was itself the result of a boom in 
financial speculation or new gold rush in America where everybody thought 
they could make a killing on the market. The crash, and consequent crisis of 
liquidity on the American market, led to the immediate withdrawal of financial 
support from Germany.
While the Great Depression that followed the crash saw the collapse of 
American industrial production, mass unemployment, homelessness, and starva-
tion, the knock- on effects in Europe saw the German economy flatline, with 
the result that the crash- era Chancellor Heinrich Bruning imposed severe 
austerity measures by cutting wages and raising taxes in order to try to ward 
off the threat of a return to the hyper- inflation of the early 1920s. The result 
of this approach was, however, further unemployment and the political insta-
bility that would eventually propel Hitler to power in 1933. Of course, the 
Nazi response to Germany’s economic situation was to spend in the name of 
the creation of demand. The early ’30s saw Hitler introduce public works 
programmes, including the construction of the autobahns and the planting of 
new forests, and force labour upon the unemployed who could not strike and 
thought better about protest. The Nazi economic miracle of this period, which 
involved the manipulation of statistics in order to create the impression of 
more or less zero unemployment, also involved investment in heavy industry, 
munitions, and arms production in preparation for the imperial expansion that 
would take place after 1939. In this respect, the Nazis sought to kick- start 
the German economy in the wake of the crash through the construction of 
a new war machine, which made economy the handmaiden of the warfare 
state, and the motor behind the construction of Hitler’s totalitarian machine 
that would soon roll over most of Europe. Nazism was, in this respect, more 
or less wholly identified with war.
By contrast, in America, where the original market crash took place, FDR’s 
New Deal was based on a similar approach to state spending. However, in 
this case the American approach to expenditure was based on the principles 
of social construction in the name of peace. While the banking or Glass- 
Steagall Act of 1933 sought to prevent a further crash by separating commercial 
and investment banking practices so financial speculation could not impact 
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upon the real economy, between 1935 and 1938 FDR sought to spend America 
out of the Depression through the introduction of the PWA (Public Works 
Administration) that would cut unemployment through the provision of work 
on public projects, including the construction of schools, roads, hospitals, and 
bridges. At the same time, public relief programmes were introduced, in the 
form of social security and unemployment insurance, in order to lift the very 
poor out of poverty. Although the cases of Germany and America led in very 
different directions, with Hitler looking to base recovery on the progress of 
the war machine and FDR funding social reconstruction in the name of peace, 
they were similar in their responses to World War I, the Wall Street crash, and the 
problems of laissez- faire in that they both turned to state intervention and 
management of economy to solve the crisis of spontaneous order and untamed 
capitalism. In the mid- 1930s Keynes (1946) provided the blueprint for this 
approach to macroeconomic management in his The General Theory of Employ-
ment, Interest, and Money, which moved away from the laissez- faire view that 
the principle economic actor is always the rational individual who somehow 
finds his place through the machinations of the invisible hand. Despite World 
War II, where the Nazi model of state management of economy drove a policy 
of totalitarian imperialism and genocidal expansionism, the Keynesian model 
held up and in the immediate post- war period became the economic ideology 
behind the reconstruction of British society.
II  The Origins of the Neoliberal Utopia
Against the Nazis who rebuilt Germany on the basis of the war machine, 
Keynes’ (1946) solution to the problem of growth was to create demand 
through expenditure in social reconstruction in order to stimulate further 
production and so on. As Arendt (1973) explained in The Origins of Totalitari-
anism, the Nazi state was an evolutionary development of the imperial state, 
where the problem of expenditure was solved by adventure and conquest in 
search of new markets. But what FDR achieved in the New Deal, and the 
Labour government realised in the welfare state, was the opposite of this war 
machine, and closer to the Maussian, Bataillean approach to economy where 
surpluses are spent in the form of gift exchange in the creation of a social 
system based upon reciprocal giving, sacrifice in the name of others, and 
obligatory generosity. According to Angus Burgin’s (2012) history of the rise 
of neoliberal economics, the period from the 1930s through the 1970s was 
dominated by the Keynesian view of economy, which suggested that state 
investment was required to create demand and confidence in order to maintain 
high levels of employment. He points out that from the 1930s onwards, when 
capitalism and workers found a consensus position somewhere between laissez- 
faire and Soviet socialism, the early neoliberals were swimming against the 
tide of received government opinion. Stedman Jones (2012) supports Burgin’s 
view in his own history of neoliberal political theory. When he divides neo-
liberal thought into three periods, which involves, first, the Ordo/Austrian 
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period from the 1930s to 1950s; second, the Chicago period from the 1950s 
through to the 1970s; and finally, what he calls globalisation, which involves the 
realisation of a kind of neoliberal pragmatism on the world stage, he notes 
that the first stage was concerned with resistance to the Keynesian hegemon. 
In this period, Stedman Jones (2012) points to three key works, which he 
thinks characterise the first phase of neoliberal thought. These works are 
Popper’s (2002a, b) two- volume work on the open society, Mises’ (1944) book 
on bureaucracy, and Hayek’s (2001) critique of state interventionism, The Road 
to Serfdom. Against the early Chicago School, where Frank Knight saw that 
state intervention was necessary, Stedman Jones explains that the Austrians 
were concerned with opposing totalitarian politics in the name of free 
markets.
While Popper (2002a, b) opposed the closed society of the Plato, Hegel, 
and Marx and read the history of philosophy in terms of the inexorable turn 
towards totalitarianism, Mises’ (1944) critique of bureaucracy explained that 
only the market can make decisions about price and that any system based 
on central planning is doomed to failure. Hayek (2001) reached a similar 
conclusion, when he employed Max Weber’s idea of methodological individu-
alism, to argue that the market is the space of freedom par excellence. This 
is the case because the market recognises that individual knowledge is always 
partial and only ever reaches completion in its fusion in the system of prices 
that defines value. Thus the Austrians saw that freedom resides in the cyber-
netic, collective, marketised approach to decision making, which meant that a 
Plato, Hegel, Marx, Stalin, or Hitler could never take possession of power in 
order to impose his own vision of the world upon everybody else. In this 
respect, economic theory was always about far more than economy, and became 
central to the construction of a liberal utopia. However, Stedman Jones (2012) 
notes that the Austrians were not entirely resistant to the critique of laissez- 
faire and Hayek at least understood that the free market paradoxically needs 
regulation in order to ensure it continues to function. Thus Hayek (2001) 
sought to avoid both laissez- faire and totalitarianism in a form of economic 
management that avoided bureaucracy and direct state management and instead 
organised market processes through legal regulation. In this way the Austrians’ 
new liberalism was defined by the imposition of ‘economic rules of the road’ 
and the attempt to strike a balance between freedom and regulation.
According to Stedman Jones (2012), it is this model that led to the emer-
gence of Ordo, or order, liberalism in Germany in the wake of World War II. 
The key assumption of the ordoliberals, including Wilhelm Ropke and Walter 
Eucken, was that the market itself is not enough and that what is required is 
social structure able to embed market discipline. Against this conservative 
approach, where social structure is necessary to support market processes and 
offset the effects of anomie and alienation, Stedman Jones points out that the 
second phase in the evolution of neoliberal thought was less concerned with 
the need to temper freedom with regulation and control. While Hayek and 
the Austrians wrote under conditions of economic crisis, when capitalism itself 
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was under threat, the emergence of the later Chicago School, and particularly 
Milton Friedman, resulted in a more bombastic utopia of capitalist freedom 
set in the context of 1950s America, when regulation and the limitation of 
individual freedom were symbolic of Soviet communism. However, it is 
important to recognise the paradox of the early post- war celebration of free-
dom, and to some extent qualify the libertarian vision of Friedman’s radicalism 
with a sensitivity to the way in which individualism was and remains largely 
conservative in American culture. While for the Austrians this turn towards 
the individual was set against the backdrop of Plato, Marx, and Hegel, in 
Friedman’s post- war America, the defence of the individual and pursuit of 
the free market in the face of big government was far less radical— and perhaps 
harked back to a more traditional Americanism of rugged individualism— than 
JFK and LBJ, who remained committed to Keynesian economics and the 
approach of FDR that saw relative equality as fundamentally important to 
social stability.
From the Friedmanite perspective the problem with FDR, JFK, and LBJ 
was not simply that they spent too much money, and thus corrupted the 
ability of the market to set prices, but also that they restricted individual 
freedom through the use of state power. In his short book The State of Excep-
tion (2005), Agamben explores the history of executive power in the 20th 
century and explains that apart from the Nazis, it is also possible to find the 
exercise of exceptional powers in FDR’s response to the Depression. In this 
way the New Deal becomes less about the emergence of a society based in 
giving and more about the extension of the reach of the state, which in 
Agamben’s view has progressively normalised the conditions of emergency 
that requires executive decision over the course of the 20th century. What is 
particularly interesting about Agamben’s example of FDR and the New Deal 
is that Schmittian political theory, which essentially amounts to a defence of 
authoritarianism, is more normally associated with political decision making. 
However, what the case of the New Deal illustrates is that the same executive 
power may be evoked in the state management of economic policy. Of course, 
the problem with Agamben’s (2005) account of the authoritarianism of the 
New Deal is that it critiques the obligatory aspect of the Maussian idea of 
obligatory generosity and forgets about the ethical value of generosity in the 
creation of a more just society. In a sense, then, his vision of the need to resist 
Schmittian executive power is in line with the Austrian and Friedmanite 
critique of the big state with one important exception, which is that the 
Austrians, and particularly Hayek, ended up recognising the need for the state 
to regulate the market from an extra- political position.
In this way Hayek’s paradoxical vision of a regulated free market is sympa-
thetic about the need for executive power, and this is evident in his later 
comments about Schmitt’s political theory, especially in The Constitution of 
Liberty (2006). In Friedman’s work on freedom, there is a clear attack on the 
big state, but the problem with this vision is that its apparent radicalism sat 
easily with the American traditions of frontierism, self- reliance, and individual 
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responsibility and found a place in a new kind of state machine that Foucault 
(2008) spoke about in his seminar on neoliberal biopolitics. Here, the state 
oversees the operation of the free market and grows into other areas of society 
in order to ensure the socialisation of the correct form of individualism. What 
this entails, then, is the adaptation of the Schmittian (2007) model, which 
Agamben found operative in FDR’s New Deal, to a state- managed form of 
capitalism that limits the space of freedom to intra- economic interaction and 
puts the executive in charge of the construction of a competitive, market- based 
social order in the realisation of what Foucault (2008) calls pastoral power. 
The reason this sat more easily with Americans is because the cultural tradi-
tion of the West, the frontier, and the rugged individual meant that the state- 
imposed order was never particularly radical in respect of the construction of 
a competitive system. By contrast to Europe, where the tendency is to critique 
the neoliberal order from the left and suggest that more state intervention is 
required in the name of welfare provision and alleviation of poverty, in the 
American case the opposite is more usually the case, and the pull is to the 
right and the critique of the state becomes about the way it limits individual 
freedoms in its perversion of the utopian conditions of the real America of 
the Old West. This is precisely where Friedman and the later Chicago School 
thinkers have found themselves in the period following Reagan’s election in 
1980. On the one hand they have supported the imposition of free market 
systems in Latin America through the exercise of authoritarian executive power, 
but on the other hand they have been frustrated by the continued existence 
of big government in America, which in their view distorts market forces and 
limits individual freedom.
In this way we might see Friedman’s (2002) political position as a con/
fusion of the libertarian defence of individual freedom and a more or less 
unconscious recognition of the need for executive power in order to impose 
and preserve the market order. From this point of view it may well be the 
case that the key difference between the European and American neoliberals 
resides less in their ideas and more in the context in which they have sought 
to apply them and the language they have employed in order to communicate 
their thinking. Where the Europeans were clear about the need for regulation 
of market freedoms, I would suggest that the same recognition of the need 
for executive power is present in the later Chicago School version of neoliberal 
thinking. Although Friedman (2002) was absolutely opposed to the imposition 
of normative values upon individuals, and believed they should make decisions 
in a market- based system that would then pass judgement, his empiricism— 
which suggested that theory needs tests, and verification or falsification— tended 
to support the rise of the expert technocrat. On the one hand, this seems to 
indicate a preference for the kind of liberal, open society Popper (2002a, b) 
sought to advance through the process of falsification, where no truth can 
stand on the basis of power alone, but on the other hand, the shift towards 
technical evidence and mathematics tended to depoliticise economy and 
transform it into a technical space beyond the reach of the masses who were 
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free within this system managed by experts, but had no freedom to make 
decisions about its wider existence or the thinking about the fundamental 
goods behind its operation.
In cultural terms Mirowski’s (2002) study of the relationship between eco-
nomics and techno- science suggests that this turn to maths reflects the later 
Chicago School’s immersion in the cold war milieu of Wiener (2013), who 
wrote the book on cybernetics and imagined the relationship between men 
and machines in terms of concepts of command, control, communication, and 
computation, and Von Neumann (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007), 
who worked on game theory in order to translate social relations into math-
ematical procedures based in the desire to gain competitive advantage. Read 
in terms of its historical situation in the period of the cybernetic revolution, 
we can better understand how Friedman’s (2002) free market economics pre-
sented a computational vision of freedom and social relations, which trans-
formed economy into an apolitical closed space defined by machinic 
interactions, cold strategic decision making, militarised risk assessment and 
management, and a complete lack of empathy for the other who was similarly 
imagined through the lens of cybernetics. Although Hayek (2012) wrote about 
the notion of spontaneous order through the idea of cybernetics, I would 
suggest that it was not until Friedman’s turn to statistics that cybernetic eco-
nomics was realised. At this point the cybernetic machine imagined in Hayek’s 
modern technological re- vision of Smith found form in a knowledge which 
began to shape the way political leaders and eventually the masses thought 
about economy, society, politics, and culture. While economy became the space 
of machinic interaction, society more or less collapsed before the economic— 
especially when Becker and Posner (2009) made the case that every interaction 
could be understood in terms of economics— and the political began to 
resemble a strange, antiseptic, apolitical space of technical decision. In this respect 
we can trace the history of the emergence of the contemporary idea of post- 
politics back to this period, which was defined by the transformation of 
embodied human thought into machinic calculation considered superior pre-
cisely because of its evacuation of fallible, error- strewn, human elements.
Against the Maussian, Bataillean economy that puts generosity and giving 
to others front and centre, the cultural impact of the expansion of the Fried-
manite model of cybernetic economics can be illustrated through reference 
to the work of John Nash (2007), Von Neumann’s rival in the field of game 
theory, who produced a strange, asocial vision of human interaction. In Nash’s 
equilibrium theory we face a situation of asocial deadlock, where both par-
ticipants make the best possible decisions they can, only to find these cancelled 
by their opponent who similarly makes perfectly rational choices, and the 
emergence of what he called the non- cooperative game. The sociological truth 
of the non- cooperative game is, therefore, social participation in a rule- based 
game cancelled by a kind of rational abyss of existential asociality that we 
might suggest was the product of Nash’s own psychopathology. As we discover 
in Ron Howard’s film A Beautiful Mind (2002), Nash suffered from 
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schizophrenia, and I would suggest that the abyssal asociality we observe in 
his theory of non- cooperative equilibrium is reflective of the schizophrenic’s 
inability to recognise the world or empathise with others who inhabit some 
strange space they cannot access. In this respect, Nash’s (2007) theory of non- 
cooperative interaction recalls R. D. Laing’s (2010) vision of schizophrenia, 
where the schizophrenic withdraws into a hidden self in order to escape from 
the horror of the world. While Deleuze and Guattari (1983) thought that the 
schizophrenic was a potentially revolutionary figure, precisely because the 
schizophrenic could not fit into the repressive, oppressive, Oedipal system of 
capitalism, what the case of Nash illustrates is that there may be a kind of 
hidden or unconscious relationship between the schizophrenic mind- set unable 
to perceive or relate to the world of others and the emergence of the form 
of cybernetic capitalism that Friedman and the Chicago School brought to 
the mainstream in the early cold war period.
The stunning irony of the emergence of the schizoid cybernetic form is 
that Friedman was able to communicate free market ideas to the masses in a 
way that had eluded the earlier neoliberals, who had always considered them-
selves above the need to meet the masses on their own terms (Stedman Jones, 
2012). Friedman was able to take the schizoid utopian fantasy of the new 
computational capitalism to the masses and explain its core ideas very simply 
in such a way that hooked into the deep vein of individualism in American 
culture and consequently contradicted the basic premise of the new capitalism, 
which was schizoid, autistic, and machinic in its understandings of individual-
ism and social life. In his famous work on autism, Bruno Bettelheim (1972) 
writes of the empty fortress and describes the condition of Joey, the mechanical 
boy, who makes up for his lack of others through the construction of a kind 
of cardboard exoskeleton. Bettelheim shows how Joey built himself this card-
board armour in order to protect his destroyed self and survive his personal 
extreme situation that the psychoanalyst relates to the condition of the con-
centration camp prisoner who is powerless and entirely unfree. The only 
freedom the prisoner has, and Joey responds to his situation in the same way, 
is to divide his self, and to retreat into his own inner sanctum where he can-
not be touched. In many respects this is precisely the process Simmel (2011) 
describes in his theory of money, modernity, and objectification of the self in 
the late 19th century and early 20th century and Nash (2007) reflects in his 
mathematical theory of the non- cooperative relation that emphasises the hell 
of the other. Moreover, what we find in each of these examples is a sense of 
barely sublimated warfare that I would suggest has found its home in the 
contemporary economy, and beyond in society and wider culture.
In the case of Simmel (1997), the experience of the contemporary city was 
comparable to the situation of the soldier on the front unable to internalise 
the horrors of war. Following Freud’s (2001a) work on shell shock, Simmel’s 
work reflects the psychological process which sees the shocked individual try 
to save his own skin through autistic withdrawal. Under these conditions the 
self transforms into the classic psychoanalytic subject comprised of an egoistic 
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exoskeleton and soft, fluid inside, which Freud spoke about in terms of the 
unconscious. While Freud (2001b) regarded the unconscious, or hidden primi-
tive, in terms of a space for repressed content and violent tendencies inherent 
in our prehuman origins, and thought that the ego was necessary to ensure 
social interaction, it would also be possible to follow Simmel and make the 
claim that the ego is simultaneously necessary to live under conditions of 
modernity but also a kind of external barrier that prevents the emergence of 
true sociality by virtue of the way in which it imposes objective culture upon 
individuals who would otherwise live in subjective sympathy. In the modern 
condition of objectivity, the other is no longer sympathetic, or a possible friend, 
but rather a potential threat, which is precisely the assumption game theory 
makes in its cybernetic translation of the psychoanalysis of the pathology of 
social withdrawal (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007). Given this move, 
the next step from Nash’s (2007) theory of equilibrium, where cooperation 
is no longer possible and social relations fail to offer hope for change and a 
social future, would be to imagine that the game tips over into a barely sub-
limated state of war, close to Hobbes’ (2008) vision of a minimal form of 
civilization. I would suggest that this state of ever- present, low- intensity war 
is precisely the situation that Friedman’s cold war economy produced in its 
turn to militarised cybernetics and game theory.
Caught in a culture of suspicion and paranoia, where the enemy was every-
where, the potential communist other easily became the non- cooperative friend 
or, by extension, the cooperative enemy, who one must fight in a competitive 
economic system in order to secure advantage. While the paranoia of this 
situation of pure war— which Paul Virilio (2008) writes about in terms of 
the generalisation of the condition of war to a kind of existential principle— 
was able to slide into American and Western society and later become a kind 
of global norm, by virtue of its identification with the American myth of 
rugged individuals who make their own way in the world, the truth of this 
pathological condition may be explained through the translation of Foucault’s 
(2004) take on Clausewitz’ famous statement about the relation between war 
and politics. Where Clausewitz (2008) thought that we should consider war 
as politics by other means, and Foucault suggested the reversal of this equation 
where politics becomes war in sublimated form, I would offer a further exten-
sion in a vision of economy thought through the lens of repressed politics 
which is in itself a condensation of warfare in order to understand the fun-
damental reality of the cybernetic economy of American neoliberalism. As 
both Foucault (2004) and later Virilio (2008) explain, it would be a mistake 
to think about the conduct of war purely in terms of the struggle between 
self- identical states, because what the history of modernity teaches, from 
Hobbes through the French Revolution to the contemporary war on terror, 
is that the sphere of the military is also concerned with the management of 
intrastate concerns. While Foucault wrote about this history in his Discipline 
and Punish (1977), where the prisoner is subject to military discipline, and also 
in his seminar series, Society Must Be Defended (2004), where he outlines his 
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theory of the martial state, and Virilio (2008) speaks of pure war and the 
process of endo- or internal- colonisation of social space, the recent history of 
the war on terror and the techno- scientific surveillance state shows that the 
cybernetic revolution takes in war, economy, and society in the transformation 
of politics into a space of emergency decision (Massumi, 2015).
There can be no democracy in the emergency state, because what matters 
is the exercise of secret police power in the name of the defence of the social 
order in the face of the enemy who is simultaneously external and internal. 
It is precisely this situation which Gregoire Chamayou (2015) writes about 
in his work on the manhunt which takes the form of the secret drone strike 
that must remain undercover in order to, first, fight the unseen enemy on its 
own terms, and second, prevent panics in the wider population which might 
undermine confidence in the executive, the existence of democracy, social 
security, and the stability of markets. In this respect I would suggest that the 
culture of the enemy, and the need to terminate threats to order with absolute 
impunity, is the open secret of contemporary processes of globalisation, which 
is identified by Chamayou (2015), but collapses into an apolitical techno- 
scientific tendency towards existential security, risk management, and immunity 
that appears entirely reasonable, rational, and objective from the perspective 
of those caught inside the cybernetic paradigm. As Randy Martin (2007) 
points out, from this point of view, war, and the strategic execution of war, 
becomes the model for thinking about risk management in finance and wider 
social relations subject to objectification under the infinite reach of the money 
economy. Similarly, it is possible to see that later perspectives, including Becker’s 
(1994) theory of human capital, which translate life itself into a potential 
source of value, also operate under the spell of a kind of martial rationality. 
In this respect, notions such as human capital and bio- capital represent the 
penetration of cybernetic capitalism into life in the form of an existential 
vision of economics that paradoxically has no concern for human life.
The irony of this inhuman form of economics, which Lyotard (1984) wrote 
about in The Postmodern Condition, is that its sadistic drive to attack the human 
in the name of the creation of a more competitive workforce in order to extract 
more value and so on, takes place in the context of a wider political ideology 
that champions the rights of the individual in the face of the monstrous, totali-
tarian state. Apart from his concern with the turn to empirical evidence, ironi-
cally in the name of hard and fast truths, Friedman’s (2002) thought comes 
from a libertarian desire to defend the individual from the tax and spend state. 
From the point of view of Friedman’s monetarist position, which is most clearly 
explained in the monetary history of America he wrote with Anna Schwartz 
(1971), the problem with Keynesian economics is that it puts too much money 
into circulation, with the result that inflation runs out of control. The monetarist 
response to this problem is to manage the money supply, drive state costs down, 
and consequently bring inflation under control. Under these conditions, pro-
ductivity should not come from the state, but rather the individual, who in the 
tradition of the American prospector will innovate and drive growth through 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   97 10-12-2016   8:17:32 PM
98 The Late Capitalist Utopia in Power
entrepreneurial activity. Given this reference to Schumpeter’s (2010) defence of 
the creative individual, it is clear that Friedman’s neoliberalism was not simply 
about economics but also concerned a kind of global social philosophy concerned 
with the reduction of the state and the need to stimulate individual innovation 
through tax cuts and a refusal to support the enemies of growth through exor-
bitant welfare which only created a culture of dependency. Against the evil of 
welfare, most clearly explained by Charles Murray (1984), the neoliberal version 
of the commune became the private enterprise zone, or space of absolute market 
freedom where low rents and low rates are set up in the name of the creation 
of surplus value.
Although the Austrians, but most especially Hayek (2001), understood 
the need for regulation of the free market in order to defend competition, 
the relationship between the Chicago School vision of the free market on the 
one hand and the very clear bias towards business on the other hand has led 
the key theorists of the neoliberal project, including David Harvey (2005) and 
Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy (2010), to conclude that the attempt 
to revive the liberal project in the 1930s has ended up in a class- based project 
designed to put capitalists firmly in charge of workers who have little union 
power and have become no more than human capital in the cybernetic machine 
that is largely indifferent to the situation. For Dumenil and Levy (2010) the 
shift to neoliberal capitalism would not have been possible without a significant 
change in the political position of managers, who they take for a kind of 
intermediary class between capitalists and workers, because it would not have 
been feasible to realise the neoliberal project, which requires the intensification 
of work and the transformation of the worker into an entrepreneurial subject, 
without the evolution of disciplinary management techniques. While managers 
in the Keynesian period understood the need for compromise and to work 
with the workforce, Dumenil and Levy explain that the new super managers, 
who Piketty (2014) suggests are key players in the development of the late 
capitalist utopia, manage in the name of the production of new forms of 
performance- enhancing subjectivity. In this respect they have no interest in 
compromise with workers, who will seek to maximise their own advantage 
or to maintain the status quo, because this will not enable the kind of growth 
that supply side economics suggests must come from the development of the 
workforce. In their classic work, The New Way of the World (2014), Pierre 
Dardot and Christian Laval explain how the neoliberal subject has been engi-
neered in line with the needs of Friedman’s cybernetic system where calcula-
tion of competitive advantage is what matters.
III  The Neoliberal Utopia and Its Discontents
Although Friedman’s (2002) Americanism leads to the common- sense view 
that the kind of individual that neoliberal capitalism needs is somehow remi-
niscent of Hoover’s rugged frontiersman, Dardot and Laval’s (2014) philosophi-
cal psychoanalysis of late capitalist subjectivity rights this misapprehension. In 
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their view neoliberal man is not simply homo economicus, but rather a far more 
advanced calculator that resembles Mirowski’s (2002) cyborg in its ability to 
make strategic risk assessments and make hard decisions on the basis of evi-
dence. As such, Dardot and Laval’s neoliberal subject is a product of Friedman’s 
concentration on empiricism, but also Wiener’s (2013) vision of the interaction 
of men and the technological environment, and Nash’s (2007) and Von 
Neumann’s (2007) hyper- rational approach to social interaction. Where homo 
economicus was a kind of gambler, who gave up on politics for economic gain, 
neoliberal man is a cyborg, who looks to take the risk out of risk through 
immersion in the techno- economic environment in order to secure competi-
tive advantage. The key commodity of the neoliberal subject is market infor-
mation, and agility in response to this data, because it is speed that enables 
the new economic man to stay ahead of the game. This concentration on 
speed, which Virilio (1977) considers the master concept of modern warfare, 
shows how neoliberal man becomes a kind of ballistic subject, a subjectile, but 
the problem with this new rationality is it has become entirely normalised in 
its colonisation of more or less every area of existence. For Dardot and Laval 
(2014), under conditions of neoliberalism, humanity is capital, with the result 
that the economy becomes a closed circuit, a true utopia, complete with the 
totalitarian identification of man and machine.
In order to try to understand the origins of the new late capitalist utopia, 
Dardot and Laval (2014) cycle back to Herbert Spencer and in particular his 
The Principles of Biology (2013), which sets out a natural ecology of competi-
tion and survivalism, and suggest that the real achievement of neoliberalism 
is the creation of a cybernetic system that stretches from heaven, in respect 
of its technological reflection of Smith’s (1999) invisible hand, to earth, in the 
sense that it simulates Spencer’s primal struggle for existence, in the realisation 
of a techno- cosmological order of divinity and dust. Reading Spencer (2013) 
through the neoliberal tradition, they take on the German model concerned 
with the creation of a social environment able to sustain capitalism and offset 
anomie, and explain that the idea that ordoliberalism is somehow concerned 
with welfare is a misconception. In their view the core of the German tradi-
tion remains the notion of individual responsibility and the concept of the 
entrepreneurial man. In this respect the German tradition is closer to the later 
Chicago version of neoliberalism than we might imagine, because individual 
action remains key. As Dardot and Laval (2014) note, in the German tradition 
man remains homo agens, the man with agency, and his social work is to con-
tribute to the practice of catallaxy, or economy that transforms the enemy 
into a friend. Under these conditions the role of social policy, and the rec-
ognition of the need for order, concerns the need to transform individuals 
into what Dardot and Laval (2014) call neo- subjects, who recognise that they 
are responsible and accountable for their own economic performance. In order 
to achieve this objective, the social state merges with the Benthamite disciplin-
ary state in the name of support for what Marcuse called, in his Eros and 
Civilization (1987), the performance principle. What is particularly interesting 
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about the concept of the neo- subject that must perform, and eventually 
becomes obsessed with the idea of performance, is that it represents a move 
away from the traditional Freudian subject, who was subjected to Oedipal 
regulation, because the kind of government that the neo- subject follows is a 
strange paradoxical form of government, what we might call following Foucault 
(2008) governmentality, that insists on the primacy of freedom. The result of 
the turn to governmentality is that the neo- subject follows external regulation 
in such a way that regulation becomes invisible and disappears into the very 
DNA of the subject itself.
In Freudian terms, we might say that the neo- subject becomes the object of 
performance through a process of internalisation that penetrates through to its 
very unconscious in the creation of a kind of ultra- individualism. Since the 
term ‘ultra’ means ‘more’ in Latin, Dardot and Laval (2014) employ this term 
to signify a form of individualism that is hyperactive and endlessly transgressive. 
The neo- or ultra- subject is always in excess of itself, endlessly looking to over-
come its own limitations, in a world that is similarly unbounded and endless. 
However, in much the same way that Luxemburg (2003) and Lenin (2010) 
pointed to the contradiction inherent in the expansive nature of capitalism that 
remains territorial, the ultra- subject is constrained by its embodied nature that 
roots it in time and space. Although the new form of neoliberal subjectivity 
suggests a novel utopian vision of the self able to grow into a kind of infinitely 
open capital space- time, the truth of the corporeality of neoliberal man means 
that this is not the case. In this respect the infinite performance principle even-
tually runs into the organic limit set by Freud’s (2003) pleasure principle, which 
shows how the acceleration of desire in drive ultimately results in the self- 
destruction, exhaustion, burnout, and what Alain Ehrenberg (2009) calls the 
weariness of the self. This is, I would suggest, the problem of the neoliberal 
utopia in the early 21st century. What the late capitalist fantasy world has closed 
off is closure itself, but the problem of the radical lack of boundary is that the 
neoliberal subject, which comes to imagine its own infinite potential to work 
and consume, collapses before what Byung- Chul Han (2015) writes about in 
terms of an abyss of positivity, essentially because it is constrained by organic 
limits that no psycho- economic ideology can overcome.
Although theories of brain plasticity explored by Catherine Malabou (2008) 
suggest potential alternatives to this utopian model, which has become a kind 
of infinite horizon since the 1980s, it may be the case that these ideas will also 
lead to the emergence of a new kind of behaviourism, or branch of neuro- 
economics concerned with engineering the ultra- subject at the level of synaptic 
connection. Against this sci- fi utopianism, which is reflected in recent Hollywood 
films such as Limitless (2011) and Lucy (2014), where normal people become 
superheroes through the use of performance- enhancing pharmaceuticals, I would 
suggest an alternative scenario, which I think it is possible to support through 
reference to the epidemic of mental illness, and especially depression and anxiety, 
in late capitalist society. In this alternative, dystopic vision, synaptic connections 
start to collapse and break down, in a model of burnt- out, destroyed subjectivity 
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that responds to the command to ‘be more’ with social withdrawal, schizophrenic 
division, and eventually the disappearance of the self. It is precisely this form 
of destroyed subjectivity Malabou (2012) describes in her work on the new 
wounded that compares the brain patterns of the human waste of late capitalism 
to sufferers of Alzheimer’s in order to explain how what Han (2015) writes 
about through the idea of excessive positivity wipes out the self in the emergence 
of the human clean slate, the utopian- cum- dystopian non- self that is eventually 
unable to recognise, or feel, its own disappearance. In the end this mental health 
catastrophe would spell the collapse of the neoliberal utopia, because it would 
become psychically unsustainable, in much the same way that Zamyatin’s We 
(1993), with its vision of destroyed subjectivity, imagined the end of the Soviet 
utopia long before its slow death even began. But Dardot and Laval (2014) 
search for opposition before the apocalypse of mental collapse in a politics we 
might understand through the lens of Melville’s (1998) Bartleby, who says, ‘I 
would rather not’. This politics entails refusal of cybernetic hyper- subjectivity, 
competition, and privatisation in a new ethics of human limitation, cooperation, 
and commonality.
However, the problem with this suggestion revolves around Dardot and Laval’s 
(2014) failure to recognise the militarised origins of the new form of cybernetic 
capitalism, which means that refusal would become an existential question that 
would throw into doubt the individual’s ability to survive, since there is no easy 
way to drop out of the late capitalist machine that seems to have colonised 
global space- time and written its name into the very code of the contemporary 
human subject. As Hill and Montag (2015) explain in their work The Other 
Adam Smith, the kind of economy Smith imagines, and the kind of economy 
that emerges in Mises (2007) and later Friedman (2002), is a necro- economy 
where those who are too poor, lazy, or belligerent to work must be allowed to 
die in order to maintain the integrity of the price mechanism. Refusal may 
well, therefore, become an existential question concerned with survival in a situ-
ation where it is moral to let refuseniks fade out of existence on the basis of 
their freedom to choose their way out of existence. Beyond the very immediate 
problem of the subject’s ability or inability to step outside of the system of wage 
labour, and to marshal the psychological resources to make this leap into nowhere, 
the additional problem with escape from the neoliberal utopia is that there is 
no future where change seems possible in this perfectly realised system, precisely 
because it is already complete in a kind of infinite present full of sensory stimu-
lation funded by indebtedness.
The state of indebtedness is key in this utopian complex because it is pre-
cisely this condition that destroys the future and that should be critically 
worked through in the name of the freedom of the individual in social context. 
While it is, of course, always impossible to know the future from the confines 
of the present, and this is what we master through immersion in social systems 
that provide a sense of limitation and hope, the evolution of neoliberal finan-
cialisation has led to a strange situation where we finance the fantastical present 
through indebtedness and then suffer the cancellation of the potential future 
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in debt and debt repayment that mean that the best we can hope for is more 
of the same. This is where the two models of indebtedness explored in the 
previous chapter on the origins of the capitalist utopia, which we might also 
understand through reference of Menger (2009) and Simmel (2011), collide 
and conflict because sociological indebtedness enables individualism in the 
sense that it sutures people into structures to enable the emergence of sub-
jectivity able to better handle the anxiety of the future that we must necessarily 
confront. By contrast, the neoliberal model of indebtedness, which runs through 
the history of financialisation up to the present, crushes the individual beneath 
the weight of debt which becomes a kind of inescapable responsibility that 
stretches off into the future and makes change impossible. While the former, 
sociological, model maintains a mode of existential openness towards the 
horizon of the future, which we might understand through the idea of uto-
pianism, the latter, capitalist, system wipes out this possibility in the formation 
of a true utopia, which stretches out across space and through time in a 
globalitarian nightmare.
But it is important to remember that neoliberal indebtedness is far from 
universal, and recall that capitalism strenuously rejects the idea of the univer-
sality of indebtedness in the name of the individual that stands alone, which 
means that the contemporary capitalist vision of debt is rooted in a sadistic 
creditor/debtor relation that destroys the future of the debtor who is locked 
into endless debt repayment. This is precisely where the neoliberal, capitalist 
vision of debt differs from the sociological, phenomenological vision of indebt-
edness, which is universal and imposes a kind of infinite responsibility on 
everybody to take care of everybody else in the emergence of the social body 
that resolves violence in obligatory generosity. This is impossible under condi-
tions of modern, never mind postmodern, capitalism, because the individual 
must be free and must resist relations that suggest otherwise. This is why 
indebtedness becomes problematic and a space of violence where sadistic 
aggression is acceptable on moral grounds. My use of the psychoanalytic term 
sadism, which Mirowski (2002) employs to describe neoliberal sociality, is 
important here because what this concept captures is the way in which the 
creditor retains his freedom through the debtor, who takes the punishment in 
order that the creditor can retain his position. By contrast, the debtor suffers 
under the burden of his debt, and recognition of his pathological individual-
ism, which confirms the superiority of the creditor whom he can never repay. 
If the ideal neoliberal individual lives through a mode of ultra- subjectivity 
that is always in excess of itself, the debtor represents a kind of minus- subjectivity, 
or mode of selfhood that is endlessly in deficit, and somehow less than itself. 
When we take this pair together what we have is a reflection of the sadomas-
ochistic sociality, which is clearly based in a deep revulsion of otherness, which 
is characteristic of neoliberal capitalism.
Moreover, the existence of this power couple, which was ironically screened 
out of view by the liberal insistence on the primacy of the objective individual 
free to contract or walk away that we can trace from Smith (1982) through 
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Hayek (2001) up to Friedman (2002), was abundantly clear in the response 
to the 2008 financial crash. Here, bank losses, and the subsequent hole in 
public finance, were transferred to the indebted masses, who were required to 
pick up the costs of the financial elites in the form of deep austerity measures, 
which were sold through the cynical manipulation of the notion of collective 
responsibility. Under these conditions the sadomasochistic power relation not 
only survived the crash but in fact emerged even stronger by virtue of a form 
of discursive escapology, which was in itself utopian in its fantastical construc-
tion. That is to say that since utopia, and the utopian imagination, have always 
entailed making maps and writing plans, I would suggest that the neoliberals’ 
discursive escape strategy from the political consequences of the financial crash 
should be understood in terms of the history of the construction and main-
tenance of what I have sought to call the neoliberal utopia, and that what this 
particular moment in this discursive text represents is the attempt to save this utopian 
form from collapse into bankruptcy. Regarding the way in which this discursive 
escape played out, I would suggest is it possible to identify three clear moves 
where the neoliberals, first, insisted upon the primacy of individualism and 
self- responsibility in order to escape the widespread politicisation of the crash; 
second, called for the collectivisation of what was now an apolitical cosmo-
logical catastrophe in order to move the burden of private loses onto the 
masses; and third, enacted a return to the language of individualisation in order 
to seal the deal, reinforce the apolitical nature of the now public debt to 
absolve the financial elites of responsibility, and finally moralise the pathological 
nature of both private and public indebtedness to complete the cycle and 
return to normality.
In terms of the individual steps in this construction, which has seen the 
neoliberal utopia emerge from the crash even stronger than before, the first 
move saw the dissimulation of the social responsibility of creditors to debtors 
in the maintenance of a stable financial system on the basis of the fantasy that 
the liberal individual is free to contract or remain free of contractual obliga-
tion. This is, of course, fantastical since finance and indebtedness have become 
necessary for survival in the neoliberal system where the supply side drive to 
increase productivity entails the reduction of wages in order to increase profit-
ability. In other words, there is no choice but to contract to debt in the name 
of survival in a low- wage society, where privatisation means the public sector 
no longer provides social security. On the other hand, the financial sector has 
made enormous profit from the debtor’s need to contract in the form of 
interest and commission, which means that the creditor should be considered 
parasitic on the debtor that he sought to exploit in the name of his own 
profitability. While this power relation, which defines class structure in finan-
cialised consumer capitalism, was abolished in the immediate response to the 
financial crash in a favour of a classic liberal defence of individualism that 
meant that it was impossible to allocate responsibility on the basis of collective 
obligation, the idea of collectivity was soon brought back in order to assert 
the responsibility of society to refinance the creditors and then cover the hole 
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in public finance through cuts to social goods. Once this collective move had 
taken place, the individual came back into view, in order to excuse the financial 
elites from responsibility and attack those who serve and rely upon public 
services in the name of efficiency and the reduction of waste.
The shocking irony of this sleight of hand, which saw the neoliberals seek 
to palm off onto the public losses incurred by reckless creditors, is that it 
sought to simultaneously socialise indebtedness through the claim that the 
current situation was a collective responsibility, and take the liberal line and 
responsibilise individuals who needed to shoulder the burden. The move which 
enabled this confidence trick to take place was the relentless sadistic attack 
on the debtor, who is the pathological other of the neoliberal class system, 
and the consequent disappearance of the excessive creditor, who was no longer 
responsible for his own indebtedness to the collective bailout. In this discursive 
machine the more the poor debtor becomes the target of public fury, the 
more the creditor— who, we must remember, made a killing off reckless loans 
to those who live off endless indebtedness— disappears and never faces his 
responsibility to the other. What this socio- economic policy, which fuses the 
Keynesian approach to state spending with Friedman’s rearticulation of laissez- 
faire in defence of the financial sector, confirms is the class- based nature of 
the neoliberal utopia, which Thomas Piketty (2014) writes about in terms of 
the entrenched inequality of late capitalism. Moreover, Piketty sees little pros-
pect of change where inequality is concerned because the explosive growth 
of the golden age of capitalism, which he locates between the end of World 
War II and the late 1970s, is unlikely to return. Where this growth, which 
enabled accumulation and the socialisation of wealth in the most advanced 
nations, was sustained by, first, the need to recover from the shocks of two 
world wars, and second, the radical technological development this recovery 
programme produced, Piketty (2014) points out that contemporary capitalism 
is far less dynamic, which is precisely what has led to the turn to supply side 
economics and the need to squeeze ever more productivity out of workers, 
who must live off debt because they have become the new frontier of innova-
tion, modernisation, and the search for efficiency.
In search of an escape from inequality, Piketty (2014) suggests a global tax 
on wealth, which would represent a return to Maussian, Bataillean, primitive 
economy, where surpluses are spent in obligatory generosity, but it is difficult 
to see how this shift would take place under conditions of the neoliberal 
utopia, where the fantasy of the self- identical individual who somehow chooses 
to relate to others and live in the world seems complete and unassailable. This 
is precisely what the case of the financial crash explains, where the neoliberals 
were able to save their utopia from collapse because of the strength of cultural 
belief in the individual and resistance to ideas of social responsibility under 
conditions of Anglo- American process of market globalisation. There is no 
doubt that the neoliberal political and economic elites have power on their 
side, and that the indebted masses have little scope for resistance, but it is 
surprising that more sustained ideological opposition to the late capitalist 
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utopia has not emerged capable of revealing its bankruptcy in popular con-
sciousness. In his book on economy and the future, Jean- Pierre Dupuy (2014) 
suggests that change is impossible in contemporary global capitalism because 
economy has humiliated politics in the closure of the future and that means 
that it has no potential for self- transcendence. When the possibility of self- 
transcendence collapses, Dupuy explains that the original Hobbesian story, 
where economy civilises human violence, breaks down and capitalism falls 
into a kind of hopeless apocalypticism. However, it is exactly when there is 
no hope that Dupuy thinks hope appears, essentially because, to paraphrase 
Dostoyevsky, when there is no God, everything is possible.
For Dupuy (2014), it is precisely the fall into despair that generates freedom 
and the possibility of action, but the problem with this view is that it fails to 
recognise the strange endlessness of the late capitalist end times, which is the 
other side of the turn to Schmittian (2007) decisionism that supports emer-
gency action in the resolution of potential catastrophe on a daily basis. In this 
respect, I think it is useful to explore the neoliberal utopia of finance which, 
from the 1980s through to the present, has become the engine of growth for 
an economic system that seems to have exhausted the limits of real expansion. 
Moreover, the value of a consideration of financialisation is that this will also 
throw light on the causes of the financial crash, which threatened the destruc-
tion of the neoliberal utopia, but that was eventually resolved, perhaps tem-
porarily, in the discursive confidence trick outlined above that cemented the 
class division between those who prosper on the basis of the creation of money 
ex nihilo and those who must live in indebtedness because of the violence of 
supply side disciplinary techniques designed to engineer ultra- subjects able to 
work ever more for even less. In this respect what consideration of financiali-
sation, and the virtual utopia of late capitalism, will achieve is the completion 
of my study of the cybernetic economic machine that evolved from Smith’s 
(1982, 1999) invisible hand, through Hayek’s (2012) spontaneous order, to 
Friedman’s (2002) con/fusion of pure maths and rugged individualism. Where 
Locke (1988) wrote through the labour theory of value, and it is possible to 
find the rearticulation of this in Dardot and Laval (2014) where the ultra- 
subject is the source of value, the exploration of financialisation enables 
understanding of the other side of the cybernetic body of the man- machine. 
While Locke’s men worked the land, and ultra- subject works upon himself, 
financialisation describes the cosmological dimension of late capitalism which 
Smith (1999) captured in the invisible hand, Hayek (2012) imagined through 
spontaneous order, but the theorists of finance capital have realised in the form 
of advanced statistical modelling that is no longer metaphorical or metaphysi-
cal, but rather real in its mathematical perfection. In this respect, finance 
represents the realisation of the earlier capitalist utopian forms, which expressed 
in theory what the theory and practice of the trade in stocks and shares makes 
manifest in mathematical equations. It is, therefore, representative of a kind of 
economic absolute that is simultaneously perfectly virtual and virtually perfect. 
This is the financial utopia.
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I  What Is the Financial Sublime?
I began Chapter 2 with an exploration of the way modern economy emerged 
from its primitive predecessor where exchange is organised around generosity. 
Although Sahlins (1974) and Mauss (2000) present primitive exchange through 
the utopian figure of the circle that never ends, the truth is that the commit-
ment to excess built into the practice of potlatch, where I am obliged to give 
more generously than the other who gave to me, creates the space for the 
emergence of the properly modern economic form, where I seek to give less 
than the other and take a surplus from our exchange. It is possible to see this 
shift in action in Derrida’s (1994) discussion of primitive economy in his 
Given Time. In this work Derrida objects to what he thinks is Mauss’ (2000) 
sleight of hand, which sees him palm off the idea on his reader of a gift that 
actually takes the form of a kind of obligatory generosity, through a compa-
rable con trick. From Derrida’s point of view, Mauss’ ‘hidden charges’, that 
mean that self must repay other with interest, create a split between the 
appearance of the gift that should require no repayment and the reality of the 
situation that locks the recipient into a system of obligatory generosity. Der-
rida exploits this gap between appearance and reality through reference to 
Baudelaire’s (2009) counterfeit coin, where the gift appears to be ‘more than’, 
but may in actual fact be ‘less than’, in order to free the beggar from the 
obligation to repayment. In this way Derrida (1994) frees the beggar from 
his indebtedness and makes him stand on his own two feet. However, Der-
rida’s favour is a strange one, because what this bad gift also achieves is the 
introduction of a culture of suspicion into the practice of exchange, since it 
is no longer possible to trust the other to repay generosity, and the emergence 
of the horror (a)society Simmel (2011) explored in his philosophical explora-
tion of money. Where Derrida responds to what he considers the simulation 
implicit in Mauss’ vision of the giving society organised around the ‘hidden 
charge’ of necessary generosity, what we find in Simmel is an exploration of 
the space produced by the modern break with the primitive economy of 
excess. Against Menger (2009), the father of the Austrian School, who presents 
economy in terms of absolute rational exchange enabled by the universal 
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mediator, money, Simmel shows how the objectivity of money replaces sub-
jectivity and what we might call the necessity of the social relation that makes 
the self the self, with an asocial order shot through with suspicion, paranoia, 
revulsion towards otherness, and a broken, fragmented form of individualism. 
While Derrida (1994) critiques Mauss’ economy in order to break out of 
what he thinks is a kind of totalitarian cycle of necessary generosity, and 
pushes this even further in his effort to destabilise the money form itself, what 
he effectively describes is Simmel’s (2011) society of technological alienation. 
While there is no doubt that money is counterfeit in this system, and Menger 
(2009) himself writes about money in terms of its empty, universal form that 
enables it to stand in for every other good, moderns behave as if money is a 
thing that accurately reflects value for the sake of its functionality. In other 
words, they need money to work because they can’t trust each other.
In this respect what Derrida (1994) inadvertently shows in his critique of 
Mauss (2000) is the way in which the counterfeit nature of money translates 
into modern social relations shot through with suspicion about the other, who 
we imagine always wants to give ‘less than’ in order to put one over potential 
friends. In other words, the modern exchanges bad money— and money is 
always bad— for the bad social relation, because they need to believe in money, 
and can live with the bad social relation, so long as they continue to believe 
in money, which, of course, makes anonymous, alienated exchange possible. 
It was precisely this shift from Mauss (2000) and primitive economics, where 
we must give more in the face of the other, to modern money, where the 
other vanishes from view to be replaced by an objective measure that every-
body knows is empty, which opens this space of universal (a)social suspicion, 
because there is always a gap between self and other, the modern gap in 
individual freedom. It was in the wake of this turn from primitive to modern 
economy that Hobbes (2008) came onto the scene. Where the ancients had 
based their political philosophy on what men and society should be like in 
light of a vision of cosmological order, Hobbes’ modern, anthropological take 
on the wickedness of men suggested that they are always on the take and 
need to be controlled through state regulation that could take the edge off 
their violence in the creation of a minimal kind of civilization. Given this 
setup, where the purpose of society is to protect men from each other, Hobbes’ 
follower, Locke (1988), starts from the point of view of the individual who 
works the land in the name of productivity. Since God wants men to make 
the most of the earth, money emerges in order to overcome the problem of 
spoilage. The productive man can now exchange his surpluses for money that 
never degrades in order to enable reinvestment and ever more productivity.
That the other has no real place in Locke’s (1988) system is clear from the 
way his theory of money was taken up by Smith (1982, 1999) in his vision 
of spontaneous order. Here, men produce and trade, and the invisible hand 
oversees the emergence of a market society, but there is no place for the 
wasteful, unproductive poor, who threaten to undermine the price mechanism. 
This is why Smith (2010) opposes trans- individual sympathy and wants a kind 
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of stoic reserve in the face of the miseries of capitalism, because welfare, char-
ity, and giving to the poor threaten to undermine the way value is expressed 
in price that is itself a product of the objective interactions of supply and 
demand. The hyper- rationality of Smith’s system, which translates into the 
dominance of objectivity over subjectivity in Simmel’s cold modernity, con-
cludes in the view that economic elegance matters more than life itself. It is 
this idea, which Hill and Montag (2015) write about through the concept of 
necro- economics, that translates through Mises (2007), who argues that there 
can be no right to subsistence, and Hayek (2012), who writes about Smith’s 
cybernetic system and confirms the post- human utopianism of capitalism that 
solves the tragic problem of human finitude through economy that makes 
men infinite in their exchange function. The cost of this escape from finitude 
into economic infinity was, however, more clearly revealed in Austrian, and 
later Chicago, neoliberal ideology. Where Hayek (2012) captured the cybernetic 
dimension of economy, which bound men to a kind of cosmological machine, 
Friedman (2002) and the later Chicago School expanded upon this insight 
when they built upon Wiener’s (2013) theory of the man- machine and Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s (2007) rationalisation of human interaction in 
the game in the production of a cold war militarised version of capitalism 
that hide its cold, instrumental rationality beneath the American ideals of 
pragmatism, individualism, and freedom. Where individualism was concerned, 
Friedman (2002) plugged into the American tradition of the rugged individual, 
the self- made man, and the frontier when he spoke of freedom in a way 
which could be understood by the masses.
However, this vision of laissez- faire was contradicted by the turn to a kind 
of mathematical abstraction in neoliberal thought that realised the theory of 
spontaneous order in the form of numbers. On the surface the turn towards 
maths represented a pragmatic concern with evidence and proof in the face 
of elite theory, but the truth was that what Friedman’s realisation of the 
cybernetic system in numbers really achieved was further dislocation of the 
objective utopian form of capitalism from the real world of subjectivity and 
the reinforcement of the subordination of men to machines in the new sci-
entific fantasy world (Mirowski, 2002). Under these conditions, which have 
been progressively globalised since the late 1970s and the early 1980s when 
the Anglo- American neoliberals came to power, economic calculation is true, 
the ‘be all and end all’, and there is no need to even think about the funda-
mentals that concerned the ancients. In this new post- political situation, 
economy has become a kind of transcendental force that recalls Kant’s (2007) 
theory of the mathematical sublime from his Critique of Pure Reason, which 
means that there is no easy way to challenge economic logic that seems to 
come from somewhere else. But where? In light of the fact that it was Fried-
man and the later Chicago School thinkers who first realised this purely 
abstract economic utopia, it is worth thinking about the history of the experi-
ence of the sublime in American history, which in David Nye’s (1996) view 
informs the importance of technology in the land of the free. For Nye, Kant’s 
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theory of the sublime, which describes the experience of the infinite that 
escapes comprehension, has a particular place in American history that relates 
to the original colonists’ experience of the New World. In other words, 
America’s first Lockean men confronted the land with a kind of awe reflective 
of its divine origins and sought to live up to the sublimity of the landscape 
through the conversion of its monstrous endlessness into a world they could 
recognise for its theological beauty.
While it is possible to observe this effort to transform the endless monstros-
ity of wasted land into a more beautiful form appropriate to the imagination 
of its divine giver in American landscape art, in Nye’s (1996) view the true 
model of utopian artifice in American history is technology. The reason Nye 
makes the leap from the monstrous natural sublime, which was impossible for 
the new settlers to comprehend, to the fantastical technological sublime, which 
would essentially prove equally incomprehensible but would impose a kind 
of temporary, rational unity upon God’s infinite gift, is because of the structure 
of Kant’s (2007) theory of the sublime that takes in two forms, the dynamic 
sublime and the mathematical or reasonable sublime. While the first experi-
ence of the sublime occurs when men experience immensity in the world 
that they cannot comprehend, the second form reflects the way in which they 
translate their failed efforts to imagine immensity through the power of intu-
ition into reason that allows them to develop visions of sublime magnitude 
that stretch off into infinity. Where comprehension and intuition fail, appre-
hension, reason, rationality, and the mathematical prevail and men imagine the 
immense proportions of the world in numbers. Of course, the problem with 
this solution is that it threatens to replicate the problem of the dynamic sub-
lime that issues from the human inability to comprehend immensity in the 
mathematical sublime where the measures of reason themselves become impos-
sible for men to conceive precisely because of their infinite reach. Under these 
conditions, the experience of sublimity passes from the inability to comprehend 
the thing itself to the inability to comprehend the apprehensive attempt to 
capture the thing itself in reason, rationality, and mathematics.
This is precisely what Nye (1996) means when he talks about the American 
technological sublime. According to his theory, the original American utopians, 
the good Lockean men who sought to work on God’s land in order to give 
it human form, transformed the sublimity of the earth that they could not 
comprehend, through their reasonable, rational, mathematical, and perhaps 
centrally technological apprehensions of the natural in their own constructed 
spaces. However, what Kant (2007) explains about the mathematical sublime, 
and we can observe in the history of the Nye’s American technological sub-
lime, is that men end up taking the infinite nature of number for a finite 
totality, a kind of finite infinite, in order to counter the way the new rational 
sublime starts to overwhelm them in its own constructed immensity. What 
we observe in the American case, then, is the Promethean apprehension of 
the incomprehensible natural sublime in reason, rationality, mathematics, and 
technology that then produces its own form of sublimity, the mathematical 
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or technological sublime. In other words, the machine becomes unknowable, 
a kind of fetish object, which men cannot understand, which is precisely how 
Marx (1990) conceived of the notion of alienation. Given the invention of 
this mathematico- technological form of sublimity, Nye (1996) then reads the 
history of America in terms of the endless attempt to re- apprehend the incom-
prehensible apprehension of the natural sublime, or God’s land, in the new 
technological environment through endless technological development, which, 
of course, only generates further incomprehensible technological apprehensions, 
further efforts to produce apprehensive fixes, and so on ad infinitum. This is 
Nye’s vision of American modernity.
Although it may be possible to read the entire history of modernity through 
this theory of progressive technological apprehension, which is more or less 
what Simmel (2011) achieves in his work on the endless objectification of 
humanity, where America differs, and advances the culture of mechanisation of 
modern Europe, is in its lack of a comparable experience of secularisation that 
imposes a vision of an earthly telos upon this process. Where the continental 
Europeans sought to resolve the experience of the technological apprehension 
of the dynamic sublime in the fantasy of what we might call the social sublime, 
the ideal city or community, the American alternative, which eventually found 
its ultimate form in the liberal/neoliberal tradition of Smith (1982, 1999), Fried-
man (2002), and Hayek (2012), kept the individual front and centre in a kind 
of dynamic model that prohibited the identification of a collective telos. While 
the Europeans thought the final purpose of technological apprehension was the 
creation of a utopian society, which was, of course, always a kind of representa-
tion of the perfection of ancient form, in the American experience the tech-
nological apprehension of the incomprehensible immensity of nature runs 
through the individual, and the meeting place of individuals, the free market, 
which eventually becomes the site of the production of technological develop-
ment and innovation, but never a thing called society that was always secondary 
to the ultimate space of freedom, the market. What we can see from this com-
parison, therefore, is that America’s ultimate technological sublime, that resolves 
the incomprehensibility of the natural sublime through progressive machinic 
apprehension, is the market, because what the market achieves is the preservation 
of the individual who works the land, and consequently resolves its natural 
sublimity into reasonable human apprehension and the provision of an objective 
means of exchange to enable further apprehension made necessary when the 
original effort to resolve divine sublimity into Promethean productivity runs 
into its own incomprehensible limit.
In this respect the market becomes a man- made cosmos somewhere between 
subjectivity, and human finitude, and objectivity, and the space of the infinite, 
the sublime. Moreover, the final result of this thesis, which reads Kant’s (2007) 
philosophy of the sublime with Locke’s (1988) theory of labour value in a 
vision of an American economic sublime, is Mirowski’s (2002) machinic dream 
that saw Friedman (2002) and the Chicago School imagine the market in 
terms of an absolutely transparent technological form that subsumes the 
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incomprehensibility of the natural sublime in apprehensive mathematical reason 
that finds pragmatic application in the new economics. What this thesis illus-
trates, culturally speaking, is how Friedman’s mathematical, cybernetic neolib-
eralism was able to find a place in America where the individual is king and 
pragmatism matters, because what his Lockean- Kantian reason achieved was 
the fusion of American nationalism and a vision of mathematical, technological 
reason that seemed to respect, and indeed champion, individual freedom in 
the world through reasoned labour and making. However, the problem with 
Friedman’s (2002) Neo- Kantian vision, which sought the apprehension of the 
incomprehensible in a form of mathematico- economic reason that imagined 
the finitude of the infinite and, as a consequence, the resolution of the mon-
strous endlessness of the sublime in the finite, organisational beauty of the 
economic system, is that it ended in the emergence of a nationalistic, paranoid 
totality fearful of the outside. This is, of course, reflective of the cold war 
context of Friedman’s market utopia that led John Nash (2007) to imagine 
the non- cooperative game and (a)social equilibrium based upon the generalisa-
tion of the inability to communicate and move forward together. While the 
sociological manifestation of this condition was the everyday low- intensity 
war Virilio (2008) writes about in terms of pure war, Friedman’s (2002) eco-
nomic justification was based in a critique of the Keynesian social state. From 
Friedman’s monetarist perspective, the Keynesian economic model was unsus-
tainable because state spending flooded the market with money and led to 
exorbitant inflation. Against this approach to the creation of demand, Friedman 
sought productivity through freedom and innovation, and freedom and inno-
vation through the creation of a more effective business environment defined 
by low taxation and more accessible, cheaper labour. While these supply side 
measures could make business more profitable, and as a result lead to more 
demand, finance became important to enable start- ups in the first place.
In this way the idea of the non- cooperative situation was never problematic 
for neoliberalism, and in fact made ideological sense, because what this vision 
of the (a)social condition suggests is a collection of discrete individuals living 
and working in a state of perpetual economic competition, able to drive 
innovation, development, productivity, consumption, and so on. Furthermore, 
this vision of social and economic struggle sat easy with Americans who 
imagined the competitive individual in terms of the self- made man who made 
use of cheap finance to buy his own piece of utopia in a return to the foun-
dation myth of the early colonists. While the idea of a land- or property- 
owning democracy took America back to its philosophical roots in Locke’s 
(1988) theory of the worked environment, it was also perfectly suited to the 
cold war milieu captured by Nash (2007) and Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(2007). Buying into property enabled the middle classes, and later on in the 
20th century, people further down the socio- economic food chain, to play 
out their own American dream and make it in the land of the free. However, 
property and home ownership was also a mechanism to enable American man 
to escape the other side of the new hyper- competitive system, which was the 
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omnipresent threat of civil war, through the transformation of the home into 
a space of high security that could effectively buy the individual out of the 
social (Davis, 2006).
What we can observe here is the way in which Simmel’s (2011) objectified 
modern money society began to revolve around a new ideological complex 
defined by, on the one hand, the celebration of individual achievement in a 
competitive socio- economic environment and, on the other hand, the attempt 
to escape from the worst effects of individualism through the flight from the 
other made possible by the very money economy that had led to the alienation 
of self from other in the first place. Since Friedman’s (2002) monetarist turn 
away from Keynesian state spending and the inflationary expansion of the money 
supply meant that government could not pay for self- realisation, the mechanism 
which would allow this new (a)social individualism to play out was carefully 
controlled credit. The key to this policy was to make sure sufficient money was 
available to enable investment but prevent exorbitant lending that would create 
a bubble economy and invariably lead to bust, bankruptcy, and recession in the 
future. Of course, the problem with this model, which was that it was limited 
by the need to keep the money supply more or less in line with productivity, 
was precisely what Friedman’s turn to mathematics enabled the finance sector 
to solve through the creation of derivatives able to hedge against the possibility 
of future losses and as a result take away the possibility of loss on the side of 
the investor. Although individual debtors could still default if they took on 
more debt than they could repay, the impact of hedging on neoliberal finance 
was to take away the risk of the lender, who could insure against loss in such 
a way that effectively floated the financial system free of a concern with the 
productive economy. While the worker remained locked into the need to pro-
duce in order to make money in order to repay debts necessary to live the 
dream, the possibility of default was no problem for the creditor and simply 
part of the broader socio- economic state of nature.
On the side of the creditor, real productivity, or the labour theory of value, 
became passé, because finance was reflective of the sign system explained by the 
father of structuralism, Ferdinand Saussure (2013), where the connection between 
the signifier and signified is entirely arbitrary and conventional, and taken up 
by the postmodernists keen to explore the effects of symbolic floatation on the 
constructedness of the world. In the works of Jean Baudrillard (1988), for 
example, the impact of this process of the postmodern dislocation of signs from 
referents was the emergence of hyper- reality, a purely virtual utopia, which found 
its home in the land of neoliberalism and financial innovation, America. However, 
while Baudrillard found hyper- reality in the abstraction of the sign from its 
referent, which consequently enables a vision of the absolute virtuality and the 
transcendental quality of finance, it is possible to develop an alternative reading 
of the nature of the neoliberal financial utopia through a consideration of the 
work of Alain Badiou. In Badiou’s (2008) work, the mathematical is less reflec-
tive of absolute abstraction and virtuality, which would produce a postmodern 
reading of finance, and more a symbolic expression of the essential, ontological 
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sphere of existence itself. The mathematical is, therefore, real in such a way that 
captures the Friedmanite and Chicago School confidence in the pragmatic nature 
of the mathematical turn in economics. But where Badiou (2008) recognises 
that the number is real, and ontological, because it reflects the infinite nature 
of existence or being, the comparison with the operation of the financial system 
becomes problematic.
Although finance makes use of the ontological and infinite properties of 
the number in pursuit of the creation of money ex nihilo, what it also seeks 
to achieve is the limitation of this infinite or, in the language of Kant (2007), 
this sublime through the hedge where the objective is to transform the endless 
possibility of price, and as a consequence the potential for monstrous fluctua-
tion, into a kind of infinite totality, where everything is predictable and already 
decided in probability. This is precisely the operation Kant (2007) explains in 
his exploration of the mathematical sublime, where men attempt the appre-
hension of the failed comprehension of nature in the mathematical that then 
fails in the creation of a new reasonable infinity, which results in the emergence 
of a kind of fake finite infinity that saves men from the horrors of the void. 
From Badiou’s (2008) point of the view, this is precisely the defensive move 
contemporary capitalism enacts in its turn to the tyrannical regime of numbers 
that represents the reduction of the ontological sphere of the infinite number 
in a kind of mathematical utopia that is entirely predictable across time and 
space. Again, the problem with this arithmetical utopia is that it opens the 
space of the infinite number, in order to create money ex nihilo through the 
practice of leveraging, but then closes the void through the regime of numbers, 
which finds form in the hedge, and the creation of a finite system based upon 
the endless repetition of particular techniques able to reason away potential 
chaos. In other words, the only way is up! In light of this endless positivity, 
the utopia of finance is, therefore, beautiful, rather than sublime, because it 
tends towards the same in the cancellation of the radical potential of the 
number. This sense of closure is, of course, a key element of every utopian 
form, and the financial utopia is comparable in respect of the way it cancels 
future possibility, through the practice of insurance that means that even though 
prices fluctuate there is no chance of the creditor taking a hit, and squeezes 
out the potential existence of alternative spaces where these practical truths 
fail to apply, because the abstract model of financialisation applies on a global 
scale. Finally, high- tech speed, and the velocity of financial calculation and 
transfer, collapses distance into temporality in the emergence of the utopia of 
global finance, and the neoliberal fantasy world is complete.
However, Badiou’s (2008) point is that the realisation of the utopian symbolic 
order represents a form of excessive signification or, in this case, numerical 
accumulation that always reveals a deeper, ontological state of lack. Under 
these conditions of what Badiou calls subtraction, the regime of numbers 
becomes endlessly vulnerable to the ontological event of the number, and this 
is clear in the case of the contemporary financial utopia where, for example, 
high- frequency trading, which enables the light speed coordination of global 
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finance space- time, also creates the possibility of market crashes, or events, 
based in automated fire sales produced by the very algorithmic technologies 
that make the global financial utopia possible in the first place. Where the 
fantasy of the hedge is based in the vision that it is possible to create math-
ematical models to ensure immunity from these kind of irruptions of the real, 
from Badiou’s (2008) Lacanian point of view it will never be possible to 
entirely repress the infinity of number beneath the finitude of numbers, because 
the very practice of repression through excessive symbolisation produces its 
own other in the emergence of a lack or void in the centre of the (financial) 
system that represents the ontology of number and beyond this the infinite 
material multiplicity of being itself. Following Badiou’s philosophy, then, I 
think that it is possible to suggest that what irruptive financial events enable 
is the critique of the symbolic space of numbers in the name of the ontologi-
cal universe of the number, which is also coincidentally a universe characterised 
by the materialist plurality of being, and a recognition of the problem of the 
real of the productive economy that concerns the worker’s body that lives, 
loves, labours, burns out, and eventually expires in silence.
II  Number, Numbers, and the Utopia of Finance
It is this thesis that I want to develop in this chapter through a consideration 
of Ole Bjerg’s (2014) work on finance and financialisation, before moving on 
to show how this utopia of numbers is vulnerable at the level of ontological 
number through reference to the work of Badiou’s student, Quentin Meillas-
soux (2009, 2015). What connects each of these thinkers is their reference to 
the later work of Lacan (Liu, 2010), whom Bjerg employs through Ž ižek’s use 
of the three registers of the real, symbolic, and imaginary, and who opens a 
space for a critique of neoliberal capitalism and financialisation because of his 
own adoption of cybernetics in the mid- 1950s and vision of mathematical 
ontology in the same period. Where Friedman and the neoliberals would 
translate Smith (1982, 1999) into a cyber theorist and their mathematical 
models created the space for complex financialisation, Lacan (1991) made 
Freud’s primal space of the id, or it, into the cybernetic unconscious outside 
of people, with the inadvertent result that psychoanalysis became a theory of 
late capitalism, and particularly late capitalist subjectivity, and late capitalism 
became a model for psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic understandings of the 
self. On the one hand this led to the problem we found in Derrida’s (1994) 
Given Time, which is that the post- Lacanian, post- structuralist attempt to escape 
from totalitarian order ends up in the mirror image of late capitalism that 
needs to differentiate in order to survive. But, on the other hand, this equation 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis and cybernetic capitalism equally creates a privileged 
space of critique, which it is at once more possible to observe in Derrida’s 
(1994) work, through reference to the idea of the free play of signification.
In the first instance, Derrida (1994) fractures Mauss’ (2000) circle of obliga-
tory generosity in the name of freedom only to reflect the post- human condition 
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of Simmel’s (1997) urban economy, which is, of course, captured in his reference 
to Baudelaire (2009), who was one of Benjamin’s (1999) favourite subjects. But 
this is not to say that Derrida is some kind of Friedmanite, because what we 
find in his theory of the free play of signification is a game that threatens to 
transgress the neoliberal financial project that seeks to contain the movement 
of numbers within a system that hedges against loss, lack, and failure. Following 
Lacan, it is precisely this possibility that Derrida (1984) seeks to keep in play 
through, for example, his exploration of the cryptic significance of ‘a’ of the 
word ‘différance’ that is written, but cannot speak its own name. For Derrida, 
the silent, secret, ‘a’ of the word ‘différance’ marks the moment of encryption, 
the moment of the loss, lack, and failure, hidden inside the play of signification 
that prevents totalitarian transparency and connects the system to the other that 
remains somewhere outside. This other represents Badiou’s (2008) infinite number 
beyond the beautiful system of numbers and the general instability of the code 
in the cybernetic financial system, but also recalls the work of earlier cold war 
proto- postmodernists, including William S. Burroughs (2013) and William 
Gaddis (1993). Recall Burroughs’ (2008, 2013) works in which he raged against 
what he considered the cybernetic control machine through the monstrosity of 
bodies, junk, and a kind of dark economy based in the con and hustle. In the 
same period, Gaddis’ (1993) works reduced Friedman’s utility function to the 
madness of the gambler. In his classic work JR (1993), the reader meets a con-
fusion of voices that effectively destroys the self caught in the market that has 
become a post- human machine.
Following these critiques of the cold war cybernetic universe, perhaps it is 
easier to understand the objectivity of Derrida’s (1994) project which, on the 
one hand, breaks open Mauss’ circle of obligatory generosity and, on the other 
hand, threatens the capitalist machine that attempts to close down the radical 
nature of mathematics in a finite version of infinity through the exposure of 
its own desperate excesses designed to hide its inherent lack. That it is possible 
to read deconstruction in this apolitical manner surely illustrates the problematic 
origins of Derrida’s work in Lacan’s (1991) take on cybernetics that was always 
beyond the space of the political itself and has found application in every aspect 
of life since its emergence in the 1950s. But if Derrida’s project is reflective of 
the power of the cybernetic revolution which shaped the turn to neoliberalism 
that organises our world today, it is possible to argue that deconstruction failed 
in the same way that capitalism and, eventually, the neoliberal utopia will fail, 
in that it cannot respond to Nietzsche’s (1991) question about what fills in for 
God when He leaves the scene. Beyond the theological cosmos, Weber (1992) 
imagined that progressive rationalisation would eventually lead to a kind of 
spiritless nihilism. It was in this empty space, where there is no law beyond the 
law to make a killing out of the other, that Melville (2008) lost his faith in a 
vision of everybody on the take in the 19th century. While American capitalism 
sought to solve this problem of godless immorality through the invention of 
various technologies able to rationalise the market— so the communication of 
price on the stock exchange shifted from writing numbers on chalkboards 
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through the first ticker in the 19th century to high- frequency trading (HFT) 
and algo trade in the late 20th century and finally the emergence of Friedman’s 
cybernetic machine explored in the previous chapter— there is no sense in which 
these innovations have completed the capitalist utopia, because the virus of 
uncertainty, the virus of the number, remains in play.
It is this radical uncertainty that I want to pick up through my reference to 
Badiou’s (2008) theory of the number and towards the end of this chapter in 
a discussion of Quentin Meillassoux’s (2009, 2015) works on the mathematical 
opposition to Kantian correlationism. Centrally, what I want to show here is 
how Meillassoux (2009) finds the origin of being— what he calls the arche- 
fossil— through mathematical science and then projects this identification of 
origins through into a theory of hyper- chaos that insists upon the pure con-
tingency of both beginnings and endings. It is on the basis of this theory of 
hyper- chaos, which describes a situation where the only necessity it is possible 
to identify is the necessity of contingency, that Meillassoux (2015) takes off into 
a theory of what he calls extro- science fiction, or science fiction that suspends 
the laws of science and as a result imagines the entirely new. The purpose of 
my reference to this work is to imagine a new form of economics, what we 
might call extro- economics, where the rule of financial hyper- chaos and the 
recognition that market turbulence is necessary result in the suspension of the 
techno- scientific cybernetic order invented by Friedman and the later Chicago 
School thinkers and escape from the post- human nightmare of the post- political 
end of history that says that there is no alternative (Fukuyama, 1992). In other 
words, I move from Badiou (2008), and the theory of the ontological dimension 
of mathematics, through his student Meillassoux (2009), and his work on the 
arche- fossil and hyper- chaos, in order to oppose the mathematical utopia of late 
capitalism, the beautiful financial system, on its own terms.
The objective of this work is to imagine a new science fiction, a new utopia-
nism, extro- economics, which suspends the cybernetic universe in order to 
imagine the new based in precisely what the contemporary socio- economic 
system disallows despite its apparent pragmatism and concern with response to 
need— the essential materiality of existence. However, before I reach an explora-
tion of Meillassoux’s (2009, 2015) work, I want to cycle back in order to outline 
the framework I propose to employ in order to understand finance, and in 
particular Kant’s (2007) theory of the sublime and Badiou’s (2008) work on 
mathematical ontology, which shows how the financial utopia that hangs over 
neoliberal society comes from the struggle between the contained form, where 
the potential infinity of the number is contained in the endless proliferation of 
numbers, and the uncontained, excessive force of the event that threatens to 
destroy the symbolic system of numbers in the revelation of the material mul-
tiplicity of being. What I have sought to explain above is that it is possible to 
explain the financial utopia through Kant’s (2007) idea of the mathematical 
sublime, where the monstrous experience of the infinite we encounter in nature 
resolves through the human application of reason that imposes order upon 
everything. The problem with this is, however, that reason itself leads to 
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complexity and becomes its own sublime. Kant (2007) calls this reasonable form 
of the experience of transcendence the mathematical sublime in order to indicate 
the way that numbers that allow the calculation of natural enormity lead to the 
identification of a new kind of infinity and shows how the response to this situ-
ation is the imagination of the infinite in terms of a closed totality. In this 
respect, the infinite no longer reflects endless distance, but becomes its own 
boundary. It is precisely this situation— which I believe it is possible to apply 
to global financialisation in order to understand the way that central bankers 
and finance ministers seek to resolve more or less infinite economic complexity 
in a finite, manageable system through the application of hedges and derivatives— 
that I want to critique through reference to Badiou’s philosophy.
But why Badiou? I want to refer to Badiou’s (2008) work in order to cri-
tique the Kantian (2007) mathematical sublime of the global financial system 
because Badiou works off a theory of the relationship between mathematics 
and ontology. Indeed, Badiou (2008) says that mathematics is ontology. What 
this means is that being can be found through mathematics, which is a sign 
system without culture, history, or embodied significance. For Badiou— who, 
I want to suggest, took this vision of maths from his teacher Lacan (1991), 
who himself picked this up from his reading of the American cybernetic 
theorists in the 1950s— what numbers can allow is access to the material 
multiplicity of being. The irony of his position is, therefore, that the number, 
which is always infinite, because like Kant’s (2007) mathematical sublime it 
has no end, results in a conclusion that reveals the primacy of the material 
and the multiplicity of this material condition, simply because there is no 
transcendental anchor. There is no God, but rather the number, and the number 
is no thing. The number is zero, a circle that simultaneously represents the 
utopian enclosure of being that recognises that there is no big Other, and the 
void that (un)grounds the infinity that opens out through the numerical 
representation of existence that knows no bounds. Where Badiou (2008) 
develops Lacan’s (1991) development of the cybernetic theorists, who he read 
through his 1954–1955 seminar in the construction of cybernetic psycho-
analysis organised around the language of probability, feedback, and entropy, 
is in the way he shifts his teacher’s vision of the cybernetic self onto a philo-
sophical level able to understand social, political, and economic conditions.
For Lacan, the matheme emerged in order to represent the universality of 
psychological process, and particularly the construction of the symbolic order 
that works on the basis of a structuralism that recognises the primacy of binary 
code, that is entirely beyond people. The unconscious is, therefore, outside, 
and operates on the basis of associations comparable to the zeros and ones of 
binary code, but Lacan (2007) recognised that the real is always present and 
fractures the symbolic fantasy of the self- identical, imaginary self we see when 
we observe ourselves in the mirror. Badiou’s (2008) reading of Lacan projects 
the theory of the three registers towards social, political, and I would suggest 
economic structure, in order to say that numbers represent a kind of symbolic 
system that makes sense of the world. Although the number has no origin 
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and no end, since it is a no thing, a zero, and as consequence stretches off 
into infinity, the symbolic system of numbers imagines, in respect of the 
Lacanian imaginary, a vision of completion, which reflects the Kantian (2007) 
fantasy of the beauty of finite infinity, and the financial utopia built upon the 
idea of endless capacity to hedge in the name of stability. Given this setup, 
Badiou’s (2008) version of the Lacanian real is, therefore, the number, zero, 
which is no thing, that (un)grounds the endless contingency of the system 
built upon its impossible foundations and conditions the infinite that stretches 
out into the future. Since the transcendental level of representation is, under 
these conditions, endlessly contingent, what Badiou (2008) reveals is the essential 
possibility inherent in the global social, political, and economic system that 
has no anchor and only opens out onto the materiality of being. Of course, 
in exactly the same way that Lacan’s subject lives through the symbolic order, 
and paradoxically imagines that the real is completely unreal, Badiou’s number, 
the symbol of the void and the multiplicity of being, is endlessly hidden from 
view by the proliferation of numbers that form a kind of metastructure, what 
Badiou calls the state of the situation.
Given Badiou’s (2008) Lacanian theory of the relationship between void and 
situation and number and numbers, I want to argue that the contemporary 
neoliberal utopia of finance, which in many respects represents the Smith- Hayek 
vision of spontaneous order in the perfectly virtual space of money, is a symbolic 
structure that seeks its own finite infinity in the practice of the hedge that seeks 
to ensure it is absolutely resistant to the revelation of its own ontological lack. 
That is to say that the financial utopia seeks to insure against the revelation of 
the inherent instability of price relative to value that originates in the labour of 
bodies and to hide this truth behind a vision of oneness and financial excess. 
However, what Badiou’s (2008) thesis allows the critical thinker to understand 
is the way in which excessive symbolisation, meant to overcome the problem 
of lack, simply reinforces the condition of lack, which, remember, is the nature 
of being, because there will always be elements that the system of symbolisation 
fails to pick up. In the case of finance there are, for example, always those who 
are unworthy of credit; and in the American case, where credit was extended 
to include everybody in the infamous practice of the NINJA (no income, no 
job or assets) loan, the effort to totalise the symbolic system simply led to its 
more or less complete collapse. In this situation where the truth of lack, or the 
void of being, that exists beneath the symbolic state comes to light, Badiou 
(2006) talks about the event, the revelation of the infinite, and the realisation of 
the primacy of the material. In Lacan’s (1993) work, this kind of symbolic break 
reflects the onset of psychosis, which is precisely why Deleuze and Guattari 
(1983) turn the schizophrenic into a kind of revolutionary hero, and Badiou 
takes the same line. While the failure of symbolisation, and the realisation of 
the contingent nature of reality, may appear fatal from the perspective of those 
who profit from the state of the situation, from the far side of this utopian form 
the collapse of the symbolic system into a blizzard of uncoordinated signs rep-
resents the emergence of immortality, infinity, and the truth.
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While morality is a property of the system which imposes finite limits upon 
reality, Badiou’s (2006) view is that the event that explodes this system reveals 
the immortal truth of materiality that knows no God. Where the former is 
concerned with repetition within the same fixed coordinates, and in this case 
recalls Freud’s (2003) theory of the inertia of being and the compulsion to repeat 
from his Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Badiou’s vision of the materiality of being 
is far more mobile. The difference between Freud and Lacan and Badiou on 
this issue concerns the concept of trauma, which exerts a kind of infinite gravi-
tational pull upon the Freudian and Lacanian subject, but Badiou (2006) escapes 
through a kind of post- psychoanalytic vision of subtraction that consists in the 
refusal to recognise traumatic anchorage. In other words, Badiou’s subject escapes 
trauma, and instead plays off the subtractive logic of the void of being, that 
means that it is endlessly productive and progressive and develops through a 
process of realisation and actualisation that leads off into the future. This how 
Badiou (2006) reads Lacan’s concept of the real— if the real is the void that 
forms the core of being and subjectivity, then being, and consequently the 
subject, is endlessly contingent and must be understood in terms of potential. 
By contrast, the symbolic order, the state of the situation, and by extension the 
contemporary late capitalist utopia of finance, are essentially defensive, concerned 
with limitation, and what Badiou (2008) writes about in terms of the tyranny 
of numbers over the void of number that threatens to reveal the ontological 
truth of multiplicity, where oneness, held together through reference to the idea 
of a structural anchor, no longer holds. Where number is no thing, and repre-
sents immediacy and immanence, numbers are always a form of symbolic 
alienation that hides the truth of being, which is exactly what Jean- François 
Lyotard (2004) says about signification in his work on libidinal economy.
In Lyotard’s (2004) work, signs hang over existence and create a kind of 
nihilistic world where the positivity of libidinal energy has no place. Under 
these conditions the sublime represents a violation of human existence that 
fractures experience and creates a crisis of perception. Where the original 
experience of the sublime was reserved for the enormity of nature, Lyotard 
(1994) follows Kant’s idea of the mathematical sublime in his formulation of 
a kind of everyday, or immanent, sublime which we find in forms of abstrac-
tion and technology that empty lived experience of significance. However, 
while Lyotard (1994) is critical of the sublime in the sense that it reduces the 
importance of existence before what becomes the reality of symbolisation, he 
also recognises the potential power of the experience of the sublime in the 
fracture of the beautiful, symbolic system that imposes consensus upon reality. 
In this respect, the Lyotard (1994) of Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime 
understands the radical potential of the sublime, which comes to represent 
dissensus and resistance to the beautiful fantasy of the totalitarian system, and 
makes a similar argument to the one made by Badiou (2006, 2008) about the 
ability of event and the realisation of the void of number in the destruction 
of the closed state of the situation and tyrannical rule of numbers. Moreover, 
where Badiou identifies number and the void with the revelation of the 
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material multiplicity of being, Lyotard (1994) rethinks the revolutionary poten-
tial of the sublime through reference to its affective, experiential dimension 
that cannot be captured in reason or rational thought. Of course, this is pre-
cisely what Kant (2007) sought to achieve through the application of mathemat-
ics to the incomprehensible experience of sublimity, and then restated in his 
theory of the mathematical sublime that resolves into a kind of finite vision 
of infinity. But, for Lyotard, the sublime is always beyond reason, and for life, 
and cannot be contained by strategies of apprehension.
Is this not exactly the way Badiou (2008) theorises number, which represents 
the contingent anchor of the tyrannical regimes of numbers, and opens out 
onto the void of being, which is true in its multiplicity, materiality, indistinc-
tion, and refusal of the count? In this respect Badiou’s (2008) number, which 
symbolises resistance to numerical objectivity and quantification in the name 
of material subjectivity and qualification that ends every attempt to impose 
significance with the qualifier ‘but’, is extremely dangerous to the contemporary 
financial utopia which is predicated on the process of translation of qualifica-
tion into quantification through the practice of valuation, the transformation 
of value into price, and finally the relative stabilisation of price through risk 
assessment and the hedge that captures the radical potential of number in 
numerical finitude. This is essentially how I read Ole Bjerg’s (2014) vision of 
the global financial system in his work Making Money, which forms the basis 
of my own theory of the neoliberal utopia of finance. Although Bjerg never 
mentions Lacan or Badiou in his account, his use of Ž ižek (1991) and the 
Lacanian theory of the three registers suggests a relationship between his 
account of finance, the cybernetic vision of neoliberal capitalism I set out in 
Chapter 3, and finally Badiou’s (2008) critique of numbers in the name of 
the void of the number.
While the connection between Bjerg’s (2014) vision of a kind of unified 
financial system and cybernetics comes from his use of Ž ižek’s (1991) Lacanian 
thought, which relates to the American cybernetic revolution through Lacan’s 
(1991) techno re- reading of Freud in the mid- 1950s, the relevance of the 
Lacanian Badiou to his position starts early in his book when he focuses on 
the distinction between value— which he relates to the real, but we might also 
talk about in terms of number— and price, which concerns the symbolic order, 
but would equally relate to Badiou’s theory of the symbolic situation. From 
this point on, I think, Bjerg (2014) constructs a vision of the late capitalist 
financial utopia of numbers, which perfectly captures the idea of the imposi-
tion of finitude upon the infinite, and enables the reader to understand the 
way this system floats above the universe of value and hedges against any 
contact with what Ž ižek (1991) writes about in terms of the real and Badiou 
(2006) captures through the idea of the void. In a sense I think this is how 
we must understand the idea of the late capitalist, or neoliberal, utopia today, 
because what Bjerg’s (2014) work captures is pure virtuality and idealism of 
this system that seeks to escape the real of productivity and the productive 
body and never look back towards the real economy where limitation and 
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exhaustion, but also transgression and infinite potential, remain possible. As 
Bjerg (2014) shows, and I propose to explain in my account of his work that 
follows, the problem with the financial utopia is twofold. On the one hand, 
it escapes the political problem of exhaustion for a new kind of fantastical 
creativity, which refuses to recognise the real of value that comes from work-
ing bodies in the magic of making money ex nihilo, and on the other hand, 
it limits the potential of real bodies that work in the world through their 
subsumption under the regime of numbers that, first, makes them largely 
unnecessary, and second, ties them up in debt that constrains their future.
Of course, the spectre of the financial crash haunts Bjerg’s (2014) work and 
looms into view in his final chapter, because the causes of, and response to, this 
situation really reflect the state of the political struggle between the neoliberal 
champions of the utopia of finance and those who think that productivity emerges 
from the work of bodies in the world that need consideration by virtue of the 
fact that they suffer, burn out, and eventually expire. Whereas the former want 
to isolate their beautiful system from the shocks caused by the asymmetry of their 
virtual machine and real productivity by passing the costs of its maintenance on 
to people who must pay the price in material terms, critics of the financial utopia 
take the view that it is no longer possible, if it ever was, to sustain the fantastical 
utopia that makes money ex nihilo off the backs of people who must suffer in 
the world. It is this political situation, and the prospect of radical change, that I 
propose to pick up in the final section of this chapter, and then explore in the 
next chapter. But before I make this move, I turn to Bjerg (2014) in order to 
outline his theory of the contemporary financial system. Bjerg starts his explora-
tion of contemporary finance by showing how the creation of financial surpluses 
resides in the essential separation of price from value in the marketplace. Since 
value remains entirely subjective from the point of view of the market, it takes 
on a price by virtue of what a buyer is willing to pay. In this way Bjerg (2014) 
brings Ž ižek, and consequently Lacan, to the table in order to explain that it is 
possible to understand value in terms of the concept of the real, which always 
escapes full symbolisation, and price comes to resemble the idea of the symbol, 
which imperfectly captures the value of value through a process of alienation. 
Since the transformation of value into price is never absolutely about the valuable 
object itself, but rather what the buyer is willing to pay relative to other valuable 
objects on the market, the valuable object has no price in itself, but only ever in 
relation to other valuable things. Thus, the symbol— in this instance price— finds 
significance in its relation to other symbols, or prices, in the formation of what 
Lacan (2007) calls a symbolic order, Badiou (2006) calls the state of the situation, 
and, in the context of economy, is called the price mechanism.
III  The Financial Utopia and the Possibility of  
Extro- Economics
In terms of the operation of the market trader who wants to profit from 
exchange, Bjerg (2014) explains that his game must be to either discover the 
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fundamental value of an object in order to assess whether there is profit to be 
made in the difference between its current price and what he takes to be its 
real value, or track the movement of prices in isolation from any assessment of 
value in order to try to predict market fluctuations that will allow him to buy 
now and sell later for a higher price. However, Bjerg is clear that the world of 
the market would collapse into chaos if there was no kind of stability around 
the relationship between price and value, and he presents three developments 
in financial theory which have provided this sense of stability. In line with the 
emergence of cybernetic, neoliberal theory in the 1950s, Bjerg (2014) points to 
Eugene Fama’s concept of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which sug-
gests that there is no way for the trader to make a killing on shifts in the 
relationship between price and value, because what he could potentially know 
about this difference is already common knowledge on the markets and, therefore, 
must already be factored into the particular price under consideration. Specula-
tion is, therefore, impossible on the market because common knowledge means 
that there is no way to take advantage of insider information. Where the idea 
of the EMH makes it difficult to see how it is possible to make money on the 
market, the next innovation Bjerg (2014) focuses on shores up price, and par-
ticularly investor’s stake, from the other side. That is to say that Markowitz’s 
theory of portfolio management and diversification of stock holdings offers a 
strategy to ensure that investors are able to offset losses on one particular stock 
through gains in another in order to ensure that the value of their overall port-
folio remains largely stable. In this way, where Fama sought to take away the 
reality of price instability through an idea of universal knowledge, Markowitz 
looks to diversify the reality of turbulence out of existence.
Finally, in the early 1970s, the stabilisation of the financial system through 
the management of price relative to value was complete in Black, Scholes, and 
Merton’s model for the creation of options and derivatives. According to Bjerg 
(2014), the key function of Black, Scholes, and Merton’s work was to track 
the fluctuation of price over time in order to generate a range of probability 
relating to potential fluctuations to enable the creation of options, derivatives, 
and other instruments to allow investors to buy in the event of price rises 
and hedge against potential losses in cases where prices fall. Although Bjerg 
(2014) never explains the connection of the contributions of Fama, Markowitz, 
and Black, Scholes, and Merton in terms of the emergence of a kind of 
financial utopia, I would suggest that it is possible to read the framework built 
through these three theories in this way because what they led to was the 
development of a kind of closed system of price able to hedge against potential 
turbulence at the level of real productivity where value is made. Bjerg’s (2014) 
triumvirate of Fama, Markowitz, and Black, Scholes, and Merton, thus, led to 
the financial landscape of riskless risk that evolved through the neoliberal 
period stretching from the late 1970s through to the present, where the idea 
was and remains that mathematical models, Badiou’s (2008) numbers, can 
rationalise the real, and contain the Kantian (2007) sublime that escapes human 
comprehension in a kind of techno- scientific vision of finite infinity.
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   125 10-12-2016   8:17:35 PM
126 Utopia of Beautiful Numbers
In this setup Badiou’s (2008) point about the groundlessness of number, 
meaning that there is no way to calculate contingency out of the system, is 
lost in a theory of the ultimate reason that operates on the basis of mechanical 
principles. In other words, whereas Badiou’s theory of the number rests on a 
Lacanian (2007) idea of the irreducibility of the real which is in itself an 
adaptation of Freud’s (2001) notion of the unconscious that cannot be abso-
lutely repressed, finance seeks to hedge the instability of value that resides in 
the universe of the void, the real, and the unconscious out of the picture 
through notions of the universality and transparency of information and 
knowledge, the essential reason of traders, and the predictive power of rational 
thought. However, for Bjerg (2014) the symbolisation, or virtualisation, of 
economy in financial structures is not simply about the creation of a kind of 
hyper- rational market that sees price become more or less free of changes in 
assessment of value, but he also shows how the emergence of finance trans-
formed the nature of money itself. In this respect he starts by asking about 
the identity of money. What is money? His answer is that in the first place 
money was symbolic of gold that worked as a type of universal mediator able 
to bridge the abyss of differential values in a process of the quantification of 
qualification. At this point he recalls Menger (2009), who thought that money 
solved the problem of barter and the double coincidence of wants, and Simmel 
(2011), who argued that money entails the objectification of subjective value. 
Beyond this idea of commodity money, Bjerg (2014) also refers to Georg 
Knapp’s state theory of money, which explains how money is the creation of 
government to enable trade across a particular territory, before taking up credit 
theory, where money is no longer backed by precious metals or the state, but 
comes into being in the form of credit notes concerned with the promise to 
pay in the future. The basis of credit theory, first outlined by Henry Macleod 
in the late 19th century, is that money starts to circulate through trade in the 
form of credit notes that become general tender and generate an economy 
reflective of relative value of productivity. Given this economy, those who hold 
the most credit become creditworthy on the basis of their ability to repay 
loans, and banks, which become institutions for the circulation of credit, lend 
to them in return for repayment in full, plus interest.
But Bjerg (2014) explains that fractional reserve banking, based in confidence 
in the bank’s ability to pay its depositors on request, means that the bank can 
issue loans well beyond the value it holds in its vaults. On the basis that banks 
are able to lend money they never had which then comes back to them plus 
interest, he explains that they are able to make money ex nihilo. In the con-
temporary financial utopia, Bjerg (2014) makes the point that the immediate 
accessibility of cash from ATMs sustains the fantasy that the bank holds reserves 
equal to total deposits, but this quickly collapses if depositors seek to convert 
their holdings into cash. He notes that what prevents this situation, the bank 
run, from taking place is circumstances where depositors are able to maintain 
confidence in the bank’s ability to pay. It is this confidence that allows the 
bank to leverage against its reserves in the creation of credit money. However, 
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in cases where the bank over- leverages and is unable to meet depositors’ need 
for cash, its ontological insolvency is revealed on an ontic level, and Bjerg 
(2014) explains that the state must step in to act as the lender of last resort. 
Under these conditions, the state must meet the shortfall in the bank’s reserves 
in order to ensure cash is available in order to prevent deep recession caused 
by a general lack of confidence in money. Once confidence is restored, and 
money is available, the bank can start to lend once more, and leverage its 
reserves in the creation of credit. Of course, it was precisely this situation that 
occurred in 2008 through state bank bailouts designed to restore liquidity to 
the markets when the general insolvency of the banking system was revealed 
in mass default on the American housing market. This situation was so severe 
because, in Bjerg’s (2014) view, banks had shifted towards what he calls post- 
credit money, which involves a degree of leverage that effectively entails the 
creation of money without cash support.
For Bjerg (2014), this process of the floatation of money, in the form of 
numbers communicated through the computerised global financial system, 
was made possible by the original floatation of cash, free from gold, in 1971. 
Following Nixon’s suspension of the gold standard, money was no longer 
bound to materiality, and the management of supply came down to state 
institutions, such as the Fed and central banks, that ensure that the money 
supply does not run out of control. This is, of course, the basis of Friedman 
and Schwartz’s (1971) monetarism and what we might call cybernetic, tech-
nocratic post- politics designed to manage the flow of money through the 
market in order to ensure finance remains available. However, the problem 
with this model of economic management is that processes of deregulation, 
which were organised to enable banks to create money in order support 
investment and so on, led the state to lose control of money supply through, 
for example, interbank lending practices, where banks seek to distribute their 
risk in ways which simply enable reckless over- leveraging of reserves. While 
the aim of the practice of the interbank loan is to disappear risk, the deriva-
tive market, which enables banks to hedge their bets, was designed to achieve 
the same objective in order to enable endless financialisation and leveraging 
of ever decreasing reserves. In instances where financial assets, such as mort-
gages, can be used to issue more finance, the virtual circle of financialisation 
is complete and value creation seems limitless. In this situation it appears that 
there is no limit to the ability to make money, because the financial market 
seems to have no connection to the real productivity of bodies, but instead 
orbits around the real economy in a kind of zero- gravity environment.
Given the events of 2007 through to the contemporary moment, it is hard 
to understand the hubris of the neoliberal commitment to financialisation, 
and in particular the idea of riskless risk, but what is clear is that the frame-
work that comprises the work of Fama through to Black, Scholes, and Merton 
led to the belief in the absolute security of the symbolic utopia of late capital-
ism that would only ever make money. Despite Badiou’s (2008) theory of 
mathematical ontology, which suggests that number will always break through 
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the fantastical system of numbers to reveal the void in the centre of the idea 
of mathematical necessity, Friedmanite neoliberals remain convinced of the 
ability of the cybernetic system, which we can read back through the Austrians 
and before Menger (2009) to Hayek (2012) and Smith (1982, 1999), to create 
order from disorder and beauty from chaos. However, in the case of the stock 
market, the German theorist Urs Staheli (2013) shows that the idea of the 
conversion of the madness of pure speculation into the rationality of what we 
might call cybernetic calculation has a long history. In his excellent work, 
Spectacular Speculation (2013), Staheli shows that it is possible to understand 
the history of market capitalism through the drive to rationalise the idea of 
speculation in order to create a vision of secure investment. In his view the 
emergence of the rational market analyst, who buys and sells on the basis of 
precise calculation, from the suspicious figure of gambler, who makes bets on 
hunches and is always on the make, was never an easy process, simply because 
the ideal American was the frontiersman, the Californian who takes a chance 
on the possibility that he will strike it rich. Although it is clear that this figure 
was always present in the ideal capitalist man of cybernetic neoliberalism, and 
this, for example, helps to explain how Friedman (2002) was able to sell his 
message of individual freedom to the cold war masses fearful of commies, 
Staheli (2013) argues that the evolution of the market involved the need to 
control this wild figure who was likely to take uncalculated risks and lose 
everything on a sure thing.
While it may have been useful for Friedman (2002) to play on the uncon-
scious fantasy of the gambler in his popular communications about the value 
of free markets, what we know from his turn to mathematical models is that 
he was committed to the attempt to establish statistical certainty in a way that 
supports Staheli’s (2013) theory of the rationalisation of the speculator. The 
problem with the speculator was, in Freudian (2003) terms, that he was caught 
under the spell of addiction, and the compulsion to make a killing, that meant 
that he was unable to think in rational terms. As Freud (2003) notes in his 
classic work, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which concerns the compulsion to 
repeat, when we are in the grip of compulsion, or what it later turns out is 
the death drive, we seem to be under the control of a kind of unstoppable 
demonic force. In other words, we are out of our minds and cannot make 
reasonable decisions. Although Freud (2003) thought that thanatos was a 
universal condition, so that nobody escapes the death drive, Staheli (2013) 
explains that discourses around the utility of the stock market emerged in 
19th- century America in order to oppose the vision of the criminal reason 
of the speculator. Against Melville’s (2008) desperate, faithless story of America 
in the Confidence Man, where it appears that more or less everybody is on the 
take, Staheli (2013) argues that narratives about the social value of the market 
played on the claim that what traders produce is prices, which create the price 
system, and result in the stable market where supply and demand coincide in 
such a way that everybody benefits. Beyond this story about stability, the 
trader’s social function extended to the way in which he could shape the 
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future by weighing costs and benefits and making prudent decisions about 
where to make investments.
Although these investments would be made in the name of self- interest and 
the maximisation of profit, there was no doubt that the rationality of the 
trader would enable him to steer clear of reckless gambles that would result 
in wider economic instability and social chaos. Staheli (2013) points out that 
in this respect the speculator’s obsession with risk became the analyst’s risk 
aversion that would steer society into a prudent future, in a revision of Smith’s 
(1982, 1999) image of the invisible hand where social good comes out of 
individual calculation. However, this is not to say that the analyst became 
somehow less of an individual, because, Staheli notes, his expertise was founded 
in his ability to manage his emotional response to others that could lead to 
the pathology of overconfidence or panic in the face of the crowd. The threat 
of the mass was, thus, ever present for the analyst, who had to evade the 
temptation to fall into the crowd and conform to its stupid reactivity. In order 
to support this need for rationality, Staheli (2013) points out that the invention 
of the ticker system by Edward Calahan in 1863 and its widespread use by 
the 1880s meant that the analyst no longer needed to work with others, but 
could retreat towards a kind of cybernetic relationship with the machine in 
order to make technocratic assessments about future value. Indeed, the inven-
tion and use of the telegraphic ticker machine on the stock market may be 
representative of a key moment in the emergence of cybernetic capitalism, 
which I have read from Smith (1982, 1999) through Hayek (2012) to Friedman 
(2002), because this tech, which was based in the transmission of binary code, 
was, arguably, the first step in the development of the global network economy 
that collapsed space into time in the creation of a market utopia. Even here, 
however, there were risks that had to be driven out of the picture, and Staheli 
(2013) points out that the problem for the analyst was how to read the machine 
and decrypt its signs without completely losing himself in the endless proces-
sion of numbers that could hypnotise him in a state where the medium 
becomes the message/massage (McLuhan, 2001).
It is on the basis of this turn to media communication in the emergent 
cybernetic economy, where money starts to become a kind of pure sign without 
substance, that Mark C. Taylor (2004) reads the history of capitalism through 
the lens of modernisation, but more especially postmodernisation, where distinc-
tions between reality and fantasy and truth and falsity collapse into pure signi-
fication and construction that passes or fails on the basis of confidence. Given 
this new environment where signs float free of potential material anchorage, 
Taylor (2004) updates Melville (2008), and feeds into a reading of a range of 
thinkers including Derrida and Baudrillard, with the claim that the counterfeit 
no longer exists. There is no fake, because there is no original, but only an 
endless procession of copies or, in Baudrillard’s (1994) terms, clones. Taylor’s 
point is that in this environment it is pointless to talk about value and imagine 
that there is some kind of fundamental basis for valuation, because there is no 
more than price, the symbol of value. For this reason Taylor (2004) makes the 
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leap from Baudrillard’s (1988) ur- space of postmodernism, Las Vegas, to the 
centre of global financial capitalism, Wall Street, in such a way that threatens to 
unpick the history of the rationalisation of the analyst Staheli (2013) presents 
in his work. As Baudrillard (1988) shows in his America, and before him Robert 
Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour (1977) explored in Learning 
from Las Vegas, Vegas is a mythological space that reconstructs the myth of 
America, where everybody can make it big.
But if Vegas is the unashamed space of Elvis, Sinatra, and the fantasy of the 
big win, the space of the American utopia carved out of the primal wastelands 
of the Nevada desert that never pretends to be anything else, Wall Street is 
its unconscious truth that imagines its role in global economic management, 
but where it really is possible to make a killing on the market, and make the 
transition from nobody to somebody and back again overnight. While Taylor 
(2004) evokes Melville’s (2008) desperate story of The Confidence Man and 
Gaddis’ (1993) vertiginous JR to critique the disorientation of the empire of 
signs, it is, of course, also possible to point to Wall Street’s big winners, those 
criminal entrepreneurs, Bernie Madoff and Jordan Belfort, who traded on the 
confidence of a rising market. Although both Madoff and Belfort went to 
prison for their confidence tricks, the truth is that in the utopian space of 
pure money, where there is nothing underneath the sign, the idea of financial 
crime can have no real significance. What does it mean to become Madoff 
or the Wolf of Wall Street when there is no real distance between money and 
Boggs’ representations of money? The answer is that it means very little, if 
anything, when the difference between real money and Boggs’ work is that 
real money is in a sense less real, since it never leaves the space of pure sign, 
whereas what Boggs at least gives to us has some material thing. If we believe 
Bjerg (2014), this is how we must understand cash today in any case— cash 
is little more than a kind of material distraction that draws our eye away from 
the real action where money takes the form of pure circulation. Under these 
conditions, we might suppose that Smith’s (1982, 1999) invisible hand belongs 
to Hermes, Greek god of markets, messages, and all kinds of confidence tricks, 
and speculate that this economic god is now online, on Baudrillard’s screen, 
the postmodern version of the ticker, space of HFT, algo trading, the blizzard 
of monetary signs, and the ecstasy of economic communication. However, as 
Baudrillard (2012) shows in his critique of excessive communication, and 
Serres (1983) also explains in his work on Hermes, there is no complete or 
total form of communication, because noise will always return to corrupt the 
system precisely when it seems most secure.
This is exactly what Baudrillard (2012) means when he writes of ecstatic 
communication, which communicates nothing but the fact of communication 
itself, and Serres (1983) reflects upon when he explains that all technical sys-
tems point towards entropy, noise, and the black depths of the universe. What 
this means is that the absolute security of the market, the realisation of Platonic 
form in the financial utopia that led Ben Bernanke and others to speak of 
the great moderation, is also Badiou’s (2006) void, the black screen, the moment 
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the numbers no longer seem to add up or make sense. For mathematician 
Benoit Mandelbrot (2004) the connection between these two moments, the 
point of total securitisation and the black screen of nonsense, runs through 
the accumulation of an endless number of small events that come together to 
create a systemic tipping point. In his view these small deviations occur because 
the logic of financial securitisation is fundamentally flawed. In his work on 
the unpredictability of markets he asks, for example, what happens when the 
trade in derivatives and options starts to feed back into the valuation of stocks 
and shares to such an extent that price becomes absolutely distorted? What 
happens when it becomes clear that probability is incapable of predicting the 
future because it is based on calculations premised on the fantasy that what 
has happened in the past will continue to happen in the future? Thus Man-
delbrot’s (2004) point is that probability theory is ineffective in a highly 
complex system because there are too many variables and too many interac-
tions to be able to base prediction about the future in an assessment of the 
past. In this way his fractal theory, which he names in reference to the Greek 
fractus that means ‘to break’, presents a picture of systemic uncertainty, unpre-
dictability, and potential collapse that contradicts the standard picture of 
cybernetic economy where calculation and the ability to hedge against fluc-
tuation enables the maintenance of stability and order.
By contrast to this utopian image of the stable economy that makes money 
and never breaks down, Mandelbrot (2004) argues that the global financial 
system is like any other complex system— it is organised around roughness 
that it is not possible to smooth out in the long run simply because it is rough 
in itself. What this means is that in contrast to the utopian capitalists, from 
Smith (1982, 1999) through Hayek (2012) to Friedman (2002), who take 
instability in microscopic cases because they believe this turbulence will even-
tually smooth out in the expansion of economic activity across space and time, 
Mandelbrot (2004) suggests that this never happens because roughness is a 
systemic property that stretches from the micro through to the macroscopic 
and cosmological view. In other words, the economy is, like every other 
complex system, rough and turbulent, and the idea of stability in the long run 
is a fantasy premised on a belief in the future that will eventually see instability 
even out towards some kind of equilibrium. In order to illustrate his thesis, 
Mandelbrot (2004) explains the condition of the global economy through the 
metaphor of the three states of matter— solids, liquids, and gases— and says 
that the complexity of the contemporary economy means that its properties 
are comparable to those of gases, where molecular organisation is highly 
unpredictable. Beyond Bauman’s (2000) vision of liquid modernity, then, 
Mandelbrot’s (2004) global economy is gaseous in the sense that its movements 
are uncertain and resistant to management over the long term. This is why, 
for Mandelbrot, the foundations of financial theory are fantastical. For example, 
he explains that Fama’s EMH cannot rely on the idea of the absolute transpar-
ency and universality of information to structure price, because it is impossible 
for information to possess the clarity the efficient market theory requires when 
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there are so many variables on the table and these expand through endless 
global interactions across space and over the course of time.
Given the speed of global processes, which is, of course, driven by cybernetic 
innovation and the expansion of computational power, it is clear that it is 
more or less impossible to imagine transparent and universal information and 
that the very technologies that made the late capitalist utopia possible have 
now begun to undermine its integrity. At this point we enter the space of 
what the late Ulrich Beck (1992) writes about in terms of global risk, Paul 
Virilio (2007) explores through the idea of the integral accident, and Ian 
Goldin and Mike Mariathasan (2014) examine in their work on the butterfly 
defect, which plays on Edward Lorenz’ chaos theory and the madness of 
hyper- connected, complex, nonlinear systems. What Beck (1992) and Virilio 
(2007) show in their respective works is that the management of the inherent 
instability of the complex global machine has led to a kind of arms race 
organised around the need to defend the integrity of the system in the face 
of the endless threats that it seems to produce. Given this situation, where the 
inevitability of the accident, risk, and instability lead to an obsession with 
security, insurance, and immunity, the war on threats to systemic integrity 
becomes generic and applies to economic instability, terror attacks, global 
pandemics, the computer virus, and a range of other risks that interact in 
order to represent interdependent global threats. Since the system is global, 
and stretches out across space and through time, these threats are, as both 
Baudrillard (1993) and Derrida (2014) point out, problems of auto- immunity, 
and therefore cannot be destroyed without threatening the integrity of the 
system itself. The reason for this is that where the cybernetic machine relies 
on communication and control, the problem of the intra- systemic other 
introduces the problem of progressive uncontrollability through viral contagion. 
There is no easy way to oppose the translation of communication into con-
tagion, but the systemic fix recommends the acceleration of information 
transmission in order to resolve the problem of complex unpredictability, 
which, of course, leads to further mechanisation in the form of black box, 
algorithmic exchange in economics and the rise of the drone in the execution 
of war that never ends.
But where is the human, and the body in the world, in this situation, which 
only seems to generate ever more risk in the form of automatic fire sales and 
more suicidal terror? The answer is that the human, bound to the body that 
cannot escape its reliance on the world, is nowhere in particular, because humans 
are simply part of the global, cybernetic machine that makes money and wages 
war for no particular reason. Perhaps the post- human horror of this situation, 
which collapses economics into war into social life in a post- political world 
where culture becomes little more than a blizzard of zeros and ones, has been 
coming since Smith (1982, 1999) wrote about the invisible hand that could 
somehow bring men together who were already in the process of making 
themselves machines impervious to the pain and misery of the other. Although 
the Stoics made a case for reserve in the face of misery, we must recognise that 
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in the instance of Seneca (Romm, 2014), this was the result of his situation in 
the court of the tyrannical Nero. In much the same way that he thought we 
must bravely endure pain because we have no choice, he also thought that escape 
from the horrors of life could be found in the open vein of suicide. Given this 
history, it is possible to shine a very different light on Smith’s support for indi-
vidualism, which clearly came from the necessity of the acceptance of misery 
and starvation, and imagine the monstrosity of the invisible hand that, Jonathan 
Sheehan and Dror Wahrman (2015) note, may have inspired Horace Walpole’s 
gothic horror, complete with a giant armoured hand that comes to earth in the 
name of the imposition of order upon chaos.
But if Walpole’s (2008) hand may be seen to represent the gothic other side 
of Smith’s (1982, 1999) vision of the capitalist utopia, the truth of the con-
temporary system would be the cybernetic arm from the future that enables 
the invention of the supercomputer that eventually destroys humanity from 
the classic sci- fi film Terminator II (Cameron, 2001). The wrinkle in this story 
is, of course, that the arm— which the scientist who eventually invents the AI 
that terminates humanity keeps in a glass case— comes from the original 
terminator sent back to the past in order to assassinate the leader of the human 
resistance that defeats the machine to end the cybernetic war sometime in 
the future. What this means is that the supercomputer somehow gives birth 
to itself, that it is truly godlike because it has no other, and no real sense of 
purpose other than to work and expand its reach— we learn early in the film 
that when the machine becomes self- aware it decides that it has no need of 
the humans who imagine they are its masters and decides to wipe them out. 
What we never discover, of course, is precisely how the machine would choose 
to spend its time in the wake of human extinction. We encounter this same 
issue in the Marvel Avengers film The Age of Ultron (Whedon, 2015), where 
Ultron turns on humanity. But how would Ultron live without humanity? 
There is no answer to this question, beyond the meaningless conclusion that 
he would simply continue to work, which captures the dystopic truth of the 
contemporary cybernetic order— that is, that it has no significance beyond its 
post- human functionality and utility, because it is difficult to sustain the view 
that the global machine that prohibits trans- individual sympathy in the name 
of economic stability is effective from the perspective of humanity. In light 
of this, we must ask Lenin’s question: What is to be done?
Following Badiou’s (2008) work on number and numbers, where the hyper- 
extension of the symbolic system of numbers creates the space of lack, the void 
of number, and the event that opens out onto the multiple materiality of being, 
Quentin Meillassoux (2015) suggests a theory of extro- science fiction of which 
we might make use in the imagination of a new utopianism of extro- economics. 
In much the same way that Badiou (2008) employs mathematical abstraction 
in the service of immediate, immanent materialism that is beyond representation, 
Meillassoux (2015) seeks out the unknowable through techno- science in order 
to escape the virtual utopia of Kantian correlationism in the name of what he 
calls the great outdoors. The basis of Meillassoux’s (2009) work resides in his 
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attempt to escape from Kantian subjectivism, which suggests that the world is 
always the world for me, and the structure of limitation found in his vision of 
the mathematical sublime, where the contingency of the infinite collapses towards 
the finitude of a kind of infinite totality. Meillassoux (2009) achieves this through 
reference to what he calls the ‘arche- fossil’, which provides evidence of the 
origins of the universe (13.5 billion years ago), the earth (4.5 billion years ago), 
and humanity (3.5 million years ago), in order to take humans beyond the 
Kantian circle into a kind of post- human materialism. For Meillassoux (2009), 
this post- human thought— which relies on Badiou’s (2008) vision of the onto-
logical reality of mathematics and is also importantly the language of markets 
and contemporary economics— is able to think origins and must, therefore, also 
be able to think endings. But this absolute, where the absolute ending par 
excellence is human, planetary, and finally a kind of universal death, must remain 
entirely contingent and a pure possibility. On the basis of this thesis, Meillassoux 
(2009) sets up the idea of hyper- chaos, which relates to the idea of the necessary 
contingency of endings (we know death will come, but it is in itself unknow-
able) and beginnings (we have evidence of the origins of the universe, earth, 
and humanity, but have no sense of the wider reasons for these origins), that 
means that every moment in between is also shot through with a kind of 
essential contingency. What, then, is the importance of this assertion of funda-
mental contingency?
Basically, the effect of this monstrous thought of the Kantian system is to 
break open the utopian circle that limits possibility in the apprehension of a 
finite vision of the infinite, and for our purposes, suggest a means of escape 
from the late capitalist utopia of numbers, by virtue of the way this mode of 
thought floods the cybernetic system that seemed virtually perfect and perfectly 
virtual with potential events. In his work on what he calls extro- science fic-
tion, Meillassoux (2015) suggests the political value of his vision of hyper- chaos 
through reference to Isaac Asimov’s story The Billiard Ball, and the way this 
can be understood through reference to a conversation between Hume and 
Kant about the reason billiard balls move in predictable trajectories. How is 
movement predictable? According to Meillassoux (2015) movement is predict-
able because it is governed by laws, which can be thought and rethought 
through Popper’s (2002) theory of falsification, until science holds a complete 
picture. However, where this concerns the comprehension of motion, or, in 
other words, an issue of epistemology, Meillassoux’s (2015) question regards 
what happens if the movement of the billiard balls concerns the breakdown 
of the laws themselves, rather than simply the human ability to understand 
what is happening. What if there is no order? What is there is nothing more 
than a jumble of events— necessary contingency? Meillassoux (2015) explains 
Kant’s answer. The scene of the movement of the ball relies on the same laws 
which govern the movement of the ball, therefore, if the rules behind the 
movement of the ball collapse, the scene itself would collapse, in which case 
it becomes impossible to imagine the problem in the first place. Thus Kant 
rejects the possibility of necessary contingency on the basis that the failure 
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of the laws of motion would collapse the scene, the space of the observer, 
and existence itself. Meillassoux’s (2015) response is to suggest a middle way 
between absolute necessity and total chaos in the imagination of extro- science 
fiction, where order exists but remains subject to the emergence of what he 
calls insurgent events where everything suddenly shifts and changes. In extro- 
science fiction there is no simple choice between necessary law or absolute 
chaos, but rather a fusion of the two states, necessary contingency, where 
change is possible within the context of a law- like situation. Given this vision, 
I think that it is possible to apply Meillassoux’s (2015) theory of extro- science 
fiction, which is concerned with imagining potential change within a law- 
bound state, to the study of markets in order to create a novel form, what 
we might call extro- economics, where it is possible to think about the new 
from within the closed, globalitarian space of the cybernetic, neoliberal, finan-
cial utopia. It is this possibility that I seek to explore in the next chapter, 
where I consider the possibility of the translation of the utopianism of neo-
liberal economics into an alternative form of thinking of ecological interaction 
based in Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) theory of the flesh of the world and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1994) work on geophilosophy and what I want to call earth-
bound being.
Filmography
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I  What Is the Minor Utopia?
In his First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (2009), Slavoj Ž ižek picks up Marx’s (2012) 
reference to Hegel in his Eighteenth Brumaire where the latter explains that 
history is ultimately repetitious in nature. According to Hegel everything 
happens twice, but Marx suggests that Hegel forgot to specify the form of 
this repetition, where events take place first as tragedy, only to be repeated 
later in the form of farce. For Ž ižek (2009), it is possible to project Marx’s 
Hegelian insight forward into history in order to understand the events of the 
early 21st century. If 1989 represented the celebratory moment when the 
American empire and the American way of life finally won out over really 
existing communism and ended the long cold war, and the 1990s saw the 
globalisation of the American life world through processes of neoliberalisation, 
then the period since the year 2000 has seen the slow collapse of this utopian 
model of social, economic, political, and cultural form. In Ž ižek’s (2009) 
account, the first moment of this collapse was represented by 9/11, when bin 
Laden and the radical Islamists of Al Qaeda struck at the heart of empire and 
provoked the global war on terror that continues to rage to this day. The 
tragic nature of this event was that it symbolised the first moment in the 
decline of American power, even though its initial effect was to cause Bush 
to pursue full spectrum dominance, which is precisely what has been played 
out in the years since 2001. That is to say that America was found wanting, 
unable to fight a war on two fronts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in no place 
to absorb the long- term costs of this new form of global neo- colonialism.
If 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror might be understood in terms 
of tragedy, where tragedy refers to the ancient dramatic form which follows 
the hero’s fatal rise and fall in the face of his inherent limitation vis- à- vis the 
omnipotence of the gods, Ž ižek (2009) writes about the global economy 
through the idea of farce, or comedy, where the key protagonist is the idiot 
who finds himself centre stage unable to comprehend or influence events 
taking place around him. In comedy the idiot is simply not up to task or able 
to handle the situation he finds himself in, and in Ž ižek’s work this idiocy 
reflects the impotence of the global financial elite who designed a system 
The Minor Utopia5
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based in the notion of securitisation that could not fail, only to find that what 
they had actually engineered was a global financial order that would neces-
sarily produce systemic crisis in the future. Given their hubris, the comedic 
idiocy of the financial elites was, and to some extent remains, rooted in their 
inability to think their way out of their situation. Centrally, however, these 
two events which might be seen to herald the destruction of the last modern 
or postmodern utopia, the global military- financial empire of the late 20th 
century, are not unconnected in the sense that the slippage from the tragic to 
the comic was present in the American response to 9/11, which saw Bush 
and particularly Donald Rumsfeld present their utopian hubris in comic terms. 
Despite their high- tech war machine, Bush and Rumsfeld seemed to be unable 
to decide whether the Iraqi insurgents were located in the north, south, east, 
or west of the country, and it soon became clear that the Iraq War was a black 
comedy without end played out in the blank, post- human spaces of the desert 
(Featherstone, 2007).
On the home front, the comic tragedy of the war on terror was mirrored 
by the tragic comedy of the great moderation that saw Bush hype up the 
American housing market and encourage further democratisation of home 
ownership. The tragedy of this situation, which saw lenders make NINJA 
loans to poor borrowers on the basis of processes of securitisation that meant 
they thought they could not lose out on the deal, is that people lost their 
homes to utopian hubris and ended up homeless and unable to support their 
families. By contrast to the comedy of the crash and subsequent fallout that 
saw the elites stumble around clueless about how to save the global financial 
system they imagined foolproof, the tragedy of the collapse of the markets 
was, therefore, that it had impacts for real people who had bought into the 
neoliberal utopia of individual self- realisation premised on home ownership, 
consumption, and debt. This utopia was itself based in the very modern fantasy 
of endless growth projected onto the level of postmodern neo- Baroque sym-
bolic inflation, where the numbers only ever go up and increase in value, 
regardless of what happens in the real economy where people work. But what 
is the value of this exercise in genre confusion that complicates Ž ižek’s (2009) 
original connection of Marx’s reference to Hegel to capture the slow collapse 
of the final utopia of the 20th century? The answer to this question is that 
what the confusion between tragedy and comedy signifies is the difficulty we 
face in the wake of the failure of the final utopia in being able to map out 
potential futures through generic forms that no longer seem to make sense 
in a world where complexity undermines the potential of individuals to act 
in meaningful ways in environments that appear beyond comprehension.
In this respect, the global present is necessarily both tragic and comic, since 
we are always tragic heroes trying to act in the face of fatal situations and comic 
fools caught up in a maelstrom of events beyond our understanding, with the 
result that the possibility of utopia, the future, and beyond this culture itself, 
which serves the function of mapping the present in order to imagine what 
comes next, start to appear impossible, representations of science fiction 
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completely cut off from the reality of today. This is in a way precisely the 
problem faced by those who responded to the global financial crash, such as 
Occupy, who knew what they did not want but were incapable of putting 
together a worked- out vision of what they did want. While this inability to 
present a plan was, to some extent, the result of a commitment to anarchism 
and direct democracy (Graeber, 2013), I would argue that it was also the result 
of a wider crisis of thinking produced by global complexity that I think has 
been underestimated in contemporary social and political thought. In the case 
of Occupy, and related leftist (dis)organisations, the problem of alternatives was, 
and remains, twofold— first, how to imagine an alternative beyond the state of 
what currently exists, and second, how to realise an alternative without reduc-
tion to the level of the existent, or what Alain Badiou (2006) calls the state of 
the situation. While extra- state movements, such as Occupy, have, in my view, 
been wholly unable to respond to these questions, the crisis of thought into 
practice, or praxis, caused by complexity has also destroyed the potential of the 
party to actually act in a way that exceeds the automatic function demanded 
by the global system that translates independence into interdependence and 
precludes the exercise of unilateral power beyond the space of warfare. In this 
respect the problem for Ž ižek (2002) is, therefore, that his call for a return to 
the Leninist party form seems impossible to realise today, since the moment the 
party engages with the state of the situation it finds itself locked into global 
processes that limit the potential of independent action.
This is, I would argue, precisely the problem of the present, which is what 
Syriza faced in their attempts to escape German austerity, and the British 
sought to address by voting to leave the EU, with similar results defined by 
an inability to imagine alternatives. In the case of the Greeks, Syriza pulled 
back from the brink in order to save the people in the short term. By contrast, 
the British leapt into the black hole under the impression that Brexit would 
mean total withdrawal from global complexity without a clear plan about 
what would happen next. The problem of ‘the next’ is, therefore, perhaps the 
contemporary manifestation of the post- political impasse of late 1990s where 
the problem was that there seemed to be nothing outside of the neoliberal 
programme that simply worked, even though this was clearly to the detriment 
of the majority. In the wake of the collapse of empire in the tragicomedy of 
9/11 and the financial crash, the problem of post- politics is the problem of 
imagination in a state of complexity that no longer works and has become a 
kind of dysfunctional global dystopia, where the original Platonic (1991) 
signifiers of utopian order, including beauty and justice, have been replaced 
by the grotesque and division, where thought no longer makes sense and has 
consequently given way to stupidity and a kind of anti- intellectual tendency 
to refuse to think big thoughts (Featherstone, 2007). There are, of course, no 
answers to the gloomy post- political situation in the closure of the mind to 
the outside under pressure of anxiety about mind- bending complexity. The 
refusal of the world, even in its threatening complexity, will only create more 
anxiety and more fear, especially when the outsider, who comes from nowhere 
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and thinks differently, ranges into view. This is the road to a revived, 21st- 
century version of fascism that will only bring generalised conflict and produce 
a future characterised by war. What, then, is the way forward?
In my view, a new utopia, or more properly a new utopianism, fit to address 
the contemporary impasse would need accept that Hegelian- Marxist dialectics 
have now more or less completely given way to complexity in terms of their 
ability to imagine the present and the ways in which the now might become 
the next. On the basis of this painful recognition, the new utopia, what I will 
call a minor utopia for reasons that will become clear through my discussion, 
would start from a place that understands the irreducibility of the global 
economy, where economy is understood in its broadest, Platonic sense that 
shades into consideration of ecology by virtue of the common root of the 
English ‘eco’ in the Greek word oikos, which means home. Since oikos referred 
to the most basic unit of the Greek city- state, the home that produced and 
reproduced life, the form of utopianism I want to explore through the concept 
of the minor utopia— which takes in issues of complexity, economy, and 
ecology— moves beyond the restricted politics of the contemporary green 
movement (though these may well relate to my vision of a new utopia) and 
refers instead to a phenomenological politics of life, where life reflects the 
metabolic, economic, and fundamentally ecological mode of being of humanity 
in the world. The essence of these phenomenological politics of life would 
involve an explicit recognition of the centrality of human suffering, pain, 
hunger, thirst, and despair to economic- ecological relations between self, other, 
and world and an understanding that addressing these experiences should take 
priority over abstract concerns such as macroeconomic growth that may be 
sold on the basis that it represents a common good, but is, in reality, concerned 
with the maintenance of profit, inequality, and the miserable state of the world 
for many of its inhabitants.
The value of the phenomenological political project of the minor utopia 
would, therefore, be (1) that it would simultaneously undermine the reified 
global financial system, which renders real experience subordinate to abstract 
concerns that only matter to those seeking profitability, because it would put 
the experience of suffering at the heart of an economic- ecological politics 
and (2) that it would overcome the impasse of the post- political present, related 
to the above reification of abstract financial concerns, by resituating the imagi-
nation, or more properly the political imagination, in the pre- cognitive space 
of the body that feels, perceives, and thinks by virtue of its necessary relation 
to others and the world that form the basis of its existence. In light of these 
points, it would be necessary to qualify my view that minor utopianism would 
need to move beyond Hegelian- Marxist dialectics by pointing out that what 
the turn to phenomenological politics really entails is a return to Marx’s (1988) 
early vision of man who lives and works in the world and produces economic 
reality on the basis of this labour. The problem of economics from Smith 
(1982, 1999) onwards is, thus, that what is hidden by the cybernetic construct 
of the economy that is beyond every man is the phenomenological relation 
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of humanity in the world and beyond this earth. It is precisely this problem 
that minor utopia seeks to address through the valorisation of life, and the 
suffering inherent in life, in order to put human experience back into the 
politics of economy and ecology. Moreover, from this point of view, it would 
be possible to replace Ž ižek’s (2009) Hegelian- Marxist vision of the tragic- 
comedic collapse of empire with a Freudian (Freud and Breuer, 1991; Freud, 
2001) theory of the same slow apocalypse based in the idea of trauma that 
enables a similar process of event, delay, and effect, but which is more squarely 
rooted in the phenomenological relation and interaction between man and 
world. This is the case because Freud’s bio- medical- philosophical project of 
psychoanalysis imagines trauma in terms of the intrusion of a violent, external 
event into the life world of the self that employs processes of repression in 
order to defend its integrity only to suffer traumatic effects later under the 
law of the return of the repressed that explains that nothing can be hidden 
away once and for all.
According to this thesis, which draws upon Freud’s early conceptualisation of 
trauma in his work with Breuer (Freud and Breuer, 1991), the events of 2008 
might be seen to represent a global trauma that has only now begun to take 
effect after a delay or interval explained by Freud’s concept of nachträglichkeit or 
afterwardsness, which shows how traumatic experiences always hit home later 
on, long after their actual occurrence. In the case of 2008 the interval, when 
the significance of the event was repressed and everybody tried to carry on as 
if nothing had happened, took the form of a period of post- postmodernism that 
we might capture through the idea of the post- mortem, where the neoliberal 
financial system sought to stagger on in its zombified form, even though the 
end game of financialisation had already been played out. Under these condi-
tions debt continues to pile up, but there is no utopian fantasy of endless growth 
that promises the ability to keep up repayment. This was, of course, the hidden 
utopian conceit of the global financial system. Lenders could create ever more 
debt on the basis of their ability to leverage limited assets, and this debt could 
be repaid through endless economic growth which would open up a space for 
more debt creation and so on into the infinite future of (manageable) indebted-
ness. Unfortunately, the problem for this financial futurism was that the gap 
between real production and financial debt became an unsustainable, unmanage-
able abyss, and the utopian form Baudrillard (1996) spoke about in terms of 
inconsequential exorbitance was transformed into a dystopian nightmare, a dead 
weight that dragged the neoliberal utopians back down to earth.
However, it is precisely this transition from a politics of the ideal, or the 
abstract financial politics of the ’80s through the ’90s, to a politics defined by 
the collapse of empire and the material weight of debt, which opens up a 
space for the articulation of a new kind of utopianism organised around the 
primacy of the experience of suffering— pain, hunger, thirst, despair— and the 
importance of seeking economic and ecological solutions to these experiences. 
Since the interval, the period between the occurrence of the event and the 
manifestation of its traumatic effects, has been about the attempt to hide from 
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the effects of the crash and escape the full consequences of the failure of 
empire, what follows will be characterised by the attempt to find a way to 
move forward and escape from these traumatic effects. In the face of the 
bankruptcy of the old system, it would seem to me that this flight could take 
the form of either the kind of minor utopianism I want to suggest here, where 
the key principle becomes economic and ecological limitation based in a need 
to reduce suffering, or an entirely different form of escapism that I think we 
find reflected in the contemporary Republicanism of Donald Trump, the 
politics of Brexit, and even recent speculation by Stephen Hawking. While 
the former models of escapism are based in limitations, and escape from the 
dead weight of debt and the anxiety of complexity through withdrawal into 
nationalism of one form or other, Hawking’s recent speculation about the 
possibility of exo- planets and exo- colonisation suggests a different route out 
of the contemporary global impasse.
While Trump, the leaders of Brexit, and other nationalist opponents of the 
EU think that the way to oppose global default is to withdraw back into the 
safety of the homeland, Hawking wants to strike out and abandon the exhausted 
world, the world defined by processes of globalisation that seem to have hit 
their limit, for some other place on a far- off planet (Ghosh, 2016). Where the 
nationalists hark back to the past, and a period before the onset of modern 
globalisation, the physicist thinks ahead into the distant science fiction future in 
order to imagine escape. Both of these approaches represent utopian imaginaries, 
but they seem either politically unrealistic, since I cannot understand how retreat 
from globalisation is possible without an unethical rejection of otherness living 
in proximate space, or philosophically problematic, because humans are part of 
the world or, even more essentially, the earth and could not simply take off for 
some other planet without consequences that would mean that some futuristic 
Heidegger would have to theorise the other- worldliness of humanity. Heidegger 
(Withy, 2015) theorised the ontological uncanniness of humanity, and though 
it would be possible to stretch this out to imagine people living on other worlds, 
what this uncanny nature also enables is a level of reflexivity that means humans 
can rethink their situation in their own world before they start to think about 
the need to abandon ship. This is precisely what I try to achieve is this chapter 
through the idea of the minor utopia which suggests that a new utopian solu-
tion to the problems of the present must recognise complexity and global 
economy but make use of this understanding of interconnectedness through the 
development of a socio- ecological vision of the phenomenological relations 
between self, other, and world sensitive to suffering, limitation, finitude, and 
vulnerability. The politics that would issue from this vision would, therefore, be 
utopian in their sensitivity to embodied conditions and their need to address 
the pain that results from an economy that has become reified and lost touch 
with humanity and their understandings of the ecological interconnectedness 
of life both in the human world and non- human earth that has been progres-
sively transformed into a standing reserve for use and abuse under conditions 
of modernity (Heidegger, 1977).
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The result of these politics would, therefore, be a minor utopia, defined by 
a recognition of what Merleau- Ponty (1969) might have called the pain of 
the flesh of the world, sensitive to both the particular rhythms of life, which 
to some extent mark out its limitation, and its perceptive depths, which are 
infinite and preclude the possibility of any kind of totalitarian final solution 
to the meaning of existence set out by, for example, both the Nazis (race) 
and neoliberals (profit). While the ethical minor utopia would oppose these 
20th- century utopias through its respect for life in its phenomenological 
materiality and its rejection of abstractions such as the racial type or worker 
profitability, it would also oppose both the contemporary nationalist and sci- fi 
solutions to the claustrophobic impasse of global complexity through its rec-
ognition of the eco- phenomenology of global interconnectedness that cannot 
ethically be reduced or philosophically exceeded, but rather must be addressed 
in its ontological necessity. In what follows I propose to develop a worked- out 
theory of the minor utopia from the bottom line of the contemporary global 
system that seems bankrupt, unsustainable, and which has, paradoxically, con-
fronted humanity with an impasse that also opens a space for critique. In this 
respect, the present offers up the potential for the critical rethinking of fun-
damental social, political, economic, ecological, and philosophical questions, 
which is precisely the terrain of utopian speculation.
Moreover, it is this critical moment, where the contemporary global system 
seems bankrupt but workable alternatives seem further away than ever before, 
that the spectres of post- capitalism, or, in a different language, communism 
have returned to fore. In the next section of this chapter I propose to engage 
with the possibility of post- capitalism through Paul Mason’s (2015) work, 
Post- Capitalism: A Guide to Our Future, in order to open up an exploration of 
the neo- Spinozan theory of the networked utopia of the multitude set out by 
Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009) in their Empire trilogy of the last decade. 
Beyond this discussion, I propose to leap to an exploration of the theory of 
semio- capitalism, theorised by Marazzi (2008), Guattari (2009), Lazzarato 
(2014), Berardi (2015a), Raunig (2016), and others. The purpose of this work 
is to contextualise Mason’s utopian vision of the post- capitalist society and 
show that the problem with this theory is that it fails to address the violence 
of technological alienation and the abuse of materiality characteristic of the 
contemporary post- industrial, post- Fordist, postmodern, post- mortem world. 
In order to build upon the phenomenological critique already present in the 
autonomists, in the next part of the chapter I turn to a discussion of the 
philosophy of Maurice Merleau- Ponty (1969) and Michel Henry (2015) in 
order to show how they can shed light on both the possibility of an ontologi-
cal utopia that respects the reality of the flesh of the world and the violence 
that results from the rejection of this ultimate truth. Here, I extend Henry’s 
(2014) discussion of the capitalist death world, which ignores lived experience 
in the name of quantification and profitability, into an exploration of the war 
on terror, where terrorism concerns the terror of life found in both American 
drone warfare and the radical Islamic pursuit of martyrdom. In this situation 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   144 10-12-2016   8:17:37 PM
The Minor Utopia 145
war becomes about a struggle between two ideal, abstract visions of utopia. 
On the one hand, the drone opposes life in the name of the kind of technol-
ogy that Heidegger (1977) linked to modern nihilism, while on the other 
hand, the apocalyptic beliefs of radical Islamists, such as the Islamic State, look 
to destroy life in the name of a God who loves death.
In order to explain the struggle between these two utopian forms, which 
are actually dystopias of death, in the context of the contemporary war on 
terror, I refer to Reza Negarestani’s (2008) classic work, Cyclonopedia, and 
seek to theorise the war between the Anglo- American neoliberal utopia of 
nihilistic technology and the radical Islamist theocratic fantasy of the caliph-
ate in terms of the cyclone, or the cyclical death drive found in Freud’s 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2003). In this classic paper everything comes 
back to the lost object of love— mother, whom Freud’s grandson seeks to 
control through the game of fort/da— and in a sense the same drive for the 
lost object is hidden deep inside Negarestani’s cyclone. In this case the 
utopian turn to idealism, which we find in both the American drone state 
and the jihadist’s drive towards the caliphate, obscures the reality of what 
Negarestani (2008) calls anonymous materials— the ground, or, in Schelling’s 
language, unground of terrestrial existence that we seek to deny in our desire 
to become more than earthbound creatures (McGrath, 2012). Indeed, in 
much the same way that Freud’s mother becomes an ambivalent figure, who 
is loved and loathed, desired and feared, in equal measure, simply because 
she represents home for the child in the process of becoming individualised, 
Negarestani’s (2008) anonymous materials capture the ambivalence position 
of humanity in the world or, perhaps more accurately, on the earth. On the 
one hand, humans are part of nature and immersed in their environment, 
but on the other hand they presume to rise above their animality and want 
to escape their reliance on their environment. In this context, the horror of 
Negarestani’s (2008) anonymous materials, such as oil and dust, is that they 
represent the death of the individual, the death of the organism, and the 
reality of humanity’s objective existence on the terrestrial plane of immanence 
where everything connects to everything else.
That this deep truth is revealed in war, which reduces everything to so 
much rubble and dust, is captured in Negarestani’s (2008) concept of blacken-
ing. Blackening describes the process by which the singular, individualised 
organism decays, and is ultimately destroyed, in the horror show of war that 
also opens up a space for thinking about a new kind of ecological politics. 
In this way Negarestani’s (2008) theory of blackening projects Freud’s (2003) 
theory of the death drive onto the level of warfare and then seeks to mobilise 
the potential of the destruction of the organism in the name of what Deleuze 
and Guattari (1983) might call a schizo- strategy capable of opening out onto 
a recognition of the reality of life beyond the idealistic utopias of the drone 
state and caliphate that are essentially premised on a Freudian politics of indi-
vidualism and egoistic integrity. Moving beyond a consideration of Negarestani’s 
(2008) work, I seek to follow this logic through by expanding my account 
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of Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) phenomenology into theory of life premised on 
the breakdown of the individual into, first, the dis- individual, who represents 
the pathetic failure of neoliberal capitalism, and second, the figure Raunig 
(2016), following Deleuze (1997), calls the dividual that opens out onto others 
and world and recognises his reliance on the outside. In order to explain what 
a world based upon dividualism, rather than aggressive capitalist individualism, 
might look like, I project my phenomenological work into a theory of red- 
green Marxism and the ecological self which is communistic in its acceptance 
of social interdependence and ecological immersion.
From this perspective the thingness of the body, which is obscene for neo-
liberal capitalism that seeks to commodify corporeality in every possible way, 
and the earth, which is civilised, used, and abused in the name of profit, 
become objects of respect, and Negarestani’s (2008) object- orientated ontology 
of horror is transformed into a minor utopianism of life. Here, the thing, the 
body, the earth are recognised for what they are— the source of life— and the 
basis upon which it is possible to build a good world. In this way, the living 
thing becomes Winnicott’s (2005) object that offers an anchor for the con-
struction of a different kind of subjectivity that no longer lives in fear, but is 
able to live ecologically in a secure world based upon respect for the natural 
conditions of existence. This is precisely what neoliberal capitalism— which 
is, in a way, the final moment of modern hubris that saw men first deny their 
place in the world in the early 16th century— refuses to recognise in the name 
of its inability to understand limits, fragility, and vulnerability. In the final 
section of the chapter, I oppose the barren world of contemporary capitalism, 
which confronts people with terrifying complexity and leaves them feeling 
entirely exposed before an alien world, with a minor utopia reflective of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) theory of geo- philosophy from their final work, 
What Is Philosophy?
At this point my use of Deleuze and Guattari (1994) is based upon a desire 
to show that the reconstruction of a more human world, a workable environ-
ment, what Von Uexkull (2010) calls an umwelten, a life world, need not fold 
back into a form of Cartesian subjectivity where men come to see themselves 
as the centre of the world. This is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari (1994) 
oppose when they oppose the organism. On the contrary, geo- philosophy is 
about the embrace of Negarestani’s (2008) anonymous materials, the earth, 
and humanity’s place within the terrestrial meshwork of interrelations. Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987) call this system, if system is the correct word, the body 
without organs or the plane of immanence, and it is this figure that reflects 
what I mean when I refer to the minor utopia/nism— that is a utopian form 
that understands humanity’s place on the earth and builds a world founded 
upon a recognition of ecological limits. While utopia is, in many respects, a 
major, paranoid form in that the genre tends to seek to create a total or world 
picture of reality, the minor utopia is paradoxical in that its construction of a 
new terrestrial ideal is based upon materialism founded in a recognition of 
the limits, fragility, and vulnerability of life.
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II  Post- Capitalism and Its Discontents
In his recent high- profile work, Post- Capitalism (2015), Paul Mason paints a 
picture of global capitalism on its last legs. Following Piketty’s recent Capital 
(2014), which presents a similarly grim vision of the future of capitalism, 
Mason explains that capitalism has run out of space for development. In his 
view, the utopian principle of growth, which has sustained capitalism from its 
origins in modern Europe up to the present day, is over. As Piketty’s (2014) 
work shows, the problem with the principle of growth is that it was always 
a utopian ideal. Growth was assumed to be infinite, but what became abun-
dantly clear in the early 1970s and has become ever more apparent since is 
that capitalism has been pushing up against its technological and environmental 
limits since the late 19th century (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, and Behrens, 
1972). While the early modern limits of national economic space were escap-
able through imperial adventure, which enabled capitalists to drive down costs 
and increase profitability in the name of further development, the devastation 
of two world wars created a space for growth through reconstruction. At the 
same time, the American century took off and new technology opened up a 
new frontier for further modernisation. Although the turn to postmodernism 
challenged the modern conceit that development necessarily equalled progress, 
and to some extent imagined the end of capitalist modernisation, the post-
modern turn to signification, and the related transformation of the real into 
a kind of excremental remainder, created the conditions for the kind of financial 
innovation that would eventually form the basis of the final modern/post-
modern utopia— the global financial system. The rest is, of course, history. 
While the happy ’90s saw the articulation of a new form of cyber- utopianism, 
which was not only good for the elites who could now play the stock market 
with wild abandon, but also everybody else who could create and recreate 
their identities free from the miserable limits of their bodies, what the collapse 
of empire Ž ižek (2009) writes about really entailed was the realisation that 
this virtual, informational utopia was no longer sustainable. After the destruc-
tion of the Twin Towers in September 2001, which represented the power of 
global capitalism, the financial system itself crumbled in 2008 under the weight 
of excessive debt, which should be understood in terms of the return of 
repressed materiality of the world. The problem of the massive debts racked 
up in order to sustain development under conditions of neoliberalism was 
essentially that they relied upon growth to remain serviceable, and this is 
precisely what had become problematic in the period since the 1970s.
Although the Chinese and Indians have become engines of growth since 
the 1980s because they are playing catch- up on Western modernity, the West 
appears to have become senile through a lack of long- term prospects for 
increased productivity and a related failure of innovation capable of making 
a real difference in the material economy. This is precisely what financialisa-
tion was able to achieve from the 1980s through the early 2000s, but the 
problem of this innovation is that the financial elites forgot that ultimately 
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their empire of signs was premised on real productivity to service debts to 
enable further debt creation, ever more innovation, and ultimately growth in 
the real economy. While there is a case to be made that collapse was produced 
by the greed of elites, who pushed debt creation to extremes that meant that 
it became unsustainable, there is also a sense in which the problem of the 
final utopia of financialisation was that it was fated to collapse from the very 
beginning because its commitment to endless virtual growth was produced 
by and based in a system that had ultimately run up against its limits in the 
materiality of the world. It is precisely these limits that came back in the form 
of the materiality of debt in the crash and continue to haunt the global eco-
nomic system today. In terms of possible futures, Mason (2015) explains three 
possibilities. He says that the elites might seek to keep the current global 
capitalist system on the rails and continue to extract profit from a low- growth 
situation by driving wages down and pushing the masses further into poverty. 
While this is possible, and precisely what we see happening across the world 
simply because there is no sense of a workable alternative to modern/post-
modern capitalism based in the endless expansion of production/consumption, 
Mason points out that eventually the masses will start to revolt in response to 
their increasing immiseration. At this point, the masses will start to vote for 
either extreme left or extreme right political parties, and the neoliberal con-
sensus that has held since the 1980s will break down. Mason (2015) worries 
that this will result in the end of processes of globalisation— which is exactly 
what we see in the cases of Trump, who wants to build a wall around America; 
separatist nationalist challenges, such as a movement to take the UK out of 
the EU; and ISIS, who think it is possible to turn back the clock to the 
medieval period of history and refound the caliphate based in sharia law— and 
that this will create conditions for endless warfare.
In many respects this thesis was developed by thinkers such as Zygmunt 
Bauman (2002) and Paul Virilio (2008) long before Mason saw the collapse 
of the global consensus into a neo- medievalism, but what interests me about 
his work is his exploration of a potential way out of the nightmare that 
threatens a rerun of a long 20th century made up of 1914–1918, 1939–1945, 
and 1949–1989. Mason (2015) calls this alternative post- capitalism and starts 
his account of this new form by explaining that what has destroyed contem-
porary capitalism is new technology and specifically information technology. 
From this point of view, capitalism made use of new technology, and the 
postmodern turn to signification over materiality, to enable financial innova-
tion and maintain growth in the face of falling rates of productivity, but 
also— and herein lay Mason’s key idea— created a new form of value, informa-
tion, that is essentially impossible to effectively privatise. Of course, the capitalist 
system sought to make use of technology to further discipline the worker, 
through the creation of the techno- proletariat chained to their workplace 
wherever they happen to be at whatever time of day or night, but Mason’s 
(2015) point is that even these strategies are unable to completely enclose 
information and suppress the potential of the commons inherent in the new 
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network society. While these disciplinary tactics represented, and continue to 
represent, an attempt to squeeze as much productivity as possible out of the 
worker in the name of profitability and growth, Mason (2015) points out that 
it is no coincidence that social media, and platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter, took off in the wake of Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008. Even 
though these platforms have also sought to develop ways to monetise infor-
mation, and essentially transform communication into data useful for corpora-
tions looking to sell to consumers, Mason does not think it is possible to 
completely contain or capitalise the ideal economic figure Drucker (2007) 
talks about in terms of the totally networked person.
The reason Mason (2015) believes that the totally networked person will 
always exceed capitalism and capitalist attempts to monetise communicative 
labour is because it is ultimately impossible to absolutely privatise digital 
information that does not degrade with use, but rather remains absolutely 
reproducible. In Mason’s view, it is precisely this feature, which we might talk 
about in terms of the excessive quality of information that means it can never 
be made scarce, that opens up a space for a new economy based on sharing, 
common innovation, and social forms of production. Although Mason (2015) 
would not dispute the late capitalist truth that society is a factory, his question 
is about what kind of factory we occupy. In his view the late capitalist infor-
mational factory is no longer a factory where it is easy for capitalists to extract 
profit from productivity, because privatisation is extremely difficult to achieve 
in a world where everybody and everything is online. As a result Mason thinks 
that the basis of struggle in contemporary society revolves around the potential 
of capitalists to privatise and monetise information in the face its inherent 
reproducibility and tendency towards commonality. In this respect Mason 
(2015) rehearses the kind of techno- Spinozan theory of the potential of the 
multitude developed by Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009) in their Empire 
trilogy, where the workers are effectively able to opt out of capitalist processes 
and form their own circuits of production on the basis of the reproducibility 
of information, but it would strike me that what this theory lacks is a theory 
of power, and particularly the power of information— rather than knowledge, 
which I would suggest is information incorporated or incarnated— to destroy 
subjectivity and render individuals unable to orientate themselves in their 
world. It would seem to me then that the problem with Mason’s (2015) 
account, and also the work of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), is that it 
underestimates the destructive power of information, particularly when this 
confronts the individual who is unable to translate this new data into embodied 
knowledge.
What Mason (2015) lacks, therefore, is a phenomenology of what Negri’s 
Italian colleagues call semio- capitalism, which in a sense refers to the kind of 
network economy he thinks will produce a post- capitalist society. Unfortu-
nately, the theorists of semio- capitalism are not nearly so optimistic, precisely 
because of the phenomenological roots of their work, which leads them to 
emphasise the catastrophic consequences of the late capitalist reduction of the 
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material, embodied, and natural to a kind of excremental remainder of the 
economic ideal— abstract symbolic, semiotic value without the material remain-
der of quality to obstruct the exchange of pure commensurable quantity. This 
is the dark other side of Mason’s (2015) positive take on the infinite reproduc-
ibility of information that he thinks will eventually ensure its democratic 
commonality. In other words, it is precisely the infinity of digital information, 
the fact that it never wears out and can be reproduced without end, that 
reveals the horror of the capitalist machine, particularly in its neoliberal form, 
that takes materiality for something that needs to be destroyed in the name 
of creation of monetary value. It is this vision that means that late capitalism 
will never stop searching for ways to increase productivity and squeeze profit 
out of the beleaguered worker and shows that opposition to this monstrous 
system should come less from the side of infinite information which, in my 
view, is representative of the space of neoliberalism itself, and more from the 
exhausted, excremental other of materiality that insists upon the quality, fragil-
ity, vulnerability, and humility of life itself.
This is precisely the view that, I think, it is possible to find in the works 
of the Italian autonomist thinkers, Marazzi (2008), Lazzarato (2014), Berardi 
(2015a), and their German colleague Raunig (2016). The key point, it seems 
to me, in their work concerns the way in which capitalism has developed into 
an ideal, symbolic form that ignores the reality of materiality that remains the 
essence of production, and it is for this reason that reference to their work is 
essential today. The reason for this is simple— the current crisis is first and 
foremost a crisis opened up by the realisation of the chasm between symbolic 
value (abstract, deregulated, money) and its material equivalent in the world 
(labour, productivity). In a sense Mason (2015) picks up on this problem in 
his book on post- capitalism when he points to the difference between Marx’s 
(1990) labour theory of value and Walras’ (2010) marginal utility theory, where 
the contrast is between a form of value concerned with the productive body 
and one that pushes the arbiter of worth towards the market. In the latter 
view there is no inherent value, but only what the market will pay, which is 
a price that can be arrived at on the basis of calculations around supply and 
demand. However, while this contrast shows how economics was able to start 
to decouple value from materiality, since the input of the worker is no longer 
a guarantee of worth, Mason (2015) never really runs with this point in order 
to illustrate the problem of the late capitalist form Berardi (2015a) and the 
autonomists talk about in terms of semio- capitalism, which is precisely the 
way in which it ignores materiality for a kind of abstract, ideal conceptualisa-
tion of value that holds its worth essentially because it lacks reality. Here, 
unreality is valuable because of its emptiness, its elegance, its beauty, and its 
lack of weight. By contrast, this is the reason Berardi (2015a) writes of the 
monstrosity of the post- human semio- capitalist economy that has no body 
and is allergic to the thickness of the thing.
For Christian Marazzi (2008, 2011) it is this allergy to thickness, thingness, 
and the slowness of materiality that underpins the violence of financial 
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capitalism. He points out that even though money was always symbolic, ever- 
increasing abstraction has meant that money and the value that inheres in the 
form of money has now vanished into an entirely ideal mode of expression 
that is set up against material worth which was, in traditional economy, the 
real guarantee of value. The reason for this is that material worth is in a sense 
always contextual, since it is valuable somewhere to somebody, and this is 
essentially an obstacle to absolute commensurability in a global marketplace 
where any contextual limitations block access to the smooth spaces of the 
wide open spaces of what Guattari (2009) wrote about in terms of integrated 
world capitalism. From this point of view, what is most valuable under condi-
tions of semio- capitalism is what is absolutely shorn of all material, contextual, 
worldly value and can be exchanged in totally abstract capitalist space without 
impediment. Semio- capitalist code is, therefore, not a thing itself, but rather 
the reduction of thingness to the state of colourless, tasteless, meaningless 
nothingness that paradoxically carries maximum value on the basis of its blank, 
bleak mediocrity. The problem for Marazzi (2008, 2011) with the absolute 
semiological destruction of quality in blank quantity is that the material world 
starts to become meaningless because humans live in semiotics webs that they 
use to describe and make sense of their world. What happens, then, when 
these webs are reduced to code, a series of zeros and ones, in the name of the 
absolute communicability of value? Marazzi’s (2008, 2011) answer is to return 
to Marx (1988) but extend his original problem of estrangement. It is now 
not only that the worker is estranged from the means of production, with the 
consequence that he becomes a beast, but that the speaking, cultural human 
is cast out of language, which transforms into a means of economic calcula-
tion, where he becomes a stupid animal. In Heideggerian (2001) terms, man 
becomes poor in world, unable to properly think about his environment or 
conceive of a future beyond the present he currently occupies.
The irony of the situation Marazzi (2008, 2011) explains is, therefore, that 
the contemporary semio- capitalist society is simultaneously marked by a crisis 
of significance and an absolute proliferation of communication. In Berardi’s 
(2015a) view, these two movements, which seem to pull in opposite directions, 
are not unconnected, since the lack of significance contained within language 
is directly related to the proliferation of the quantity of signification which 
overturns the old relationship between language and world in the name of 
abstraction and commensurability. Under these conditions where language 
seems to lose its purchase on the world, and fails to describe our situation in 
the world, Berardi (2015a) argues that signification proliferates. Words, signs, 
symbols, concepts become meaningless, so they proliferate in a desperate attempt 
to capture the meaningfulness of the world, which was, of course, lost in the 
turn to semio- capitalist abstraction where signification is about the commu-
nication of empty value. Berardi (2015a) writes of this paradoxical process 
that opposes lack to excess and degradation to exorbitance in terms of the 
semiotic inflation of the postmodern neo- Baroque. Here, he compares the pres-
ent to the Baroque, which saw the failure of the old world and the opening 
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up of the new, in order to explain why more words, more signs, more symbols 
appear in order to capture the significance of experience in the world that 
appears meaningless. Of course, the difference between the two historical 
moments, the Baroque and neo- Baroque, is clear. While the Baroque was 
concerned with the attempt to make sense of the new modern world, the 
semiotic inflation of the neo- Baroque emerges from the degradation of lan-
guage under conditions of abstract capitalism.
It is this process, that is to say the translation of all signification into markers 
of monetary value, that creates the conditions for the neo- Baroque and semiotic 
inflation related to the desperate attempt to impose significance upon the 
world. In this way the problem of complexity in contemporary global capital-
ism is not simply about our inability to think through and understand the 
speeds and connectedness of the world, but also about the way that the rise 
of semio- capitalism has transformed language into a worldless carrier of abstract 
value. Given this new, degraded form of language, is it any surprise that com-
plexity seems incomprehensible? For Berardi (2015a) it is possible to trace this 
problem back to Nixon’s floatation of the dollar in the early 1970s. In Berardi’s 
view what this achieved was the deregulation of money, its decoupling from 
material referent, and its translation into pure sign. The knock- on effect of 
this was twofold. On the one hand money became worldless and able to 
effectively colonise the entire planet by virtue of its ability to invade every 
sphere of life. On the other hand the monetisation of every sphere of life 
started to undermine the meaningfulness of the world, with the result that 
the new global situation began to confront people like a monstrosity— a 
nightmarish abstraction they could not understand, but which seemed to 
control their lives from afar. The fatal response to this condition has been to 
generate ever more signification in an attempt to effectively understand the 
world, even though the means of cultural representation and reflection have 
already been degraded by the imperialism of the abstract money form.
For Berardi (2015a), then, it is no coincidence that Nixon’s deregulation of 
money and the rise of financial capitalism— where money is simply a sign 
with no reference to cash or other material symbol of value— emerged in the 
same period that saw the computerisation of the world. Following Lyotard 
(1984), who first identified the importance of the computer to contemporary 
capitalism in his The Postmodern Condition, Berardi (2015a) writes of the com-
puter in terms of a calculating machine. Where the abstraction of money 
derealises significance, deterritorialises value, and essentially un- worlds, the 
computer seeks to calculate, evaluate, and produce programmatic responses to 
the new un- world of late capitalism. However, this process of abstract un- 
worlding and computational calculation is fatal because there is no possibility 
of the emergence of sensuous meaningfulness. Everything takes place at the 
level of abstraction, which is why, even when the computer appears to sys-
tematise the world— in the case of, for example, the great moderation— there 
is no sense in which the world feels any less alien. This is, in a way, the 
fundamental problem of Mason’s (2015) vision of post- capitalism. That is to 
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say that the problem with his utopia is that it seems absolutely premised on 
the emergence of a kind of techno- Spinozan multitude formed through the 
Internet or social media that would not address the problem of the unworldli-
ness of contemporary capitalism. Instead of setting about the re- creation of 
real worlds, it would seem to me that what the techno- Spinozan multitude 
would achieve would be a kind of degraded, alienated community of people 
who share likes on Facebook but never reconnect to each other or their world 
in a more meaningful, phenomenological sense. In this respect, the problem 
of Mason’s (2015) account is less concerned with economics, and more about 
the way he misses the essential violence of semio- capitalism, which is precisely 
about its allergy to materiality, quality, and life that cannot be commodified, 
quantified, or rendered absolutely commensurable. What Mason (2015) misses, 
therefore, is the violence of semio- capitalism that attacks singularity and trans-
lates real life into the meaningless shit of a system that has no time for the 
world beyond numbers.
In his recent works on indebtedness, Maurizio Lazzarato (2014) refers to 
Deleuze’s (1997) short paper on the control society in order to argue that the 
violence of finance is founded upon the way it subjects quality to quantity 
and destroys life in the name of the obligation to balance the books. Follow-
ing Deleuze, Lazzarato explains that the indebted subjects— which include 
more or less everybody in financialised capitalism— are enslaved to their obli-
gation to repayment. Under these conditions, the freedom the subjects might 
have had in democratic society to decide upon alternative futures disappears 
and they become part of a cybernetic machine concerned with the service 
of endless debts. For Lazzarato (2014), Berardi (2015a), and the other autono-
mists, this situation of enslavement to numbers stands in stark contrast to the 
situation in the child prior to processes of Oedipalisation. Before induction 
into the nightmarish society of control, the child possesses what Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) write about in terms of machinic subjectivity, which sees 
alternatives everywhere and wants to explore the world. It is passing of this 
utopian form of subjectivity into the maturity and enslavement of Guattari’s 
(2009) integrated world capitalism that, I would suggest, forms the centrepiece 
of the autonomists’ critique. Of course, late capitalism valorises creativity, 
imagination, and thinking otherwise, and it is easy to identify this ideology 
in the Californianism of, for example, Apple and Google. But for Berardi 
(2015a) there is a qualitative difference between the form of mock creativity 
we experience when we pick up the latest Apple product and the imaginative 
production Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987, 1994) prioritise in their works.
In his recent book, And: Phenomenology of the End (2015a), Berardi captures 
this difference through reference to notions of conjunction and connection. 
While the former idea, conjunction, represents true creativity, in that the 
subject changes through his interactions with others and world, Berardi thinks 
connection is a debased, ultimately defensive, mode of conjunction, where the 
individual reaches out but never really engages with otherness. Where con-
junction is an open process, which is essentially decentred, for Berardi 
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connection, and connectivity, is closed and based upon a programmatic centre 
that dictates the terms of contact. In Berardi’s (2015a) view this is how we 
relate today, and this is how we should understand the Californianism of 
Apple, Google, and the other techno- utopians who promise to transform 
people into creatives who open out onto the world. Reading Berardi (2015a), 
it becomes clear that this cannot be the case, because real openness to the 
world would take place through the unmediation of our corporeality which 
is already in the world. This is, of course, precisely what Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987, 1994) mean when they refer to the plane of immanence. By contrast, 
what computational technology achieves, when it places a media device between 
self, other, and world, is the disruption of the consistency of the world and 
the alienation of the machinic subject in the Californian individual who thinks 
he is creative because he connects to others programmatically. Although Apple 
and Google imagine that they connect the world, there is no ontological or 
ecological depth to their work, but instead the (dis)integration of lonely indi-
viduals into a cold unity that promises some relief from alienation through 
desperate connectivity. That is to say that the lonely individual, cut off from 
others and world by semio- capitalism, reaches for the alienation of program-
matic connectivity in order to survive. It is this desperate, defensive strategy 
that accounts for in turn what Berardi (2015a) refers to through the idea of 
the swarm effect, where the simulation of integration appears on the basis of 
mass programmatic dis- individualism and the fascistic brand loyalty tech cor-
porations, such as Apple, are able to command, simply because they offer some 
sense of consistency in a world that seems alien and meaningless.
This is, however, a terminal strategy in light of the way connectivity defends 
against unworldliness through a denial of the incalculability of materiality, 
what Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) variously call the schizophrenic and 
the machinic, and further disassociates self from other and world. Although 
the disorientation of the self is endless, Berardi (2015a) explains that semio- 
capitalism is in the process of seeking to rewire human hardware so that there 
is no gap between the technological system and human responses to the 
environment. Writing of what he calls neuro- totalitarianism, he points out 
that humans are currently unable to cope with the complexity of their world 
and the abstract code given to them to make sense of their environment. 
Humanity’s organic neural networks are out of line with the technological 
networks which have evolved through processes of globalisation. Although 
our brains are plastic, and can evolve within reason, for Berardi (2015a) we 
have reached the limit of organic humanity in contemporary cyber- time. In 
the face of the lightning speeds of semio- capitalism, he explains that a range 
of psychological/neurological problems have emerged: dyslexia, dyspraxia, 
attention deficit disorder, and a range of addictions concerned with a desperate 
need for stimulation. Consider the example of sex addiction. In Berardi’s 
(2015a) view, sex addiction is the result of the loss of the other brought about 
by late capitalism. In the face of endless work, which saps energy, and instru-
mental rationality, which destroys the possibility of eroticism, sex transforms 
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from an affective relation in the world to an objective encounter fetishised by 
the misery of loneliness and fantasies about the pleasure of the other. However, 
the sex addict, who occupies the space of drive and is only really concerned 
with his own trauma, takes the other for an object. The other is a commodity, 
an object, a despised thing, which is precisely why the other can never really 
solve the addict’s problem— the loss of human orientation towards the other 
and beyond this, the world itself.
Unfortunately, Berardi (2015a) cannot even find potential salvation from 
this horror show in the figure of a mother who might provide children with 
a more sensuous, affective, and essentially human introduction into the world, 
because he notes that contemporary kids tend to learn their first words from 
machines. The problem here is that words learnt from machines fail to establish 
a relation between language, touch, and the sensuous world, but instead induct 
kids into a monstrous world of abstraction where words have no real connec-
tion to things and thus never provide them with the machinery to reflect 
back upon their own experience. While Merleau- Ponty (2011), the philosopher 
who casts a long shadow over this theory, finds the roots of the alienation of 
self from world in the modernity of Descartes, Berardi (2015a) looks to the 
origins of America and the Puritans who were already out of place and ended 
up despising life itself in the name of abstract perfection. In his view we can, 
therefore, find the roots of semio- capitalism in the original American settlers 
who, he explains, invented the cybernetic figure of the more than human 
neo- human. From this perspective, the history of modernity through post-
modernity, and the history of capitalist economics from Smith (1982, 1999) 
through Friedman (2002), might be re- read in terms of the evolution of the 
neo- human who finally finds his un- home in the neoliberal society. As such, 
Berardi (2015b) thinks the 1970s realised what started in early modern America, 
and captures this through reference to Bowie’s enigmatic Heroes. Here, Bowie’s 
line ‘We could be heroes . . .’ is simultaneously a recognition that there will 
be no more heroes in the new programmatic society where everybody is a 
pseudo- individual, and a desperate call for heroism in a world marked by 
depression, despair, and the end of utopian hope.
Despite the rise of the neo- human, represented by the fantasy of the always-
 on worker who spends his days and nights searching for new ways of making 
money, and the collapse of real heroism into the fantastical celebrity, the media 
star Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) explored in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
humans are not machines and cannot live without others and world. In this 
respect perhaps the best representative of the horror of the neo- human in 
semio- capitalism is the Japanese hikikomori who cuts himself (because the shut- 
ins are usually young men) off from material interaction with others, but then 
reaches them through machines— the various computers and new media 
technologies that form the monstrous architecture of his semio- capitalist womb. 
Although the hikikomori retreats towards this techno womb in order to escape 
the horror of the world, which seems frightening and threatening, the problem 
with his strategy is that it offers no escape. As Berardi (2015a) notes through 
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reference to South Korea, the most connected society in the world, which 
also has the highest suicide rate, the hyper- connective environment is unlive-
able. Under these conditions, where the connected are cast into a living death 
by technology that transforms them into tech- no- bodies, suicide seems like 
the only way out. The real alternative, disconnection from the machine, seems 
impossible and largely unimaginable. However, for Berardi (2015a), this is 
precisely what must happen through, first, the poetic reclamation of language 
able to express the sensuous, affective materiality and depth of life beyond 
measure, and second, the reconstruction of the real world through this new 
language which is itself founded upon the perceptive interactions of self and 
other in the environment.
When Berardi (2012) writes of the uprising, then, what he means is opposi-
tion to the deregulation of reality in semio- capitalism. We could say that what 
Berardi proposes here is the schizophrenic deregulation of late capitalist deregu-
lation, which has led to the post- human territoriality of abstract economics and 
neo- human nobodies, and the reconfiguration of new ecologies based upon the 
ontological relation between self, other, and world that are irreducible and real 
beyond the dire constructed, symbolic order of capitalism that imposes a false 
order of scarcity and excess upon humanity. While Mason (2015) founds struggle 
upon enclosure, the problem of private property, and capitalism’s need to gener-
ate surplus value, Berardi (2015a) shifts the terrain of battle towards ecology, 
environment, and the human life world that semio- capitalism seeks to destroy 
in the name of abstraction. This is why Mason’s (2015) utopia of open source 
connectivity is not enough from Berardi’s point of view. From this perspective 
the Californian utopia of Apple, Google, and info tech is in reality a dystopia 
of absolute capitalism that transforms the embodied human into the abstract 
neo- human and then sells the desperate, disassociated self a fantasy of interaction, 
interconnectivity, and creativity, which it invariably consumes in order to try to 
ease the pain of mutilation and loneliness. Against the fantasy world of Steve 
Jobs and the other virtual utopians, Berardi (2015a) finds the truth of the semio- 
capitalist utopia in the paranoid dystopias of the other Californian, Philip K. 
Dick, where technology is never a route to some happy, creative dreamworld, 
but instead the gateway to the kind of neuro- totalitarianism he identifies with 
Google’s latest attempts to translate reality itself into a live data set. However, 
the situation is far from hopeless because, in Berardi’s (2015a) view, paranoia, 
which derealises the normal utopia of semio- capitalism into a sinister dystopia, 
and depression, when the future looks bleak and we cannot see a way forward, 
create the conditions for the new on the basis of their destruction of the con-
structions of the present.
Through reference to Guattari’s own winter years, Berardi (2008) argues 
that depression has the potential to produce political change. Although depres-
sion and despair are more normally associated with exhaustion and an inability 
to act, Berardi suggests that the desperation of depression, the very lack of 
future, may produce the will to change, precisely because no external possibil-
ity of change seems present. In this way Berardi (2008) connects depression 
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and despair to voluntarism and the revolutionary will and argues that alterna-
tive worlds might be born in the darkness of misery. Akin to Philip K. Dick, 
and perhaps the 20th century’s most famous paranoiac, Daniel Paul Schreber, 
Berardi suggests that other worlds grow out of disassociation from the now 
and a refusal to accept reality in its present configuration. In his own dark 
fantasy, semio- capitalism is really a kind of thanato- economics, which destroys 
the individual who cannot sleep for electronic images flashing before his eyes, 
that pushes towards the critical point Guattari (1995) called the chaosmic 
spasm suggestive of a new kind of reality. Although Berardi (2008) never really 
spells out what this new reality would look like, my sense is that where his 
critique of semio- capitalism leads is Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987, 1994) plane 
of immanence or the body without organs where the self is immersed in the 
other and world and reality is based upon anonymous flows of perception 
that meet in the formation of subjectivities comfortable with openness. In his 
book After the Future (2011), Berardi tells us that the future expired sometime 
in the 1970s, around the time the Sex Pistols closed their Anarchy in the UK 
with the refrain ‘No Future’, because this is when language started to collapse 
into abstract signification. Shorn of the ability to write the present, or effec-
tively remember the past, the future began to disappear, especially for the 
young, because there was no way to construct temporal trajectories out of 
the now.
In this respect Berardi’s (2011) vision of the horror of neoliberalism is very 
close to Bernard Stiegler’s (2009, 2010, 2013) account of the problem of 
disorientation. Similarly, Berardi and Stiegler are also more or less in agreement 
about how to respond to this situation. Where Stiegler (2013) suggests political 
struggle over the status of knowledge, which in his view must be wrestled 
away from technocrats who are only interested in instrumental rationality so 
that it can enable people to better understand their world, Berardi’s (2012) 
turn to poetry and sensuous thought is about the reclamation of language in 
the name of the reconnection of speech, writing, and body that perceives. 
Only when this happens, and there is a relationship between embodiment, 
perception, suffering, thought, and articulation in language and culture, will 
we be able to escape the horror of the permanent present of semio- capitalism 
where humans have been reduced to the status of soft machines and language 
is little more than a tool for keeping accounts. In a sense, then, it is clear that 
Berardi is, like Stiegler, keen to protect the human, and the humanist tradition, 
from the post- humanism of techno- semio- capitalism. However, it is also clear 
that he has little time for the possessive individualism that conspires with the 
nihilism of capitalism and prefers instead the kind of eco or geo- philosophy 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) wrote about in their final work, What Is Philoso-
phy? I think the reason for this is clear. Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of 
the plane of immanence and the body without organs have the potential to 
translate the destroyed capitalist self, who is defined by lack, despair, and 
indebtedness, into an ecological subject founded upon its relation to others 
rooted in the environment.
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With regard to the way in which the shift from semio- capitalism to a more 
ecological, material world might take place, there is once more common 
ground between Berardi (2011, 2015a) and Stiegler (2014). For the latter, late 
capitalism has exhausted itself in instrumental rationality to the extent that 
the very spirit that supported its progress into the future has vanished. The 
critical moment this loss of spirit produces is, for Stiegler, a moment of cata-
strophic possibility. The same is the case with Berardi who, in works such as 
After the Future (2011) and And (2015a), presents the collapse of the future 
and the destruction of the self in depression and despair in terms of a schizo-
phrenic strategy where the autistic semio- capitalist individual might open out 
onto the complicity with everybody and everything that surrounds them. 
Unlike Stiegler (2013), who takes his lead from Derrida, Berardi’s (2015a) 
theory is straight out of Deleuze and Guattari, who imagined a similar schizo-
phrenic cartography. More specifically, Berardi (2008) draws on Guattari’s 
theory of transversality, which he developed in his work at La Borde, in order 
to think through the possibility of a new flat ontology. Here, human psychol-
ogy is no longer premised on Freudian Oedipal relations between Mom, Dad, 
and me, but rather self, other, and a new third object capable of opening up 
schizophrenic possibility. Given Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) geo- philosophy, 
Guattari’s (2014) late concern with ecology, and Berardi’s (2015a) own focus 
on the importance of materiality, my view would be that this third object 
must be world, or perhaps more properly earth, since earth is where humans 
find their ontological roots. It is impossible for humans to survive without 
earth, and it is on the basis of their perception of earth that they develop 
culture and create life worlds. The problem with the current, semio- capitalist, 
world is, however, that earth and human perception have been abandoned for 
abstraction and this has led humanity into crisis, where the global social, 
political, economic, and perhaps centrally cultural system no longer works.
According to the German thinker Gerald Raunig (2016), the problem of 
the present is precisely the militarised neo- human, the individual, who resists 
the truth that he is born and lives in others, worlds, and earth. Reading Raunig’s 
recent work, it is clear that the late capitalist individual— who evolved out of 
a long history of attempts to theorise the self- identical self stretching back to 
Descartes (1984)— is essentially a paranoiac, living in a delusional universe 
where there is a very clear line between self, others, and world. In this respect 
we confront the solipsistic dimension of paranoia, which seems to throw 
Berardi’s (2015a) view of the use value of paranoid thought into sharp relief, 
where the traumatised self cuts himself off from the world in his own fantasti-
cal private space. However, in much the same way that Berardi (2008) seeks 
out the possibility of depression, despair, and withdrawal from trauma, which 
is, of course, a key strategy of Italian workerism where the key idea was to 
refuse labour, Raunig (2016) thinks that the militarised, neo- human individual 
is representative of the final moments of the self- enclosed, solipsistic self and 
that breakdown will ultimately result in the emergence of a new form of 
ecological subjectivity he writes about through the anthropological idea of 
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dividualism. While Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987), and following them 
Berardi (2015a), rely on the figure of madness, the schizophrenic, to capture 
subjectivity beyond individualism, Raunig (2016) refers to anthropology, and 
shows how non- Western primitive society is defined by dividualism. Here, 
where the gift economy prevails, there is no sense that there is an individual 
who can balance his books and somehow extract himself from society, but 
rather a recognition of dividualism, where the self is naturally divided in 
origins, reliance, and future potential in others and the environment. While 
this form of interdependence and reliance has become a symbol of weakness 
under conditions of Western modernity because of its associations with vul-
nerability and fragility, Raunig’s (2016) suggestion is that dividualism is the 
truth of the world and that the armoured self, the Freudian ego, that confronts 
the environment through military operations is an unsustainable fantasy.
III  What Is the Flesh of the World?
In respect of the common focus of Marazzi (2008, 2011), Berardi (2011, 2012, 
2015a, 2015b), Lazzarato (2014), and Raunig (2016), who similarly write of 
the destruction of materiality by semio- capitalist abstraction that hides the 
reality of the complicity of self, other, and world, it is clear that their master 
sources are Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983, 1987) anti- Oedipal works, their later 
work on the value of philosophy (1994), and Guattari’s (2014) own works on 
ecology. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, the autonomists find a utopian 
alternative to the violence of semio- capitalism in the schizophrenic collapse 
of self- identity and the radical openness of the plane of immanence. In a sense 
this vision captures the meaning of the minor utopia I want to outline in this 
chapter, because it emphasises the excessive dimension of lack that endlessly 
opens out onto otherness and refuses the hubris of self- identical states of 
subjectivity in a humble utopianism that recognises the truth of material 
vulnerability and fragility, but I believe it is possible to trace the philosophy 
of this perspective back further than Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987, 1994) 
to the work of the philosopher of embodiment and perception, Maurice 
Merleau- Ponty (1969). Although my sense is that the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, and following them Berardi, Marazzi, Lazzarato, and Raunig, contains 
an implicit recognition of the importance of the body and the relationship 
between the body and world, I also think that this embodied dimension is 
played down in their writings, primarily because of their opposition to the 
self- identical organism which might become the centre point of a new para-
noid philosophy of identity. While it is no doubt important to resist the 
organism in the name of resistance to the possibility of the self- identical 
individual, my view is that it is a mistake to overstate the extent to which 
Merleau- Ponty (1969) thought the body was a self- identical thing, and that 
it is possible to see the basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) body without 
organs in Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) philosophy of the flesh, despite the more 
explicit influences of Artaud and Klein. Given this possibility, in the final 
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section of this chapter, I want to explore the possibility of what I have sought 
to call the minor utopia, which I think we find in Berardi and the autonomists, 
and before them Deleuze and Guattari, through reference to Merleau- Ponty’s 
(1969) theory of the flesh of the world.
Following an exploration of Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) key ideas, I will seek 
to situate his ontology in Michel Henry’s (1983, 2014, 2015) work, centrally 
because he reads Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) late concept of the flesh and his 
critique of cybernetic reality in terms of a critique of social and political 
systems committed to abstraction. Since Henry (2014) wrote his book on 
these destructive social and political systems in conversation with celebrations 
of the end of history, his focus is really existing communism and capitalism. 
In light of this focus in the heady days of American empire, the purpose of 
my discussion is to project Henry’s (2014) critique of abstract death worlds 
forward to consider the thanato- politics of the war on terror when empire 
appears in a state of collapse. Here, I pick up Reza Negarestani’s (2008) classic 
Deleuzo- Guattarian Cyclonopedia in order to show how the contemporary 
American drone state and Islamic radicals, such as the Islamic State, are com-
plicit in the emergence of a global, cyclonic death drive that threatens to 
destroy life itself in the name of abstract idealism. Here, abstract utopia becomes 
about the destruction of materiality, and it is precisely this dystopian turn that 
Negarestani (2008) seeks to exploit in the name of schizo- strategy. That is to 
say that he employs the ideas of the blackening and leper creativity to suggest 
that processes of apocalyptic desertification and objectification might open the 
way for what he calls complicity with anonymous materials, which I take to 
refer to the (un)revealed earth and the possibility of a new ecological contract 
between self, other, and environment humbled by suffering and the final 
humiliation of all- out war that reveals the absurdity of the hubris of abstract 
utopianism. It is on this basis that I close the chapter by projecting my reading 
of Merleau- Ponty (1969), Negarestani (2008), and Henry (2014) forward into 
a sketch of the minor utopia that relies on reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1994) final work on geo- philosophy, What Is Philosophy?
In his final, unfinished book, The Visible and Invisible (1969), Merleau- Ponty 
famously outlines the concept of the chiasm, or the flesh, which refers to gen-
eralised, anonymous, material existence. Although the flesh is before every world, 
since it names the original, ontological state of the earth where flows of percep-
tion are everything, Merleau- Ponty’s phenomenology explains that every singular 
individual participates in the chiasm and contributes to the formation of worlds 
on the basis of this participation. This is how speech, writing, and culture 
emerge. Language and expression more generally name flows of perception 
across the flesh and create a sense of a visible world. However, the essence of 
Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) project is to explain the ontology of the flesh in relation 
to the problem of intellectualism that takes the semiotic expressions of percep-
tion, casts them out of context, and uses them to create a vision of reality that 
is cut up into individual elements that then become originary. Under these 
conditions, which Merleau- Ponty (2011) connects to Descartes’ modern 
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philosophy that locates truth in cognition, thought loses touch with the earth, 
which becomes a monstrous object that needs to be studied from somewhere 
else, namely the external vantage point of the cogito. From Merleau- Ponty’s 
(2011) point of view, the failure of Descartes’ philosophy was that he missed 
the truth of the world in the flesh and perception and instead sought out the 
final, object, scientific truth, which is impossible to obtain because of the abyssal 
nature of reality that can never be known. But simply because reality cannot 
be known once and for all does not mean that it is somehow a monstrous alien, 
and Merleau- Ponty (1969) affirms this idea in his theory of the reversability of 
the flesh, where the organism becomes complicit in nature by virtue of the 
undecideability of the relationship between the being who simultaneously touches 
and is touched. This sensuous interaction, which necessarily opens the individual 
up to embodied perception, ensures participation in the flesh and enables the 
empathetic connection between self and other. Against this world, the truth of 
the world, that Merleau- Ponty (1969) names the invisible, and that is always in 
some ways intimate, the earth only becomes a monstrous object, an alien to be 
studied, puzzled over, and reduced to the status of the abstract concept, from 
the point of disembodied cognition that denies its participation in the flesh in 
the name of the fantasy of certainty beyond perception. Long before Berardi 
(2012) imagined the political potential of the poetic, Merleau- Ponty (1969) had 
written that painting was able to articulate the abyssal nature of reality. In this 
respect he thought that it was a far superior mode of cultural expression than 
the abstract sciences that sought to mutilate reality in its transformation into 
conceptual truth because it could represent the world without killing it.
Building upon Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) work, Michel Henry (2015) writes 
of processes of incarnation, where the world finds provisional embodiment in 
the self, in order to describe a kind of phenomenological unconscious or 
psychoanalytic ontology. In this way the world perceives through the self, feels 
hunger in the stomach of the starved, suffers in the embodied pain of the 
desperate, and imagines utopia in the hopes of the destroyed in hopeless situ-
ations. This is precisely how we must understand Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) 
vision of the invisible, or dynamic matter, and how perception and expression 
contribute to modernity. Perhaps it is this complicity of life that the schizo-
phrenic, who is unable to understand the boundary between self and world 
or reality and fantasy, recognises, and this is why schizophrenics have a utopian 
function in the Cartesian (Descartes, 1984) strategy concerned with the normal 
derealisation of the world into abstraction. The function of abstraction is, of 
course, to fend off doubt, and this is precisely what Descartes thought he had 
been able to do, until the abyss came back locked in a staring contest with 
Nietzsche (2003), who was able to recognise the limits of reason. While 
modern science took off into abstraction, what Dillon (1998) writes about 
through the idea of the fatal semiotic reduction that invariably spins off into 
unreality, Merleau- Ponty (1969) emphasised the primacy of what he called 
autochthonous organisation, or a kind of ecological ontology where everything 
touches and is, in turn, touched by everything else in a kind of inescapable 
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relation of universal perception. For Merleau- Ponty (1969) this is the flesh of 
the world, the gestalt of the earth, that comes before reflection. When we 
take thought to be somehow prior to perception, we miss the way in which 
ideas and concepts flow through people in much the same way that the earth 
writes poetry through the poet, paints pictures through the painter, and imag-
ines new worlds through the utopian thinker.
By contrast to Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) Cézanne, who captured the flesh of 
the world in still life, the problem with science and abstraction resides in the 
way in which it seeks to refuse its relation to the world in the hard and fast 
subject/object relationship that defines scientific methodology. However, in much 
the same way that Lacan (2007) contrasts the originary body in pieces to the 
developmental imaginary self visible in the mirror, Merleau- Ponty (2011) sug-
gests that the scientific self develops through alienation. Before socialisation 
Merleau- Ponty’s (2010) child perceives the fleshy truth of the world and feels 
the reversability of self, other, and environment. For Merleau- Ponty (2010) the 
child’s thought is, therefore, fundamental thought, and should not be understood 
in terms of lack. Instead, what the child’s perception of the endless reversability 
of the world that is always in excess shows is that the abstract reduction of 
reality which we find in, for example, Galileo is a flight from abyssal nature of 
truth (Dillon, 1998). For Henry (2015) the problem with the modern tendency 
to abstract truth, which cuts reality up into pieces and then tries to insist that 
this is somehow real, is that it is unliveable in the face of the flesh of the world. 
Following Merleau- Ponty (1969), he explains that reality is incorporation, 
Heideggerian mit- sein, and there is no way to assert independence, separation, 
superiority, and inferiority. In fact, in his view, it is precisely this modern ten-
dency to translate reality into abstraction that led to the emergence of what he 
calls death worlds, Nazism, really existing communism, capitalism, where an idea, 
such as race, class, or profit, becomes a utopian principle that turns out to be 
more important than life itself and ends up becoming an excuse for the transla-
tion of humans into things that can be exterminated, destroyed, or used up in 
the name of some higher truth (Henry, 2014).
Although Henry (2014) wrote his book on the 20th- century empires of death 
in the happy days of the end of history in order to warn the post- communists 
that they would not find life in the West, where everything is subordinate to 
the abstract god of profitability, I think it is possible to project his critique of 
utopias of death forward into the contemporary to better understand the philo-
sophical significance of the war on terror in what might be the dying days of 
American empire. In much the same way that Henry (2014) warns the old 
communists about the thanatological nature of the West, one might say the 
same to the contemporary radical Islamists, who think they can export death 
to worlds where people are in love with life in order to win the war on terror. 
They could not be further from the truth, because, from the point of view of 
Merleau- Ponty (1969) and Henry (2014), the West loves the death of life in 
abstraction that is more real than reality itself. This, in my view, is the secret 
complicity that binds the West, which loves the death of life in techno- scientific 
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capitalist abstraction, and the jihadists, who seek death in the name of their own 
utopia of the long lost medieval past, in the war on terror and explains why 
Reza Negarestani’s (2008) obscure work, Cyclonopedia, which captures the deep 
metaphysical truth of this war of modern utopians, is the most insightful account 
of the struggle for dominance in the deserts of the Middle East. For Negarestani 
(2008) the war on terror cannot be understood through modern dialectics, 
where thesis meets antithesis to produce a collision into the synthetic future, 
because both parties share a secret complicity that means that their confrontation 
in the desert should be understood through a different figure, the figure of the 
cyclone, which finds its best articulation in modern thought in Freud’s (2003) 
theory of drive. We find Freud’s theory of drive, or more particularly the death 
drive, in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2003), when the child seeks to offset 
the trauma of separation from mother by endlessly playing fort/da, which the 
founder of psychoanalysis takes for a representation of the inertia of being, where 
what is born seeks its own death in order to escape the horror of life for the 
ecstasy of nothingness.
Negarestani (2008) never really explores Freud’s paper in his strange book, 
because Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 1994) remain his master thinkers, but I 
think the concept of the death drive, which is useful in the psychoanalysis of 
addiction or other behaviours concerned with the symbolic escape from 
trauma, casts a long shadow over the mythological symbol of the cyclone. 
What is the cyclone of the war on terror if it is not a mythic manifestation 
of Freud’s death drive on the level of global war in the deserts and destroyed 
cities of Iraq and Syria, those ruined places and spaces of emptiness, loneliness, 
and despair? In these ruins the complicity between the American military and 
Islamic State is manifest in the former’s strategies of techno- desertification, 
where expressions of life are transformed into objects to be targeted in the 
name of the creation smooth space more suitable for battle, evaluation, and 
economic exchange, and the latter’s apocalyptic jihadism, which reduces life 
itself to little more than an interval in the inexorable movement towards 
martyrdom and heaven. Under these conditions everything is transformed into 
a miserable object subordinate to the abstract utopian fantasy. In the American 
case Negarestani (2008) points out that everything leads back to oil, which 
is similar to Freud’s (2003) spool or the addict’s narcotic in respect of its 
symbolisation of the flat line, though in this case the equation of materiality 
and death is literal. What is oil but the decay of the world transformed into 
the fuel to drive the great postmodern consumer society complete with its 
financial system and will to escape the horror of materiality?
Given this will to destroy the world in the name of a utopia of abstraction, 
it is not surprising that the transition from Bush to Obama, which was supposed 
to represent a scaling back of America’s global adventurism, has actually ended 
up becoming about the automisation of the war through the use of drones. In 
this respect America has taken its men and women out of the theatre of war 
in the name of the turn to what Chamayou (2015) calls necro- ethics. Here, the 
abstract machine without a body confronts the hostile environment of the world 
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in the name of the exercise of complete control. As such, necro- ethics becomes 
less about the destruction of the enemy, but instead concerns the objective 
neutralisation of uncontrollable matter and its transformation into manageable 
material. As Brian Massumi (2015) explains in his recent book on contemporary 
American approaches to warfare, the perception of the threat environment 
requires the exercise of onto- power, which is power imposed upon the world 
through the Cartesian (Descartes, 1984) logic of abstraction. What the military 
must work on is the earth itself before the emergence of world in order to 
overcome the enemy in their ontological relationship to their environment. The 
reason for this is that the environment is, of course, the space of terror and fear, 
which is why the drone operator is a kind of militarised shut- in (hikikomori). 
They never set foot in real battle space because the whole point of the war on 
terror is to try to win the struggle for ontological power in order to define the 
other’s relationship to their environment. When the enemy holds the upper 
hand, the Westerner lives in fear, which is why the Islamic State has sought to 
reimagine the violence of Al Qaeda in order to raise the stakes and redefine the 
normal consumer’s relationship to their environment.
In much the same way, then, that the American war on terror is driven by 
the need to subdue the Islamic radicals through the destruction of their onto-
logical relationship to the earth in the name of the wider project concerned 
with the endless abstraction of semio- capitalism, the motivation of the Islamic 
State is the destruction of matter and the introduction of fear into every circuit 
of the enemy’s life world in order to open the way for apocalypse. This is the 
real objective of the grizzly utopia founded by al- Zarqawi while he was 
imprisoned in the Jordanian desert— apocalyptic destruction in the name of 
the return to the medieval past. Indeed, biographical interpretations of al- 
Zarqawi suggest that his drive towards apocalyptic destruction might have 
been rooted in his own personal death drive organised around an absent father 
and a mother fixation (Warrick, 2015). From a Freudian point of view, we 
might, therefore, conclude that al- Zarqawi’s obsession with death, murder, and 
torture was the result of resentment towards the external world and that what 
he really wanted was to return to Mom through the wholesale destruction of 
others who were really only ever fleshy symbols of his own self. In this respect, 
al- Zarqawi was perhaps always a masochist acting out the role of sadist, and 
we might risk a similar claim about his baby, Al Qaeda in Iraq, which later 
became the Islamic State. According to the psychoanalyst of Islam Fethi 
Benslama (2009), Islamic identity has always been defined by what he calls 
the torment of origins brought about the encroachment of Western modernity. 
Here, Benslama’s point is that modernity destroyed the original form of Islamic 
identity, but, at the same time, transformed it into a kind of utopian fantasy 
of the lost past, which has become the rallying point of Islamic radicals ever 
since. In this way Benslama (2009) supports the Freudian reading of al- Zarqawi’s 
death drive, because what his position effectively shows is that radical Islam 
is a thanatological movement concerned with the destruction of the present 
in the name of a return to the future past of the medieval caliphate and 
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beyond this the nothingness of heaven where God awaits. This is why the 
colour of the Islamic State flag is black. The black flag signifies the painful 
loss of the past which haunts radical Islam, the desperate desire for revenge 
against Western modernity, and finally the void of death, the nothingness that 
will finally resolve the torture of lost origins (Freud, 2003).
But for Negarestani (2008) the abyss of war is not entirely hopeless, because 
what he calls the blackening or leper creativity, which refers to the thanato-
logical destruction of matter in the name of the utopia of nothingness, offers 
the potential to think through the objective anonymity of the earth and its 
creatures beyond the worlds of Western modernity and radical theocratic 
thought. In this respect, Negarestani transforms the blackening of war which 
pushes towards the void of death into a schizo- strategy that might enable 
humanity to rethink its ontological relation to the earth and imagine a new 
world based upon organic limits, vulnerability, fragility, and the essential rela-
tion of the self to other through the mediation of the environment. As such, 
I think that Negarestani’s (2008) esoteric interpretation of the war on terror 
which employs schizophrenic strategies to push towards recognition of the 
irreducibility of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987, 1994) plane of immanence is 
also essentially concerned with thinking through the possibility of escape from 
Cartesian idealism for Merleau- Ponty’s (1969) flesh of the world. The problem 
with Cartesian idealism, which we also find articulated in work by Paul Burkett 
(1999) and John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark (2011) on Marx’s theory of 
nature, is that it introduces an ecological rift, to use Foster’s term, and effec-
tively destroys humanity’s ontological relationship to the earth. Under these 
conditions humans lose sight of the ground of existence and reconstruct their 
worlds through machines. Thus, Foster and Burkett show that the techno- 
scientific world, which becomes about truth, is in reality a fetish object, and 
the real truth of the world resides in the metabolic relationship between 
humanity and the earth.
From the Marxist point of view of Burkett (1999) and Foster and Clark 
(2011), this ontological relation is the ground of the commons and the reason 
why the problem of capitalist enclosure in the name of private property is a 
philosophical error reflective of a faulty understanding of the nature of reality, 
rather than simply an ethical or political problem. Shorn of the basis of the 
earth, Foster’s and Burkett’s work show why the capitalist enclosure of reality 
in the abstraction of evaluation is simultaneously thanatological, since it destroys 
the thing itself, and infinite, because there is no ground able to contain its 
endless speculation. This is precisely what money symbolises and demonstrates 
why the phenomenological project concerned with the ecological rediscovery 
of the earth upon which humans might build better worlds must also run 
through the politics of class struggle, since those who are locked in the privacy 
of abstraction oppose those who work upon the earth and are engaged in the 
kind of metabolic interactions Marx (1988) understood to be foundational to 
what it means to be truly human. This is the case because the humanism of 
the worker is based upon participation in worlds firmly rooted in interactions 
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with the earth, rather than a tragic, utopian attempt to take off and leave the 
earth behind for some imaginary world founded in abstract thought. It is the 
latter, practical, attitude that I think describes what it means to participate in 
the commons and, beyond this, support the social and political project of 
communism, which Marx (1988) wrote about in his critique of estranged 
labour in terms of communion with in turn self, other, materiality, and the 
earth itself. In this respect I think it is possible to draw a line from Marx’s 
(1988) theory of the commons and communism through to Merleau- Ponty 
(1969) and the concept of the flesh of the world and finally Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1987, 1994) ideas of the plane of immanence and the anonymous 
body without organs.
Each of these thinkers contributes to the notion of what I want to call the 
minor utopia, which is opposed to the kind of hubris usually associated with 
the idea of the utopian and instead describes a kind of humble, ecological 
vision of the ideal world where humans recognise their terrestrial, earthbound 
nature and build new worlds on this basis. Before Marx (1988), I think we 
find a similar ecological vision of reality in the work of Spinoza (1996), who 
famously asserted the identity of God and nature, and, following Spinoza, 
Schelling (2004), who wrote of the impenetrability of nature in order to show 
that the turn back to earth should not entail the articulation of the kind of 
miserly, austere politics of limitation. Although Spinoza, Schelling, Marx, 
Merleau- Ponty, and Deleuze and Guattari can, in my view, be placed within 
a tradition of what we might want to call the univocity of being, this does 
not necessarily mean limitation; though, of course, this is precisely what it 
means from the point of view of abstraction and economy concerned with 
endless accumulation. From the perspective of the ontological relation between 
human and earth, however, there are no limits, since perception and interaction 
are endless. This is, I think, what Schelling meant when he wrote of the abyssal 
unground, which is simultaneously necessary and a kind of vortex that enables 
freedom (McGrath, 2012), and Deleuze and Guattari (1987) captured through 
the concepts of the plane of immanence and the body without organs which 
endlessly deterritorialises. In their final work, What Is Philosophy? (1994), 
Deleuze and Guattari wrote that science seeks to translate the utopian move-
ments of deterritorialisation into function in the name of the management of 
chaos. In this way science ejects humanity from the world and places the 
scientist in a godlike position. By contrast, they explain that philosophy seeks 
consistency and understanding and write of the philosopher in terms of the 
superject who seeks to think about the earth conceptually in a philosophical 
world that does not destroy its movements.
Finally, Deleuze and Guattari refer to art, the figure of the artist, whom 
they call the inject, who plunges into the sensuous and seeks to represent the 
infinity of perception through finite means of great work. Reading back into 
their works on capitalism and schizophrenia, perhaps they might have added 
a fourth form of engagement with what they call the chaos of the earth, 
which is capitalism or the system of dejection that destroys the individual and 
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leaves him worldless, like Heidegger’s (2001) rock. The value of the introduc-
tion of this fourth term would be to connect What Is Philosophy? (1994) to 
their earlier works but also to establish the grounds of geo- philosophical politics 
today, which are, in my view, about the struggle over home and what it means 
to live in a good home, or a utopian society. From the point of view of capi-
talism, the good home consists of abstraction, calculation, predictability, a refusal 
of the organic, and a rejection of the earth. But where does this leave humanity, 
which is organic, rooted in the earth, and characterised by its ability to per-
ceive? This is where we can usefully refer to Heidegger’s (2001) work on the 
fundamental concepts of metaphysics and particularly his discussion of world 
and worldliness. Heidegger (2001) explains that rocks are worldless, since they 
are entirely enclosed and unable to relate to the world, while animals are poor 
in world, because they relate to the earth, but never transcend their immersion 
in their environment. It is only humans that are world forming, in Heidegger’s 
view, by virtue of their ability to shape their own world. While the problem 
of rocks and animals is one of captivation, whereby they are enclosed in nature, 
the human advantage resides in the distance of what he calls the present- to- 
hand that suspends behaviour and enables action.
The problem of this state is, however, that it plunges humanity into uncan-
niness, which, when we read Heidegger, is less a kind of psychological experi-
ence, and more an ontological condition concerned with ‘throwness’ and 
fundamental alienation (Withy, 2015). Given this situation, the error of what 
I have sought to call above capitalist dejection is that it emphasises this alien-
ation through a will to technological abstraction. This is precisely the drive 
to technological enframing Heidegger (1977) associates with the forgetting of 
being and modern nihilism and Merleau- Ponty (1969) seeks to escape through 
his emphasis on the flesh of the world. But while the use of the idea of the 
flesh saw Merleau- Ponty push towards the kind of post- human ecological 
anonymity that might open up a new way of being, it is possible to argue 
that Deleuze and Guattari (1994) sought to radicalise Merleau- Ponty’s vision 
through their geo- philosophy, where earth replaces world, which is already far 
too human to capture the nameless identity of everything with everything 
else on the plane of immanence. It is only under these conditions, where 
world becomes earth which exposes the terrestrial nature of humanity, that it 
will truly be possible to construct a new world, what Von Uexkull (2010) 
called a life world, on the basis of the kind of social, political, economic, and 
ecological constraints revealed by the contemporary moment Ž ižek (2010) 
writes about in terms of the end times. This new world, which I have sought 
to capture through reference to the Deleuzo- Guattarian notion of the minor 
utopia, would recognise the ecological limits, vulnerabilities, and fragilities of 
humanity grounded in terrestrial space, and in this respect require the end of 
the infinite expansion of abstraction, economy, and consumption. However, 
by contrast to the necessity of the imposition of an austere economics of un- 
growth, the humble minor utopia of limits would also entail a profound 
rearticulation of what it means to be human, and centrally an assertion of the 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   167 10-12-2016   8:17:39 PM
168 The Minor Utopia
primacy of perception and the deep engagement with others on the basis of 
a recognition of common earthbound nature. In this respect, the minor utopia 
would not simply be a miserable place, defined by lack and austerity, but rather 
representative of the emergence of an infinite utopianism concerned with the 
abyss of perception and the possibility of humans to understand through 
sensuous experience.
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I  The Lost Child in the Angelic City
In this chapter, and the chapter that follows, I propose to take up the politics 
of the environment explored in my work on the minor utopia through a con-
sideration of, first, urban abandonment and the possibility of post- growth earth-
bound being, and second, alienation, estrangement, and the re- emergence of 
politics in a conflict- based recognition of inequality and division. In the first 
instance, I turn to the cinema of director Nicolas Winding Refn in order to 
explore the problem of abandonment in the contemporary city. Reading his 
recent films Drive (2011) and Only God Forgives (2013), I show how Winding 
Refn captures the horror of estrangement and alienation through an exploration 
of the politics of the destroyed family and the abandoned child. Where Drive 
leaves its protagonist, the nameless Driver, lost in the post- human city of things 
where nobody really matters, I turn to Only God Forgives to show how Winding 
Refn imagines escape from this horror through Buddhist philosophy and a vision 
of the extinction of drive in the destruction of the self. Although Only God 
Forgives imagines the annihilation of the driven self from the inside, there is a 
sense in which the other side of Winding Refn’s horror show is the minor 
utopia from the previous chapter, and it is this catastrophic potential I pick up 
in the next chapter, Dis- United Kingdom. Following the current chapter I leap 
from Winding Refn’s dystopic imaginary of the global city (Los Angeles to 
Bangkok) to contemporary British politics and the abandonment of youth and, 
as a consequence, the future, which it is possible to explore through discussion 
of the August 2011 riots in London and other major British cities. The objec-
tive of this chapter is to take the problem of abandonment found in Winding 
Refn’s cinema and think about it through the political situation of contemporary 
Britain in order to show how the economics of contemporary capitalism have 
created the conditions for the re- emergence of what I want to call the encounter. 
In this context the idea of the encounter refers to the revelation of irreducible 
social relations and the problems of inequality and abandonment that destroy 
the potential of the future in conflict that necessarily emerges from the failure 
or refusal to face the ecological fact of social relations which characterises neo-
liberal political thought and practice. It is these problems that, in my view, the 
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Only God Forgives
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conflictual encounter challenges in the name of a new utopian politics where 
the neoliberal self, the possessive individual who lives through drive, gives way 
before the kind of ecological being organised around recognition and respect 
for psychological, social, and terrestrial limits set out in Winding Refn’s horror 
show and on the other side of this nightmare of the extinction of thirst, the 
minor utopia.
In his recent neo- noir films, Drive (2011) and Only God Forgives (2013), the 
Danish- American director Winding Refn has captured and distilled the dystopia 
of the contemporary city through his cinematic construction of two imaginary 
urban deserts, Los Angeles and Bangkok. While Winding Refn’s vision of the 
city is in many ways a 21st- century take on the representation of urban space 
found in the classic noir of the 1940s through to the 1960s, where his con-
struction of the space of human interaction evolves beyond what we find in 
classic noir is in the mythic or religious dimension which his films evoke. 
Both Los Angeles and Bangkok are angelic cities, places where the profane 
world of man lifts towards the meaningful universe of God and there is hope 
for the future, but what we discover in Drive and Only God Forgives are spaces 
of cosmological fatalism, apparently devoid of significance. While classic noir 
constructs similar fatal places, and the noir city is always a horrific second 
nature, the urban wilderness in Winding Refn’s films takes on mythological, 
religious, and existential import, precisely because the angelic origins of his, 
and perhaps all, cities is made clear to the viewer through a process of dia-
lectical suggestion. Of course, the Californian myth of the frontier, the gold 
rush, and ‘making it’ conditions every noirish representation of LA, the failed 
utopian city of the late 20th century, and Bangkok is possibly the other world 
city where utopian possibility, in this case the sexual utopia of desire unleashed, 
rubs up against dystopian horror, and the descent into meaningless, utterly 
profane metabolism, where identity becomes about fucking or being fucked.
In Drive the utopian possibility of LA is a kind of spectre that haunts the 
story of the main character, the anonymous Driver, and his symbolic family, 
single mother Irene and her young son Benicio, who he finally tries to save by 
leaving them a bag of dirty money. In James Sallis’ (2006) book of the same 
name the story plays out slightly differently, because Irene is killed in gang 
violence and Benicio is sent away to live with his grandparents, but Winding 
Refn’s screenplay saves both characters and leaves them to live out their lives in 
a fatherless family. In this respect, there is some sense of escape from the horror 
of the nihilistic city in Drive, but this is a debased, lonely form of salvation. In 
the case of Driver, escape means loneliness, and consolation in machines. As 
both Sallis (2006) and Winding Refn (2011) emphasise, he drives, and that’s all 
he does. At the end of the film we realise that he drives, and merges with the 
endless cycles of the engine, because he has nothing else, and no sense of human 
community. The city in Drive is, thus, a lonely, alienated space where all human 
relations are broken, if not completely destroyed.
Switching from West to East, Winding Refn’s vision of Bangkok in Only 
God Forgives (2013) is no better. Here, the mythological, cosmological 
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dimensions of the story are ramped up, and the main character, Julian, who 
oversees a trafficking operation for his dead Dad, absent Mom, and psycho 
brother, sees no exit from the cycle of drugs, prostitution, and violence that 
swallows him and his dysfunctional family. However, it’s not strictly true to 
say that Julian has no way out of his noirish predicament, because Chang, 
the demonic cop, who steps into the role of the disciplinary father in the film, 
is on hand to sort everything out. Unfortunately, what the film shows is that 
the only escape from the eternal return of suffering in desire and violence 
resides in brutal Oedipal violence. As the story evolves, Chang, who Winding 
Refn calls ‘the angel of vengeance’, takes the hands, arms, and, in one case, 
eyes of the various criminals he encounters, in order to restore karmic balance 
in the city of angelic salvation, hope, and possibility. But what kind of pos-
sibility is this? Essentially, the mythological dimensions Winding Refn constructs 
in Only God Forgives (2013), and the dystopia and consequent dark utopian 
hope he offers, are Buddhist in nature. The endless cycle of profanity, drugs, 
prostitution, fighting, and abuse are reflective of the Buddhist philosophy which 
understands existence in terms of endless suffering. We thirst, we desire, and 
we suffer. Escape is possible in Buddhist thought through enlightenment and 
the transcendence of material concerns, but what Only God Forgives shows is 
what this apparently utopian moment looks like from the perspective of the 
profane individual who lives through the cycles of drive. Of course, it does 
not look like a good place which is also a non- place, because neither self nor 
place exist in Nirvana. From the point of view of the profane individual, this 
mode of escape is no utopia, but rather hellish violence, and discipline which 
effectively destroys the self. In this respect, Winding Refn’s Bangkok is perhaps 
the classic Freudian city, the kind of space where the father of psychoanalysis 
might have written Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2003a), in light of his fatalistic 
vision of utopian escape through thanatological self- destruction.
In seeking to understand the dystopian, and perhaps dark utopian, dimen-
sions of Winding Refn’s films in this chapter, I focus on the problem of 
loneliness and the ways in which this condition is reflected in his construction 
of the urban spaces of LA and Bangkok. Reflecting upon the situation of 
Winding Refn’s main characters, Driver and Julian, within these alienated 
spaces, I want to suggest that it is possible to understand his work through 
the idea of the lost child who grows and becomes a lost man or alienated 
individual within what we might call the dystopian anti- city. At this point I 
will comment upon the remarkable performances of Winding Refn’s leading 
man, Ryan Gosling, who captures the childlike quality of the lost man who 
seems incapable of social relation. In order to trace the reasons for this situ-
ation, and set up a psychoanalysis of Winding Refn’s films, it becomes important 
to explore the histories of his lost men, and in particular look for instances 
where family relations went wrong or left the boy in a state of traumatic loss. 
In both cases Winding Refn’s works suggest moments of trauma, which leave 
his main characters without parental support and especially the firm but fair 
hand of Dad, and might explain why they struggle to orientate themselves in 
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the world. In Drive (2011) the main character, Driver, is anonymous, which 
immediately suggests his alienation, and captures the loneliness that pervades 
his life to the extent that he barely communicates with other people. While 
both Sallis’ (2006) book and Hossein Amini’s script suggest this loneliness, it 
is only in Winding Refn’s film, and Gosling’s performance, that the existential 
dimensions and the full horror of Driver’s alienation comes to the fore.
In the screenplay and the film itself there is little sense of the cause of this 
situation, and we are left with the suspicion that Driver’s failure to relate to 
others is somehow a reflection of the wider urban malaise of the dystopic LA 
he inhabits. But Sallis’ (2006) book provides a deeper insight where we learn 
that Driver comes from a destroyed family which collapsed when Mom mur-
dered Dad with a bread knife. No wonder Driver lives out his life in a state 
of post- traumatic withdrawal. Out on his own, without the support of Mom 
or Dad, Driver lacks identity and we never learn anything about him. Winding 
Refn’s film tells the story of his search for a sense of self in a new family. First, 
Driver finds a father figure in Shannon; then he discovers what he hopes will 
be his own family in the form of Irene and Benicio before Standard, the real 
husband and father, comes back on the scene. Finally, Driver finds himself 
trapped in the criminal family of Nino and Bernie Rose, who replay the original 
violence from his childhood. What follows is an orgy of violence that leaves 
more or less everybody dead and Driver on his own with only his car for 
company. While Driver projects his traumatic lack and destroyed self into the 
violence that consumes everybody in Drive, his final escape is symbolised by the 
roar of the engine that accompanies the end of the film. As Drive fades to black, 
Winding Refn opens a new front in the lost child’s struggle to find some sense 
of identity in the Thai capital of pereversion, Bangkok.
In Winding Refn’s follow- up to Drive, Only God Forgives (2013), main char-
acter Julian runs the family trafficking business with his psychotic brother, Billy. 
Mom is back in America. We later learn that Dad is six feet under and Julian 
is laying low for his murder. Although we discover that Julian killed Dad for 
Mom, which repeats the patricide of Driver but this time puts the murder on 
the son, we never learn about Dad’s crimes. However, when Mom eventually 
shows up in Bangkok, we realise that Dad must have been bad because she is 
the classic Freudian women who can’t let the men in her life have their own 
living space. She blames everything on Julian, and it’s clear he will never be his 
own man while she is on the scene. Enter Chang, the angel of vengeance, who 
fills in for the missing father, and eventually gives Julian a way out of his hope-
less situation. In Winding Refn’s original screenplay, Jenna, the tyrannical Mom, 
walks away, but in the film itself Chang kills her, before subjecting Julian to 
Oedipal discipline, in order to seal the deal and leave us in no doubt about the 
cop’s role in saving his foster son from his violent mother. The fate of Oedipus, 
and Oedipal violence, is thus the resolution of the family violence that pervades 
the film. Gosling’s depiction of Julian is, similar to his Driver, perfectly reflective 
of the character’s existential condition. He is thrown, lost, largely silent, boyish, 
and childlike. Yet his calm betrays his fatal resignation to his situation. He is 
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hopeless in every sense of the word. But where he lacks the reason of a grown-
 up is not in his perception of his situation, but rather in his inability to think 
through a possible escape route. Thus Julian’s childishness resides in the same 
lack which conditions Driver’s life. Without parental support to place him in 
the normal symbolic order where it becomes possible to relate cause to effect 
in order move into the future, Julian cannot escape from the reactive, regressive 
modes of behaviour that trap him within the cyclical orbit of drive. Under 
conditions of drive everything becomes about reaction, revenge, and equality of 
exchange— women, drugs, and violence are all subject to the logic of equivalence, 
and only God, or the angel of vengeance, forgives, and therefore offers a way 
out through a divine calculus beyond the painful profanity of economic value.
This is, I think, the precise problem of urban or post- urban space in Wind-
ing Refn’s work. On the one hand what we learn from Lewis Mumford (1968) 
is that the city is the essential utopian— indeed, human— space, which makes 
culture, language, history, and significance itself possible. For Mumford urban 
space humanises man, places him in a state of security, and opens up possibility 
beyond metabolism. Beyond the fatal cycles of nature, where life consists of 
the endless struggle to survive, man is projected into culture, where he can 
become human and sublimate his libidinal energy into the construction of 
civilization. In this respect, the city represents Oedipus, and Oedipal discipline 
in concrete form, simply because it takes man out of nature and locates him 
within the cultural sphere of language. Where Winding Refn intervenes in 
this story is in his vision of the city, which evolves beyond security and culture 
and becomes a new urban jungle. Under these conditions, which were similarly 
imagined in the late 19th- century and early 20th- century European context 
by Durkheim (1984), Marx (1988), and Simmel (1997), the hyper- rationality 
of urban culture reinvents the violence of nature within the space of the city 
itself. In this situation, the city, the original space of security, becomes a modern 
or, in Winding Refn’s (2011, 2013) case, postmodern jungle, and man enters 
a new phase where he must fight to survive in a violent, precarious form of 
civilisation. Thus, in much the same way that Marx (1988) imagined his 
proletarians, whose lives were conditioned by basic, animalistic needs, the 
characters in Winding Refn’s films live through drive. They are caught in fatal 
cycles of perfect exchange without end, where women, money, drugs, and 
violence are absolutely commensurate, and can only harbour fantasies about 
escape. While Irene and Benicio represent Driver’s fantastical escape through 
the reconstitution of family in the lonely anti- city, the fatal truth of his dream 
comes to Julian in the shape of Chang, the angel of vengeance, who takes 
his arms and casts him into the darkness of the Oedipal city, which is, ironi-
cally, a kind of gloomy utopia.
My view is, therefore, that Winding Refn’s dystopia, and what I call above 
his dark utopia, is concerned with a psychosocial story of civilization in a state 
of collapse under conditions of postmodern urban development. LA and Bangkok 
become the backdrop for his reflections simply because they capture the drama 
of the transformation of the city into a kind of postmodern anti- city— LA is, 
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of course, the space of urban dreams become nightmares for the 20th century, 
while Bangkok projects the fatal dystopia of drive, where the realisation of 
fantasy ultimately results in frustration, onto the metaphysical, religious plane of 
Buddhism. In this chapter my objective is to take two of Winding Refn’s films, 
Drive (2011) and Only God Forgives (2013), and treat them through a social and 
political psychology based upon the classic Platonic view of the interconnection 
of man and city. For Plato (1991) the truth of man, and his temper, could be 
observed in the city, which was an architectural representation of the psycho-
logical state of man. On the other hand, Plato also saw that the good city could 
produce good men who would in turn reinforce the needs of the good city 
and so on. What we find in Winding Refn’s film is, in many respects, the dys-
topic alternative to this utopian circuit, where the postmodern anti- city produces 
destroyed men who simply reinforce the negativity of the urban space they 
move through. Essentially, I think that this is the problem that both Drive (2011) 
and Only God Forgives (2013) reflect and, at the same time, resolve through a 
Freudian preoccupation with Oedipal themes.
In both Drive and Only God Forgives, Winding Refn makes use of what 
Alain Silver and James Ursini (2004) call the noir style in order to establish 
the Platonic connection between man and city. As Silver and Ursini note in 
their book on noir style, the objective of noir stylisation was to capture the 
psychological state of man in the representation of his environment. According 
to Silver and Ursini (2004), this update of Plato’s psychology of the city, which 
connects internal states to external environmental conditions, can also be found 
in the works of Edvard Munch and the German expressionists, who inspired 
the noir style in the first place. This style, which captures states of decay, 
dislocation, and alienation through the use of chiaroscuro, or light/dark, imagery, 
was first developed by the expressionists, who sought to use deep contrast and 
shadowy imagery to capture the trauma of Weimar Germany. From Silver and 
Ursini’s (2004) perspective, noir cinema employed similar stylistic devices in 
order to represent the psychosis of American society, and particularly American 
society rendered in space, in the early post- World War II period. For Kelly 
Oliver and Benigno Trigo (2002), the reason this particular period of history 
threw up noir was because it was a moment of enormous change, and perhaps 
the era that saw the shift from modern to postmodern forms of social organ-
isation. The result of this post- war period of change was, for Oliver and Trigo, 
the emergence of a diffuse or ambient form of social anxiety, centrally revolv-
ing around white male fear of others, including women and ethnics, who 
white men felt were in the process of undermining their natural social, political, 
economic, and cultural authority. According to this account, then, we might 
suggest that whereas expressionism represented the post- World War I German 
trauma related to loss and an inability to mourn, noir followed hot on its 
heels in order to capture the American anxiety about the enormous social 
changes produced by World War II. In the case of noir, Oliver and Trigo 
(2002) argue that this free- floating anxiety— because anxiety is, of course, fear 
without a clearly defined object— took the form of a fear of the femme fatale 
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and the conspiratorial foreigner who endlessly threatened the lonely hero or 
what I call in this chapter the lost child. In Oliver and Trigo’s (2002) work 
Noir Anxiety, noir is, therefore, centrally about white male America’s castration 
anxiety in the face of the emergence of postmodern society.
In his work on the urban condition in noir cinema, Edward Dimendberg 
(2004) builds upon this perspective by showing how the essence of noir resides 
in the situation of the hero thrown into the technological nightmare of the 
late modern/postmodern city which has no interest in humanity. Recalling 
Simmel’s (1997) famous work on urban alienation, which was coincidentally 
written in the Weimar era of expressionism, Dimendberg argues that noir 
imagined urban space in two ways. First, the city was a centripetal place, 
where the self was crushed by over- proximity, density, and speed, and second, 
it was also a centrifugal space, characterised by loneliness, alienation, and dis-
tance. Although the two positions appear contradictory and incommensurable, 
what Simmel’s (1997) Weimar work Metropolis and Mental Life shows is that 
the modern city was simultaneously dense, crowded, and overpopulated, and 
at the same time dispersed, lonely, and alienated, on the basis that the latter 
state represents a psychological reaction to the former condition. Consider 
Alberto Giacometti’s expressionist City Square— the square, the ancient meeting 
place of the community, is populated, but there is also a deep sense of separa-
tion and alienation about the figures, who are blank, anonymous, and have 
no relation to each other. Thus, Giacometti sought to capture the condition 
of modern urban space and show how the growth of the city, increases in 
urban density, and the mechanisation of modern life led to psychological 
withdrawal from others resulting in the kind of indifference Simmel (1997) 
talks about in terms of the blasé attitude. Here, urbanites live in a grey world 
where, precisely because of the endless newness and shocks of their environ-
ment, they remain impervious, armoured, and closed off to external stimulus. 
In a sense, then, it is precisely this stark division between self and environment, 
and the resultant loneliness and paranoia of the modern self living in a state 
of constant unease, uncertainty, and anxiety, that noir captures through its use 
of chiaroscuro style which represents the world in terms of sharp contrasts 
between light, dark, overexposed spaces, and shadowy corners.
For Simmel (1997) the contrast between the over- proximity and alienation 
of the modern city led to the emergence of the psychological condition of 
loneliness, whereby the self is simultaneously absolutely free in an environment 
that seems oblivious to its existence, and yet also imprisoned in a kind of suf-
focating anonymity that constantly throws it back upon itself. Moreover, this 
condition of loneliness also made the modern individual susceptible to psycho-
pathological forms of solipsistic introspection, thus creating the pathological 
mode of reflexivity Freud (2003b) refers to through his work on paranoid 
schizophrenia and others, such as R. D. Laing (2010) and Deleuze and Guattari 
(1983), would take up in the 1960s and 1970s. There is no doubt that this 
schizo- paranoid psychology is present in noir, which, as Silver and Ursini (2004) 
show, regularly employs the effect of the prison bar in order to capture the 
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protagonist’s fatal situation, and there is little sense that this feeling of hopeless-
ness has receded or declined in contemporary neo- noir films, including Winding 
Refn’s Drive (2011) and Only God Forgives (2013). This historical connection is 
important, because Dimendberg (2004) suggests that the end of classic noir and 
the rise of neo- noir from the 1960s onwards can be traced to a bicoastal shift 
in American urban development from East Coast verticality to West Coast 
horizontality. Put another way, Dimendberg’s argument is that the centre of noir 
shifted from New York, which had in a sense held together the bipolar opposites 
of centripetal and centrifugal space, towards Los Angeles, where the centripetal 
concern with density and over- proximity collapses before the centrifugal ten-
dency to endless extension, expansion, and resultant alienation. Under these 
conditions, Dimendberg suggests that the noir gives way to neo- noir and the 
new space of urban or perhaps post- urban horror becomes somewhereville, 
which is also anywhereville, which is also nowhereville. The central Platonic 
question would be, then, whether this shift in urban structure impacted upon 
the psychological condition of the protagonists or whether the shift from New 
York to LA, verticality to horizontality, and noir to neo- noir left the modern 
or postmodern self in the same alienated predicament.
I would suggest that this is the case and that the core psychological prob-
lematic of neo- noir remains the same as that of its classical forerunner. That 
is to say that regardless of this shift away from over- proximity towards the 
alienation and separation of sprawl, it is clear that paranoia, anxiety, and 
the fear of the other remain central to neo- noir, perhaps precisely because the 
other is now more distant, unknown, and unseen. If we consider David Lynch’s 
neo- noir LA trilogy, which spans The Lost Highway (1997), Mulholland Drive 
(2001), and Inland Empire (2006), it is clear that the psychological effect of 
sprawl of the City of Angels is simply to intensify the hopeless position of 
characters who cannot change their situation or escape from themselves pre-
cisely because their environment offers no well- defined points of orientation 
to begin to map the process of change or foundation upon which to rethink 
their identity. In this respect, we might conclude that the psychosis of Lynch’s 
cinema resides in the way in which he casts his characters into the meaning-
less spaces of LA sprawl and then confronts his audience with the same lack 
of symbolic narrative structure that faces his protagonists. Although Lynch’s 
neo- noir works knowingly make use of stylistic devices employed in noir film, 
and thus situate the viewer in a very particular world, the psychosis of his 
texts themselves— and perhaps his sprawling Inland Empire (2006) is his classic 
work of post- urban psychosis— constantly disorientate his audience. In other 
words, noir tropes remain and are recast in new form, so, for example, the 
sharp contrasts of the chiaroscuro style are replaced by what we might call 
colour consciousness, where deep red signifies madness and so on, but these 
stylistic sign posts are constantly undermined by Lynch’s endeavour to represent 
psychosis from the inside and in this respect radicalise the noir commitment 
to capture internal states in the construction of the external world. In this 
sense Winding Refn’s works are perhaps less radical than Lynch’s neo- noir 
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films, simply because they maintain narrative coherence and step back from 
the representation of post- urban psychosis, but for this very reason I think 
that it is possible to argue that they construct more coherent images of con-
temporary urban dystopia than we find in Lynch, where the urban is itself 
only really present in its negative form, a psychotic ruin of its former self.
II  Drive and Despair: On the Dystopia of Post- Urban 
Loneliness in Winding Refn’s LA
Based upon the novel of the same name by James Sallis (2006), Winding 
Refn’s (2011) Drive tells the story of the otherwise anonymous Driver, played 
by Ryan Gosling. Driver lives alone and works on Hollywood stunts. In his 
spare time he is a getaway driver for hire, hence his name, which signifies his 
complete identification with his role and the machine he drives. Upon meet-
ing crooks to organise a robbery, Driver explains his role— he drives, there is 
no more. That’s all he does. Driver’s loneliness, and in Sallis’ book we are told 
that he enjoys the anonymity of LA, is perfectly captured by Gosling, who 
radicalises the personality of the character in the novel by suggesting a kind 
of autistic withdrawal from social engagement. While the book provides 
explanation for Driver’s condition, through his memory of Mom’s murder of 
Dad, the film itself never frames his blank, mechanistic, behaviour. However, 
it is clear that Driver is compelled to tentatively seek out others, and upon 
meeting Carey Mulligan’s Irene and her young son Benicio, he seeks to form 
relationships and become a family man. Although this attempt to become a 
husband and father is thwarted when Standard, Irene’s real husband and Beni-
cio’s father, returns home from prison, Driver maintains his commitment to 
them. Against his better judgement, he helps Standard commit a robbery in 
order to buy his freedom from his previous employers and become a better 
husband and father. Unfortunately, the robbery is a setup and Standard ends 
up shot in the neck. As a result, Driver finds himself on the run with a bag 
full of dirty money, and everything unfolds from here. Driver wants to return 
the money to the gang in order to save Irene and Benicio, but ends up on a 
killing spree when they refuse to let him off the hook. After killing various 
hoods and the bosses Nino and Bernie Rose, Driver realises that there’s no 
way out of his situation and he can never see Irene and Benicio again. He 
has to disappear and live out his tragic life alone.
On the basis of its focus on urban alienation, loneliness, amorality, fatalism, 
and criminality, the story of Drive (2011) is organised around the classic themes 
of noir cinema. However, there are important differences between the book and 
Winding Refn’s film, which centrally revolve around the morality of Driver, 
who Winding Refn transforms into a kind of moral hero who fights to save 
Irene and Benicio. Sallis’ character is in a sense less driven by moral concerns 
and perhaps more focused on self- preservation. He loses Irene to gang violence, 
and Benicio is taken away to live with extended family. While this takes away 
Sallis’ character’s moral cause, Gosling’s Driver maintains his commitment to his 
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adopted family throughout and they become the only good thing in his life. 
In a sense they represent his symbol of hope, and the principle of utopian good-
ness, which he fights for in an amoral world characterised by cyclical violence 
that has only one end— the accumulation of money. In this respect, Drive (2011) 
contains a classic noirish critique of the city and, in this case, LA, which becomes 
a hellish dystopia, where the only thing that matters is circulation. From the 
first moments of the film, it is clear that Gosling’s Driver is caught inside this 
endless fatal cycle. The film begins inside a car engine and establishes Driver’s 
identification with machines on this basis. Akin to Bruno Bettelheim’s (1972) 
mechanical boy, Joey, who sought to transform himself into a robot built from 
cardboard boxes and aluminium foil in order to escape the horror of parental 
indifference, Gosling’s Driver takes cars over people every time. This is why the 
cars in the film are never simply cars, but rather imbued with personality and 
a clear sense of identity. Even though we learn that Driver’s car, the Silver Chevy 
Impala, is the most popular car in America, and will thus blend in or at least 
not stand out, the identification of the car, and focus on its identity, provides it 
with a personality within its anonymity. In this respect, the car is similar to 
Driver himself, anonymous, seeking some kind of identity. Indeed, the film 
stretches the comparison between Driver and his car through his function— ‘He 
drives, that’s all he does’— and intimate knowledge of the machine— ‘The only 
thing he knows is cars.’ Akin to the machine, which does not need to sleep, 
Driver suffers from insomnia, and never sleeps. In order to emphasise his mecha-
nisation, in the first scene of the film we see his face lit by neon, the symbol 
of the postmodern city that never sleeps and works on the basis of post- human 
rhythms.
After the film establishes Driver’s mechanisation in its first scene, Drive (2011) 
builds its story of its main character’s alienation from other people. Even when 
Gosling’s Driver seeks out others— his father figure Shannon, Irene, Benicio, 
Standard— his personal attachment ends in either their death or fear of death 
and he is left isolated, alone. In order to emphasise this point, the film ends in 
a car park and a maze of indistinct cars. Driver starts his car, the engine roars 
into life, and he drives away. The film ends. Thus the final message of Drive is 
that Driver is on his own, thrown back upon his machines, which symbolise 
his traumatic past, and endless attempts to repair himself through, first, protective 
identification with technology which holds him, and second, tentative attempts 
to establish relations with others which always crash upon the rocks of the 
postmodern urban condition that prohibits emotional connection. What this 
shows is that even though Driver drives, and is essentially in control of his 
machine, he is also driven by unconscious trauma, what Freud called the com-
pulsion to repeat, which forces him into the future to order to try to repair his 
damage. The image of the engine, which opens the film, and the sound of its 
roar which closes Driver’s story, are, therefore, symbolic of the centrality of 
psychoanalytic drive to his and every other human life. In much the same way, 
I would suggest that this symbolism also captures the essential mechanisation of 
humanity, which Freud (2003a) explained through the unconscious compulsion 
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to repeat, and appears absolutely alien to us precisely because we believe we are 
in control of ourselves. It is, of course, only in extreme cases, such as Bettelheim’s 
(1972) Joey and Gosling’s Driver, where severe trauma results in disassociation 
from self and others that the essential mechanisation of life becomes explicit 
and takes on the form of identification with the repetitious nature of machines. 
Apart from cars, Driver’s alienation from himself and others is also reflected in 
Drive’s construction of urban or post- urban space, the sprawl of LA. Although 
there are debates about the extent of sprawl in LA, and Ed Soja (2014) argues 
that the city is also characterised by high levels of density that counteract the 
effects of suburban expansion, and the American imaginary LA will always be 
the city of sprawl, anywhereville, nowhereville, and the existential void of the 
post- urban condition.
In Drive (2011), the endless horizontality of the city reflects Driver’s alien-
ation from the world in that he spends his time either chasing or being chased 
by others whom he either wants to love, destroy, or escape. In Husserl’s Ideas 
(2012), the horizon is essential for progress through life, and this futuristic, if 
not futurist, vision was taken up by Norman Bel Geddes, who was the man 
behind Futurama and the ‘City of Tomorrow’ in the late 1930s (Albrecht, 
2012). There are no people in Bel Geddes’ vision of the future, and the urban 
is a kind of mechanical organism that simply works. The car is, of course, 
central to his idea of the new world. Akin to Le Corbusier’s modernist machine 
for living, estrangement was written into Bel Geddes’ vision, simply because 
humans where nowhere to be seen. If this was the future, then it was a lonely 
place, which suggests the engineer’s view that machines were more rational, 
predictable, and clean than humans, who were the primary cause of the prob-
lems of Depression- era America. However, the problem of the seductive idea 
of a future without humans, which essentially remains the ultimate paranoid 
fantasy, is that the future is in itself impossible for the last man standing. As 
Bernd Jager (1971) explains in his paper on the lived experience of dimen-
sions, without the other who provides us with a sense of objective and sig-
nificance, the horizon becomes a symbol of infinite regress and endless 
frustration. Movement is impossible under these conditions. On my own, I 
vanish into the future without significance, direction, or landmarks. On this 
lost highway my life becomes a chase, where I am either chasing some sense 
of meaning or being chased by some other who wants to hunt me down. 
This is exactly how Driver experiences the road and movement towards the 
horizon in Drive. As Virilio (2005) explains in his Negative Horizon, the vehicle 
is essentially a machine for the organisation of speeds into the future, and this 
is precisely the role the car plays for Driver— it organises his movement, but 
it never provides him with a sense of direction which he essentially lacks 
because he has no other.
Driver’s problem is that Mom’s murder of Dad left him without a significant 
other to structure his horizon from very early on. Thus, Driver drives, but 
he never really gets anywhere, which is why the symbol of the car, and the 
engine, pretty much sums him up— they work, they move, they drive, but 
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they have no direction of their own, and require otherness to plot their course. 
This is why Driver is a lost child, a man who never really grew up because 
he was unable to resolve the problem of childhood trauma, or perhaps what 
Jager (1971) calls a delinquent, the person who never had parental guidance 
to structure his movement into the future. In Laurence Rickels’ (1991) psy-
choanalysis of California, the psychopathology of the lost child essentially 
characterises the people and culture of the Golden State. In his view, this state, 
born in the infantile fantasy of omnipotence, and the dream of ‘having it all’ 
in the 1840s, has never really grown up. Of course, Californians must be born, 
and they have parents, but Rickels’ point is that the parental function, which 
explains that we must live out a life of lack that makes us human, has never 
worked on the West Coast, primarily because the origin story of the place 
itself is that it really is the dreamworld where you can have what you want. 
For Rickels, California is, thus, a death world which, like the Donner Party, 
is set to eat itself, run by a death cult, which thinks that total consumption 
is the route to some kind of permanent, flatline state of peace and happiness. 
The essential European reader of America, Baudrillard (1988), supports this 
thesis when he notes that America is a utopia realised in the process of becom-
ing a dystopia. On the space of desire, and desire reduced to the fatal circularity 
of drive, he explains that Americans believe that dreams can come true. 
Whereas Europe is the space of tragedy, where utopian fantasy crashes upon 
the rocks of reality, the terrible truth of America is that it fails to recognise 
the irony of utopia and makes it real. Given that California, the Golden State, 
is America’s utopia, it is, therefore, no surprise that both Rickels (1991) and 
Baudrillard (1988) find the consequences of its happy nightmare here in the 
shape of what the latter calls the thanatological desert form.
Under conditions of Baudrillard’s (1988) desert form, the Californian seeks 
out peace, happiness, and endless freedom and refuses anything that looks like 
limitation, including the other, which puts a new spin on the idea of the 
frontier. On the frontier of escapism, place, which is by nature defined, limited, 
and enclosed, is abolished in favour of space, and what would become Bel 
Geddes’ fantasy of the post- human metabolic city, where one feels like the 
sole survivor. In this post- apocalyptic, post- mortem state where the limitations 
of life collapse before the furious revolutions of the technological death drive, 
Rickels (1991) explains that everybody is dying to be reborn. In other words, 
the Californian personality is organised around a new age, Western perversion 
of the Buddhist idea that one can escape oneself for the nothingness of the 
void. On the basis that this vision displays the infantile, or at least immature, 
tendency to believe in the lack of lack of kids, Rickels points out that the 
essence of the Californian is the desire for endless youth. However, since youth 
is wasted on the young, and kids are endlessly preoccupied with the freedom 
of grown- ups and never really fantasise about their own youth, he also explains 
that there is a deep sense of desperation about the Californian obsession with 
youth which comes from an unconscious recognition of the inescapable truth 
of trauma, lack, and decay. For Rickels (1991), then, the Californian mentality 
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can only be explained by shifting through the gears of what he calls Freud’s 
two systems. The first system incorporates Totem and Taboo (2001), where the 
primal father who tyrannises everybody is overthrown by his kids, who become 
a kind of friendship group that ends up being similarly tyrannical on the basis 
of peer pressure that says that it’s hip to be square.
In what Rickels (1991) calls Freud’s second system, which revolves around 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2003a), the kids feel lost because Dad is no longer 
in their lives, and start to search for some new sense of significance. This is 
where desire comes into the picture. However, the catch is that because Dad 
is dead, and the kids are living in a world where everything is possible, desire 
quickly becomes drive, and the friendship group forms around a cultural belief 
in ‘making it’, finding endless love, complete happiness, and total satisfaction. 
For Rickels (1991) the horror of California is, therefore, that it’s based upon 
a kind of infantile suicide pact, where everybody agrees that it’s time to escape 
into love, happiness, and peace which excludes others who generally fuck 
things up and cause the misery of limitation. On this basis, Rickels (1991) 
writes about California’s happy suicidal tendencies and presents a deeply 
ambivalent, noirish image of the Golden State. Following Adorno and Hork-
heimer (1997), who fled to the land of the free in the 1930s, he suggests that 
Americans, and particularly Californians, look to fill in for the lack of Dad, 
and the relation to others that Dad would make possible, through consumer-
ism and what McLuhan (2001) calls gadget love. For McLuhan, gadget love 
involves a process of self- amputation, whereby the technological environment 
becomes too much for the cyber- man, who responds by seeking escape into 
fetish objects, which mean that he no longer needs to deal with the real world. 
In Adorno and Horkheimer’s account things work slightly differently, because 
the escape into the world of things is premised on the attempt to escape the 
misery of production and the loneliness of capitalist life where everybody is 
a competitor. Under these conditions the gadget becomes the best possible 
buddy because it won’t intentionally screw you over.
Either way, in both cases the gadget becomes a perverse version of Klein’s 
(1997) transitional object, which is supposed to help kids move from Mom 
to others, but here ends up becoming a fetish object, or what Marx (1990) 
calls a commodity. This is, of course, exactly the purpose the car serves in 
Winding Refn’s Drive— it represents a totemic object for Driver, who lost his 
parents too soon, which reflects his desperate Californian freedom to drive 
into some future better than the present he currently inhabits. Since the 
American car is never simply a car, but rather a Chevy Impala or some other 
name, Driver, much like every Californian, identifies with his machine, and 
the psycho- cultural capitalist complex it represents. He lives through this 
complex. Indeed, for Rickels (1991) this structure represents the psycho- political 
challenge of LA: the struggle to live in the face of drive which pushes Cali-
fornians towards their happy demise in thanatological utopia. Moreover, reading 
Reyner Banham’s (2009) classic study of LA, The Architecture of Four Ecologies, 
it is clear how this psychopathological immersion in drive maps onto space. 
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Of course, for Banham, who explains that LA prioritises mobility over monu-
mentality and writes about the city in terms of autopia, endless roads are a 
positive invention because they capture the spirit of the frontier and the West 
in concrete form. It is only really towards the end of his account that Banham 
compares LA to the red planet from Ray Bradbury’s (2008) Martian Chronicles, 
and even then there is very little critical discussion on this dystopian spin. 
Following the work of David Nye (1996), we might conclude that Banham 
was in awe of the technological sublime and for this reason failed to see the 
problems of the urban or post- urban horizon.
Devoid of landmarks or significance, there is no real progress in LA, because 
it is a space of endless circulation, and essentially empty. In the wake of 
Baudrillard (1988), who makes the point about LA’s origins in the deserts of 
the West, perhaps the best way to understand the City of Angels is through 
Paul Virilio’s (2000) logics of disappearance and desertification in his essay 
‘Twilight of the Grounds’, which shows how high- tech speed, movement, and 
circulation eventually destroy time, space, and dimension in the emergence of 
a postmodern void. Picking up where Banham (2009) left off, perhaps 
Baudrillard’s (1988) desert form and Virilio’s (2000) logic of desertification 
represent the truth of LA the author of The Architecture of the Four Ecologies 
sought to capture through his reference to the similarity of the city to Bradbury’s 
Martian landscape. In both Baudrillard and Virilio’s work, the desert represents 
the coincidence of opposites, and thus a kind of terminal space, which we 
should understand in terms of both origins and endings. Again, in both cases 
the key to the abolition of distance is technological speed. In Virilio’s (2000) 
work speed destroys the three bodies that make up the world, namely the 
territorial body, where the environment has human significance; the social 
body, where other people matter; and the animal body, where biology is nec-
essary for movement. First, speed collapses territory because here becomes 
there without the necessary space of identification in between, second, speed 
cuts out the other who becomes an obstacle to free movement, and third, 
speed mechanises biology because the animal body tires and is too slow even 
in top condition. This is, in essence, the desert form Baudrillard (1988) writes 
about in his America, which he associates with California and LA, and which 
we find in Winding Refn’s Drive, where Driver abandons the city to pure 
movement without destination, lives out a life without others who represent 
dangerous baggage, and finally identifies completely with his car, a condition 
perfectly captured by the first and last moments that bookend the film. In this 
way perhaps it is not really science fiction to say that the final moments of the 
film, when Driver takes off into the wilderness, represent Virilio’s (1999) last 
vehicle from his book Polar Inertia that concerns the high- speed collapse of 
time and space into the void Baudrillard calls the desert form.
While the concept of the desert is in many respects the dominant idea in 
critical writings on LA, such as those of Soja (2011) and Dear (2001), who 
emphasise the decentralisation of the city relative to the classic American 
modern city of Chicago, there is also a sense in which the theme of 
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postmodern disorientation and displacement, which Jameson (1991) roots in 
Bunker Hill, connects to the other central problem of LA urbanism, asociality, 
or, worse, hyper- division. On the basis of the problem of spatial dislocation 
and the consequent condition of homelessness, the Durkheimian (1984) idea 
of the collective conscience collapses, and LA becomes a space of suspicion, 
violence, and crime, which is precisely the kind of environment which Wind-
ing Refn evokes in Drive (2011). Of course, this noirish view of LA as a space 
of violence and criminality is supported by both Mike Davis (2006) and 
Norman Klein (2008) in their respective histories of the city. Against Banham’s 
(2009) utopian image of autopia, Davis (2006) builds upon Peter Plagens’ 
(1972) theory of the ecology of evil and suggests that LA is, much like Rickels’ 
(1991) sunshine state, an infantile fantasy. For Davis the City of Angels is a 
commodity, sold to people like any other commodity, which offers people 
escape from their insecurities. Thus LA offers the fantasy of the perfect sunny 
lifestyle— the perfect body, which we can make in cosmetic surgery; perfect 
sex, which we can find in the hardcore porn of the San Fernando Valley; and 
perfect spirituality, which we can discover in the positive psychology of the 
city and its culture. However, for Davis the problem with this vision is that 
it is essentially a mythology, comparable to the Californian fantasy Rickels’ 
explores, and the reality of the LA drive to ‘make it’ is that it burnt out long 
ago and became an empty promise of utopia. As Wim De Wit and Chris-
topher Alexander (2013) explain in their history of LA utopianism, the problem 
with drive is that it can easily become overdrive, and overheat, destroying the 
engine of progress itself.
Although De Wit and Alexander (2013) take up the metaphor of the engine 
in their discussion of the futurism of LA, there is no sense in which they 
recognise the psychoanalytic dimensions of the concept of drive, which Freud 
(2003a) unpacks in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. However, consideration of 
their history of utopian disappointment in light of Winding Refn’s story of 
Driver’s endless search for escape from loneliness suggests the moment when 
drive, and the attempt to obtain utopian closure, becomes overdrive, and col-
lapses into the kind of obsessive mechanisation which works without belief 
or illusion. In psychoanalysis, of course, there is no concept of overdrive, 
because there is nothing beyond drive itself but the moment of thanatological 
burnout and destruction. However, perhaps what De Wit and Alexander’s 
(2013) idea of overdrive captures is the moment when the utopian belief of 
desire folds into the obsessive repetition of drive itself where there is no belief 
in fulfilment, but only desperate, empty mechanisation. This idea is, I think, 
central to the histories of both Klein (2008) and Davis (2006). Beyond the 
utopianism of the booster myth, Davis, in particular, finds a dystopia of gutted 
urbanism and social division. Akin to Soja (2011) and Dear (2001), Davis’ LA 
is a city which has been destroyed by the shift from industry to post- industry 
which left the poor, mainly black, working classes largely redundant. For Davis, 
the narcotics industry grew up in this vacuum and became the employer for 
black working- class men. The result of this was not to solve the problem of 
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alienation, but to contribute to the creation of a postmodern neo- noir ecology 
of fear, which Davis says hangs over LA like thick smog.
In Davis’ (1999) book on the anxiety and paranoia of LA, the ecology of 
fear represents a sense of impending doom, which links to the environmental 
situation of the city that makes it susceptible to wildfires, droughts, and earth-
quakes, but also captures the horror of otherness that pervades the city. In the 
second half of the book, Davis tracks the history of LA fear in fiction, and 
refers to the noir tradition, including LA Confidential (1997), as well as sci- fi 
films such as Independence Day (1996), where LA becomes the centre of a 
hostile alien takeover of the entire world. It is, of course, easy to update Davis’ 
story and refer to more recent films such as Battle: Los Angeles (2011), which 
replaces Islamic radicals with alien invaders and projects the urban war in Iraq 
onto the streets of LA, and The Purge (2013), where criminality and the urban 
war of all against all is legalised for one night only and ends up spilling out 
into the suburbs and coming home to of all people a security expert and his 
family. Winding Refn’s Drive (2011) is part of this tradition, and it employs 
the motifs of division, violence, and low- intensity war, which Battle: Los Angeles 
and The Purge focus upon, in order to create the backdrop for the loneliness 
of Driver, who realises it’s better to keep himself to himself. While there is 
no war between aliens and others or desperate middle- class homeowners 
fighting to survive in Drive, its neo- noirish world is premised on a vision of 
the essential corruption of the social body, where even criminals rip each other 
off at every turn. Davis (2006) picks up this idea in his history of LA, City 
of Quartz, and especially in his chapter on the fortification of the city. Against 
the alienation, and subsequent suspicion of others, that characterises LA, Davis 
argues that the city has become obsessed with defence and fortification. Writ-
ing in the late 1980s when the walls between East and West were in the 
process of collapsing in Europe, Davis points out that walls were being built 
across LA. He explains that this is the built expression of sadistic space, or 
space organised around cruelty and power, and refers his reader to the build-
ings of Frank Gehry to support his theory of military urbanism. In this context, 
Gehry’s Danziger Studio becomes a dumb box, a kind of oversized panic room, 
while the Frances Howard Goldwyn Library represents the architectural equiva-
lent of a .44 Magnum.
In his focus on the destruction of public space through the creation of a 
military architecture of division and defence, Davis’ (2006) work captures the 
noirish ambience of Winding Refn’s Drive where everybody is on their own 
and trust is a utopian concept in short supply. However, whereas Davis provides 
a political vision of the post- urban condition of LA by suggesting that the 
city is divided between police and gangs, Winding Refn’s film is unusual 
because of its more or less total lack of police. Following the first scene, where 
Driver outruns the LAPD in order to demonstrate his prowess behind the 
wheel, the film focuses on his relationships with his potential family and 
criminals. While Davis’ (2006) focus in City of Quartz is the problem of 
sovereignty, or, in the language of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the way the 
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lords of social order, Mitra and Varuna, structure the anomic spaces of the 
city, Drive assumes that there is no structure and that corruption is more or 
less total. This is not entirely surprising, since, as Davis (2006) notes, one of 
the core political functions of the LAPD in the neoliberal period of the 1980s 
has been to criminalise the poor, black youth, and welfare moms and transform 
these people into outlaws. Given Driver’s homelessness, it is no surprise that 
the story of this orphan revolves around his relationships with other lost souls 
and criminals, and that the police who organise social structure barely feature, 
precisely because there is a sense in which the firm but fair Oedipal power 
of the police is precisely what has been withdrawn from the streets of the 
city, leaving it to become a kind of urban or post- urban jungle in the neo-
liberal period. Left to his own devices, then, Winding Refn’s Driver lives 
somewhere inside Davis’ (2006) dialectic of noir and sunshine. Drive itself 
trades on the desperate allure of LA, of the dream gone sour, but Driver 
himself occupies the psychotic space of the social without authority, devoid 
of organisation. Driver’s LA is thus Baudrillard’s (1988) nocturnal inferno, 
which the French critic compared to a postmodern version of a picture by 
the Dutch painter Hieronymus Bosch, where the luminosity of neon takes 
over from the natural light of the sun, and human relations collapse before 
the dumb horror of mechanisation without reason. This is neo- noir LA, the 
anti- city which will become the post- urban dystopia of Ridley Scott’s (1982) 
Blade Runner, where traffic is a kind of living thing and there is no escape 
from the drive to reach the other and the despair of homelessness.
III  ‘Wanna Fight’: Oedipus Comes to Bangkok in 
Winding Refn’s Only God Forgives
In his Only God Forgives (2013), Winding Refn extends his exploration of the 
lost child in post- urban dystopia, shifting the setting of his story from LA to 
Bangkok and introducing the figure of the law in order to show how the 
alienated man can find his place in the social order. In Only God Forgives, the 
lost child— again played by Ryan Gosling, with the same sense of estrangement 
with which he developed Drive’s main character— inhabits the endless city of 
Bangkok and struggles to find his place in the world. Akin to Drive’s noirish 
LA, there is no real social structure in Winding Refn’s Bangkok, and what 
order exists is organised around perversity. Centrally, the economy governs 
social relations, but this is not the official economy of normal buying and 
selling, but rather the shadow economy of women, drugs, and gambling, which 
is overseen and governed by deadly violence. In shifting the scene of his story 
from LA to Bangkok, Winding Refn alienates his viewer from the traditional 
noir setting of LA to the site of what we might call Bangkok noir and sug-
gests a form of urbanism which resembles the kind of city that might emerge 
at the end of Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents (2010). Written towards 
the end of his life in the late 1920s, Civilization and Its Discontents represents 
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2003a) lifted towards sociological 
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speculation. In other words, Freud sought to imagine what would happen if 
men who live through the compulsion to repeat, drive, and the desire for 
self- destruction were suddenly thrown into society. The answer is they would 
annihilate themselves and— via the mechanism of projection which shifts the 
desire for self- destruction onto the urge to destroy the other— each other. On 
the basis of this insight, Freud reached the conclusion that society was essen-
tially a defence mechanism against violence and that the various social rules 
and so on that humans live by are essential to the preservation of life. The 
catch is, of course, that these endless rules make humans miserable because 
they limit their ability to get what they really want— self- destruction. Hence, 
for Freud, civilisation, and society itself, must be miserable. However, the 
problem with this situation, and with keeping society miserable, is that it relies 
on misers who prohibit sex, violence, and basically whatever it is the kids 
want to do. The patriarch is, thus, essential to Freud’s system. But we know 
what happened to him.
In this way it is possible to say that we might extend Rickels’ (1991) theory 
of Freud’s two systems by suggesting a third moment. Beyond Totem and Taboo 
(2001), where the kids kill Dad, and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2003a), where 
the kids seek out eternal peace in thanatology, we can introduce Civilization 
and Its Discontents (2010), where Freud desperately searches for Dad and tells 
the kids to wait until their father comes home. The problem for Freud was 
that there were no suitable fathers in, of all places, the home of modern 
European civilisation, Germany, and the site of expressionism spiralled into 
psychosis. In the wake of Weimar, Hitler came onto the scene, a kind of 
perverse father, who was full of childish resentment about the hurt he felt 
about his own early years, and the 1930s saw the rise of a new kind of society 
organised around the normalisation of criminality. While the Nazi version of 
this criminal society was essentially austere and stripped back to bare metal 
in its commitment to the mechanisation of sadistic violence, the later American 
version of this fatherless, thanatological society found and normalised the 
escape from pain in consumerism, rock ’n’ roll, and the pleasures of the flesh. 
Unlike the Nazis, who sought to hang onto a kind of Lutheran austerity, 
inadvertently sexualising the movement in BDSM gear, the post- Freudian 
Americans made no bones about their commitment to escapism through the 
body. As Robert Merton (1938) would explain in the 1930s, the rules of 
American society were there to be bent and everybody was in on this game. 
For Merton, the success theme, ‘making it’, was everything in America, to the 
extent that if you could not make it by fair means, people would look to 
make it by playing dirty. What is noir if it is not the cinematic representation 
and critique of Merton’s anomic America? In Only God Forgives (2013), Wind-
ing Refn takes this Freudian vision of society balanced on the edge of civilisa-
tion, and the economy of women, drugs, and violence that makes the world 
turn, and explores its borderline situation through the figure of Julian, Gosling’s 
lost child who is caught between fatherless psychosis and determination by 
the law of the surrogate father. The additional dimension here, and what really 
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makes the dystopian imagery of Only God Forgives special, is the introduction 
of a Buddhist vision of the world, which reframes the psychoanalytic notion 
of drive in terms of the Buddhist cycle of the eternal return of the same, and 
thus interprets the noirish urban prison through a theory of the misery of 
existence or cosmological fate, which the protagonists can only escape through 
transcendence of the body and its thirsts.
Regarding the plot of Winding Refn’s film, Only God Forgives (2013) tells 
the story of Julian, who is the second of two ex- pat American brothers living 
in Bangkok. The brothers run a small- time criminal operation, trafficking 
drugs and running fighters on the Thai boxing circuit. From the very start 
Julian is more or less mute, lost in himself, a picture of existential homeless-
ness. By contrast the elder brother Billy, who does not last very long, is a 
psychopath, and we are led to the conclusion that part of Julian’s job is to 
look after his wayward brother. In the beginning Mom and Dad are absent, 
but we later learn that Dad was a nasty piece of work who was murdered by 
Julian in defence of Mom. As the film develops we see that Julian is stuck 
in the Oedipus complex— isn’t everybody?— and can’t escape the gravitational 
pull of his mother, who treats him like a chump and idolises his psycho 
brother. Julian is very much Avital Ronell’s (2012) loser son, and he can’t 
form proper relationships. He tries to relate to Mai, a Thai working girl, but 
he’s emotionally locked in, and she can’t reach him because Mom is always 
in the way. In the face of this treatment, Julian has nowhere to go and he 
knows it, until Chang, the ultra- violent cop and stand- in father figure, arrives 
on the scene. Chang is Winding Refn’s symbol of the paternal law, where the 
law refers to more than bureaucratic rules and captures Dad’s role of the 
communication of moral regulation and moral authority, and his task is to 
put Julian in his place. But apart from being a psychoanalytic symbol, Chang 
is also a Buddhist figure, who imposes karmic order upon the world and gives 
Julian a way out of his life of crime through the discipline of drive and the 
abandonment of his self. Unfortunately for Julian— and this is the additional 
dystopian aspect of Only God Forgives (2013)— the escape from drive which 
Chang offers is not exactly painless, and perfectly captures the horror of 
Oedipal discipline and Buddhist annihilation. This is gonna hurt.
In the end Julian finds some kind of inner peace, Nirvana, which Freud 
(2003a) linked to self- destruction in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, but he is not 
the man he was before his confrontation with Chang. Before Julian meets 
Chang, the story winds up a situation where the exchange of violence for 
violence makes sense. The first brother, Billy, runs amok in a brothel and kills 
a prostitute. The police arrive to find Billy covered in blood with the dead 
girl. Chang calls the dead girl’s father and leaves him with Billy so that he 
can exact his revenge. The girl’s father beats Billy to death, but then Chang 
asks him how he allowed this to happen in the first place. Why was his 
daughter a working girl? The girl’s father realises his mistake, and tells him 
he won’t forget, but Chang imposes Oedipal discipline to be on the safe side. 
Chang tells him he knows he will remember and then cuts off his arm below 
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the elbow with a sword which is not exactly police issue, but rather a symbol 
of phallic power. Following his murder, Billy’s mom, Jenna, arrives looking 
for answers. Who did this? She is the picture of the sadistic mother, possessed 
by the female Oedipus complex that makes her want to crush everybody in 
sight, and she leaves Julian in no doubt that he’s to blame for her favourite 
son’s death. When she eventually works out that Chang was to blame, she 
puts a hit out on him, which ends badly for the assassins. Now Chang wants 
to know who hired the potential killers. In a key scene, Chang tracks down 
the handler of the hitmen and violently murders him with metal skewers. 
Chang is getting closer to Julian and Jenna. When he finally meets Julian, 
Julian tells him he loves violence, and we know that what he really loves is 
the endless cycle of misery. He can’t escape. He asks Chang if he wants to 
fight— perhaps the key line of the film is ‘Wanna fight?’— to which Chang 
agrees, and the Oedipal struggle between surrogate father and son ensues.
In Winding Refn’s screenplay the fight takes place in a more or less formal 
boxing venue with a crowd and so on, but the film strips the scene back, so 
that its symbolic dimension is absolutely clear. In the film there is no crowd 
to witness the Oedipal struggle, and the fight itself is highly stylised. It takes 
place against the backdrop of the image of the dragon, which symbolises 
eternal recurrence, primordial origins, and the mother who swallows. However, 
from Eliot Smith’s (2008) study of dragon mythology we learn Eastern cultures 
take a less one- sided view of the original aquatic monster. According to Eliot 
Smith, the Eastern dragon is not only a symbol of Mom, but also a sign of 
sovereignty, authority, and Dad’s rule. Thus it is possible to say that the key 
fight scene represents a custody battle over little Julian. Although Julian is in 
the ring with Dad, this is really about a struggle between Mom and Dad over 
the boy’s soul. Is he going to be swallowed up by Mom or is his new Dad 
going to subject him to Oedipal regulation? As it turns out, Chang wipes the 
floor with Julian. In the screenplay Julian lands a couple of shots on Chang, 
but the film is more decisive and Chang’s superiority is absolute. Following 
the screenplay, the film perfectly captures the ceremonial aspect of the fight, 
which suggests that this Oedipal struggle revolves around Julian’s initiation 
into a more enlightened situation rather than any real contest, because there 
is no real sense that Julian is ever likely to beat Chang. Indeed, we are left 
with the conclusion that the fight between Chang and Julian is always a 
mismatch between a man and a boy who really wants to be shown the way, 
regardless of his superficial protests. However, Julian’s problem is that he’s still 
under the thumb of his mom, Jenna, and so he seeks out Chang’s family. He 
needs revenge. As a result he kills Chang’s wife, but leaves his daughter to 
live out her life without her mother. At the same time, Chang confronts and 
kills Jenna, and we realise that Julian’s murder of Chang’s wife was in effect 
symbolic of his desire to kill his own mom.
Finally, the two men, surrogate father and adopted son, meet and Chang 
imposes Oedipal discipline upon Julian. The symbol of the sword returns and 
Chang takes both Julian’s arms— again, below the elbow. This act symbolises 
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Julian’s psychoanalytic castration and his recognition of the phallic power of 
the moral law. The arm is important because throughout the film the image 
of Julian’s forearm and the clenched fist represented his commitment to vio-
lence, struggle, and infantile omnipotence. You can’t tell me what to do! Chang 
frees Julian from this need to fight and the economy of violence which had 
characterised his life in Bangkok. Beyond the psychoanalytic dimensions of 
Chang’s violence, which symbolise castration and the imposition of the paternal 
law, there is also a sense in which his actions must be understood in terms of 
their Buddhist and Thai context. Chang imposes Buddhist karmic order upon 
Julian and in a sense breaks the cycle of violence which he had previously 
lived through. In this respect Chang sends Julian to Nirvana, which was a 
concept the father of psychoanalysis knew, recognised, and, of course, explored 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2003a), even though the central principle of 
Buddhism is essentially that one must find one’s own way. The qualification 
to this is, of course, that the concept of Thai kinship is centrally concerned 
with the statist defence of Buddhism, and therefore the relationship between 
Buddhist thought and authority is more complex and the two cannot be 
simply separated out. In a sense Chang represent the Buddhist sovereign, or 
the Vedic god complex Georges Dumezil (1990) explores in his Mitra- Varuna, 
where Mitra represents normal social order, and Varuna the terrible sovereign 
who steps in to bind outlaws to the system of rules and regulations when 
they step out of line. In Only God Forgives this process of binding takes place 
through the separation of Julian from his infantile commitment to omnipo-
tence and the drive towards death which had already taken Billy. It is, thus, 
important that Chang does not execute Julian, but rather forgives him, saves 
him, through extreme violence, because death itself is no guarantee of Nirvana, 
since one will continue to return if karmic balance is not in place. In this 
way we might say that Chang saves Julian from Freud’s self- destructive Nir-
vana complex, so that he might show him the true light of peace, balance, 
and a life without thirst.
In much the same way that LA is central to the storyline of Drive (2011), 
in that it provides the perfect backdrop for Driver’s homelessness, Bangkok is 
key to the narrative of Only God Forgives (2013), because it captures the hellish 
cycle of drive and Buddhist existence which defines Julian’s life. While Chang 
represents the Buddhist way of escape from this cycle, the criminal city that 
Chang polices represents the space of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) war 
machine which exceeds state order and organisation. As Deleuze and Guattari 
explain in their follow- up to Anti- Oedipus (1983), A Thousand Plateaus (1987), 
the Vedic Mitra- Varuna god complex relies on the warrior god Indra to wage 
war on its others, but the problem with Indra is that it is itself endlessly 
transgressive and problematic for those who seek to maintain order and stabil-
ity. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987) the objective of Mitra- Varuna is to 
establish defined space, or place, and impose rules and regulations, whereas 
Indra, the god of the war machine, is nomadic, and moves across frontiers and 
boundaries. Indra is, thus, the god of the transgressive, the outlaw, the criminal 
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gang, and kids who will not listen, and he moves through the smooth, unregu-
lated spaces— the river, the open road, the desert, the oceanic space. It is this 
struggle between the forces of Mitra- Varuna, which we can associate with 
Freud’s Oedipus, and Indra, which refers to infantile rebellion but also outlaws 
of every kind, that defines Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) Anti- Oedipal project 
of the late 1960s/early 1970s and characterises Winding Refn’s image of 
contemporary Bangkok.
In Only God Forgives (2013), Bangkok is a city of transgression, but centrally 
a city where transgression has become normal, and the law appears on the 
periphery in order to try to restore some kind of order. This city of vice, this 
city of horror, is a dystopian representation of Julian’s psychology turned inside 
out, or conversely Julian represents the human embodiment of this evil city 
which Chang seeks to clean up. These are the key coordinates of Winding 
Refn’s psychoanalytic/Buddhist utopia/dystopia. However, Only God Forgives is 
more than simply narrative, and neo- noir style is central to the power and impact 
of the film. The central function of the style of the film is to throw its viewer 
into the nightmarish city, which is comparable to the inferno of LA in Drive 
in the way it presents its protagonists with a Sartrean (1989) situation from 
which there is no exit. The use of colour to capture the mood of the city, 
which in turn reflects the mood of the key protagonists, compares to the colours 
of Chris Coles’ (2011) images in his collection Bangkok Noir, where the City 
of Angels becomes a city of demons and infernal drives that have no end. Akin 
to Coles’ representations of Bangkok and its inhabitants, Winding Refn’s city is 
inspired by expressionist imagery. This is black hole urbanism, where the city 
is a kind of vortex, organised around a nihilistic economy, and lit by neon glow 
which advertises hopelessness, despair, and disappearance into Freud’s (2003a) 
thanatological nowhere. In this respect Only God Forgives conjures feelings of 
madness, passion, frenzy, and despair through its use of colour, and particularly 
deep reds and purples, which transforms Bangkok into the cinematic equivalent 
of Mark Rothko’s nightmarish Red pictures.
The Buddhist frame of the film only deepens this sinister effect. While the 
absolute profanity of this dystopia, where people are meat and everybody is 
for sale, would be bad enough, the sacred symbolism of the city creates a scene 
where despair is existential and cosmological in nature. The irony of Winding 
Refn’s Bangkok is, therefore, that this most materialistic of cities, where people 
live through corporeal sensation, also takes on existential, cosmological signifi-
cance and confronts its viewer with not simply the hopeless, desperate dystopian 
now, but also meaninglessness and nihilism of existence itself. Although Julian 
is a small- time drug trafficker, and Chang is a middle- rank cop, their con-
frontation thus takes on enormous significance. This is not simply noir, but 
rather the eternal struggle between freedom and fate played out against the 
backdrop of the urban inferno. According to Barry Bell’s (2003) exploration 
of the symbolism of Bangkok, it is possible to argue that this eternal conflict 
between the human transcendence of metabolism and the mute violence of 
nature which Winding Refn captures is written into the very fabric of the 
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city itself. Indeed, when we read Mumford’s (1968) classic City in History we 
are led to conclude that the battle between humanity and nature is written 
into the form of every city, and in this respect the Bangkok of Only God 
Forgives is no different. Akin to the modern European cities of Simmel (1997), 
Benjamin (1999), and Tonnies (2010), and Winding Refn’s LA, the picture of 
Bangkok that Bell paints is that of a chaotic, formless city on the edge of 
collapse. He contrasts the speed of movement through Bangkok’s urban space 
with its grinding traffic and the brutal materialism of the city’s sex industry 
with its religiosity which suggests salvation from the violence of nature. For 
Bell (2003), Bangkok’s lack of form, its lack of order, its profanity, which we 
find expressed most perfectly in the sex precincts of Patpong and Pattaya, is 
always in conflict with its Buddhist identity and the sacred Wats, such as Wat 
Pho, which capture potential salvation and escape from this earthly life through 
the symbol of the mandala. While LA expresses this division between the 
profane and sacred through the way the city seeks to raise itself above nature 
which in turns invades its urban spaces in the form of the post- urban desert, 
Bell (2003) explains that Bangkok’s perilous position somewhere between 
transcendent space and materialist void is defined by its aquatic nature: built 
upon water, the water culture of the city captures the endless, and tragic, 
struggle of humanity to impose order and form upon the disorder and form-
lessness of nature. This is the despair, but also hope, of Bangkok.
The waters of Bangkok have special significance. As Mircea Eliade (1959, 
1991) notes, water symbolises human origins and the primordial void which 
saw the creation of the world itself. In this way the watery nature of Bangkok 
captures the moment of divine creation, which gave birth to both city and 
humanity, and suggests the fatality of this endeavour, which is endlessly threat-
ened by the void of nature. On the basis of this interpretation we can see 
why Bangkok’s urban waters produce an ambivalent effect. On the one hand, 
the city’s water is endlessly reflective, a pure surface, which suggests that there 
is no more, and nothing beyond the profanity of the material, but on the other 
hand, they conjure the image, and idea, of abyssal depths, and infinite signifi-
cance. Ironically, the illusion of the abyss creates the tendency to imagine 
transcendence and escape from base materialism. In other words, there is some 
hope in this hopelessness. In Bell’s (2003) view, this sums up Bangkok, a liquid 
city organised around a deeply religious mode of thought, Buddhism, which 
imagines infinite peace in the return to the nothingness of cosmological origin. 
While the void threatens, and looms over the human city, the Buddhist world-
view suggests the embrace of disappearance and the final, once and for all, 
escape from the endless cycles of creation, decay, destruction, and recreation. 
Thus Bell’s Bangkok becomes a thanatological city, organised around Freud’s 
(2003a) death drive, and the pursuit of Nirvana, even though this precludes 
suicide or violent self- destruction, which would simply result in eternal return 
and more misery.
Centrally, I would suggest that Winding Refn’s (2013) film captures the mytho-
logical dimensions of Bangkok and employs them to represent its protagonist’s 
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psychological conditions. In this way Winding Refn follows the classic noir tradi-
tion, where urban space becomes a screen upon which to project internal psy-
chological states. However, it is also possible to suggest that his representations 
of Bangkok also show how individual psychology is never simply a matter of 
material or biological conditions, but rather an effect of culture, so that individual 
psychopathology can be understood in terms of deeper, spiritual concerns and 
problems. Writing in the wake of the work of Carl Jung, the philosopher of 
religion Mircea Eliade (1991) makes this point when he suggests that Freud’s 
symbolism of mother, and consequent concern with Oedipus, should not simply 
be understood in terms of the desire for the mother herself, but rather linked 
up to the wider cultural significance of maternity, which symbolises creation, 
emergence, and birth, and also the terrifying escape from trauma, pain, and suf-
fering into peace, pleasure, and the flat line of non- existence. Although I would 
suggest that this symbolic understanding of the figure of the mother, and psy-
choanalysis itself, was always present in Freud, and that he was never simply a 
materialist, I would support Eliade’s view of the importance of symbolic psychol-
ogy, and argue that the power of Only God Forgives resides in the way in which 
Winding Refn captures this symbolic dimension, where Mom represents the 
terrible centre of the universe and possible escape from the karmic cycles of the 
city which is the principle site of Julian’s pain and suffering. However, it’s 
important to think about both Mom and Dad here. Where Jenna represents one 
mode of escape for Julian, which essentially entails the profane destruction of his 
self which goes nowhere, Chang symbolises an alternative, sacred way out of his 
situation, which reframes everything in terms of annihilation in Nirvana. Where 
Jenna is a sign of flow, the waters of annihilation, the primordial dragon, and the 
Freudian (2003a) nightmare of the Nirvana principle, I would suggest that sur-
rogate father Chang reflects the Great Vehicle of Buddhism and the possibility 
of the end of desire, drive, and thirst in the peace of immobility, disappearance, 
and Nirvana. Centrally, where Jenna offers no deeper significance, what Julian 
finds in Dad’s story is some reason for his pain. There is something else.
In this respect Only God Forgives (2013) turns on Julian’s forced choice between 
two parents, Mom or Dad, and two deaths, the bad death of the eternal return 
and endless revenge or the good death of the final escape from the karmic cycle 
of misery, pain, and suffering into the peaceful nothingness of Nirvana. Of 
course, Julian chose Mom in the past, and did away with his own Dad, but 
following the logic of Buddhist thought he has to choose all over again, but 
this time in the capital of pereversion and Buddha. Caught between a rock and 
a hard place, because both alternatives entail extinction, Julian eventually realises 
Chang represents the only way out. Only God forgives. In the world of Mom, 
where he can never be his own man, corruption is essential. Here, sex, drugs, 
and violence are everything, and nothing transcends material value. Ironically, 
the city, which is meant to bring people together, is absolutely divided, because 
it is a city of drive, where you take what you want now. Men and women are 
worlds apart and only come together through the medium of money. In the 
words of Lacan (2000), there is no sexual relation, since commodified sex is 
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simply masturbation with a live partner who is no more than the kind of fleshy 
commodity Benjamin (1999) found in 19th- century Paris. This much is evident 
through older brother Billy’s psychotic murder of the prostitute, whose life is 
meaningless, and Julian’s own tragic efforts to relate to women, including Mai, 
whom he cannot reach because he cannot see beyond their base materialism— 
her debased objectivity. Of course, when Julian desperately tries to show Mom 
that his relationship with Mai is serious, Mom scoffs, and immediately puts the 
girlfriend back in her place. She’s a whore, a commodity, and she can be fucked, 
but not taken seriously like a real person. In Jenna’s eyes, the very fact that 
Julian wanted to relate to Mai is evidence of his weakness, his inability to take 
the world for what it is, a cruel economy of more or less valuable things. He 
needs to internalise the reality principle of postmodern Bangkok.
But what a hellish reality principle. Surrogate father Chang captures the 
problem of Bangkok in one of several scenes where he sings karaoke Johnny 
Cash:
I fell into a burning ring of fire,
I went down, down, down,
And the flames went higher
And it burns, burns, burns,
The ring of fire, the ring of fire.
Against the burn of the inferno, Chang also offers Julian escape from the hor-
rors of the ring of the fire through Oedipal castration which the film also codes 
in terms of the Buddhist extinction of thirst. In the final scene where Chang 
takes Julian’s arms, the cop asks about his very first memory. Julian responds 
that he remembers the darkness, nothingness, and the void, presumably of life 
in utero. Following his revelation of this memory, which is symbolic of life lived 
with Mom, Chang takes Julian back to the darkness through the Oedipal cut, 
which is also the symbol of Buddhist salvation, and the film fades to black. In 
this respect Chang, the angel of vengeance, is representative of what we might 
call the paternal, Buddhist, death drive for the City of Angels, which is also the 
city of the maternal, Freudian, death drive where revenge never ends. The 
essential message of Winding Refn’s Only God Forgives (2013) is, therefore, that 
the male child, lost in the maelstrom of the post- urban condition, must submit 
to the pain of an alternative form of Oedipal discipline in order to save his soul. 
While Drive leaves Driver lost, back on the road, Only God Forgives (2013) saves 
Julian through an Eastern mode of Oedipal discipline, which is also the Bud-
dhist destruction of drive or thirst in Nirvana. Centrally, both Drive and Only 
God Forgives revolve around the situation of lost men in what we might call 
fatherless dystopias. Whereas in Drive (2011) the key female character, Carey 
Mulligan’s Irene, ultimately fails to save Driver, the same can be said for Mai in 
Only God Forgives (2013). However, Mai’s role in Julian’s life is largely incidental 
compared to the presence of Jenna, his demonic mother who embodies the 
horror of the post- urban, psychotic condition Winding Refn represents in both 
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films. Against Jenna’s maternal dystopia, Chang steps in to offer Julian an escape 
route into a perhaps no less terrible phallocentric utopia of Oedipal power. This 
is, essentially, Winding Refn’s dark utopia for the 21st century, which sets up 
the stark choice between Mom and Dad that faces the lost child, only to resolve 
his psychotic freedom in a terrible utopia of immersion in the whole, which 
may very well look like some kind of perfect state from the perspective of the 
man who has left his self behind, but remains a scary prospect for somebody 
caught under the spell of trauma, desire, and drive.
Filmography
Battle: Los Angeles, 2011, Jonathan Liebesman, Sony.
Blade Runner, 1982, Ridley Scott, Columbia- EMI- Warner.
Drive, 2011, Nicolas Winding Refn, Icon.
Independence Day, 1996, Roland Emmerich, 20th Century Fox.
Inland Empire, 2006, David Lynch, Optimum.
L.A. Confidential, 1997, Curtis Hanson, Warner Brothers.
Lost Highway, 1997, David Lynch, Polygram.
Mulholland Drive, 2001, David Lynch, Universal.
Only God Forgives, 2013, Nicolas Winding Refn, Icon.
The Purge, 2013, James DeMonaco, Universal.
Bibliography
Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. (1997) Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: Verso.
Albrecht, D. (2012) Norman Bel Geddes Designs America: I Have Seen the Future. New York: 
Abrams.
Banham, R. (2009) Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press.
Baudrillard, J. (1988) America. London: Verso.
Bell, B. (2003) Bangkok: Angelic Illusions. London: Reaktion.
Benjamin, W. (1999) The Arcades Project. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bettelheim, B. (1972) The Empty Fortress: Infantile Autism and the Birth of the Self: Infantile 
Autism and the Birth of the Self. New York: The Free Press.
Bradbury, R. (2008) The Martian Chronicles. London: Flamingo.
Coles, C. (2011) Navigating the Bangkok Noir. New York: Marshall Cavendish.
Davis, M. (1999) Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster. London: Vintage.
Davis, M. (2006) City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. London: Verso.
Dear, M. (2001) The Postmodern Urban Condition. Oxford: Blackwell.
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1983) Anti- Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Volume I. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1987) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Volume 
II. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
De Wit, W. and Alexander, C. (2013) Overdrive: L.A. Constructs the Future 1940–1990. Los 
Angeles, CA: Getty.
Dimendberg, E. (2004) Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Dumezil, G. (1990) Mitra- Varuna: An Essay on Two Indo- European Representations of Sovereignty. 
New York: Zone.
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   196 10-12-2016   8:17:43 PM
The Lost Child of the Dystopian City 197
Durkheim, E. (1984) The Division of Labour in Society. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Eliade, M. (1959) The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. London: Harcourt.
Eliade, M. (1991) Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Freud, S. (2001) Totem and Taboo. London: Routledge.
Freud, S. (2003a) Beyond the Pleasure Principle: And Other Writings. London: Penguin.
Freud, S. (2003b) The Schreber Case. London: Penguin.
Freud, S. (2010) Civilization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
Husserl, E. (2012) Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. London: Routledge.
Jager, B. (1971) ‘Horizontality and Verticality: A Phenomenological Exploration into Lived 
Space’ in Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology. Volume 1, Issue 2. Pg. 212–235.
Jameson, F. (1991) Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. London: Verso.
Klein, M. (1997) The Psycho- Analysis of Children. London: Vintage.
Klein, N. (2008) A History of Forgetting: Los Angeles and the Erasure of Memory. London: Verso.
Lacan, J. (2000) On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972–1973: Encore: 
The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
Laing, R. D. (2010) The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. London: 
Routledge.
Marx, K. (1988) ‘Estranged Labour’ in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. New 
York: Prometheus Books. Pg. 69–85.
Marx, K. (1990) Capital: Critique of Political Economy: Volume I. London: Penguin.
McLuhan, M. (2001) Understanding Media. London: Routledge.
Merton, R. K. (October 1938) ‘Social Structure and Anomie’ in American Sociological Review. 
Volume 3, Issue 5. Pg. 672–682.
Mumford, L. (1968) The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects. New 
York: Harcourt.
Nye, D. (1996) American Technological Sublime. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Oliver, K. and Trigo, B. (2002) Noir Anxiety. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Plagens, P. (11 December 1972) ‘Los Angeles: The Ecology of Evil’ in Art Forum. December 
1972. Pg. 67–76.
Plato. (1991) The Republic. New York: Basic Books.
Rickels, L. (1991) The Case of California. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Ronell, A. (2012) Loser Sons: Politics and Authority. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Sallis, J. (2006) Drive. Harpenden: No Exit Books.
Sartre, J.- P. (1989) No Exit: And Three Other Plays. New York: Vintage.
Silver, A. and Ursini, J. (2004) The Noir Style. London: Gerald Duckworth.
Simmel, G. (1997) ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ in Frisby, D. and Featherstone, M. (Eds.) 
Simmel on Culture. London: Sage. Pg. 174–187.
Smith, G. E. (2008) The Evolution of the Dragon. Brookfield, WI: First Rate Publishers.
Soja, E. (2011) Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: 
Verso.
Soja, E. (2014) My Los Angeles: From Urban Restructuring to Regional Urbanisation. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
Tonnies, F. (2010) Community and Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Virilio, P. (1999) Polar Inertia. London: Sage.
Virilio, P. (2000) ‘The Twilight of the Grounds’ in W. Thesiger, R. Depardon, M. Khemir, and 
P. Virilio (Eds.) The Desert. London: Thames and Hudson. Pg. 102–119.
Virilio, P. (2005) Negative Horizon: An Essay in Dromoscopy. London: Continuum.
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   197 10-12-2016   8:17:43 PM
I  There Is No Social Relation: Neoliberalism and 
Heterotopia
In this chapter I propose to pick up on ideas of abandonment, conflict, and 
utopian politics explored in the previous chapter through an exploration of 
urban unrest in contemporary Britain. In this context, I seek to explore con-
temporary neoliberal Britain as a socio- economically divided nation, characterised 
by class conflict deferred by spatial and discursive strategies organised to deny 
the reality of inequality and injustice, and show how this Dis- United Kingdom 
has started to break down before the revelation of the irreducibility of social 
relations based in the catastrophic economics situation post 2008. In the first 
section of the chapter, I discuss the nature of asocial relations in neoliberal space, 
explaining the ways neoliberalism denies inequality in a theory of objective, 
competitive asociality, through a consideration of Robert Sampson’s (2012) recent 
work, The Great American City. Noting the theoretical connection between 
Sampson’s theory of space, the postmodern urbanism of the LA School (Dear, 
2000), and the idea of the neoliberal city as a spatially disorganised city, I move 
on to refer to Loic Wacquant’s (2007) concept of advanced marginality. Here, 
and on the basis of Wacquant’s view that American urban marginality is coming 
to a city near you in the near future, I suggest that theories of American urban-
ism may be appropriate for studying neoliberal space in contemporary Britain. 
Building on this idea, and extending Sampson’s postmodern theory of the 
neoliberal city, I turn to Foucault (1986), Lefebvre (2003), and the idea of het-
erotopia or other space to explore contemporary Britain as fragmented urban 
space. First, I take Foucault’s (1986) concept of heterotopia, which refers to the 
modern attempt to territorialise economic circulation and thus defuse potential 
social turbulence in a strategy of spatial organisation, as a mode of governmen-
tality which can be seen to police the neoliberal denial of social inequality, and 
particularly the abandonment of youth, through a strategy of division, separation, 
and segregation. Second, I use Lefebvre’s (2003) notion of heterotopia, which 
represents a space of encounter and possibility, to oppose this Foucauldian con-
struct and open up possibilities for rethinking the social condition of the con-
temporary British city. However, rather than discuss these theories in isolation, 
Dis- United Kingdom
Division, Encounter, and Utopianism 
in Heterotopic Britain
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and in order to create a dialogue, and situate them in a discussion of contem-
porary British urban society, in the second section of the chapter I focus on the 
heterotopic dimensions of the 2011 riots. My suggestion in this section is that 
the riots may be seen to represent the breakdown of the Foucauldian model of 
spatial governance under severe economic pressure and the violent emergence 
of Lefebvre’s space of social encounter and utopian possibility. Finally, and rec-
ognising the ways in which the riots opposed the neoliberal denial of social 
inequality, I spend the final section of the chapter considering the political 
response to the events of August. Here, I seek to show how the British govern-
ment sought to pathologise the rioters, and thus render their ethical challenge 
irrelevant. However, my argument is that this failed to effectively defuse the 
contemporary political moment, caught somewhere between neoliberal separa-
tion and social encounter, and Britain remains in a state of social, political, 
economic, and cultural crisis, most clearly revealed by the protest vote that led 
to the decision to leave the EU in the summer of 2016. It is this space of crisis, 
this space of conflict in between division and sociality, which I seek to capture 
in the title of the chapter, Dis- United Kingdom (Charlesworth, 2007).
But first, and before considering the heterotopic politics of the riots, I want 
to turn to Robert Sampson’s (2012) work, and consider his discussion of the 
urban politics of neoliberalism from his Great American City. In his recent book, 
The Great American City, Robert Sampson (2012) argues that the neoliberal 
orthodoxy has emphasised the importance of the individual to the detriment 
of sociological thinking and any sense that place or environment impacts upon 
life chances or outcomes. The central objective of his work is to not only 
provide a global perspective on Chicago in the early 21st century, but also to 
more generally oppose the neoliberal hegemon by showing how individuals are 
rooted in community, society, neighbourhood, and more broadly webs of social 
relations. In short, Sampson wants to restate the importance of space, the envi-
ronment, and the city itself, where this is understood classically in terms of 
human community. In Sampson’s view, the problem with the neoliberal vision 
of the city, which is largely premised on the idea of urban space as a machine 
for the production of surplus value, is that it is largely placeless. Instead of 
understanding the city as a place which contains individuals and enables and 
disables their lives, the economistic view of the city reduces the urban to abstract 
space which atomised individuals move through with more or less resistance 
generated by competition with other atomised individuals. In this view, the city 
is flat space, a geometric abstraction, which individuals traverse with relative 
success on the basis of their individual abilities or powers. From a sociological 
point of view, Sampson recognises the problematic nature of this vision of urban 
space, which is that it reduces individuals to self- possessed atoms which are 
completely untouched by environmental factors, such as community, neighbour-
hood, or wider social conditions, and throws them back upon themselves and 
their own self- possessed abilities. According to this position, there can be no 
social inequality, because the individual exists in abstract flat space, and the 
environment itself is a kind of colourless background. Under these conditions 
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the playing field is always level because it is a geometric abstraction based in 
economic calculation and the only explanation for the differences between 
people is that they have differential abilities, potentials, and motivations.
In opposing this view, Sampson’s (2012) work draws on a massive amount of 
empirical evidence to show why place, environment, and the city matters. This 
evidence, which shows how place impacts upon levels of poverty, crime, life 
expectancy, community organisation, and moral cynicism, explains that individuals 
are more or less an effect of their environment, which is itself path dependent 
and thus not easily affected by social change. What this means is that poverty, 
crime, life expectancy, and other neighbourhood effects are durable. As a result, 
when they are understood through the lens of neoliberal thought, or ideology, 
which takes the city for a flat space, they start to look like natural effects, which 
are somehow the result of individuals making their environment in their own 
image. In the neoliberal view, therefore, it is not that I am my place, but rather 
that my place is me. Against this view, Sampson is clearly rooted in the Chicago 
School tradition of thought, whereby individuals are an effect of their environ-
ment (Dear, 2002). I would, however, dispute that this makes him an environ-
mental determinist. It is not, therefore, that the city is some kind of quasi- natural 
environment that simply exists. Essentially, this is the neoliberal view. Here, the 
city is abstract space, which simply exists, and must be managed to be more 
economically productive. Centrally, these management techniques would in no 
way skew the environment or produce unjust or unnatural inequality. Instead, 
they should make the urban environment more productive for everybody, enabling 
the economic system to function more efficiently, with the result that inequali-
ties emerge as a by- product of the free and fair competition between individuals 
who naturally possess differential abilities, potentials, and motivations.
Contrasting this position, Sampson’s (2012) view is that the individual is an 
environmental effect, that this environment is itself a product of a society, which 
is organised in particular ways on the basis of particular pre- existing social 
formations. In other words, there is no sense in which it is possible for individu-
als to simply make their own way in some kind of quasi- natural environment, 
because they do not exist in a pre- social void or economic state of second 
nature, but rather live in urban places, which have been made by humans and 
developed historically on the basis of political decisions. Thus, the theoretical 
basis of Sampson’s work is that individuals exist, and live in a human- built world, 
and if their lives are to change or improve, it takes more than basic individual 
activity, meaning that changes to an individual’s life chances largely rely on 
macroscopic social and political decisions. In other words, the individual is made 
in his environment and is an effect of society, politics, economy, and culture. 
Thus, my environment more or less makes me. In this way, Sampson presents a 
classic defence of sociology and sociological thinking against the neoliberal 
hegemon which repeats the Thatcherite mantra that society and centrally social 
space does not exist. ‘Do not blame others for your plight.’ ‘Do not blame your 
environment for your situation.’ Sampson disputes this view. Politically speaking 
his position is that in order to address social inequalities, which are centrally no 
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longer an effect of basic natural differences between people, the state must com-
mit to social welfare, and addressing the unevenness of the urban environment, 
rather than simply regarding the city as an objective engine for the production 
of economic profit that simply works.
However, having said this, Sampson’s (2012) vision of the city is much more 
complicated than the original Chicago School image of urban space, which 
famously explained the concentric zone model of Chicago that was then later 
exported for the study of other modern cities, and it is this that renders his 
social and political position more problematic. Against the original Chicago 
School model of urban space, which was distinctly modern in the ways in which 
it showed how the city was neatly divided between large concentrations of class 
which reflected the organised nature of Fordist production techniques (Dear, 
2002), Sampson’s vision of Chicago and particularly his idea of neighbourhood 
is premised on a postmodern vision of the city in line with the post- Fordist 
condition of late capitalism (Dear, 2000). Centrally, I would argue that his new 
Chicago is understood through the lens of the postmodern theory of urbanism 
developed by the Los Angeles writers, such as Dear (2000), Davis (2006), and 
Soja (2011), where advantage and disadvantage are spatially distributed in a far 
more disorganised manner than was the case in the modern city of Park and 
Burgess (1925). Here, I would argue that Sampson’s city is somewhere between 
the old industrial Chicago and the third city utopia of neoliberalism (Bennett, 
2010), meaning that inequality persists, but that this is no longer uniformly 
distributed across the city in easily discernible patterns of haves and have nots. 
Instead, what we find in this new postmodern city is pockets of breadline poverty 
in close proximity to areas of enormous wealth and affluence, and a form of 
informal or neighbourhood segregation which is generally understood to rep-
resent postmodern urban geography (Dear, 2000; Davis, 2006; Soja, 2011).
In the American experience, this form of neighbourhood segregation is, of 
course, premised on the historical experience of race and the ghetto, which 
Wirth (1956) famously explored, and Wacquant (2007) rethought in his work 
on advanced marginality and the hyper- ghetto. For Wacquant in particular, it 
is primarily because of this history of racial segregation— which has seen the 
state abandon particular areas of the city, leaving them to generate their own 
social, economic, and cultural modes of existence in the formation of the 
hyper- ghetto— that it is not possible to directly translate the American experi-
ence of urban division across the Atlantic and develop a comparable European 
theory of urban segregation. In his view, the French banlieues and British 
council estates are not comparable to American hyper- ghettos because the 
historical form of racial segregation is simply not present in these environ-
ments. Having said this, the other core concept of his Urban Outcasts (2007), 
the notion of advanced marginality, offers a counterpoint to his theory of the 
hyper- ghetto, which differentiates the American from the European experience 
of urban division, because it suggests that America’s present is Europe’s future. 
Thus, the idea of advanced marginality explains that the theory of marginality, 
where this means that the urban poor are socially, politically, economically, and 
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culturally marginal to society, must not be taken as an archaic leftover of an 
industrial past which will soon disappear under conditions of neoliberalism 
with its economic dynamism and value generation. On the contrary in Wac-
quant’s view, advanced marginality means that marginality and urban inequality 
are effects of neoliberalism, which does not generate wealth and value for the 
sake of some kind of socialist principle of equality premised on social and 
economic planning, but rather creates surplus for the sake of enabling the 
most able to exercise their abilities to make money with the view that some 
of this wealth will eventually trickle down to the poorest members of society, 
thus raising the economic level of the society overall. This is, of course, a 
generous and apolitical reading of neoliberalism premised on classical liberal 
economic theory, and one which opponents of the neoliberal model, such as 
Bourdieu (1998) and Wacquant (2007), would reject.
Extending Sampson (2012), who wants to socialise neoliberal thinking by 
subjecting it to an idea of the importance of understanding the relations between 
individuals in space, the position adopted by Bourdieu (1998) and Wacquant 
(2007) is that neoliberalism must be understood as a ‘utopia of unlimited exploi-
tation’ where the rich are allowed or enabled to monopolise value on the basis 
of a theory of quasi- natural competition which is in reality an effect of a history 
of capitalist exploitation, class struggle, and state manipulation for the sake of 
business interests. According to this view, then, we must see the contemporary 
neoliberal city of Sampson and Wacquant as a melting pot of barely concealed 
class exploitation and inequality distributed across space in an variety of disor-
ganised ways according to the history of capitalist urban development and 
concealed by an ideological commitment to the theory that space is no more 
than the objective backdrop to free and fair competition between competing 
atomised individuals. Adopting this idea, and in light of Sampson’s theory of 
the need to socialise neoliberal thought, and Wacquant’s theory of advanced 
marginality which suggests that the American urban experience is coming to 
a city near us soon, my objective in this chapter is to consider how we might 
understand the British urban experience through the lens of the postmodern 
theory of urban space as divided, separated, and segregated in disorganised ways. 
In order to achieve this, I want to build upon the insights of Sampson and 
Wacquant concerning urban disorganisation and neoliberal exploitation, by 
turning to the spatial theory of heterotopia explained by Foucault (1986) in his 
work on other spaces and Lefebvre (2003) in his work on the urban revolution, 
which captures the idea of divided, separated, and segregated space in a variety 
of ways useful for understanding the contemporary British urban experience 
from a broad sociological perspective. Although there has been work on the 
postmodern and divided nature of British urban space in recent years, including 
most popularly Anna Minton’s Ground Control (2012), my reason for turning to 
the concept of heterotopia and Foucault and Lefebvre for my theoretical toolbox 
is that they offer a general theory of space that comprises notions of neoliberal-
ism, governmentality, territoriality, biopolitics, abnormality, isotopia, abstraction, 
and utopia, which I want to draw upon in my discussion.
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In building upon this discussion in the next section of the chapter, I intend 
to develop a general theory of the heterotopic state of contemporary British 
urban space through Foucault’s (1986) theory of the concept in the context 
of his wider works and particularly his Collège de France lectures on abnor-
mality (2003), security and territory (2007), and biopolitics (2008). The purpose 
of my turn to Foucault is to show how the concept of heterotopia can be 
employed to understand the divided, separated, and segregated condition of 
urban space under conditions of neoliberalism where the city is characterised 
by what we might call a geography of disorganisation (Dehaene and De Cauter, 
2008). Here, my thesis will be that this condition of spatial disorganisation, 
which distributes inequalities unevenly across the city, and is the result of 
neoliberal approaches to value generation through development, speculation, 
rent, and so on, is subject to attempts to manage social space through biopoliti-
cal approaches to governance, what Foucault calls governmentality, and the 
sorting of individuals into broad categories of normality and abnormality on 
the basis of their relationship to the economy. The result of this situation, which 
occurs in the context of the neoliberal view of the city as abstract smooth 
space which individuals move through in free and fair competition with other 
individuals, is that inequality is naturalised as the result of inherent abnormality 
and the fragmentation of the urban into heterotopias of absolute wealth and 
breadline poverty is understood as a condition of the objective process of 
competition in the capitalist environment. Returning to Sampson (2012), what 
this means in its most basic terms is that the disorganised and unequal urban 
environment which is created by neoliberalism is subject to processes of gov-
ernmentality that transform those who inhabit this environment into the 
architects of their own situations in disorganised and unequal space. Here, the 
truth that I am made by my space which is made by neoliberal speculation is 
transformed into the ideological fiction that I make my space and my own 
environmental situation on the basis of my self- possessed abilities.
Following this work on the applications of the Foucauldian concept of 
heterotopia to British urban space, I then turn my attention to Lefebvre’s 
(2003) idea of the same concept to consider the possibility of heterotopia as 
a utopian space of social encounters, connections, and collisions. Here, I pro-
pose to insert Lefebvre’s concept of heterotopia into a framework comprising 
ideas of isotopia, which refers to contained space, and utopia, which, in his 
view, means virtual space or space to come. In this complex, heterotopia, or 
other space, is the opening or crack in isotopic, or contained space, which 
throws open the possibility of the creation of some new kind of space of 
sociability in the future. Here, I propose a dialectical shift from Foucault (1986) 
to Lefebvre (2003) which takes place when Foucault’s notion of heterotopia, 
or other space, which I take for a divided, separated, or segregated place, 
becomes Lefebvre’s notion of isotopia, or closed space, which is then itself 
subject to transformation into some other heterotopia under particular social 
conditions, thus opening the way for utopian possibility and socio- spatial 
reconstruction. Centrally, I take this dialectical process which turns through 
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heterotopia, isotopia, and utopia to represent Lefebvre’s (2003) concept of the 
urban as urbanisation, his related idea of the urban revolution, and a contem-
porary example of the intimate connection between utopian thought and 
urban space, which we might trace back to Plato, More, and Augustine (Eaton, 
2002). Updating this connection, I focus the next section of the chapter, which 
seeks to show how British urban space may be understood through Foucault 
(1986), Lefebvre (2003), and the idea of heterotopia, on a discussion of the 
spatial significance of the August riots of 2011, which I take to be important 
because of the way they expressed the violent asociality of neoliberal society 
under pressure of economic recession.
II  Theorising the Encounter: Understanding the 2011 
English Riots as Heterotopic Collision
Essentially I would argue that the English riots of 2011 revealed the existence 
of a deeply divided Britain, what Disraeli (2008) called in 1845 ‘the two nation 
divide’, or more recently Simon Charlesworth (2007) spoke about in terms of 
a ‘Dis- United Kingdom’. Although the riots took place specifically in English 
cities, essentially London, Birmingham, and Manchester, I think that it is difficult 
not to see them as symbolic of the divided and spatially segregated nature of 
contemporary Britain under conditions of economic stress, where it is far more 
difficult to manage inequality through the policing of asocial division, separation, 
and segregation in space. Although the idea of a divided nation is no kind of 
news (Hutton, 2010; Dorling, 2011b), I think that the depth of this division is 
often underestimated because the excluded, or what Alain Badiou (2012) calls 
the inexistent, are by definition more or less invisible, largely silent politically 
because of a lack of adequate mainstream representation, economically disad-
vantaged and redundant, and culturally deviant in relation to the established 
values of so- called normal neoliberal forms of behaviour. In addition to this level 
of political, economic, and cultural invisibility, I would suggest that social mar-
ginality is cemented by spatial separation and segregation, where the abnormal 
are enclosed or contained on geographically peripheral housing estates or areas 
outside of the circuits of exchange where concentrations of neoliberal socio- 
economic power are found (Minton, 2012). Consider London, where Tottenham 
and the Broadwater Farm estate rub up against Crouch End village, or Tower 
Hamlets, one of the most disadvantaged areas in Britain, which borders Dock-
lands, one of the centres of neoliberal power in the capital city. Further north, 
consider Liverpool. Here, the purpose- built shopping utopia, Liverpool One, has 
been specially designed following principles set out by Oscar Newman (1973) 
to exclude the neoliberal poor from consumption and the spaces of economy 
and push them back towards inner city heterotopias of poverty, such as Toxteth 
(Minton, 2012).
Although these spaces of breadline poverty and enormous wealth occupy 
more or less the same geographical location, and it can be difficult to separate 
them on a map, on the ground they feel like different worlds (Minton, 2012). 
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Here, we touch upon one of the key aspects of what I am calling, following 
Charlesworth (2007), the Dis- United Kingdom, which is that spatial division, 
separation, and segregation is so effective in contemporary Britain, not because 
it is somehow formally enforced or policed, but rather because it exists in the 
ways social, economic, political, and cultural distinctions are expressed in the 
ideological and discursive construction and phenomenological and existential 
reality of social space. This is, in my view, why heterotopia is first a form of 
Foucauldian (1986) governmentality, because what it achieves is the separation 
of these divergent social, economic, political, and cultural realities in space 
which essentially enables them to coexist without endless conflict, and second 
a concept which recalls Lefebvre’s (2003) idea of utopia, because this separa-
tion is never entirely complete, and there is always potential for encounter, 
collision, and conflict that may pave the way for radical social change. Given 
that this level of change is not on the neoliberal agenda, the heterotopic divi-
sion, separation, and segregation of individuals and communities in space is, 
therefore, in my view, an essential form of social control in a class society 
which wants to pretend that class no longer exists and that there is no social 
inequality. Ironically speaking, I think that this neoliberal fantasy is only pos-
sible on the condition of spatial division which hides the reality of the unequal 
social, political, economic, and cultural relations between people and maintains 
Disraeli’s (2008) ‘two nation divide’. In this respect, Charlesworth’s (2007) idea 
of the Dis- United Kingdom is not simply a critical commentary on the divided 
nature of contemporary Britain but also a reflection on the spatial techniques 
of separation and informal segregation which are essential to the more or less 
peaceful maintenance of this division.
This is also why I want to consider the 2011 August riots as potentially 
utopian revolts, because I think that what was achieved by these events, which 
occurred when the neoliberal principle of socio- economic asociality in space 
was undermined by the economic meltdown and subsequent austerity measures, 
was the transgression, or over- coding, of the normal division between people 
contained by the heterotopic method of division, separation, and segregation, 
and the creation of a space of encounter, collision, and conflict comparable 
to the notion of heterotopia expressed by Lefebvre (2003) in his work on the 
urban revolution. While the Foucauldian (1986) notion of heterotopia, or the 
other space, is perfectly adequate for understanding processes of spatial 
division— because it explains how the economic tendency towards deterrito-
rialisation folds back into social strategies of territorialisation or what Turner 
(2007) calls enclavement in ways which enable society to persist in the face 
of economic turbulence, creative destruction, and so on— my view is that 
Lefebvre’s (2003) vision of the same concept enables us to see how the strategy 
of enclavement, which translates into his notion of isotopia or contained space, 
may itself explode in the creation of heterotopias of encounter, which open 
onto new utopias, or spaces of virtuality and possibility. I think that this theo-
retical model comprising Foucault (1986) and Lefebvre (2003) can enable us 
to understand the events of August 2011 and allow us to move beyond standard 
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views about the lack of politics of the rioters or their nihilistic obsession with 
consumption. Essentially, and most importantly, I think that the essential point 
of the riots, which has largely been missed in a consideration of new modes 
of communication, was their mobility, and the way this transgressed the spatial 
immobility or enclavement of heterotopic Britain that may be explained using 
the Foucauldian theory of controlled space. Unlike traditional riots, such as 
the 1981, 1985, or 2001 British riots or the 2005 French riots, which tend 
to take place on estates or in heterotopias of poverty that are already spatially 
separated from zones of affluence and power, I want to argue that the novelty 
of the 2011 riots is that they crossed borders and exploded the heterotopic 
organisation of British urban space by virtue of their nihilistic focus on con-
sumption (Bauman, 2012; Tester, 2012). Unlike previous riots, which have 
occurred within the bounds of the normal heterotopic organisation of social 
space and thus allowed commentators to speculate on their causes through 
traditional notions of working- class political protest (‘The working class is in 
their environment and protesting about their situation in this life world’), 
because the 2011 riots transgressed the bounds of normal heterotopic spatial 
organisation and became highly mobile, they created an uncanny effect, where 
we should understand the notion of the uncanny in terms of Freud’s (2003) 
psychoanalytic concept of the unheimliche or unhomely.
Thrust front and centre, roaming free of their normal heterotopic place, the 
unruly crowd of young people, who had presumably not yet been socialised 
enough to know their abnormal place, were uncanny, unhomely, out of place, 
or in Bataille’s (1991) language, a kind of accursed share. By virtue of their 
desire to loot and take what they could not legitimately buy, the mob of failed 
consumers was thus away from home, outside of their normal place, and it is 
this that confirmed their identity as a kind of Foucauldian (2003) abnormality, 
and in my view defined their unknowing ethical challenge to the Dis- United 
Kingdom. Out of place, the kids from the other space came to represent a 
dangerous mob, and normal people trembled about what might happen if this 
mob descended on their neighbourhood. Yet, I also think that the mob forced 
Britain to confront the existence of ‘the two nation divide’ and think through 
the state of society, regardless of whether this was ever on the official political 
agenda. Although the members of the mob sought to cover their faces and 
hide from their crimes in a way which confirms the unwitting nature of their 
ethical challenge, my view is that for four days in August 2011 they brought 
normal Britain, which had previously existed within its own private space, or 
privatopia, face to face with the reality of abnormality, division, separation, 
and segregation across the nation. In seeking to understand the nature of this 
challenge, which took place when the Foucauldian (1986) heterotopia of 
control broke down under pressure of crash course economics, austerity mea-
sures, and realised inequality to produce a form of spatial conflict relevant to 
Lefebvre’s (2003) idea of the other space of encounter and collision, I think 
we may look to Bauman’s (1993) postmodern ethics in the book of the same 
name. He refers to Levinas to suggest that what we must seek to do in an 
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individualised society of strangers where we feel no responsibility for anybody 
is to take absolute and unconditional responsibility for others on the basis of 
faciality, or our face- to- face confrontation with their misery, poverty, exclusion, 
and marginalisation.
Unfortunately, and this is the paradox of Bauman’s (1993) position, this 
face- to- face confrontation is precisely what is lost in a society of individuals, 
where economic, political, and cultural division is hidden in spatially separated 
spaces, heterotopias of wealth and poverty that never meet despite their suf-
focating geographical proximity. However, I think that it was precisely this 
confrontation which re- emerged and hit normal Britain in the face in August 
2011, provoking what Badiou (2012) calls the return of history, even if this 
political moment quickly disappeared back into what he calls the moment of 
interval, or the ahistorical period where the dominant ideas are considered 
bankrupt but nobody is willing to admit they are dead or speculate on new 
macro theories of society for fear of rocking the boat or threatening established 
power relations. Caught in the middle of this post- mortem period of history, 
normal Britain may not have literally found itself face to face with abnormal 
individuals, because the rioters sought to cover their faces to evade the backlash 
they knew would eventually come, but what the mainstream was metaphorically 
forced to face, and what these uncanny events brought home, was the existence 
of the previously inexistent other, who was usefully rendered anonymous by 
his hidden identity, and a situation which absolutely illuminated the divided, 
separated, and segregated nature of British society. Responding to this situation, 
the neoliberal elites quickly rejected the unwitting ethical challenge of the 
marginalised and sought a return to the divided, separated, and segregated 
norm of the Dis- United Kingdom. This revanchist strategy was achieved by 
swift discursive and judicial mobilisation which saw, first, a popular ‘Blitz spirit’ 
emerge, supported by then Conservative Lord Mayor of London Boris Johnson 
literally and symbolically sweeping the streets of capital; second, a law and 
order narrative reinforced by police raids on rioters’ houses and harsh sentences 
handed out to those convicted of involvement in the riots; and finally a neo-
conservative social backlash, which saw the coalition government threatening 
to cut the benefits of rioters and local councils threatening to evict them from 
their properties.
Moreover, this strategy, which entailed further ostracising the most marginal 
members of society on the basis that they were beyond the pale and entirely 
abnormal, was largely supported by the rest of the normal population. The 
reasons for this punitive popular response are not difficult to understand, and 
we can refer to Bourdieu’s (1998) notion of precariousness, Hall’s (Hall and 
Jacques, 1983) concept of authoritarian populism, and Bauman’s (2006) theory 
of liquid fear to explain how a population caught in a highly precarious social 
and economic situation defined by high levels of social and economic anxiety 
might accept and even welcome authoritarian measures set on the definition 
and exclusion of abnormal others who may be excluded so that they feel more 
likely to survive the chaos of the economic state of second nature under 
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conditions of meltdown. Thus, I think we start to approach the psychological 
basis of the popular support for the Dis- United Kingdom and what we might 
call the neoconservative society of spite, which entails a kind of puritanical 
moralism based on the belief that the best way to ensure socio- economic survival 
is to condemn the other, and conditions a deeply worrying authoritarian identi-
fication with the over- dog and hatred of the marginal, poor, and weak. It is on 
the basis of this psychological complex, which I think is entirely comparable to 
Adorno’s (1964) theory of the fascistic authoritarian personality, that David 
Cameron and the coalition government were able to reassert their authority and 
re- establish the heterotopic condition of Dis- United Kingdom with the kind 
of privatopias, fortified spaces, and carceral zones discussed by the Los Angeles 
urban theorists such as Dear (2000), Davis (2006), and Soja (2011).
Yet, despite this outcome, which saw division, separation, and segregation 
re- established under conditions of deep economic stress, and taking into account 
Steve Hall’s (2012) view that the riots were characterised by a nihilistic lack 
of politics, I would argue that the events of August were immensely significant 
almost by accident because they created a space of encounter and fractured 
the Foucauldian (1986) order in a moment we might think about in terms 
of Lefebvre’s (2003) idea of heterotopia. Although there was no utopian reso-
lution, because the openness of the heterotopia of riots never found expression 
in a worked- out programme for social, political, and economic change, and 
the possibility of some other spatial organisation was never suggested, the 
possibility was clearly there, and was represented in the carnivalesque atmo-
sphere which was central to the conduct of the riots. Unlike traditional riots, 
which may have an explicit political agenda, the accidental politics of these 
events explain this carnivalesque atmosphere, because they were so clearly 
based in Bakhtin’s (1984) principle of overturning, which he explains in terms 
of the monstrosity of the medieval carnival when all existing power relations 
were turned upside down and all social norms and values were suspended. Is 
this not exactly what happened in the riots when the normal spatial relations 
of the Dis- United Kingdom— which mean that the haves and have nots are 
spatially divided and separated in more or less closed heterotopias in order to 
ignore their inequality— were suspended and the mob ran riot across the 
economic centres of England’s major cities? The accidental nature of this 
carnivalesque atmosphere, and the reason its political significance was entirely 
unintentional, was that the rioters wanted to loot and steal, essentially follow-
ing neoliberal norms by other means, which is exactly how Robert Merton 
(1996) explained the normality of crime in America in the 1930s. As such, 
it would be a mistake to say these events were explicitly political, and disagree 
with Bauman (2012), Hall (2012), or Tester (2012) who talk about their nihil-
ism, because they are correct when they point out that the rioters were simply 
enacting neoliberal behaviour by other means under conditions of recession 
and austerity where the possibility of making it by traditional means seems 
impossible. However, my central point about the politics of the riots would 
be that it is precisely in this nihilism, in this meaninglessness, that we are likely 
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to find new politics and utopianism for the future, because where else would 
it appear in a historical period characterised by exhaustion, immobility, lack 
of imagination, and the end of history itself?
Against the end of history, and the end of politics, which I have sought to 
render spatially through a construction of the Foucauldian (1986) notion of 
heterotopia and spatial immobility, I think that what the riots symbolise is the 
potential of politics to emerge ex nihilo, the potential of politics to come from 
out of nowhere, and the encounter of apparently atomised individuals in social 
space who may not even be aware of the significance of their actions. In my 
view, this is where we will find our political, utopian resolution to the period 
of interval Badiou (2012) situates beyond the end of history. In many respects 
this idea of the riots as a political event occurring behind the backs of their 
participants recalls the original moments of the Arab Spring, and in particular 
the Tunisian Revolution, when street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself 
on fire in protest about the confiscation of his goods by an overzealous state 
official, even though the original utopian possibility of these events was even-
tually taken over by the Islamic State. Clearly Bouazizi’s protest was not aimed 
at sparking a large- scale political revolution anywhere, never mind Tunisia or 
across the Arab world, and yet this is exactly what happened. Similarly, and 
in much the same way that Bouazizi could not have known the impact of 
his small protest, the rioters in England’s cities had no macro political agenda 
but simply wanted to be a part of a society, where in neoliberal society this 
means the ability to consume and have one’s piece of the pie. In this respect, 
I want to argue that the rioters’ politics were, like Bouazizi’s politics, objective 
politics, which means that they made an objective political statement, regardless 
of the subjective intention of those making that statement. Although this may 
not reflect traditional meanings of political behaviour, demonstration, or protest, 
where people are acutely aware of the meaning behind their actions, my sense 
is that this form of objective politics is particularly appropriate for a form of 
society which understands itself in abstract, objective terms, which is exactly 
what we find with neoliberal society.
Consider Thatcher’s famous mantra, there is no alternative, and Fukuyama’s 
(1992) declaration of the end of history, which demonstrated that we had reached 
the end of everything associated with political division. In the face of this new 
terminal ideology all that remains is objective or quasi- natural violence, which 
is essentially the expression of the natural differences between people through 
economics realised in social stratification, political power, cultural normality or 
abnormality, and spatial situation. Against this system of stratification, which 
neutralises all forms of political difference, there is no protest, since any expres-
sion of opposition marks one out as either criminal (the rioters, looters), insane 
(which would be the fate met by a British Bouazizi), or impotent (peaceful 
demonstration which can be ignored by an elite who believe in the objectivity 
of the contemporary social order), simply because the neoliberal discursive field 
has effectively already objectified the economic system and recoded opposition 
in criminal, psychiatric, and utopian terms. How does one, therefore, oppose 
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this system? In my view, the reason the rioters or looters, as I will now refer to 
them, were so successful in their unwitting political demonstration against the 
exclusionary nature of neoliberal society, especially in its crash era version, is 
because they unwittingly struck at the heart of the neoliberal machine, the 
economy, and thus practiced a form of political idiocy, meaning radical politics 
through over- identification. Discussions of the riots in works by Bauman (2012), 
Hall (2012), and Tester (2012) have already explained that the rioters or looters 
were absolutely driven by consumption, and the desire to take what they could 
not buy, but what has not been noted is that this behaviour, which celebrates 
consumption outside of the practice of production, struck against the very logic 
of capitalism, where one produces in order to consume, and in doing so repre-
sented a kind of ghoulish parody of the neoliberal mode of capitalism and the 
behaviour of the banker and developer who are parasitical in their relation to 
material production.
In reflecting the truth of neoliberal capitalism, then, where one seeks to 
consume without the effort of production, and showing how this mode of 
(an)economic behaviour is basically Marx’s vision of primitive accumulation 
dressed up for popular consumption, the rioters- cum- looters demonstrated the 
reality of neoliberalism in a four- night performance of Hobbes’ (2008) fiction 
of the warre of all against all. However, contrary to Bauman (2012), Hall 
(2012), and Tester (2012), I do not think that the mob’s riotous behaviour 
was completely negative, because what this surplus humanity, the waste product 
of British society, also demonstrated was the original meaning of the city, a 
political space of encounter, and in doing so offered a perverted assertion of 
their ‘right to the city’ (Mitchell, 2003) which was objectively critical of the 
reality of the Foucauldian (1986) city of division, separation, and segregation. 
While the spatial divisions of the neoliberal city are, in my view, designed to 
obscure the existence of inequality, the riots offered a moment of Marxist 
clarity, not because they were explicitly political, but because they were abso-
lutely economic in their pursuit of consumption. In their creation of a new 
heterotopia, they produced a frozen dialectic and revealed the truth of division, 
collision, and warre, a negative social relation of the very worst that defines 
neoliberal society, and leaves little doubt about the need for a new positive 
politics of social care. In this respect we may follow Frantz Fanon’s (1967) 
view, explaining that the state of emergency produced by the riots was also 
a state of emergence, a return to the space of the street, a space of encounter, 
and politics. However, we have not yet seen this political moment evolve into 
anything meaningful, and the period since the riots have produced a backlash 
against Badiou’s (2012) inexistent who have, if anything, been pushed even 
further onto the margins of society. That is to say that if the riots represented 
a turn to Lefebvre’s (2003) concept of heterotopia with its utopian possibilities, 
then the years that have followed August 2011 have seen a return to the 
Foucauldian (1986) model of enclavement, which is designed to oppose the 
turbulence of economic circulation with a spatial strategy organised around 
principles of division, separation, and segregation. In the final section of this 
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chapter, I propose to explore the neoconservative response to the riots, and 
explore in more detail the politics of spatial division, before concluding with 
suggestions about how the riots might be seen to represent the emergence of 
a new fantastical politics of the city.
III  Against Dis- United Kingdom
The dominant political response to the riots involved a medicalisation of the 
conditions of inequality, deviance, and abnormality in David Cameron’s idea 
of the sick society. In this theory of social pathology, which recalls Bauman’s 
(1991) discussion of the medicalisation of Germany in the 1930s, conflictual 
relations became evidence of the presence of a deviant hard core hidden within 
British society. Akin to the Conservative’s earlier idea of Broken Britain, which 
Iain Duncan Smith advanced as far back as 2006, the notion of the sick society 
in no way implied that society itself was sick, but rather suggested that there 
was a criminal element within British society that needed to be managed and 
controlled. In this way, the idea of the sick society was less a challenge to 
reform social structures in the name of a more inclusive society than it was 
a call to quarantine the deviant, divide society more rigorously between insid-
ers and outsiders, separate the saved from the damned, and segregate the lost 
causes in marginal spaces which could be more effectively policed. Against 
the very idea of society, which implies a recognition of social relations, the 
implication of the concept of the sick society was the need to reassert the 
Thatcherite truth that there is no society through the denial of inequality and 
injustice in the neoliberal discourse that these conditions are somehow expres-
sions of normal competition between people who have different motivation, 
potential, and ability. On the basis that this is the territory of neoliberal ideol-
ogy and governmentality, it would be unfair to say that this attempt to fracture 
social relations in a theory of competition and distance is somehow the preserve 
of the current coalition government, because it is not and I would argue that 
Tony Blair’s much earlier concern with respect was about exactly the same 
principle of asociality. In Blair’s theory of respect, respect became about the 
poor and marginalised maintaining their distance from their well- to- do neigh-
bours in a denial of the very violent and aggressive social relations generated 
by neoliberal capitalism. Given that the marginalised were never likely to suffer 
in silence, New Labour’s response was a raft of antisocial behaviour measures, 
including the now infamous ASBO, which became about containing the 
dangerous individual.
In the case of the ASBO or Anti- Social Behaviour Order, the idea was that 
dangerous individuals needed to be contained spatially. They needed to be 
separated and segregated and kept away from normal society in a way that 
perfectly repeats the Foucauldian (1977, 2003) logic of the early modern town 
under conditions of infection by plague. In Foucault’s work, and particularly 
Discipline and Punish (1977), the shift from the leper colony to the plague 
town represents a shift in the logic of social control from one where the other 
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was completely excluded and cast out of society to one where the other was 
partially excluded, quarantined, and governed within particular spaces inside 
society. This is essentially how Foucault begins his work on governmentality, 
which is not developed in Discipline and Punish, but is more fully worked out 
in his lecture series of the mid to late 1970s, including the classes on the 
abnormal individual (2003), security and territory (2007), and finally biopolitics 
and neoliberalism (2008). Moreover, this shift— which essentially represents 
Foucault’s theory of a mode of specifically modern governance concerned 
with managing the economic principle of circulation through the control of 
those elements that circulate but need to be controlled, such as beggars, vagrants, 
and delinquents— is at the centre of his idea of heterotopia developed in the 
late 1960s. Here, Foucault (1986) argues that heterotopia is absolutely con-
cerned with placing the spaces of economic circulation that disrupted society 
in the early modern period, which is why I have chosen to think about this 
concept in terms of socio- spatial organisation in a neoliberal context where 
class division is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. Here, the Foucauldian 
(1986) idea of heterotopia becomes about the exercise of what Wacquant 
(2009) calls the right hand of the state, and the increasing tendency to seek 
solutions to socio- economic problems in discipline and social control. In David 
Garland’s (2002) view, this tendency has accompanied the rise of neoliberalism 
in the West, and emerged because of a general lack of belief in the value of 
the left hand of the state or welfare in solving problems of crime and devi-
ance. According to Garland’s thesis, welfare theory, which saw criminals as 
individuals in need of rehabilitation and normalisation, gave way in the latter 
part of the 20th century to neoliberal social theory, which adopted a punitive 
view of the abnormal individual who could no longer be saved, but rather 
needed to be managed, controlled, and governed in their Hobbesian badness. 
Although Garland steers clear of the basic Foucauldian (2003) position that 
questions the very construction of the abnormal individual as an effect of 
socio- economic power, preferring to explain the way the criminal was treated 
after the event as either somebody who could be saved or was always already 
damned, his point about the neoliberal view of the natural wickedness of 
humanity remains very important for my argument.
The reason Garland’s (2002) point about the neoliberal view of the natural 
deviance of man is important for my thesis is because it allows us to under-
stand why the emergence of what he calls a new iron cage of discipline and 
governance seems to make perfect sense in the neoliberal universe. Once one 
accepts the basic neoliberal position on humanity, which if we read C. B. 
MacPherson’s (1986) study of Hobbes and Locke represents a projection of 
contemporary conflictual relations in a fantasy of savage nature, it is easy to 
understand how the socio- spatial organisation of heterotopia, division, separa-
tion, and segregation comes to characterise the city as space of society and 
politics, purely on the basis of a discursive construction of the other as dan-
gerous, threatening, and naturally abnormal, a paradox which Foucault (2003) 
connects to the idea of monstrosity in his lectures on the emergence of the 
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notion of the abnormal. We can see evidence of this construction of danger-
ous humanity in the case of the 2011 riots where the rioters were seen to be 
driven by ‘pure criminality’, rather than environmental conditions, crash era 
economic policy involving welfare cuts, and so on. In his work on these events, 
David Harvey (2012) reflects upon a piece from The Daily Mail which talks 
about feral youth, and in doing so constructs the rioters as wild animals, 
completely outside of civilised norms and values. In line with Owen Jones’ 
(2012) work on the chav as a figure of class hate, The Daily Mail’s idea of feral 
youth is a perfect representation of the strategy of scapegoating explained by 
Rene Girard (1989) whereby the other becomes a container for every evil in 
society. The Foucauldian (2003) abnormal, the monstrous other, serves exactly 
the same purpose of justifying division, separation, and segregation and explain-
ing away conflict produced by economic inequality as somehow a natural 
property of particular individuals who are less civilised than those considered 
normal citizens.
Explaining this biopolitical strategy as the basis of all racist thinking, Foucault 
(2003) points to ideas of natural deviance and degeneration as concepts for 
allowing exclusion and creating discourses of abandonment that I have else-
where spoken about in terms of hoodie horror (Featherstone, 2013). Although 
the city remains, under these conditions it is less a place of community, civili-
sation, and culture the way it was conceived by the ancients (Mumford, 1968), 
and more a space of dissimulated conflict, inequality, division, separation, and 
segregation (Davis, 2006). However, the point of Harvey’s (2012) discussion 
of the notion of feral youth is that the fantasy of the neoliberal city as an 
abstract space of competing individuals following objective economic rules is 
becoming more and more difficult to sustain today, primarily because of the 
expansion of worklessness, redundancy, and precariousness following the failure 
of the neoliberal credit bubble. Instead, the reality of exploitation, inequality, 
injustice, and governance through segregation is becoming clear, with the 
result that social conflict is more difficult to defer in the idea of social mobility 
sustained by economic growth. In response to this situation, new governmental 
discursive and spatial strategies are being employed to shore up the structures 
of neoliberal society, such as reduction of housing benefit for the poor recoded 
scroungers, which will more rigorously divide haves from have nots in space. 
However, even these cannot reduce the basic level of antagonism that has 
emerged as a result of the expansion of inequality and injustice under crash 
era conditions where the production of value is failing and it is impossible to 
maintain the fantasy that everybody can have their piece of the pie.
In Harvey’s (2012) view, these governmental strategies are the key battle-
grounds of politics today, which is why he explains the notion of feral youth 
as an ideological diversion from the reality of the feral elite and feral capitalism, 
the animalistic truth of the neoliberal fantasy of fair, free, and objective com-
petition. Danny Dorling (2011a) supports this view by marshalling a range 
of statistics to show why contemporary neoliberal Britain is an unjust and 
economically, morally, and ethically bankrupt society. Despite the fact that 
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neoliberal Britain cannot accept its own monstrosity and persists with the 
view that inequality is the result of objective competition, Harvey and Dorling 
advance the view that animality, abnormality, and corruption are everywhere 
and support Foucault’s (2003) theory of the organisation of the unjust society 
in his lectures on abnormality. In these lectures Foucault explains how French 
society on the brink of revolution was organised around two polarities, which 
we may call, following Giorgio Agamben (1998), the exclusive- inclusion and 
inclusive- exclusion, or outsider who is inside and insider who is outside. 
Expanding his work on these social positions, Foucault tells us that the sov-
ereign, or exclusive- inclusion, was absolutely free of the law and could behave 
with total impunity. In other words, the sovereign was in society, but operated 
outside of its laws. By contrast, the lumpenproletariat, or inclusive- exclusion, 
was totally subjected to the laws of the land, but had none of the protections 
afforded other citizens and was instead left to roam free like a wild animal. 
The lumpenproletariat was, thus, essentially inside society, but also completely 
abandoned as a kind of sociological waste product. In Agamben’s (1998) work 
these polarities, which took the form of the notions of the voracious libertine 
and popular cannibal in Foucault’s (2003) take on revolutionary France, become 
states of exception, the authoritarian tyrant who makes the rules and homo 
sacer who is more or less outside of society.
In the context of the current chapter, I think that these exceptions can be 
seen to translate almost directly into the contemporary neoliberal stereotypes of 
the banker and the feral youth and their spatial correlates, the bank and council 
estate. While the banker is inside society, but seems to behave with total impunity, 
the feral youth is outside normal community by virtue of his animality, but still 
formally a member of society. Reading contemporary neoliberal Britain through 
Foucault and Agamben, I think these two social types can be seen to define the 
basic coordinates of social class conflict and consequent socio- spatial organisation, 
where, for example, Docklands represents a kind of heterotopia of the financial 
elites and Tower Hamlets a segregated space for the abnormal population 
(Minton, 2012). Unwilling to accept this relation, however, because of its potential 
to reveal the reality of class conflict, the neoliberal sleight of hand, and the 
discursive trick of successive governments identified by Stuart Hall (2011), has 
been to oppose the normal, middle- of- the- road taxpayer to the feral population, 
the scrounger, in such a way that screens the conflict between two social excep-
tions and instead opposes a construction of normality to an idea of abnormality 
and inherent deviance. It is on the basis of this construction that the Conserva-
tive government sought to mobilise a populist response to crash era precarious-
ness, comprising normal individuals, or those who are inside the neoliberal 
economic circuit (what we now call ‘working people’), against a feral population 
of scroungers and petty criminals who are seen to exploit welfare in order to 
live for free. Under conditions of a global economic meltdown where everybody 
feels the anxiety that accompanies the state of socio- economic precariousness, 
and especially the middle classes who feel they are least secure in their privilege, 
it is not surprising that neoliberal Britain has become a society of spite 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   214 10-12-2016   8:17:45 PM
Dis- United Kingdom 215
characterised by hatred of those who are seen to be getting something for noth-
ing and living off society, primarily because they live outside of the normal 
economic spaces of neoliberal society. It is this asocial relation that, I want to 
argue, finds spatial form in the Foucauldian (1986) heterotopia, which is simul-
taneously both inside and outside of normal social space conceived as productive 
economic space.
The essential political problem with this discursive construction of normality 
and abnormality, which mobilises spite against the weakest members of society 
and legitimates a heterotopic approach to socio- spatial relations revolving 
around division, separation, and segregation, is that there is no longer any sense 
of inequality or injustice in society and instead a view of normality and 
abnormality within a discursive space of abstract, objective, asocial relations 
characterised by free and fair competition. Within this space of competition, 
where the rules of the game are determined by economic logic, there is no 
critical sense of social justice, but only calculations of more or less value 
underpinning a metabolic vision of humanity. In this peculiarly urban view 
of society, which Simmel (1997) discovered in the early 20th century in his 
works on the relationship between the city and money, human civilisation 
fuses with nature in a kind of socio- economic state of second nature. Akin 
to nature, where there is no history, in the socio- economic state of second 
nature, there is no motivated change and no democratic participation or direc-
tion, but only the endless life cycle of capitalism Schumpeter (2010) called 
creative destruction, which is defined by the fact that it simply works, where 
working means turning through economic cycles and producing value. This 
view of the idiocy of neoliberal society is in line with Foucault’s (2008) theory 
of the origins of modern governmentality, which he roots in a shift from a 
Greek notion of citizenship requiring a political stance to a Christian idea of 
pastoralism where the individual is a member of a flock which is directed 
under conditions of total obedience.
Although Foucault (2008) does not completely explain the political implica-
tions of this shift, it is clear that there is no democracy in the pastoral vision 
of power which he connects to the modern liberal and neoliberal state, but 
only an authoritarian conception of social relations that is coloured by the 
idea that economy and the reproduction of life, what Foucault calls biopolitics, 
is more important than politics in the classical Greek sense, which was con-
cerned with matters beyond economy or oikos, the space of the home. What 
this means, then, is the modern liberal and neoliberal city is no longer the 
polis, space of political community and social debate, but rather oikos, a space 
of economy and economic calculation concerned with life, living, death, and 
dying. In short, the neoliberal city is a nihilistic space of biopolitics and 
metabolism, a space of creative destruction which enables life to renew itself 
but little more, a static space outside of history, a space going nowhere. As 
such, there can be no sense of political critique in neoliberal space, or any 
kind of discourse relating to concepts such as justice beyond economic turn-
over, because these ideas simply do not make sense in this context. This is 
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the case because people are no more than bearers of economic value, which 
renders them fit for either inclusion in the vital spaces of the city, or exclusion 
to the margins, which Sharon Meagher (2009) talks about in terms of ‘urbs 
sacra’, where the city is largely dead, insofar as the neoliberal machine that 
only values economic production, profit, and growth is concerned. This divi-
sion describes the contemporary state of exception in neoliberal Britain, and 
captures the idea of Dis- United Kingdom which I have sought to elaborate 
through first a discussion of Sampson’s (2012) attempts to reconstruct a socio-
logical vision of the neoliberal city, and second an exploration of Foucault 
(1986), Lefebvre (2003), and their concepts of heterotopia, division, and encoun-
ter in the context of the 2011 riots.
Throughout the chapter I have attempted to show that neoliberal British 
society is a class space, defined by insider and outsider socio- economic posi-
tions, which recalls Engels’ (2009) classic exploration of industrial Manchester. 
In this way my analysis relies on Lefebvre’s (1991) notion of concrete abstrac-
tion, whereby class relations map onto concrete space and the organisation of 
the city, the space of community and society, to show how neoliberal relations 
are expressed in a heterotopic urbanism of division, separation, and segregation. 
However, I have also argued that this model of socio- spatial organisation, which 
I have sought to capture in Foucault’s (1986) idea of heterotopia that reter-
ritorialises social relations in the face of the turbulence of economic deter-
ritorialisation, has been put under enormous pressure because the neoliberal 
social form Lefebvre (2003) calls the bureaucratic society of controlled con-
sumption is no longer functional in the wake of financial meltdown. In the 
face of economic failure, and the collapse of the neoliberal profit margin, 
asocial relations of competition have been radicalised, the precarious majority 
have been made to feel even more anxious, and the weakest members of 
society have been placed in an impossible, hopeless situation. Under these 
conditions, the Thatcherite drive to accumulate profit has been radicalised in 
a kind of neoliberal death drive represented by the emergence of a Hobbesian 
(2008) warre of all against all expressed in the urban riots of August 2011.
More specifically what these riots represented was the desire of what Badiou 
(2012) calls the inexistent, the collateral damage of neoliberal society, to escape 
from the situation in the heterotopias of abandonment, and find something 
beyond these hopeless dead zones. In seeking to escape from the horror of 
being- waste, which was expressed through the neoliberal desire for things, the 
inexistent established a political social relation inside a society that rejects these 
kind of relations and threw down an ethical challenge that society must now 
answer. This is where I sought to use Lefebvre’s (2003) concept of heterotopia 
to explain the leap beyond the heterotopia of control to the other space of 
encounter, collision, politics, and ethical challenge. Regarding this ethical chal-
lenge, I do not think that it is enough to respond with the view that the 
rioters represented no more than greedy neoliberals. Instead, I think that we 
must recognise that the rioters’ or looters’ nihilistic desire to consume repre-
sented, and will continue to represent, a sublimated desire for the future, a 
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desire for some relief from the endless night of hopelessness, a desire for hope, 
a desire for utopia. As such, what we must do is respond to the heterotopia 
of collision and the ethical challenge of events such as August 2011 by desub-
limating the nihilism of the looters, and seizing the opportunity to move 
beyond the neoliberal society of enemies that has been revealed to be bankrupt 
in more or less every way. In order to do this we must escape the impasse of 
the end of history, which is represented in space by the Foucauldian (1986) 
heterotopia of division, separation, and segregation, and take advantage of the 
heterotopic moment of collision, conflict, and encounter. There is, I think, 
hidden somewhere deep inside this negative form of conflictual encounter the 
possibility of the new politics, a positive politics beyond the mainstream alter-
natives that remain shackled to the existing state of division that cannot be 
named, a utopian politics of fantasy and imagination, that we must struggle 
to realise. In attempting to bring this politics about, and escape from the 
politics of brute fact that will never lead us anywhere new, we should follow 
Badiou (2012), who notes that riots are always negative explosions of desire 
in need of organisation, and found a new politics, a dictatorship of the fantastic 
that can move beyond the current impasse of neoliberal society. But before 
we can escape this impasse, and as a first step, I think we must heed the ethical 
challenge of events such as the riots of 2011, and recognise the socio- spatial 
injustices of contemporary Britain, which neoliberal ideology seeks to deny 
in social spaces of division, separation, and segregation. Thus, I think we must 
recognise the social reality of a Dis- United Kingdom and seek to move beyond 
this through a politics based in an understanding of the irreducibility of social 
relations founded in the environment which is more than simply a machine 
for the production of profit and economic growth.
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I  ‘The Social Relation Is a Spectre’
In the mid- 1980s the French philosopher Jacques Derrida enigmatically sug-
gested that ‘the future belongs to ghosts’ (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002: 115). In 
the thirty years since Derrida made this statement about the ghostly future 
and the ten years since his own passing, I believe that this vision has become 
increasingly true— I would suggest that the relationship between the future 
and haunting is perhaps even more relevant today than it was in the 1980s 
when Derrida spoke these words, simply because the late philosopher saw the 
ghosts of the past of the globalised world coming before they had really made 
their presence felt. But if Derrida saw the ghosts of the future early, famously 
writing about them in his book on hauntology, Specters of Marx (1994), then 
my argument is that they are everywhere today and centrally that we, as 
sociologists, are in a privileged position to listen to their stories and respond 
to their demands. Following Derrida’s occult vision of the future, what I want 
to suggest in conclusion is that this ghostly future will more or less rely on 
sociology, or what we might call spectro- sociology, and its potential to haunt, 
spook, and finally possess the contemporary capitalist neoliberal hegemon, 
which is defined by its absolute opposition to the spectre of the other, and 
most importantly the human relation between self and other that transcends 
the objective economic transaction. This is a grand and perhaps even hyper-
bolic claim, but we must not forget that in the mid- 19th century the founder 
of critical sociology, Karl Marx, explained that Europe was haunted by a 
spectre, the spectre of communism. In The Communist Manifesto (2004) Marx 
and Engels conjured the spectre in order to explain that the capitalist system 
could not continue to abuse the working classes, the proletariat, without 
producing revolutionary unrest and eventually the dialectical turn towards the 
absolute form of society, the communist society. In this context the spectre 
of communism comes from the past, haunts the contemporary moment, and 
suggests the possibility of a future free from the misery of the present. It was 
on the basis of this ghoulish vision and Marx’s early interest in the ghostly 
that Derrida wrote his Specters of Marx in the mid- 1990s. Here, Derrida 
imagines that the defeat of really existing communism in the Soviet Union 
Conclusion
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and Eastern Europe, and the subsequent triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama’s 
End of History (1992) that predicted the completion of the Hegelian dialectic 
in American- led globalisation, will inevitably produce a new world of ghosts— 
the ghosts of the defeated, the destroyed, and the leftovers of the new global 
capitalist utopia.
The essence of Derrida’s argument is that Fukuyama’s global liberal, democratic, 
capitalist utopia is also the exhaustion of Weber’s (2010) spirit of capitalism in 
its complete realisation. Under these conditions, when there is no more ideology, 
no way to articulate the profound injustices of the systematic production of what 
Ž ižek (2008) calls objective violence, misery, and despair, Derrida suggests that 
the spirit of capitalism transforms into its own ghostly other— the spectre, the 
ghost of the ghost, that refuses to rest or accept the idea of the end. From the 
perspective of the neoliberal hegemon, and those whose task is to maintain this 
order, the spectre represents a horror show, because it haunts the end of history 
paradigm that says that there is no more with its other— the spectre comes from 
the past in order to represent the horrors of the present and suggest the pos-
sibility of some other future. In this respect, Derrida’s spectre, the main character 
in the late capitalist horror show, is also a utopian figure that suggests hope, 
possibility, and a future in the true sense of the word that addresses the misery 
of the present in the name of an alternative vision of society. Derrida’s Marx 
is, therefore, an uncanny Marx. Following Freud (2003c), who explained the 
uncanny in terms of the menacing sense of unfamiliarity hidden within the 
familiar, Derrida’s spectres of Marx emerge from the complete rationalisation 
of late capitalism, where absolutely everything is subject to the rule of the 
miserable god of the bottom line— the capitalist calculation of surplus value. In 
this situation the spectres emerge from the tombs and mummified bodies of 
Lenin and Mao, where they live on, post- mortem, somewhere between life and 
death, encrypted, to use the language of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok 
(1994). In this way the spectres represent the dirty secret of the late capitalist 
machine that the end of history hegemon seeks to endlessly exorcise and con-
demn to the past. Of course, as the Anti- Capitalist movement, Occupy, Syriza, 
and seemingly endless protests against austerity across Europe testify, the spectres 
refuse to die, ironically because they are already dead. This remains the political 
or post- political situation today— the end of history paradigm suggests that there 
is no alternative, but the champions of this ideological position cannot effectively 
exorcise the other, the spectre.
It is on the basis of this situation, Derrida’s global capitalist hauntology, that 
I want to develop my thesis, and suggest that the spectre haunting contem-
porary Europe, and perhaps global capitalism itself, is not simply Marx and 
Engels’ (2004) spectre of communism, or indeed Derrida’s (1994) spectres of 
Marx, but rather a far more abstract, ideal, or indeed spectral, spectre of sociol-
ogy, which is less about the return of this or that political movement— although 
it may well be about this too— and more concerned with the ghostly return 
of the truth of the basic ontological social relation between people that capi-
talism, and especially neoliberal capitalism, seeks to exorcise in the name of 
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the absolutely self- enclosed individual, homo economicus. In my view it is this 
essential truth, the basic interdependence of people in social relations shot 
through with the possibility of collaboration and collective action, but also 
the recognition of injustice and deeply unequal power relations, that neoliberal 
capitalism cannot tolerate and has sought to exorcise ever since the British 
prime minister Margaret Thatcher announced that ‘there is no society’, because 
foreclosure of this space, the space of social relations, is the foreclosure of the 
space of politics, socialism, communism, and more or less every liberation 
movement which seeks to address inequality and injustice. In terms of the 
social and political impact of this attempt to disavow the truth of the social 
relation, Zygmunt Bauman (2000b) has written widely about the individualisa-
tion of society and shown how the late capitalist hegemon views the idea of 
the irreducible relation between individuals as a kind of relic or fossil of the 
past that is no longer relevant in the liberal present where individual freedom 
trumps collective responsibility every time. In the face of this vision, which 
initially emerged out of the postmodern, liberal critique of totalitarianism and 
the state more generally, I would argue that the situation and status of the 
practice of sociology is more or less reflective of the situation of the left, and 
leftist thought, on the contemporary political scene.
While the space of the political left has been foreclosed by the hegemonic 
position of the end of history paradigm, with the subsequent emergence of 
Derrida’s spectres of Marx, my view is that the space of sociology, focused on 
the study of social relations, has also been foreclosed, and the discipline subse-
quently marginalised in the university, simply because the kinds of truths the 
discipline can produce, truths concerned with the effects of social relations, have 
been rendered largely null and void by the late capitalist neoliberal paradigm 
that cannot recognise the injustice of systemic inequality or objective violence 
primarily because from this point of view the social relation does not exist, or 
is at best considered marginal relative to the importance of individual behaviour. 
However, the refusal to recognise the essential importance of social relations does 
not make social relations disappear, and it is this ideological move, the foreclosure 
of the social relation, which, in my view, has led to the proliferation of the 
ghosts of the present that remind us of the systemic nature of oppression and 
violence. Thus we should not only speak of the spectres of Marx, or the spectre 
of communism, but also the spectres of the racialised society, and the spectres 
of the patriarchal society, because what these ghosts have in common is their 
refusal of the neoliberal truth of individualisation beyond social relations that 
simultaneously allow for a recognition of systemic injustice and the possibility 
of collective, political action. What is the role of sociology within this complex, 
where the foreclosure of the space of social relations leads to the endless emer-
gence of ghosts and ghouls? The answer is that sociology, the spectral discipline 
of the disavowed social relation, must recognise the irony of its marginal position, 
which is that its situation on the very edge of relevance in the neoliberal knowl-
edge machine is in truth a reflection of its central, critical position for the 
production of alternative futures. What this means is that sociology may be the 
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utopian discipline for the 21st century concerned with the spectral projections 
of past revolutions that failed; present misery, despair, and injustice; and future 
hope and possibility.
It is perhaps fitting that I first spoke of the ghosts of 20th- and early 21st- 
century capitalism and what we might call spectro- sociology in Prague, the 
city Derek Sayer (2013) writes about in terms of the dark capital of 20th- 
century Europe. In Sayer’s work, Prague is the 20th- century successor to 
Benjamin’s (1999) 19th- century Paris, city of hauntings and future possibilities. 
In this respect there could be no better place to speak of the emergence, 
foreclosure, and finally the spectralisation of sociology from really existing 
Marxism through to the postmodern, post- socialist, neoliberal, end of history 
period we inhabit today where individuals stand on their own. The final, 
funereal moment of this story, the moment of neoliberal triumph, comprises 
the late 20th- century invention of Bauman’s (2000b) individualised society of 
homo economicus, the neoliberal self who thinks about the world in terms of 
costs, benefits, and rational choices. But we must remember that the emergence 
of this self was explored long before Gary Becker and Margaret Thatcher, 
when Georg Simmel (Frisby and Featherstone, 1997) wrote about the mental 
life of the modern urbanite in 1915. Simmel’s theory was that in order to 
live with the endless turbulence of the modern city, urbanites must shut 
themselves off from their environment, including those other people who exist 
in suffocating over- proximity, and learn to think objectively so that the only 
question they ever have to ask concerns price. In light of the way the con-
temporary neoliberal individual is driven to think in terms of instrumental 
rationality, costs/benefits, and competitive advantage, it is clear that neoliberal 
society, or perhaps we should say neoliberal asociety, represents a kind of reali-
sation, and radicalisation, of Simmel’s theory of the objectification of social 
relations one hundred years after the theorist of sociation wrote about the 
violent effects of money upon society. Under these conditions, when the 
relationship between people is one of price and monetary cost— which Simmel’s 
follower Walter Benjamin (1999) famously understood through the figure of 
the prostitute— it is no surprise that the true, human, social relation that 
exceeds the objectivity of money becomes a kind of stain, affront, or offence 
to the capitalist, and even more the neoliberal self, where every aspect of life 
has become about the monetary equation.
Writing in the shadow of Freud, Simmel saw that the emergence of money 
and the modern urban environment created a tendency towards distance, simply 
because human psychology is not able to absorb and process extreme levels of 
external simulation. In this way Simmel’s self evolved a defensive front, an armour, 
or in psychoanalysis an ego, which could interact with the world objectively. It 
is this dispassionate, distanced, and individualised self that has become the ideal 
of capitalism, and especially neoliberalism, and has understandably led to the 
reduction of the social relation to the study of economic interaction. Why is 
this understandable? It is understandable because when the self is simply an 
objective calculator— that thinks about everything and everybody through the 
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   223 10-12-2016   8:17:46 PM
224 Conclusion
lens of cost/benefit— economics screens out sociology and the human social 
relation becomes a profane economic exchange. But what this economic per-
spective misses, and what constantly returns, is the deeply affective dimension 
that is impossible to repress, precisely because it is fundamental to what it means 
to be human and participate in what Marx (1988) wrote about in terms of 
species being. In his study of ghosts and spectres, psychoanalyst Stephen Frosh 
(2013) explains that Freud conceived of the irreducibility of the social relation 
in terms of transference, and beyond this the occult notion of telepathy, which 
clearly shows the extent to which individualism and the idea of the individu-
alised self had penetrated Western thought— the father of psychoanalysis sought 
to conceive of the social relation in terms of the occult. But while Freud thought 
about the social relation through the idea of telepathy, he also recognised that 
the objective self is an impossibility, and that our interactions with others produce 
spectres that we can never escape.
In the curved space of Freudian psychoanalysis, which is clearly outlined in 
books such as Repression (2001b), The Uncanny (2003c), and Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (2003a), the dead always return to haunt the living in spectral form. 
Following the logic of Freud’s theory of repression and Derrida’s Specters of Marx 
(1994), I want to argue that we can identify a melancholy of contemporary 
global capitalism characterised by a procession of ghosts and spectres that can 
never be laid to rest because they represent the essential truth of the social rela-
tion of self, other, world, and beyond this earth— the truth of sociology. On the 
basis of this vision of late capitalism, I suggest that sociology must realise its 
spectral position and become a kind of spectro- sociology, less interested in objec-
tive truths and more concerned with the voices of the ghosts of the past, present, 
and potential futures. However, the problem for sociology remains that the 
spectre and the ghost of the social relation cause deep anxiety within the neo-
liberal asociety that is resistant to the recognition of its truth because it is pre-
mised on the existence of a kind of militarised individualism that refuses to 
recognise the other outside of its base objectivity and equivalence to monetary 
value— what is it worth? As a result, I think that sociology must confront what 
I want to call the resistance to social analysis, which reflects a sociological ver-
sion of Freud’s (2012) famous resistance to psychoanalysis, the fear of ghosts 
that represent traumatic events that we cannot face, in the name of the defence 
of the spectral truths that it is uniquely positioned to receive. In this conclusion 
I suggest a response to the defensive complex of the resistance to social analysis, 
but before I reach this final point, I want to talk through, first, the history of 
the emergence of the neoliberal, antisocial world, and second, the impact of this 
world upon sociology and the sociological imagination.
II  Spectres R Us, or, The History of Neoliberal 
Individualism
What appear to be the intractable problems of the present— extreme inequality, 
poverty, and misery— are exacerbated by the despair and hopelessness that 
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emerge from the failure of the future bound up with the end of history para-
digm. This lack of possibility, and the perception that change is impossible, is 
the result of the failure of our sense of collectivity, community, and cohabita-
tion rooted in neoliberal celebration of individualism and denigration of the 
sociological imagination on the basis that the social relation is somehow a 
harbinger of totalitarianism. It is this situation, the end of history, end of hope, 
and end of the future, which has led to the proliferation of spectres: the spectres 
of destroyed hope, contemporary despair, and despondency about our com-
mon, but entirely individualised, fate. This is why we fear the apocalypse, and 
the dystopic imagination dominates utopian speculation in contemporary 
society— because we have no hope, and we refuse to trust the spectres of the 
social relation that comment upon our essential interdependence. Consider, 
for example, apocalyptic, dystopian visions of The World Without Us (Weisman, 
2007), which I would suggest is an eco projection of the destroyed self, or me 
without world, of neoliberal capitalism, which simultaneously reveals and masks 
the truth of our sociality. But it is not easy to listen to these traces, or spectres, 
because the history of liberalism, which is also modern history, is the history 
of the triumph of the individual. While the ancients thought in terms of the 
polis, and the identity of the micro- and macrocosm that bound man to city 
to cosmos, Leo Strauss’ (1996) original modern philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, 
made individual conflict, ‘the warre of all against all’, the centrepiece of his 
political society. In Hobbes’ thought, man is always wolf to man (homo homini 
lupus) and his only hope for survival is the transcendence of the general fear 
of every other man in the particular fear of one big man— the monstrous 
Leviathan, the sovereign, political society. In this way Hobbes (2008) explained 
the emergence of society, a society of uneasy peace and ambient menace, and 
set the tone for liberal and later neoliberal history to come.
Following Hobbes’ dire sociology, which depended on absolute state power 
to ensure minimal state cohesion, John Locke (2003) sought to limit the power 
of the state on the basis of certain God- given rights, and centrally the right 
to private property. In Locke’s thought, and particularly his Two Treatises of 
Government (2003), the right to property comes from God, but it is the state’s 
role to ensure the defence of this through the creation of earthly law. What 
the state must not do, however, is overstep the mark and begin to meddle 
in the rights of individuals. We find this suspicion of the state, and beyond 
this the fear of the potential of other people who always represent a limit on 
individualism, expressed throughout liberal history. For example, in Bernard 
Mandeville’s famous work, The Fable of the Bees (1989), which is often con-
sidered the first defence of free market economics, the individual must be 
allowed free rein, because this will eventually lead to public good and society 
will be a better place for everybody. This is, of course, the classic defence of 
laissez- faire economics which we find in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations 
(1982, 1999), where individual self- interest translates into social benefit through 
the mechanism of the invisible hand. What we find here, then, is the essential 
liberal theory that regards economy as a device able to unite individuals around 
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their basic disunity. Once Hobbes’ authoritarian state disappears in classical 
liberal thought, though the Leviathan would return in neoliberalism, there is 
no possibility of collective action, because the ability to decide and direct 
society had been handed over to a benevolent god, the god of the invisible 
hand. Even in the case of Mandeville’s hive, there is no realisation of collective 
intelligence because no one insect has a vision of the colony, but only its own 
aims and objectives. Of course, for liberal opponents of authoritarianism and 
later totalitarianism, such as Karl Popper (2002), this lack of human omniscience 
was essential, because methodological individualism was a guarantee of democ-
racy. In other words, nobody should be able to claim sufficient knowledge to 
be able to lead society into the future— the moment anybody obtains this 
knowledge, that person is likely to become Stalin or Hitler.
While Smith’s theory upheld this prohibition on human omniscience through 
the idea of the invisible hand, where social relations come together to produce 
a benevolent outcome because of divine intervention, the problem of his 
identification of theological belief and economics was that it produced a kind 
of social idiocy, or what Bernard Stiegler (2013) calls systemic stupidity. Against 
Smith’s transformation of theodicy into what Joseph Vogl (2014) calls oikodicy, 
or belief in the spirit of economy, we may argue that sociology was born in 
an attempt to understand the way that relations between individuals produce 
society which in turn shapes individual behaviours. From Comte, who first 
employed the term ‘sociology’, through Durkheim, who wrote about ‘social 
science’, to Marx, who sought to empower humans through the politics of 
communism, the purpose of the analysis of the invisible social relation was 
always to demystify the fetishistic belief in some supernatural prime mover 
and enable proper motivated human action. Reading Weber’s (2010) work on 
the spirit of capitalism we perhaps find the ultimate theory of systemic stu-
pidity. While Weber reflects Smith’s focus on moral sentiment and spirit in 
the emergence of capitalism, he also recognises that value rationality is ulti-
mately a terminal psychological disposition that will always tend towards 
instrumental rationality and a kind of spiritless, nihilistic form of behaviour. 
In the final pages of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2010), 
Weber famously captured the nihilism of the properly modern economy 
through the idea of the iron cage, but we may equally turn to Franz Kafka’s 
(2007) Metamorphosis and the tortured figure of Gregor Samsa, or Marx’s own 
mutilated, estranged worker, for evidence of the effects of the hyper- 
rationalisation of modern capitalism.
My use of the term ‘hyper- rationalisation’ is key here, because what the 
English term hyper suggests is simultaneously less and more than, lack and 
excess. What this means is that when economic rationalisation finds its realisa-
tion in the nihilistic iron cage, and consequently extinguishes its spiritual 
origins, something returns, the monstrous remainder, the leftover, what Georges 
Bataille (1991) calls the accursed share in his book of the same name. In this 
way Gregor Samsa, the bureaucrat who becomes an insect, or Marx’s worker, 
who is estranged from his own humanity, reflects the transformation of Smith’s 
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invisible hand, the original spirit of capitalism, into its monstrous, negative 
other— the spectre that haunts the godless machine that Marx and Engels 
write about in terms of communism. When we read Lenin or Luxemburg 
on the evolution of international capitalism and imperialist adventure, we learn 
that the stupid, laissez- faire system eventually led Europe into World War I 
and eventually World War II. The result of this catastrophic period of history 
was the end of laissez- faire and the turn towards state management in the 
form of Leninism- Stalinism, Nazism, Keynesianism, and finally neoliberalism. 
While the communists sought to manage economy in the name of class, Nazi 
state management took place for the sake of the nation and the purity of the 
racial type. By contrast, the Keynesian liberals were concerned with pursuing 
state- managed growth to secure the transcendence of social need. Finally, the 
neoliberals, and particularly Hayek (2001), attempted to fuse the liberalism of 
Smith with regulation in order to enable individual freedom. It is, therefore, 
a mistake to imagine that neoliberalism was ever about the return to laissez- 
faire, because what we find in Hayek, and what Foucault (2008) illustrates in 
his seminar on biopolitics, is that the neoliberal mode of governmentality has 
always been defined by a kind of authoritarian defence of individualism. The 
individual is free, but only within the economic framework set out by the 
state in order to ensure competition and profitability.
The history of the 20th century, and certainly the American century from 
the 1940s onwards, reflects the struggle between the ideological positions of 
communism, Nazism, Keynesianism, and what we might broadly call neoliberal-
ism, with the eventual result that contemporary global capitalism is organised 
by variants of neoliberal ideology that think about the role of the state in terms 
of the defence and organisation of individualism. In the face of the collapse of 
the totalitarian regimes of Stalinism and Nazism, it is possible to argue that the 
great epoch of European modernity came to an end and was replaced by the 
American vision, postmodernity, defined by individualism, consumerism, and a 
new belief in the power of technology. Since the modern European project of 
collective progress was considered bankrupt, the American postmodern utopia 
that was suspicious of the totalitarian potential of collective meta- narratives 
became the new global hegemon. Of course, the European critique of this 
model of asocial organisation soon took off, and Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) 
attacked the pseudo- individualism of the American consumer, but the late 20th 
century has seen the spectacular erosion of social structure before the key figure 
of the capitalist individual who pursues his own utopia of self- realisation through 
the free market. Following Marx and Engels (2004), who wrote about the melt-
ing of solid structures under conditions of modernity, Bauman (2000a) calls the 
new postmodern society a liquid society— that is to say, a society in which it 
is no longer possible to rely on social structures or social order. In the new 
liquid society no structures hold, because every order is temporary, contingent 
on the turbulence of market forces, which represents the only certainty in the 
new world. That is to say that there can be no sense of stability in the liquid 
society, and no sense of collective action, because neoliberal ideology demands 
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that the only constant, the only order, is the order of individual competition 
that ensures that there can be no totalitarian resolution or stabilisation of social 
and political structures.
In light of the neoliberal assertion of the order of individual competition, 
it is possible to understand why Bauman’s contemporary liquid society has 
very little relationship with the idea of freedom— neoliberal freedom represents 
a novel form of authoritarian freedom or enforced market freedom, and this 
explains why the free global society continues to generate spectres. The neo-
liberal free market conjures the spectres of failed revolution, thwarted utopian 
hope, contemporary misery and injustice, and destroyed futures, because the 
form of freedom it defends is in reality a mystified unfreedom characterised 
by the right to be poor, miserable, desperate, and the victim of systemic, objec-
tive violence, inequality, and injustice. Indeed, the very idea of injustice takes 
on a very particular significance in the neoliberal society of unfreedom where 
it comes to refer to market interference, rather than stupid, systemic inequality. 
Under these circumstances the idea of justice refers to competition free of 
interference and intervention— which is precisely the reason why neoliberals 
oppose the formation of trusts and cartels so aggressively— and the maintenance 
of economic space where instrumental rationality functions effectively. This 
is why contemporary neoliberalism is more than simply a return to Locke, 
who similarly opposed state intervention, because what we also find in post-
modern capitalism is a kind of computerised Benthamism able to weigh 
benefits relative to costs and absolutely rationalise decision making in the ways 
that Jean- François Lyotard (1984, 1993) outlines in his works on postmodernity 
and the inhuman. The irony of this situation is, therefore, that the much- 
vaunted figure of the individual that neoliberals defend to the hilt starts to 
vanish in a blizzard of information that reduces freedom to the necessity of 
information management. In this situation the individual is a kind of tech- 
no- body who must struggle to survive the capitalist second nature that recalls 
Hobbes’ (2008) state of nature.
Since this economic space is organised around Herbert Spencer’s (2013) 
principle of the survival of the fittest, there is no spirit about contemporary, 
hyper- rational capitalism. Instead the liquid society is characterised by a kind 
of hard materialism, which is absolutely immobile and precludes meaningful 
change. This is why Fukuyama’s (1992) vision of the end of history in the 
triumph of the American model of society contains an existential dimension 
suggested by his reference to the Nietzschean last man, even though this is 
never really worked through in the book itself. Although Fukuyama invokes 
the idea of boredom, and suggests the problem of postmodern society where 
nothing really changes even though society is organised around the celebration 
of endless innovation, he fails to see the apocalyptic consequences of this situ-
ation, which is the kind of de- subjectivisation and de- individualisation Bernard 
Stiegler (2011, 2012, 2014) explores in his work on disbelief and discredit. In 
these works Stiegler shows how individualism and the utopia of self- realisation 
have begun to collapse back in on themselves today because there is no 
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recognisable social relation through which it is possible to position the idea 
of a subject, self, or individual. The classic symbol of this process of de- 
subjectivisation, de- identification, and dis- individualisation is, of course, social 
media, which, Stiegler notes, is based in the catastrophic failure of sociability. 
The paradox of social media, what we might call antisocial media, is, therefore, 
the same paradox that marks the life of Simmel’s (Frisby and Featherstone, 
1997) urbanite who lives out a lonely existence in the middle of suffocating 
over- proximity or Baudrillard’s (2012) ecstatic mediated individual who cannot 
stop talking, precisely because he has nothing to say. At the extreme, cutting 
edge of this paradox we find the contemporary porn addict, who consumes 
sex online but is absolutely allergic to others, and the Japanese hikikomori, 
who spends his life in virtual communicative space but never leaves his room. 
However, the distance between these pathological extremes and normal Face-
book use is, I would suggest, less qualitative and more quantitative, and defined 
by the same reversal. As Derrida (1997) notes in his Politics of Friendship 
through reference to Aristotle’s enigmatic statement ‘O my friends, there is 
no friend’, the proliferation of friends is the destruction of true friendship. Is 
this not precisely why Facebook is so successful and important?
What we learn from watching David Fincher’s The Social Network is that 
Mark Zuckerberg set up Facebook in order to meet women he could never 
meet in real life. Is it not possible that the popularity of his invention is rooted 
in this same logic— we make up for what we lack in our embodied lives 
through the endless proliferation of virtual sociality which never really hits 
its mark? In other words, the excess of virtual friends never makes up for the 
lack of the embodied friend, which our virtual lives eventually render impos-
sible, and the problem of loneliness and asociality becomes a permanent fixture 
hidden deep within the logic of the social network society. This is why I 
would suggest the turn to the study of big data is a serious mistake for sociol-
ogy. What can big data mined from Facebook or Twitter really tell us about 
society beyond a series of frequencies? While the study of what Durkheim 
(2006) called social facts through the exploration of statistical relationships has 
always been important to sociology, I would suggest that the field of big data 
is problematic because of what it represents— the desperate attempt of sociol-
ogy to map social reality itself through the virtual, which is itself a symptom 
of the hyper- individualisation of society. In this way I would suggest that it 
is possible to read the cultural significance of big data through Freud’s (2003b) 
famous case study of paranoia, Daniel Paul Schreber. Where Schreber took 
flight from the trauma of his childhood into a paranoid fantasy world where 
he was able to explain everything, in the world of big data we can understand 
everything about the world through the virtual, even though, or perhaps 
precisely because, the experience of neoliberal individualism is characterised 
by anomie where everything, but nothing, is possible. In much the same way 
that the economic reduction of the social relation to the base economic 
transaction evacuates the irreducible connection between self and other of its 
human profundity, which Marx (1988) sought to capture through the idea of 
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species being and Freud (2001a) explained through the occult notion of 
telepathy, my sense is that the study of big data threatens to violate the social 
relation through the transformation of human interaction into objective data.
What is lost here is, of course, the phenomenological depth that exists 
between self and other that opens up endless creative potential, simply because 
big data starts off from the profane, materialist perspective of late capitalism— 
the individual is everything and the social relation is no more than a basic 
economic transaction. From the perspective of the closed- off, solipsistic, we 
might even say paranoid individual, the other is no longer constitutive of 
identity, but rather one more base object in the world. In this way late capi-
talism transforms the individual into a profane calculator that understands the 
world in terms of costs and benefits and degrades the other as one more object 
in a world of things, and the world itself no longer has significance beyond 
its use value. However, the problem with this situation, which a reading of 
the work of Jacques Lacan (1997) illustrates, is that when the social world, 
and the world itself, has been reduced to base quantity, subjectivity and indi-
vidualism itself collapses. In contemporary culture this is precisely why the 
selfie has become such a phenomenon. In the past people took photos of their 
significant others in order to remember their presence and preserve them in 
spectral form, but today we no longer take pictures of others, but rather seek 
to capture our own likeness in a high- tech manifestation of Lacan’s (2007) 
theory of the mirror stage. Remember, Lacan’s point was that long before 
Oedipalisation, children individualise themselves from Mom through a process 
of imaginary identification. Against the fractured, fragmented, pre- Oedipal 
self, the imaginary mirror image confirms the child’s unitary identity and sets 
him up for entry into the symbolic order where he must live within rules 
and regulations and grow through time. This is only possible, though, on the 
basis of the original imaginary construction of a self- identical vision of the 
self— ‘I am me and not you or this, that, or the other object.’
While this should happen in childhood, the contemporary significance of 
the selfie is that it indicates a profound crisis in capitalist subjectivity. Since 
the self is no longer constituted by social regulation and social structures that 
rely on a web of relations, precisely because every relation has been debased 
and quantified to the extent that it is too thin to carry real significance, the 
selfie, the high- tech version of Lacan’s (2007) imaginary stage, emerges as a 
desperate strategy to save the new de- subjectified self from psychotic collapse. 
This is the selfie’s primary function— it presents the high- tech cogito John 
O’Neill (1991) writes about in his Plato’s Cave, where I assert my existence 
through my own image. Given that there is no society to care about or affirm 
my being in the world, I only know I exist because I can see myself in the 
high- tech digital image. Of course, Christopher Lasch (1991) wrote about 
this situation in the late 1970s, which coincidentally also represented the 
moment when neoliberal ideology came out on top of Keynesianism in the 
struggle of economic ideas, but the notion of a culture of narcissism is not 
straightforward. While the straightforward interpretation of this idea relates 
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to the concept of self- obsession, what psychoanalysis shows is that the condi-
tion of narcissism is a deeply defensive approach to self- constitution which 
hides the destroyed self in its own objectification or spectralisation. In other 
words, the selfie highlights the process whereby I become my own spectre— a 
ghostly image of myself necessary to save my identity. Moreover, this spec-
tralisation effect is not simply confined to the selfie, but also relates to the 
more general use of the mobile media device. Consider the infamous Internet 
meme, Einstein’s Nightmare, which shows a range of social situations scarred 
by mobile media use. The point of the meme is to show that even when we 
are with other people, we are also somewhere else that we access through the 
global network, and to illustrate the poverty of the social relation in contem-
porary capitalist society. Thus Einstein’s Nightmare is also the sociologist’s 
nightmare because what this simple meme shows is that late capitalism entails 
the destruction of self- other relations through a process of virtualisation.
When we gaze into the screen— and this is particularly the case with the 
abyssal surface of the iPhone or iPad— we confirm our own identity in our 
reflection. We can simulate social connection through Facebook, Twitter, and 
various other social media platforms, but there is no other in virtual space, 
because the other is defined by a phenomenological thickness that makes 
demands upon me. This is exactly what Levinas (1999) understood through 
his theory of the ethics of faciality— when I look into the face of the other 
I become responsible and I feel compelled to respond. In the case of social 
media where friends proliferate it is easy to ignore people or, in the case of 
FaceTime, simply refuse the connection in the name of the kind of defensive 
individualism Bruno Bettelheim (1972) understood through the concept of 
autism. The contemporary social media self is, therefore, the ideal neoliberal 
individual, who refuses relation to the other because of the potential threat 
the other poses and prefers instead the isolation of what Bettelheim calls the 
empty fortress— that is, the militarised self. Moreover, this situation is not 
simply a cultural phenomenon concerned with social, or mobile, media tech-
nology, because I think that it is possible to identify a similar phobia of the 
irreducibility of social relations in the contemporary Eurozone crisis. While 
we certainly find a fear of debt in liberal thinkers, such as Locke and Hume, 
who thought that the state was a potential money pit, I would suggest that it 
is possible to identify a deeper ideological fear of indebtedness in the crisis 
that revolves around the refusal to accept that debt is part of the human 
condition itself.
In Bataille’s (1991) vision of general economics, which refers to economics 
understood outside of the narrow confines of the discipline, it is impossible 
to repay our debts to others and world that sustain our existence. That is to 
say that the phenomenological relation is absolute. However, what we see in 
the contemporary euro crisis represents the height of hubris— the neoliberal 
economic idea that it is possible to repay debts is evidence of the fantastical 
belief in the existential isolation of the individual who needs nobody and 
rejects even the basic reliance on the biosphere itself, which becomes the 
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ultimate commodity, even though it is absolutely beyond exchange. The Greek 
has, of course, become the scapegoat for the defence of this vision of restricted 
economics, where every debt is repayable and it is possible to balance the 
books, and miserly refusal of the truth of general economics which asserts the 
ecological connection between self, other, world, and earth. The Greek is thus 
the sacrificial lamb of neoliberal economics set on the refusal of the irreduc-
ibility of social relations, and this is why the sociologist must really oppose 
austerity in the name of an ethics of generosity, gifting, and the necessity of 
universal indebtedness. The problem of neoliberal debt is therefore less that 
we are always in debt, because existence is debt, but rather the fantastical belief 
that it is somehow possible to repay our debts and live in the black. The 
problem with this view is that it defends restricted economy from the truth 
of general economics by insisting that we repay what we owe to others with 
the result that, as Maurizio Lazzarato (2012) has shown, we effectively cancel 
our futures in subordination to our creditors. In this respect neoliberal capital-
ism abolishes the possibility of a future worthy of the name, because all the 
debtor can look forward to is an endless present of repayment. Under these 
conditions the lonely debtor is subject to the horror of dehumanisation— he 
cannot change his situation, or live into the future, because his existence is 
determined by the endless reproduction of his present indebtedness. This 
programmatic condition confirms the debtor’s systematic stupidity in the god-
less machine of late capitalism, and it is precisely this situation that conjures 
the spectres of sociology, the spectres of the social relation, that insist upon 
the truth of general economics where we cannot escape our reliance on each 
other or our world— the humanised biosphere.
III  Spectro- Sociology and the Resistance to Social 
Analysis
While the refusal of the other is locked into liberal/neoliberal history, I believe 
that this vision of asociality is entirely unsustainable and that the phobic reaction 
to and rejection of the basic sociological truth that we find in the work of, for 
example, Gilbert Simondon, who wrote about trans- individualism, is what pro-
duces the procession of spectres that haunt contemporary capitalism with their 
complaints about injustice, misery, and injury (Combes, 2012). From the neoliberal 
perspective, there is no social relation, but only economic exchange that limits 
responsibility to contractual obligation, but the sociological truth the spectres 
reveal is that the human condition is to be responsible because the individual 
is founded on otherness in the present, born in the world made by the others 
of the past, and can only make a future on the basis of cooperation with other 
people who share the same vision of how the world might change. In this way, 
debt is irreducible, and this is essentially what Derrida (1994) explains in his 
Spectres of Marx— the spectre demands responsibility, and a recognition of indebt-
edness, that is horrific from the point of view of the neoliberal subject who 
learns that debt is somehow evil, but is in truth representative of the possibility 
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of a space of freedom beyond the capitalist injunction to live out a lonely life 
in suffocating proximity to others who are similarly phobic about interdepen-
dence. Against Nietzsche’s theory of debt, which he sets out in his On the 
Genealogy of Morals (2008), explaining that essential indebtedness is the philosophy 
of the weak, the sociological vision of debt that the spectre communicates car-
ries a message concerned with the necessity of humility born in the very real 
limitation of the self- identical individual in those others who sustain its existence. 
It is, of course, precisely this humility which is lost in contemporary global 
capitalism that individualises everybody, with the effect that it is possible to 
fortify Europe in the face of migrants on the run from destroyed lands and 
defend the necessity of severe austerity in the context of an economic system 
that supports exorbitant luxury.
When neoliberal ideology rejects the connection, or responsibility, between 
self and other, the spectre returns in order to insist upon the irreducibility of 
the social relation. This is why the spectre is perhaps the key figure of early 
21st- century sociology. In the wake of the end of history, and the globalisation 
of capitalism, the other is nowhere. In this situation there is no hope for self 
or other because there is no social situation open to change. As Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1997) note in their theory of ghosts, it is in these hopeless times 
when ghosts appear. In their view the spectre represents destroyed hope and 
in this respect keeps possibility alive post- mortem. According to Freud (2003c), 
the fear of ghosts, the fear of the dead who have not been able to pass over 
but remain in our world, is symbolic of the inability to internalise trauma. 
He thought that ghosts will continue to haunt the living until psychoanalysis 
works through the hard core of trauma which would allow the spectre to pass 
over to the other side. While we can read this therapeutic vision conservatively, 
so that spectres pass over and very little changes, it is also possible to take a 
more radical interpretation of what Laurence Rickels (2011) calls unmourning, 
or the inability to enable the ghost to leave the world of the living, and sug-
gest that the spectral symbol of the need to address injustice, misery, and 
despair will only leave the scene when its conditions have been met. From 
this point of view, the spectre becomes a figure of utopian possibility and 
potential transformation, which is exactly what the sociologist of haunting 
Avery Gordon (2008) explains in her Ghostly Matters. For Gordon the spectre 
represents the possibility of enchantment, the possibility of hope, in a godless, 
disenchanted world where hopelessness has become the norm.
In his Specters of Marx (1994), Derrida argues that the spectre represents a 
new atheological theology and that spiritless capitalism is fated to produce 
ghosts by virtue of the phantom objectivity of the commodity that fascinates 
the consumer. In this way Derrida shows how the pinnacle of late capitalist 
estrangement is characterised by the reflexive production of spectres. Against 
this neo- Gothic thesis one might claim that the hyper- visibility of our medi-
ated world screens out the possibility of haunting, but what the works of 
Jeffrey Sconce (2000), Laurence Rickels (2011), and Stefan Andriopoulos (2013) 
show is that media is, and has always been, the space of modern and 
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postmodern haunting. While there is a sense in which the postmodern theory 
of the ghostly concerns the production of a phantasmatic world where reality 
itself breaks down before universal simulation where ethics no longer make 
sense, my view is that the spectre of sociology has a very clear ethical, political 
function concerned with giving voice to the other who came before, must 
live in misery today, survive the catastrophe of the cancelled future, and cen-
trally demand that the neoliberal individual recognises his claims on the basis 
of a social relation which is absolutely irreducible. In this respect it may be 
possible to supplement Derrida’s (1994) reference to Hamlet’s spectre with 
the case of Dickens’ (2003) Jacob Marley and the ghosts of Christmas past, 
present, and future, who show the story’s famous capitalist miser, Ebenezer 
Scrooge, the horror of the destroyed lives of Bob Cratchit and Tiny Tim and 
force him to face up to his responsibility for their situation. While Scrooge 
rejects Christmas in the name of the love of money, Marley’s ghost confronts 
him with his own traumatic past and shows him his own miserable end in 
order to show him that the social relation is irreducible and that generosity 
and indebtedness are essential human attributes necessary for survival. Thus 
Marley shows Scrooge what happens when we lose these human qualities and 
abandon each other for money— we live and die in misery.
In much the same way that Dickens wrote about the failure of the spirit of 
generosity in his A Christmas Carol in 1843, which was coincidentally the same 
decade in which Marx and Engels published The Communist Manifesto, Derrida’s 
student and collaborator, Bernard Stiegler (2011, 2012, 2014) explores the failure 
of belief and spirit in contemporary capitalism and suggests that the postmodern, 
neoliberal, global economy has similarly transformed into a kind of hopeless, 
nihilistic machine for the production of profit. That is to say that while Dickens’ 
ghost emerges to critique Scrooge’s cruel and desperate vision of Victorian 
capitalism, Stiegler suggests that a similar spectralisation is necessary today in 
order to save postmodern society from economic destruction. Against Luc 
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2007), who suggested that the 1960s led to the 
emergence of a new individualistic spirit of capitalism which could provide 
people with hope in personal freedom and self- realisation, Stiegler suggests that 
this turn to what we might call hyper- individualism has led to the creation of 
the kind of miserable society Dickens imagines and Scrooge, Bob Cratchit, and 
Tiny Tim endure— the individual is everything and there is no room for gen-
erosity or a recognition of the sociality that makes people human. Indeed, there 
is no social space beyond the space of the miserable economic transaction. As 
a result, compassion is impossible, which Scrooge explains in his famous refusal 
of sympathy— ‘Are there no prisons? Are there no workhouses?’— and the other 
is simply left to perish. This is the misery of capitalism, which Dickens painted 
in the 1840s, Marx and Engels imagined in the same period, and Bernard Stiegler 
explains in his works on contemporary disbelief and discredit. After the period 
of Keynesian state management between the horrors of Victorian laissez- faire 
and its rebirth in the form of neoliberal economic governmentality, Stiegler 
(2012) shows how the horror remains the same and that we must return to the 
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question of fundamental human value once more. In this respect the message 
of the spectre of sociology, which reminds the individual of his irreducible 
responsibility for the other who must live and die in misery, is very similar to 
the message Marley’s ghost brought to Scrooge, who was confronted with 
destroyed lives and compelled to change his ways in order to produce a better 
world where responsibility, compassion, and sympathy form the basis of a socio-
logical ethic of care.
As a result it is possible to see that the utopianism of the spectre of sociol-
ogy revolves around a rejection of the restricted economics of neoliberal 
individualism in the name of a vision of social relations where human value 
trumps the right to private property. Given this vision, the future the spectre 
conjures contains the possibility of a form of globalisation for itself, rather than 
in itself, where an integrated, sociological world organised around human value, 
rationality, and a recognition of a communistic ethic where I am necessarily 
bound to the other supersedes the systemic stupidity of the godless theodicy 
of neoliberal capitalism. However, the life of the red- green utopian fantasy of 
the spectre, where there is a recognition of the irreducible interdependence 
of self, other, world, and earth, is absolutely reliant on sociology and its idea 
of the social relation that remains beyond the pale in neoliberal society where 
the individual is the primary unit and his interactions with others are reduc-
ible to base, instrumental, economic transactions. Thus the radical nature of 
sociology resides in its necessary resistance to this weak vision of the social, 
and its critical, utopian potential is founded upon its core claim that ensures 
its marginality in the neoliberal universe that cannot recognise social interac-
tion beyond economics. As a result sociology becomes a spectral form of 
knowledge concerned with the spectre of the social relation screened out by 
the hyper- rationality of neoliberal capitalism, where the individual is everything. 
While neoliberal ideology must oppose sociological truth because the ideas 
of irreducible relationality, trans- individualism, and absolute responsibility for 
others destroy the fantasy of the self- reliant, rugged individual and conjure 
the horror story of totalitarianism in its opposition to the unplanned society, 
from the sociological point of view, the militarised individualism of late capi-
talism suggests dystopia and catastrophe because there is no human future 
under conditions of systemic stupidity. These are the coordinates of the political 
struggle of the spectre of sociology, and the dystopian fantasy of the catastrophic 
future should not be dismissed in the name of realism, because the assumption 
of the worst opens up a space of utopian possibility simply because it becomes 
necessary to imagine change (Dupuy, 2014). Of course, neoliberal capitalism is 
complicit in the production of the vision of the late capitalist dystopia and 
the spectres that speak about the need for some other way, because its rejec-
tion of social responsibility condemns ever more people to live in poverty, 
misery, and despair.
Under these conditions the spectre of sociology is the hopeless hope of 
global capitalism to conjure the words of Walter Benjamin (2009), who wrote 
about the emergence of possibility in the ruins and rubble of the contemporary 
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through his exploration of German tragedy. Following Benjamin, my view is 
that the mission of sociology today should be to take care of the spectre, to 
nurture and love the spectre, to listen to its words, and embrace spookulation 
in the face of the neoliberal resistance to social analysis that insists upon hard, 
objective facts reducible to material presence. This is not the knowledge of 
the spectre, or the social relation of which the spectre speaks, which is why 
Freud’s (2001a) attempt to socialise psychoanalysis led him to write about 
telepathy. The irony of the truth of the irreducible social relation and the 
reality of the trans- individual that links self to other to world to earth is that 
it is entirely inaccessible to economic analyses that insist upon its reduction 
to the individual transaction, and better understood through theory- fiction or 
what we might call schizo- nomadic thought, able to account for the thickness 
of the self in history, the depth of its relationality in the present, and the extent 
of its possibility in the future to come. In this way I want to suggest that 
sociology must critically oppose the resistance to social analysis that emergences 
from the neoliberal fear of relationality. This condition, which reflects the 
sociological equivalent of Freud’s (2012) resistance to psychoanalysis, represents 
the defensive response to the trauma of estrangement that the miserable indi-
vidual cannot possibly recognise because his identity relies on the phobic 
exclusion of otherness. What I have sought to show above is that this refusal 
of otherness has a long history and is rooted in the emergence of modern, 
and particularly liberal, thought that takes in Hobbes, Locke, and eventually 
Adam Smith. This is why the refusal of the irreducibility of relationality, where 
the other is always an enemy or a friend one can simulate in the distance of 
social media, is so durable and difficult to oppose even in the face of hyper- 
visible inequality, injustice, and systemic violence.
Given the history of individualism, which has led to the emergence of a 
militarised, suspicious, antisocial form of identity where sympathy, compassion, 
and care are signs of weakness, there is a lot at stake in the neoliberal indi-
vidual’s resistance to the spectre of the fundamental social relation. In this 
situation sociology must develop a psycho- therapeutic sensitivity to the violence 
of its own message— from the neoliberal point of view, the spectre is a ghoul 
that haunts late capitalism and threatens the demise of the individual and 
sociology is a horror story that wants a return to the dystopian conditions of 
the Stalinist/Nazi past, where the abstract thing called society destroyed free-
dom. However, sociology is in truth a utopian mode of thought, because it 
teaches compassion, cooperation, and collective action in the name of a shared 
future. In defence of this utopianism, I believe that sociology must refuse the 
phobic identification of collectivity with the horrors of totalitarianism and 
carefully teach others to accept what they least want to recognise, the other 
who makes demands upon them which they cannot ignore and the world 
that limits them which they cannot live without. As sociologists, we should 
respond to students, whose socialisation means they know the neoliberal world 
and fear their responsibility for the other, with critical explorations of social 
structure. Although higher education has become a machine, organised to feed 
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students into the neoliberal workforce, which is deeply suspicious of sociologi-
cal truths, spectro- sociology can infiltrate this factory for the transformation 
of thought into information, and teach its occult knowledge of spectres of 
the past, present, and future to come (Freire, 1996). This is, in my view, the 
utopian task of sociology— conjuration of the spectre of the social relation 
that can emancipate the future from the ruins of the present. It is, finally, 
particularly appropriate that I set out this theory of spectro- sociology in Prague, 
neo- Gothic capital of 20th- century Europe, which, as Derek Sayer (2013) 
notes, is not a city where history always moves forward, but rather a space of 
hauntings, surreal manifestations, and utopian possibility.
Bibliography
Abraham, N. and Torok, M. (1994) The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis: Volume 
I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. (1997) Dialectic of the Enlightenment. London: Verso.
Andriopoulos, S. (2013) Ghostly Apparitions: German Idealism, the Gothic Novel, and Optical 
Media. New York: Zone Books.
Bataille, G. (1991) The Accursed Share: Volume I: Consumption. New York: Zone Books.
Baudrillard, J. (2012) The Ecstasy of Communication. New York: Semiotext(e).
Bauman, Z. (2000a) Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.
Bauman, Z. (2000b) The Individualized Society. Cambridge: Polity.
Benjamin, W. (1999) The Arcades Project. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Benjamin, W. (2009) The Origin of German Tragic Drama. London: Verso.
Bettelheim, B. (1972) The Empty Fortress: Infantile Autism and the Birth of the Self. New York: 
Free Press.
Boltanski, L. and Chiapello, E. (2007) The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso.
Combes, M. (2012) Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Derrida, J. (1994) Specters of Marx: State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New Inter-
national. London: Routledge.
Derrida, J. (1997) The Politics of Friendship. London: Verso.
Derrida, J. and Stiegler, B. (2002) Echographies of Television. Cambridge: Polity.
Dickens, C. (2003) A Christmas Carol and Other Christmas Writings. London: Penguin.
Dupuy, J.- P. (2014) Economy and the Future: A Crisis of Faith. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State 
University Press.
Durkheim, E. (2006) On Suicide. London: Penguin.
Foucault, M. (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979. Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave.
Freire, P. (1996) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. London: Penguin.
Freud, S. (2001a) ‘Psychoanalysis and Telepathy’ in The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud: Volume 18: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology, and Other Works. New York: 
Vintage. Pg. 177–195.
Freud, S. (2001b) ‘Repression’ in The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume 
XIV: ‘On the History of the Post Psychoanalytic Movement’, ‘Papers on Metapsychology’ and Other 
Works. New York: Vintage. Pg. 141–159.
Freud, S. (2003a) Beyond the Pleasure Principle: And Other Writings. London: Penguin.
Freud, S. (2003b) The Schreber Case. London: Penguin.
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   237 10-12-2016   8:17:47 PM
238 Conclusion
Freud, S. (2003c) The Uncanny. London: Penguin.
Freud, S. (2012) A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. Ware, Herts: Wordsworth.
Frosh, S. (2013) Hauntings: Psychoanalysis and Ghostly Transmissions. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
Gordon, A. (2008) Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Hayek, F. (2001) The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge.
Hobbes, T. (2008) Leviathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kafka, F. (2007) Metamorphosis and Other Stories. London: Penguin.
Lacan, J. (1997) The Psychoses: 1955–1956: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III. New York: 
W. W. Norton and Co.
Lacan, J. (2007) ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoana-
lytic Experience’ in his Ecrits. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Pg. 75–82.
Lasch, C. (1991) The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. 
New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
Lazzarato, M. (2012) The Making of the Indebted Man: Essay on the Neoliberal Condition. New 
York: Semiotext(e).
Levinas, E. (1999) Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Norwell, MA: Kluwer.
Locke, J. (2003) Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
Lyotard, J.- F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press.
Lyotard, J.- F. (1993) The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Cambridge: Polity.
Mandeville, B. (1989) The Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Publick Benefits. London: Penguin.
Marx, K. (1988) ‘Estranged Labour’ in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and 
the Communist Manifesto. New York: Prometheus Books. Pg. 69–85.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (2004) The Communist Manifesto. London: Penguin.
Nietzsche, F. (2008) On the Genealogy of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Neill, J. (1991) Plato’s Cave: Desire, Power, and the Specular Functions of the Media. Norwood, 
NJ: Ablex Publishing.
Popper, K. (2002) The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume 1: The Spell of Plato. London: 
Routledge.
Rickels, L. (2011) Aberrations of Mourning. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Sayer, D. (2013) Prague, Capital of the Twentieth Century: A Surrealist History. Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press.
Sconce, J. (2000) Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telegraphy to Television. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
Simmel, G. (1997) ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ in Frisby, D. and Featherstone, M. (Eds.) 
Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings. London: Sage. Pg. 174–187.
Smith, A. (1982) The Wealth of Nations: Books I- III. London: Penguin.
Smith, A. (1999) The Wealth of Nations: Books IV- V. London: Penguin.
Spencer, H. (2013) The Principles of Biology. Lenox, MA: Hard Press.
Stiegler, B. (2011) The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit: Volume I. 
Cambridge: Polity.
Stiegler, B. (2012) Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit: Volume 
II. Cambridge: Polity.
Stiegler, B. (2013) What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology. Cambridge: Polity.
Stiegler, B. (2014) The Lost Spirit of Capitalism: Disbelief and Discredit: Volume III. Cambridge: 
Polity.
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   238 10-12-2016   8:17:48 PM
Conclusion 239
Strauss, L. (1996) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Vogl, J. (2014) The Specter of Capital. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Weber, M. (2010) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Weisman, A. (2007) The World Without Us. London: Virgin.
Ž ižek, S. (2008) Violence. London: Profile.
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   239 10-12-2016   8:17:48 PM
15037-0096-FullBook.indd   240 10-12-2016   8:17:48 PM
